MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides
Jun 07
UN Security Council Approves Hariri Tribunal

- (U) Security Council established a tribunal to prosecute suspects in assassination of Rafik Hariri, Lebanese PM
  - Hezbollah called tribunal a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, “an attack on its internal affairs”
  - Lebanon’s President Lahoud expressed skepticism, said he would support court if “fair and impartial”
  - Syria refuses to cooperate
    - President Assad stated no Syrian citizens will be handed over to UN
  - Tribunal established after failed attempts to get statutes constitutionally approved in Lebanon
  - Lebanon has until 10 June to establish own tribunal, UN decision will automatically enter into force
- (U) Lebanese gov’t accuses Syria of involvement in 14 Feb 2005 attacks in Beirut which killed Hariri and 22 others

(C//REL) Assessment: Tensions in Lebanon exacerbated by sectarian overtones; Syrian-backed opposition and Hezbollah represent Shi’a, while pro-Western government largely Sunni
JAM Targets Suspected Coalition Sympathizers

- Rogue JAM leader Abu Dura directed affiliates to torture Iraqi nationals suspected of cooperating with CF
  - LN accused of working with CF at BIAP was ordered to be tortured
- In Diwaniyah, two JAM members reportedly killed man suspected of working with CF
- Since these incidents, Muqtada al-Sadr has publicly ordered JAM not to attack ISF, Got, or fellow Iraqis

Assessment: Execution and torture typical response of JAM addressing operational security or perceived disloyalty. Sadr’s direction not to target fellow Iraqis likely will go largely overlooked. Expect JAM members to continue targeting those they suspect of collusion with CF.
AQI Propaganda: Redirecting Media

• AQI attempting to deflect media focus away from AQI actions by accusing other groups
  – Accused police and Islamic party in Fallujah of violating women and mosques, of corruption, despicable behavior, and harming Muslims; vowed revenge
  – Accused CF of bombing Ba’qubah Market, killing innocent Muslims
  – Adam Gadahn implied US forces were baby killers and war criminals

• Mocked CF capabilities
  – Claimed additional funding, troops will have no effect
  – Luis Atallah mocked failure to find kidnapped soldiers

Assessment: AQI media efforts focused on attempts to redirect negative media stories and accusations onto other groups. Efforts attempted to display AQI as good Muslims while demonizing opposing groups. Expect media campaign to continue, specifically against CF
Little Progress in EU-Iran Nuclear Talks

- (U) EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani met in Madrid Thursday
  - First talks since the latest UN deadline on the suspension of Iran’s nuclear program
  - Two primary points of contention: suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment, UN sanctions
    - “No fundamental breakthrough, but we made advances on some important issues.” - Solana
    - “Iran will use all legal and judicial means to realize its legitimate rights and will not halt nuclear activities.” - Larijani
  - Agreed to two tentative rounds of talks within next 14 days
    - Discussion within 1 week, face-to-face in 2 weeks
    - Will discuss ideas introduced during Thursday’s meeting, issues raised by the IAEA

(C//REL) Assessment: Breakthroughs in the impasse are unlikely
Threat Assessment:
Inter-Religious Council (IR-C) Reconciliation Conference

- IR-C Conference scheduled 11-13 June
  - Al-Rasheed Hotel on northern edge of IZ
  - Reconciliation Project
    - Attendees include Shi’a, Sunni, Christians
    - Intend to reduce sectarian violence

- Threat of attack on conference
  - No current threat reporting to suggest attack specifically targeting Al-Rasheed Hotel, conference, attendees
  - Current threat to CF, ISF, CIV in IZ remains high
  - Agenda of conference increases potential threat

Assessment: The Al-Rasheed Hotel remains a target for AIF. Successful attacks against the participants of the IR-C Conference have the potential to undo efforts at reconciliation and reignite sectarian violence, undermine ISF/CF security, and provide significant propaganda opportunities.
Sadr Sets Strategic Agenda

- Muqtada al-Sadr reportedly met with senior Sadrist leaders in late May to address important issues:
  - Combat CF and promote swift CF withdrawal
  - Strategy of peaceful resistance
  - Protect Trend leaders from raids, arrest
  - Consolidate organization’s efforts
  - Purge rogue Sadrist, JAM elements
  - Establish committees to handle internal issues
  - Resist conflicts with ISF
  - Increase partnership with provincial councils
  - Form charitable institution to assist IDPs

Assessment: Muqtada al-Sadr is likely laying out his strategic framework for OMS/JAM over the coming months. He expects senior cadre members to bring a focused effort to these issues with the primary objective of Coalition withdrawal.
Localized Opposition to AQI in Salah Ad Din

- **Salah Ad Din Rescue Council (SADRC)** formation announced
  - Mid May, Resistance groups and tribal leaders met to discuss details using the Anbar model
  - 24 May, Council formation announced on Sot al-Iraq TV, Sheikh Hamad al-Hassan named as chairman

- **Government support to SADRC** in question
  - Mid May, Salah Ad Din Deputy Governor Abdallah Jubarah reportedly supported the Salah Ad Din tribal resistance to AQI
  - Jubarah publicly opposed SADRC on Salah Ad Din TV 25 May

- **AQI views opposition as threat**
  - Murder & Intimidation campaign attacking families of tribal leaders
  - AQI reportedly bribing provincial leaders in order to undermine anti-AQI efforts

- **Early May, 1920 Revolution Brigade** aligned with Ansar al-Sunna to combat AQI in Salah Ad Din

**Assessment:** While preliminary, the efforts to establish SADRC are a positive step towards cooperation against AQI. However, lack of provincial and GoI support threaten to undermine viability of coalescing opposition.
Meeting of G8 Foreign Ministers
Before Summit

- (U) G8 FM s met in Potsdam, Germany a week before the 5-6 June summit
  - Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s FM s also present
  - Main topics to be discussed
    - Climate change
    - Violence in Darfur
    - Nuclear standoff with Iran
    - North Korea
- (U) G8 FM s announced they will support “further appropriate measures” if Iran fails to comply with the UN demands
  - Iran reiterated it would not suspend uranium enrichment

(C//REL) Assessment: Iranian defiance of international pressure unlikely soften. G8 summit focus on Iraq not expected
Bridge Attack in Salah Ad Din

- Explosion damages Sharijah bridge
  - Multiple IEDs rigged underneath
    - Failed to detonate all explosives
    - Bridge still passable to light vehicular traffic

