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announced at beginning

### Commander's Conference (Luncheon) 10 Feb 07

#### Change of MNF-I Mission/Evolution of the Situation:

- Modification of priorities
- Level of violence invalidates strategy, in particular sectarian violence after al Askari Mosque bombing
- Security is a prerequisite for the way ahead
- Transition still important, but must protect the population, particularly in Baghdad
- Maliki is our guy; time is right to move forward – both U.S. and Iraqi governments understand this is the last chance

#### Increase in MNF-I Forces:

- 5 BCTs, plus 4K Marines (must hold CENTCOM to this)
- Not about plus-up, but about how we are using the forces

... but still, quantity had a quality all its own

#### TTP for Population Security:

- Must position forces in the neighborhoods
- JSSs, combat outposts, patrol bases

Surv

find presence ... continue

#### Embrace Iraqi Units:

- Execute linked arms with Iraqi forces

under Casey planned/potential in SD topped approached SO

#### Unity of Effort with ISF:

- Co-locate HQs, exchange liaison officers, shared SA, etc.

any doubt... "lie" let Cav... base of ops

#### Information Operations:

- React to insurgent/terrorist propaganda
- Got Iraqis doing the right things in front of the camera

(CF lead... but still... Iraq: unity of effort... rel. of GOL (Maliki) # CF led ops

#### Escalation of Force:

- Don't let subordinate commanders modify the ROE
- Shape the situation so as not to put our soldiers in questionable situations
- MNC-1 modifying investigation policy

#### Importance of Continuity:

- Key leaders must remain for extended periods to maintain relationships with Iraqis
- Do not allow SA to drop off in transitions
- Intel analysis in particular have a hard time in transition; must keep experienced team in Iraq

#### Discussion:

- Must be able to manage relationships with Iraqis; Iraqis must lead when possible, but if we don't get a grip on the violence, then it doesn't matter who is in charge. Maliki understands this now

get grip on violence... then transition... look for opp... for IA lead... but...

not interested in BRAC 4 Iraq or consol. HQ (23)

a metric down R's interest

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secure + trans... de-emphasize trans.

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- Must control both Baghdad and the Baghdad belts; accelerants to violence in the capital originating outside the city
- Must continue to enhance/support TTs and coordinate their activities
- Maintain offensive mindset, use of systems to help target enemy (aviation/UAV link)
- Support outreach to tribes in al Anbar
- BCTs must embrace PRTs
- Look at embedding at the senior levels of the Iraqi government
- Creation of Rule of Law green zone in Rusafa
- GRD must get involved in oil, electricity
- Figure out right structure with AMB Tim Carney
- Must get refinery at Beiji working, protect pipelines from Kirkuk and to Baghdad
- Do not overly trumpet our successes; must temp down expectations with slow, incremental progress; levels of violence is key metric; will take months
- Must expand Iraqi prison capacity; current plan nowhere near adequate
- 1.4b has energized some Sunnis to support the GoI (they fear being run out of Iraq); must support al Anbar initiative
- Need to build up Iraqi capacity in non-security lines of operation
- Campaign plan is very good, but if you can't secure the population, you can't execute it
- Enemy senses a turning point and is ramping up the violence to counter our strategy; they are looking for another al Askari mosque to reignite the civil war
- Concern that metrics will crowd out deeper thinking and longer range goals
- Having said that, we cannot get away from looking at the level of violence as the key indicator of success
- Gated communities, battalion CPs in neighborhoods, use of ID cards/biometrics
- Continuity should include Iraqi army as well; cannot know neighborhoods if units rotate every 90 days
- Time may be ripe to drive a wedge between PM Maliki and JAM
- Tie jobs/employment with improved security; allow Iraqis in al Anbar to enlist to serve locally
- Must restrict damage from VBIEDs
- Reconciliation is key in the long run
- Need to ramp-up ministerial support teams
- Work with Embassy to craft UNSCR, then get Iraqi buy-in
- BCTs must own the TTs
- Anticipate increased Iraqi needs with expansion of ISF
- Expansion of Iraqi logistical capability proceeding very slowly; maintenance especially a weakness
- Continuity includes keeping units with their organic parent headquarters where it makes sense to do so
- Need to pull together an intel architecture for Iraq; big project, but must be done
- Four big transportation projects: Turkish LOC, Jordanian LOCs, port of Um Qasr, and rail capacity
- Too much capability in GRD not to bring it to bear, especially in oil, electricity sectors
- Encourage short-term embeds and facilitate their movement away from the IZ
- We will stand behind our soldiers and their decisions on the battlefield

Star

sim ... MND-N, -W (brief)

✓

mod. strategy

→

more explicit guidance on posture

affirmed →

(sim)

partnership ... BCTs in Iraq's affairs

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