- Refinement of bridge attack TTP
  - Majority of attacks in MND-N are placed IEDs
    - Attacks target bridges in remote areas
    - Attacks on guarded bridges employed VBIED/TBIEDs (MOSUL – 16 MAY)
  - Sharijah bridge attack employed placement

Assessment: AQI attempting to refine bridge attack methods in order to limit ISF/CF freedom of maneuver, disrupt civilian movement. Unit assesses AQI elements responsible are same individuals who conducted attack 30 May on planned IA patrol base known as North Castle accessible via Sharijah bridge
Sadrist Undermine Maliki Administration

- Prime Minister Maliki proposed candidates to replace ministry heads vacated by Sadrists
  - Sadr Trend legislators expected to reject Maliki’s candidates

- Sadr withdrew six ministry leaders in mid-Apr
  - Sadr publicly claimed the ministries were given to Maliki to serve the interest of the Iraqi people, regardless of political affiliation
  - Sadrist officials announced Maliki was given a free hand and full power to choose ministerial replacements regardless of religious sect or ethnicity

Assessment: Despite Sadr Trend claims to have allowed Prime Minister Maliki the freedom to chose unbiased professional candidates to fill vacated Sadrist ministries, Sadrist continually oppose Maliki’s candidates in an attempt to undermine the Gol, preserve Sadrist influence in ministries.
Iraq and Iran: Joint Oil Infrastructure Projects

- Iraq has agreed to an Iranian offer to build a pipeline to connect Iranian oil terminals and refineries to Iraq's Basra oilfields.
  - Pipeline will carry 200,000 barrels of Iraqi crude to Iran
  - Agreement was reached during a meeting between Iraq Minister of Oil Husayn al-Sharistani and the Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad
  - The GOI gave Iran preferential treatment because Iranian firms are willing to stay in Iraq
  - Form a joint committee to implement the project
  - Iran also invited to bid on contracts to build four new oil refineries in Iraq

Assessment: Proposed pipeline would provide Iraq with a third route for crude export, though uncertain timeline of the project will not affect short-term exports and revenue. Expect continued Iranian efforts to invest in Iraqi oil industry.
Planned Iranian-Brazilian Oil Venture

- (U) National Iranian Oil Company and Petrobras aim to finalize deal by summer
  - $2 billion foreign investment required to develop Iranian oil fields in Caspian Sea
  - Petrobras said in March they would be expanding overseas exploration activities this year
    - $5.6 billion set aside for international projects through 2011, $40 billion planned overall
  - Oil fields would be Iran’s first developed in Caspian Sea
  - Iran is second largest OPEC producer, but could fall in rankings due to lack of investment
  - Iran is seeking to attract foreign investors to increase cultivation of its oil and gas reserves

(C//REL) Assessment: Iran will continue efforts to attract foreign investment, as domestic capital is insufficient to sustain expansion of natural resource developments
Chlorine-Augmented SVBIED Attack vic FOB Warhorse

- Third chlorine attack to target CF
  - First chlorine attack targeting CF base
- Shift in geographic focus/targets
  - 4 of last 5 chlorine attacks occurred in Diyala, Salah ad Din
  - 10 of first 11 chlorine attacks occurred in Anbar Province
- Evolving TTP
  - Increased effectiveness
    - 4 of last 5 resulted in successful chlorine releases compared to 2 of first 5 attacks
    - Employing larger chlorine tanks
    - Standoff assessed to be deliberate, compared to earlier attacks with close proximity detonations
  - 3 June attack conducted as part of complex attack (9 rds IDF 1hr prior, F/C VBIED)

Assessment: Based on attack trends, expect continued AQI employment of chlorine VBIEDs in increasing complex attacks targeting CF in Diyala Province. While relatively ineffective as concerns lethality, AQI will continue to refine this TTP based on the perceived propaganda benefit.
Ongoing JAM Checkpoints in Baghdad

- JAM in Bayaa district reportedly set up three checkpoints to screen vehicles for Sunnis
  - Sunnis reportedly kidnapped, interrogated, executed
  - Source reports at least 25 kidnappings since 15 May
- JAM in Huriyah reportedly set up checkpoints as of Apr 07
  - JAM justified illegal checkpoints by claiming to protect a local market from VBIED attacks
    - Market reportedly targeted by recent VBIEDs
    - JAM actions supported by market vendors
  - Four checkpoints protect market using large air conditioning units to block road

Assessment: JAM imposes security measures where it perceives the government has failed to provide adequate security for Shi’a. Expect illegal checkpoints to continue as JAM attempts to portray itself as defender of Iraqi Shi’a and respond to AQI provocations
Ethno-Sectarian (E-S) Conflict

26 May – 01 June 2007

- 107 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 235 killed
    - 104 injured
- 98 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 177 killed
    - 52% of total casualties
    - 75% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 25 deaths

June 2007 Outlook

- 458 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,356 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 828 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Casualties decreased despite a slight increase in E-S attacks from last week, principally in Baghdad Province. Sectarian HP attacks in Baghdad continued to perpetuate E-S violence within mixed neighborhoods. Attacks across the provinces remain steady or have declined, especially in Ninewa Province where there have been no ethno-sectarian attacks in the past two weeks.
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths in Baghdad Security Districts

Assessment: Effective HP attacks in Rusafa and West Rashid caused over 50 deaths and will likely result in increased sectarian reprisal attacks from JAM. Reported incidents increased in East Rashid, likely due to increased CF presence during OP DRAGON FIRE EAST. Increased JAM activity in Rusafa (Sheikh Umar) attributed to reprisal attacks for 2 HP attacks in the same area. E-S activity in Mansour continued to be low as Sunni on Sunni violence remained the focus of AQI and other Sunni groups. Activity in Adhamiyah and New Baghdad may indicate continued JAM purging of Sunnis in majority Shi’a areas.
Seven Turkish Troops Killed in Attack

- (U) Raid killed 7 Turkish Soldiers at military outpost
  - Outpost located in Eastern Turkey city of Pulumur
  - Stolen vehicle drove through gate, attacked with grenades, automatic weapons
    - 1 attacker killed, 1 wounded but escaped
- (U) Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul asserted Turkey had “every right” to take action against the KGK (PKK)
  - Blamed PKK for suicide bombing in Ankara
  - Turkey blames Kurdish insurgents for 30,000 deaths since 1984
- (U) Kurdish media sources assert Turkish troops shelled area just inside northern Iraq Sunday

(C//REL) Assessment: Attack likely to fuel increased political, public calls for CBO targeting KGK.
AQL-Sunni Conflict in Ameriyah

- Tactical alliance of Sunni groups against al Qa’ida in Iraq
  - Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) and 1920 Revolution Brigade
    - Denied publicly by 1920 Rev Bde
    - Probably members of Mujahidin Army and Ansar al-Sunnah

- All involved groups continue to conduct and claim attacks against CF

- Alternate reporting indicates “Baghdad Patriots,” a group of locals organized to fight AQI is responsible for the recent fight

- Omar al Baghdadi, emir of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), called on ISI fighters to stay off streets; discouraged fighting with IAI

Assessment: Fighting likely inspired by AQI targeting of Sunnis and ideological fanaticism; represents maneuvering between Sunni groups for dominance. Groups likely to maintain cooperation while common threat/enemy exists; attacks from Ameriyah against CF/ISF probable if/when AQI eliminated. AQI will likely attempt to return when conditions allow.
Foreign Development of Syrian Natural Gas Industry

- (U) Syrian Ministry of Petroleum signed agreement with Shell for development of Syrian industry
- (U) Agreement includes:
  - Evaluation of undiscovered gas potential
  - Studies of gas production, transport, distribution
  - Research for gas-liquidation industrial capacity
  - Training program run by Shell for Syria
- (U) Syria ranks 47th in proven natural gas reserves, 43rd in production
- (U) Shell has 20-year history of work in Syria

(C//REL) Assessment: Shell unimpeded by US unilateral sanctions on Syria. Expect Syria to endeavor to sustain this longstanding relationship.
Reported JAM influence at Umm Qasr Port

- As of late May, MoT reportedly ordered MoI Customs Police (CP) out of Port Umm Qasr
  - MOI CP reportedly leaving in 2-3 weeks
  - MoT Facility Protection Services (FPS) to assume MOI CP duties
  - FPS heavily infiltrated with JAM, involved in smuggling

- JAM reportedly intimidates Umm Qasr Port Personnel
  - JAM allegedly co-opted Iraqi Port Authority Director General in April 2006 through intimidation
  - North Port manager reportedly resigned in late May, left country after JAM attempt to co-opt

Assessment: MoT is slowly becoming the gatekeeper for all of Iraq through its expanding influence over water and aviation ports. JAM’s penetration of MoT, FPS enable it to smuggle contraband, people, and weapons into or out of Iraq. Expect JAM to repeat similar methods of gradual encroachment as it seeks to gain control over other ports of entry.
Threat Update

- Plan to kill or capture CF in Risalah, West Rashid
  - Deliberate disclosure of IED location in order to draw CF into ambush
  - IEDs reportedly located at one of two locations:
    - Hay al l’Alam Stadium
    - Local soccer field near stadium

- CIOC issued Situational Awareness 06 1703 JUN 07

Assessment: Risalah is a known area of JAM presence. Plot is likely motivated by recent publicity of successful kidnappings.
Multiple VBIED Incidents in Kadhamiyah

- 2x VBIEDs detonated along Al Nuab St.
  - Targeted Shi’a civilians; at least 20 injured
    - IA engaged 1st VBIED; killing driver, VBIED detonated
    - Driver of 2nd VBIED was identified and killed in firefight by IA forces following detonation
- Additional VBIEDs found and cleared
  - IA located additional 2x VBIEDs
  - Located further south along Al Nuab St.
- Since JAN 07, 8 VBIED attacks in Kadhamiyah
  - Majority in Salaam neighborhood along Mansour border
  - First VBIED in Kadhimiya/Zahra’ neighborhoods since 22 OCT 06
- TTPs, methodology suggest AQI

**Assessment:** AQI most likely attempted to cause massive civilian casualties in multiple VBIED attacks, hoping to incite sectarian reprisals into Sunni neighborhoods in Mansour. This is likely intended to relieve pressure AQI is under in Baghdad by redirecting attacks toward sectarian targets.
JAM Recruiting Tactics in Huriyah, Baghdad

- JAM reportedly targeting the unemployed and poor, as of April
  - Promising jobs within MOD, MOI
    - Recruits told they are not required to complete established employment processes
  - JAM unable to provide jobs, many new members quit shortly after joining
- As of Mar, JAM reportedly used intimidation as recruiting tool
  - Locals threatened with torture if they did not join JAM
  - Leaders threatened to kill recruits trying to leave
  - JAM reportedly not well liked in Huriyah

Assessment: JAM’s inability to deliver on its promises, reliance on intimidation has hurt its image in Huriyah. These actions are inconsistent with Sadr’s aim to improve public opinion of OMS/JAM. Emphasis on government capacity to provide jobs could further contribute to JAM’s unfavorable public image in Huriyah.
OMS/JAM Leadership by Committee

- Muqtada al-Sadr met with high-level JAM members in Najaf to discuss reorganizing/reforming JAM
  - 10 member committee formed to implement proposed changes
    - Ahmad Shaybani participating in committee
    - Changes reported to start early Jun and include creating various councils
      - Military assistance supervisory
      - Administrative assistance supervisory
      - Public relations committee
      - Political councils

Assessment: These changes reflect a continued movement in OMS/JAM to return to a committee-based form of leadership. Sadr is likely attempting to reshape OMS/JAM by relying more on the organization’s senior leaders who favor the ideals of Muqtada’s father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr.
Threat Update

- High Profile attack in Haditha Area
  - AIF plan to use three VBIEDs in three different areas of the city
    - Identified as 3 x green Renault fuel tankers
    - Tankers to be filled with chlorine
  - VBIEDs to be used at unknown time in June at 3 Haditha checkpoints
  - Last VBIED attack in Haditha occurred 23 Jan
  - CIIOC issued situational awareness report 07 1616D JUN 07

Assessment: Location and method of attack suggest AQI is planning the attack. Based on recent propaganda statements, such an attack could be the beginning of an effort by AQI to regain the offensive in Anbar.
STBIEDs near Syrian Border in Ninawa

- 2x STBIEDs detonated east of Tall Kujik, VIC Rabiya
  - Targeted ISF:
    - 1x STBIED (dump truck) detonated near IP Station, possibly en route to COP Heider
    - 1x STBIED retreated from IP Station, redirected attack at IA base under construction 1.8 km east
    - 2x AIF KIA, 5x IP KIA, 5x LN killed, 14x IP WIA, 5x CIV (UK Cont) injured, 1x LN injured
- Most recent HP attack VIC Rabiya 29 April
  - VBIED targeted IA patrol near market
- TTP, methodology suggest AQI

**Assessment:** AQI most likely attempting to keep LOCs open for flow of supplies, FFs along facilitation route from Syria to Mosul. Attack is assessed as response to recent targeting of corruption at POE, intended to intimidate ISF.
JAM Trains in Assassination Techniques

- Reportedly trained 50 Diwaniyah JAM members in sniper tactics in
  - Training consists of urban sniping techniques
    - High angle shooting
    - Concealment techniques
  - Duration of training reportedly 3 months long

- Nasiriyah JAM reportedly training assassination team
  - 15-member team to target those who oppose JAM
  - Team members selected for their loyalty
  - Team departed for training 27 May, location UNK, duration of training expected to be 1 month
  - Team to operate in Nasiriyah, but may deploy across Iraq
Propaganda: Smoothing Troubled Waters

- 7 June, Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) described ceasefire with AQI as response to Gol, CF comments on Sunni fighting in Baghdad
- 6 June, IAI proclaimed cease-fire with AQI
  - Statement posted to official website
  - Spokesman gave telephone interview with al-Jazeera
- 4 June, IAI accused AQI of attacking IAI and Sunnis
- 30 May, ISI issued a statement analyzing US and Iranian policies in Iraq
  - Claimed US seeks to establish “allied secular gov’t that would fight Islam”
  - Claimed Iran seeks to have “rejectionist (Shi’a) control in Iraq”
  - Statement implied US and Iran have found a way to both have the gov’t they desire in Iraq by working together
- 26 May, ISI denied responsibility for actions against the people of Anbar

Assessment: Senior leadership of AQI and IAI seeking to portray themselves as unified in their opposition to CF presence in Iraq, downplay ongoing tensions between Sunni groups despite continued Baghdad fighting. Expect AQI to continue denying attacks on the Sunni populace. IAI likely to focus propaganda toward CF, Gol.
Iran Confirms Detention of Fourth Iranian-American

- (U) Iran confirmed Friday the detention of
  - is a founding board member of the University of California, Irvine, Center for Citizen Peace building
  - Detained last month
    - Never arrived at expected destination in Europe 13 May
  - Held on security related charges
- (U) 3 other Iranian-Americans are also detained
  - Charged with espionage and endangering Iran’s national security
- (U) President Bush demanded Iran “immediately and unconditionally” release the Iranian-Americans
  - Iran accused US of interfering in the country’s internal affairs

(C//REL) Assessment: Timing of acknowledgement likely Iranian attempt to sustain media coverage for propaganda purposes, implicitly pressure US concerning Irbil 5
Mosque Attacks Continue

- PBIED, STBIED detonated in Daquq, At Tamim
  - Targeted Shi’a Turkoman Mosque, civilians
    - STBIED detonated at mosque
    - PBIED detonated at nearby clinic simultaneously
  - Damage to mosque unknown
    - 18 civilians killed, 20 civilians injured

- Al Fattah Pasha Mosque destroyed in Baghdad
  - Sunni mosque destroyed in unknown explosion
    - 3rd mosque destroyed in as many weeks in West Rashid
    - Open sources claimed JAM occupied the Al Fattah Pasha
      and nearby Rahman Mosque as of early 6 JUN
      - JAM members reportedly flew banners above mosques

Assessment: AQI TTP of targeting mosques in sectarian attacks has spread to outlying provinces with yesterday’s attack in At Tamim; retaliatory attacks possible. Sectarian violence continues in West Rashid as most likely JAM elements destroyed Sunni mosque in Hayy Bayaa. Expect retaliatory mosque attacks in West Rashid as cycle of sectarian violence continues.
Iraqi Christians Reportedly to Honor Sadr

• Reportedly Christian families in New Baghdad plan to honor Sadr
  – JAM allegedly provided security for 50 Christians families after moving from East Rashid to New Baghdad
  – Christians were gathering in appreciation to thank Sadr for security, possibly on 14 Jun at an unspecified school

• Sadr expressed an Iraqi unity theme in his Kufa Mosque sermon on 25 May
  – Called for unity of all Iraqi citizens
  – Articulated his willingness to protect minorities, namely Christians, who have reportedly been targeted by AQI

Assessment: Sadr is actively pursuing a multi-faceted agenda to repair and reshape public perceptions of JAM. This event could serve as a vehicle to improve JAM’s image in New Baghdad while attempting to create perception JAM provides security for all targeted by AQI. Expect JAM to publicize such events.
Ba’athists Proposed New Political Front

- Senior New Ba’ath Party (NBP) member Fawzi al-Rawi is lobbying to establish a new, non-sectarian, Iraqi Political Front
  - Late May, the Front is aimed to replace the unrealized broad-based Constituent Conference (late 2006) to address Iraq’s situation
- Al-Rawi received positive feedback from prospective members of various organizations
  - Late May, positive feedback from individuals affiliated with the Muslim Ulama Council, National Constituent Conference, National Front, and other Iraqi Nationalists in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon

*Assessment:* Fawzi al-Rawi is likely driven to increase his personal stature as a prominent future figure in an attempt to shape the political landscape for the anticipated post-CF Iraq. However, he is unlikely to have the necessary influence to launch and sustain the new Front. More significant NBP figures are likely behind the scenes looking to establish a political caucus without Ba’athist taint.
Iran to Begin Gasoline Rationing

- (U) Rationing will be implemented 21 June
  - Smart card for each vehicle will limit amount
  - Concerns rationing could cause social discontent in Iran
  - Government hopes rationing will curb imports in light of UN sanctions for its nuclear program

- (U) Iran’s fuel price one of lowest in world
  - 11 cents per liter, 25% raise compared to last year, currently consumption unlimited

- (U) Iran lacks refining capacity to meet fuel consumption demand
  - Iran imports 30 million of the 70 million liters consumed per day
  - Last year spent $5.5 billion importing gasoline
    - Only willing to spend $2.5 billion this year

(C//REL) **Assessment:** Subsidy of gasoline unsustainable in long term, especially given limited refining capability and reliance on imports
AQI Continue Targeting ISF NW of Musayyib

- Complex attack targeted IA compound
  - STBIED detonated on OP2, followed by SAF
    - 10 IA KIA, 20 IA WIA, 3 IA UA
    - OP2 completely destroyed
    - Employed dump truck laden w/2000lbs of HME

- Previous HP attacks targeting ISF
- 27 MAY STBIED attack on 4/8 IA
  - STBIED detonated on CP 63
    - 2 IA KIA, 4 IA WIA; CP damaged, but intact
    - Employed blue 4 ton truck
  - 18 MAY SVBIED attack on IP CP 311
    - Detonated during vehicle search at CP
      - 3 IP KIA; SVBIED was White Prince Sedan

Assessment: AQI continue to employ suicide TBIED/VBIEDs against ISF positions along the Euphrates River NW of Musayyib. These attacks may indicate a possible migration of AQI elements from Anbar to MND-C AOR and are most likely attempts to intimidate ISF in order to regain freedom of maneuver.
JAM Directed to Curtail Operations

- Early June, JAM commander Jasim al-Hasnawi ordered Special Groups in parts of western Baghdad to halt operations
  - Hasnawi understood from JAM meeting with Muqtada al-Sadr to halt all Special Groups operations in the Huriya district

- Early June, JAM commander Ahmad al-Shaybani ordered Special Groups to cease activities in Karkh (likely referring to western Baghdad), Kut
  - Special Groups leader Akram al-Ka’bi challenged Shaybani’s authority to issue such an order
  - Ka’bi, Shaybani, Sadr planned to meet in Najaf for an important meeting with senior Sadr loyalists

Assessment: Sadr and Shaybani appear to be working in concert to bring JAM Special Groups under control while Special Groups leader Ka’bi is operating out of personal interest and contrary to Sadr’s aim of improving JAM’s image. Ka’bi is likely to be reprimanded for his disregard for Shaybani’s authority.
Southern Oil Union Workers' Strike

- Union officials have threatened to resume strike on 10 June if demands are not met

- Southern Oil Co. workers went on strike
  - On 4-5 June 2007, 600 oil workers went on strike for improved pay, and input into the Hydrocarbon Law
  - Two pipelines to Baghdad temporarily shut down

- Representative from the MoO and IA reportedly met with Union leaders
  - On 5 June, the MoO and Oil Pipeline Co Workers Union reached an unspecified agreement: all fuel shipments resumed

- Prime Minister Maliki ordered the arrest of four union leaders for “sabotaging the Iraq economy”
  - Arrests not conducted because of agreement

**Assessment:** Union actions were more symbolic than substantive. MoO will meet minimum possible demands to keep southern oil workers from disrupting pipeline operations. ISF will move on arrest warrants, if strike resumes
Threat Update

- AQI plans to attack LSA Anaconda with VBIED, chlorine-augmented VBIED
  - Kia Bus VBIED will attempt to breach perimeter
  - Tanker chlorine-augmented VBIED will attempt to detonate inside compound
  - Samarra Amir Talaal Abd (Al Aziz)
    Slayhim Al Bazi (aka Abu Tiba) reportedly coordinating attack
- Attack to occur after completion of local school exams
- Most recent chlorine-augmented VBIED attack against CF was VIC FOB Warhorse 3 Jun; 65 WIA (RTD within 24 hrs)
- CIO/C issued situational awareness report 10 1424D MAY 07

Assessment: AQI likely attempting to repeat perceived success of attack on FOB Warhorse. Past attack suggests a likely attempt to detonated the chlorine-augmented VBIED upwind of the FOB.
Intelligence Highlight

- SVBIED attacked CF CP on MSR Tampa
  - Detonated on CP 20A east of Iskandariyah
  - 3 CF KIA, 12 CF WIA, 1 LN TERP WIA
  - 1 x overpass bridge destroyed, laying on underpass blocking traffic along Tampa
  - 1 x radio relay station destroyed

- Reporting suggests AQI intend to shift targeting from civilians to CF, ISF
  - 9 JUN: STBIED attack against IA OP
    - STBIED detonated west of Iskandariyah
    - Since Mid-May, only 2 of 14 HP attacks have targeted civilians in MND-C AOR

Assessment: Likely AQI elements conducted 2 HP attacks within 24hrs in area surrounding Iskandariyah in possible attempt to preserve control in the area. Expect continued attacks in vicinity of Iskandariyah against smaller CF, ISF fixed positions
Sadrists Drafting New OMS Constitution

- In late May, OMS/JAM officials discussed forming a political committee to write a new constitution
- Shaykh Jasim AKA Abu Muhammad claimed to belong to a Sadrist committee charged with writing a constitution
  - As of early June, draft constitution reportedly to be sent to Sadr on 9 June
- Constitution intended to centralize offices and organizations
  - Improve JAM’s image among Iraqis
  - Possibly return JAM control to OMS, though status of future JAM military actions not specified

Assessment: Sadr and senior advisors see strategic value in a structured organization and are attempting a variety of efforts to reorganize internally, reshape Iraqi public opinion of OMS/JAM
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

02 June – 08 June 2007

- 127 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 250 killed
    - 95 injured
- 115 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 215 killed
  - 62% of total casualties
  - 86% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 31 deaths

June 2007 Outlook

- 481 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,439 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 842 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Attacks increased most notably in Diyala and Ninawa Provinces with a decrease in Baghdad Province. Baqubah area remains tenuous as JAM attempts to assert its presence in the majority Sunni area. After two weeks of no incidents, Ninawa Province had an increase in executions, specifically in Mosul. Expect a sustained increased level of executions in MND-N
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths (Districts)

Assessment: Incidents decreased in East Rashid as CF-ISF operations likely limited AIF freedom of maneuver. West Rashid remains tense as JAM attempts to regain influence in the area, while Sunni extremists use intimidation tactics to dissuade LN from supporting CF/ISF and JAM. Activity significantly decreased in Rusafa after the previous week of reprisals, while activity in Mansour increased as both Sunni groups and Shi’a contest fault line areas. Activity in Shaab and Ur (Adhamiyah) is attributed to JAM continued purging of Sunnis in majority Shi’a areas and Sunni on Shi’a violence in Hayy Adhamiya. The increase in Kadhamiya is likely JAM executions of Sunnis suspected of cooperating with extremist groups, AQI HP attack on local shops.
Iranian Envoy Meets with EU, Cancels

- (U) IAEA meeting scheduled for 11 June, cancelled last minute
  - Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA asserted Iran will continue enrichment activities and nuclear activities without pause
  - ElBaradei labeled Iran IAEA’s No. 1 nuclear proliferation concern by continuing to broaden its uranium enrichment campaign
  - Western diplomats reported pullout from talks forced by hardliner Ahmadinejad supporters
- (U) Top Iranian and EU aides to Larijani and Solana met 11 June as precursor to future talks
  - Both aides spoke in positive terms, but cautioned against expecting “miracles”

(C//REL) Assessment: Iran continues attempts to split international community in attempt to prevent consensus for increased sanctions
AQI Attempts to Shape Battlespace

- Baqubah Highway Bridge destroyed 11 June
  - Forces Shi’a civilians/JAM to travel through Sunni-controlled Old Baqubah
- Previous bridge attacks
  - 2 June: AQI attempted to destroy a bridge on ASR Cheyenne in Salah ad Din
    - Assessed as attempt to isolate ISF
  - Mosul: 16 May attacks on bridges
    - Assessed as attempt to divert prisoner transfer convoys onto ASR Santa Fe
- Current Threat reporting suggests AQI plan to target bridge south of Tikrit

Assessment: AQI strategy likely focused on tactical targeting of infrastructure in effort to shape local conditions. Increased media attention likely reinforcing AQI perception of success.
JAM Intends to Target IP Commander

- Abu Liqa commands IP Tactical Support Unit (TSU) in Nasiriayah
  - Refuses to submit to JAM intimidation
  - Purges JAM sympathizers within IP
  - Led 16 Apr counter offensive against JAM attacks after refusal to release prisoners
    - Took control of OMS office during attack
- JAM leaders seek to assassinate Liqa
  - Amarah JAM leader directed JAM in Nasiriayah not to interfere, as it was his mission
  - Aws al-Khafaji gave Nasiriayah JAM permission to assassinate Liqa

**Assessment:** JAM recognizes IP challenge to JAM dominance as threat in Nasiriayah; expect continued attempts to target ISF leaders who refuse to yield to JAM intimidation tactics and threaten to draw support from local populace away from JAM.
Three Month HP Trend in Baghdad

- HP Attacks in Baghdad Down
  - Trending downward in May
    - Remain within historical norms, but below long-term average of 9.5 HP attacks per week
  - Reduction likely due to Operation Fardh al-Qanoon
    - Disrupts facilitation efforts
    - Lengthens attack planning cycle
    - Key targets hardened
    - Persistent CF targeting of key leadership impacts operations
  - Trend possibly not permanent
    - Foreign fighter flow, suicide attacks remain in normal range
    - Networks will attempt to adapt to changed security situation
    - Cells regenerate after targeting

Assessment: The recent decline in HP attacks in Baghdad suggests positive effects of Fardh al-Qanoon. AQI networks will attempt to adapt to the changing security situation, regenerate following CF, ISF targeting.
Reaction to Samarra Mosque Bombing

- (U) Iran condemned the attack
  - Blamed “the occupiers” for fuelling violence
  - Threatened to halt its regional cooperation to stop Iraq’s spiraling violence
- (U) Arab League denounced attacks and called on Iraqi government to strengthen security measures
- (U) Jordan’s King Abdallah condemned the attacks saying the “hideous crime was an insult for all Muslims”
- (U) Hezbollah blamed the “US occupation”
  - “While we strongly condemn this criminal act, we view it as an act that serves the interest of the US occupation”
- (U) AMS denounced the crime, but holds the “occupation” and “influential sides” of Gol responsible

(C//REL) Assessment: Expect continued attempts to blame CF, Gol for mosque bombing from many regional governments and organizations with little focus on the actual attackers
Assessment: Preponderance of threat reporting indicates disparate JAM elements’ intent to attack CF in response to bombing of Golden Mosque. Limited reporting indicates possible retaliatory attacks against Sunnis.
Shi’a Reactions to Golden Mosque Bombing

- Sadr publicly urged restraint, called for three days of mourning and peaceful demonstrations
  - Sadr blamed CF, GOI, but avoided reference to Sunnis
- Sistani labeled act “takfiri,” urged restraint
- Sadrist walkout from CoR
- Peaceful protests already in Baghdad, Nasiriyah, Samarra
- Some JAM affiliates disregarded Sadr’s guidance for restraint
  - JAM elements targeting CF in Husaniyah
  - Press reports various attacks on Sunni mosques across Baghdad, unconfirmed operationally
- Grand Mosque (Sunni) in Iskandariyah bombed, minaret destroyed, likely in retaliation

Assessment: Expect most mainstream JAM to obey Sadr’s directives, though some elements will launch attacks against Sunni, CF targets. Expect Sadrists to publicly exploit perception of security failures in attempt to further erode public support for Gol.
Golden Mosque Bombing: AQI Perspective

- Almost certainly an AQI attack
  - Responsible for Feb 2006 attack
  - Ongoing intent to attack again

- Timing of attack likely driven by accessibility
  - Not tied to any known significant date
  - AQI attacks when it can, where it can
  - Key factor: Attacker access to the target

- AQI Intent
  - Spur Shi’a to attack Sunnis; drives Sunnis to AQI for protection
  - Divert attention from Sunni extremists vs. AQI fight
  - Garner significant media attention for propaganda
  - Demonstrate inability of GOI to protect a known target

Assessment: Curfew likely to hamper near-term AQI operations. Should Shi’a reprisal targeting of Sunnis occur, it could reinforce AQI’s ranks, cause the various Sunni extremist groups to band together for mutual protection
OMS, JAM Leaders Attempt to Police Ranks

- JAM commander Shaybani, OMS Public Relations Director Iqabi planned meeting 7 June with Sadr to discuss JAM members’ actions
  - Members allegedly securing contracts with government ministers on behalf of OMS without authorization
    - Iqabi wanted to punish the men
  - JAM military supervisory council took authority over situation
    - Iqabi and Shaybani unhappy with council’s answer
      - Planned to circumvent the council and meet with Sadr to inform him of the problem

(U) Ahmad al-Shaybani

Assessment: Senior OMS leaders continue efforts to improve OMS/JAM public image. Iqabi and Shaybani likely attempting to clarify C2 relationships following reorganization. Expect Shaybani to continue such efforts to reinforce discipline
Abu Dura Directs Attacks, Logistics in Iraq

- **Abu Dura angered by Golden Mosque attack**
  - Ordered associates to retaliate; gave instruction on executing rocket attacks
    - Affiliates reportedly conducted attacks on CF, IZ, civilians in Baghdad
    - Affiliates believed Sadr also ordered attacks, but only targeting CF
    - Some JAM leaders encouraged attacks against unspecified targets, likely CF

**Assessment:** Abu Dura continues to have strong influence in Iraq while located in Iran and remains capable of facilitating attacks through his JAM-affiliated network. He encouraged Abu Dura affiliates to conduct attacks in order to maintain plausible deniability on behalf of mainstream JAM, avoid contradicting Sadr.
Insurgent and Extremist Propaganda

- Sunni Resistance groups called on mujahidin to cease infighting
  - 1920’s Rev Bde denied fighting ISI in Ameriyah
  - Al-Rashidin Army issued call for unity to mujahidin

- ISI reached out to tribes, Baghdad mujahidin
  - Urged Iraqi tribal leaders to be patient in the face of “crusader campaign”
  - Offered gratitude to chiefs for support, allegiance
  - Warned of massive conspiracy to drive Sunnis from Baghdad
  - ISI commander issued “congratulations” to Baghdad mujahidin
    - Claimed more than 14 CF vehicles destroyed in week
    - Asserted CF, ISF casualties “many times more” than alleged CF reporting of 100
    - Exhorted Ameriyah fighters to hold their ground against CF

Assessment: ISI is attempting to use continued fracturing of Sunni Resistance C2 as a distraction from its own inability to control Sunni confrontations in Ameriyah, tribal opposition to ISI.
Sunni Mosques Attacked VIC Az Zubayr

• Recent attacks
  – 15 JUN SAF & RPG attack on Annas Ibn Mazi Mosque (Sunni)
    • Located NW of Az Zubayr
    • IA successfully defended mosque
  – 15 JUN mosque (Sunni) destroyed
  – 13 JUN SAF attack on mosque (Sunni) VIC Az Zubayr
• Likely JAM involvement in retaliatory attacks
  – Retribution for 13 JUN attack on Golden Mosque
  – Assessed as lower level leaders acting independently

Assessment: Expect continued targeting of Sunni mosques in retaliation for the Samarra attack despite Sadr’s public call for restraint.
OMS/JAM Initiate Strategic Planning

- Sadrists forming 10-man committee to determine religious and political missions of all OMS/JAM offices
  - Committee members thought to be Sadr’s closest confidants
- Salah al-’Ubaydi considered collaborating with Fadhila leader Ayatollah Muhammad al-Ya’qubi
  - Proposed working together to dominate municipal and provincial council elections
- New leadership for Baghdad JAM appointed
  - Jabar Hassan al-Musawi appointed Sadr City commander, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabiri named Musawi’s assistant
  - Muhammad Salih al-‘Aysawi named Military oversight leader in charge of training JAM
  - Sadr City divided into 4 zones; one JAM commander in each zone

Assessment: Sadr’s 10-man committee likely a strategic planning board to define internal structures and mechanism by which OMS/JAM will operate, which may streamline C2. Ubaydi seeking political partner to compete against main rival at provincial level, ISCI. JAM zoning in Sadr City likely intended to hold leaders accountable for smaller groups, gain greater control
Implications of Ameriyah Resistance to AQI

- Ameriyah remains key battle ground in Baghdad
  - First example of Sunni resistance to AQI inside Baghdad
  - Pressure from Shi’a militia encroachment, security operations and increasing AQI intimidation

- 1920 Rev Bde inaction motivated by doubt of GOI support
  - Strong presence in Ameriyah, but doubtful after GOI’s initial inactivity on Abu Ghraib initiative
  - Muthanna al-Dhari sought to mediate cease-fire

- Implications for other Baghdad suburbs
  - Ameriyah conflict unique in its genesis, but potential example to other areas
  - Public awareness of CF support undermined its legitimacy; discreet support from CF would provide plausible deniability allowing groups to retain credibility

Assessment: Sunni Resistance elements in Ameriyah likely motivated to proclaim ceasefire with AQI to reassess situation, prevent loss of credibility. Delayed GOI support to the Abu Ghraib Emergency Response Unit probably fostered doubt among resistance groups, increased motivation for ceasefire announcement. GOI movement on the issue will embolden Sunni community to oppose AQI
Threat Update

- High Profile attack in Ramadi
  - AIF plan to use chlorine-augmented VBIED in Ramadi
    - Target: recruiting station for IP, newly hired IP; assessed to be possibly FOB Blue Diamond
    - Tanker description: white with orange cab; blue stripe on front of vehicle
    - Vehicle VIC Thar Thar
  - Attack timing unknown
  - 6 x chlorine-augmented VBIED attacks VIC Ramadi; Last attack occurred 23 Jan
  - CIOC issued situational awareness report 16 0952D JUN 07

Assessment: Location, target, method of attack suggest AQI. Local ISF perceived as most dangerous threat to AQI freedom of maneuver. Expect continued efforts to intimidate local opposition to AQI through targeting of IP and recruits.
Intelligence Highlight

- 13-16 JUN IDF attacks against IZ
  - 4 of 6 attacks originated from W. Rashid
    - All 4 employed 107mm rockets
    - 3 POOs located in Bayaa, fourth assessed as also in W. Rashid
  - Reporting indicates JAM elements in Bayaa/Aamel area are conducting these attacks
    - Most likely JAM Special Groups
    - Targeting CF as part of retaliatory attack in response to Golden Mosque bombing
    - Shift to launch locations in W. Rashid
      - Possibly in response to Op Vigilant Guard
      - Bayaa area perceived by JAM as more permissive following rotation of predominantly-Kurdish IA units from neighborhood

**Assessment:** JAM Special Groups elements will continue to conduct IDF attacks from West Rashid while perceived as relatively permissive, less susceptible to counterfire
Sadr Calls for March to Samarra

- Sadr’s Najaf office issued a statement 16 Jun calling on all Iraqis to march to Samarra Golden Dome Mosque arriving 5 Jul
  - Condemned US, UK, Israel
  - Insinuated GoI had not defended the mosque
  - 5 Jul marks birthday of Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatimah al-Zahra
- Sadr considered it his duty to gather “believers” to defend holy places
  - Portrayed march as religious duty for public
- Mosque bombed 22 Feb 06, 13 Jun 07
  - Following both bombings, Sadr publicly called for calm, engaged in Sunni outreach, though unlike in 06, Sadr has not blamed “takfiris” in 07

Assessment: Sadr’s proposed march could accomplish diverse objectives including: draw public support to OMS/JAM, promote Sunni-Shi’a reconciliation, undermine government security, mask possible JAM concentration in Samarra. March will likely displace ISF in order to provide security along anticipated route for many marchers from Sadr’s base of power in Sadr City.
AQI Staging Operations in Rural Iraq

- AQI routinely relies on rural villages for safe-houses and recruiting
  - Examples include Lake Thar Thar region of Anbar; breadbasket of Diyala; recently in Bichigan, Salah ad Din

- In Bichigan, locals trying to rid village of AQI
  - Locals report increasing opposition to AQI in response to murder and intimidation tactics
  - Only five IPs reportedly in Bichigan
  - Nearest IP station approx 27km south in Duluiyah; poor roads reportedly inhibit response
  - Neighboring Albu Farraj currently providing funds, equipment
  - Reportedly open to Gol assistance

Assessment: AQI continues to rely on rural outposts as safe havens for staging attacks against CF, ISF. Gol support to localized ISF has potential to further restrict AQI freedom of movement and attack planning.
Intelligence Highlight

- 17 JUN complex attack on joint convoy
  - CF were transporting IP trainees from Siniyah to FOB Lion
  - Attack comprised of VBIED followed by SAF
    - 3x CF WIA; 3x IP WIA; 2x IP trainees KIA
    - 11x IP trainees WIA; 1 CIV killed, 1 CIV injured
- 17 of 27 HP attacks targeted ISF in MND-N in June 07
  - 15 of 17 targeted IP elements
- 5 of 8 HP attacks targeted ISF in MNF-W in June 07
  - All 5 targeted IP
- Threat reporting 16 Jun indicates AQI intent to target Ramadi IP recruiting station with chlorine-augmented VBIED

Assessment: Based on HP attack trends thus far in June, AQI in Northern and Western Iraq are focusing attacks on IP, likely attempting to prevent establishment of effective local security forces. Expect continued intimidation of local populace through such attacks in effort to deny support to GoI
JAM Leaders Discuss Policing Rogue Actors

• 12 Jun, Baghdad JAM commander Ibrahim al-Hilfi ordered arrest of likely Special Groups members for unauthorized attacks on CF.
  – Hilfi asked JAM Military Supervision Council head Fallah al-Shanati if he sanctioned Mustafa al-Bahadli’s JAM affiliates attacking CF in Baghdad.
  – Bahadli affiliates: Wisam Khawajah and brother ‘Ala Khawajah, likely Special Groups members.
  – Shanati denied giving permission for attacks.
  – Hilfi prepared to support attacks on CF outside Baghdad, but ordered affiliates’ arrest based on Shanati’s reply.
• 7 Jun, JAM and OMS leaders, Military Supervision Council working to rein in JAM members negotiating contracts without prior approval.

Assessment: Khawajah brothers’ arrest likely reflection of continuing efforts to assert control, rein in rogue elements, indicating Sadr’s directives and restructuring are beginning to be effective. Expect senior-level efforts to purge JAM to be hindered by continued lower-level members’ ties to rogue militants.
09 June – 15 June 2007

- 89 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 125 killed
    - 9 injured
- 77 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 124 killed
  - 93% of total casualties
  - 99% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 18 deaths

June 2007 Outlook

- 457 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,159 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 755 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Following initial spike in activity the day of the 2007 Samarra Mosque bombing, incidents across Iraq decreased by 50% each of the following two days, largely driven by the Baghdad curfew combined with Friday prayers. This trend contrasts with the days following the 2006 Samarra Bombing, when activity sharply increased and remained above the pre-bombing daily average.
**Ethno-Sectarian Deaths (Baghdad Districts)**

**Baghdad District Incidents 02 JUN 07 – 08 JUN 07**
- 72 Sectarian Incidents
  - 105 Total Killed
  - 66 Execution Incidents
  - 100 Total killed

**Baghdad District Incidents 09 JUN 07 – 15 JUN 07**
- 47 Sectarian Incidents
  - 51 Total Killed
  - 42 Execution Incidents
  - 50 Total killed

**Assessment:** Significant decrease in sectarian violence likely a result of calls for calm following Samarra Mosque bombing coupled with the curfew; attacks directed primarily against CF rather than civilians with first instance of two consecutive days without any sectarian deaths reported in the districts (15, 16 Jun) since before first Samarra bombing in Feb 06, suggesting widespread willingness to heed leaders’ directives. Pre-bombing activity across the districts likely JAM consolidation, reprisal attacks between both Sunni and Shi’a elements in contested faultline areas. Expect some increase in ethno-sectarian incidents with curfew lifted 17 Jun, end of three-day mourning period.
Threat Update

- JAM intends to kidnap 7x CF or IA
  - Retaliation for detention of known JAM commander
  - Mustaq Abu Kamas currently held at Camp Echo
  - Captured soldiers to be bartered in prisoner exchange
  - CIOC issued situational awareness report 18 1311D JUN 07

Assessment: Kidnapping likely to be conducted by Special Groups. Operation would most likely consist of IED-initiated complex attack on convoy followed by abduction of troops after convoy has stopped, or abduction of IA at checkpoint
Threat Update

- AQI planning SVBIED attacks in Baghdad
  - Abu Ghraib based AQI cell, likely Abu Ghazwan network, preparing 2x SVBIED
  - Targets:
    - Shi’a market in Kadhamiyah
    - IZ CP, specifically eastern or southern
  - Timing: next 5 days
  - CIOC issued situational awareness report 18 0747D JUN 07

Assessment: Despite emerging attacks and threat reporting of other, less-hardened targets, expect continued efforts to target IZ and market places due to strategic significance, propaganda value, potential to incite sectarian reprisals
Intelligence Highlight

- Targeting of civilians with VBIEDs near gas stations
  - 18 June, 3 VBIEDs detonated in W. Rashid
    - 5 civilians killed, 26 civilians injured
    - All were remote detonated
    - 2 placed near gas station
    - 1 placed 100m south of gas station
  - Threat reporting indicates AQI targeting of gas stations
    - VBIEDs to be placed intentionally at gas stations
      - VIC of Bayaa, Aamel and Saydiyah (W. Rashid)
      - Intent to target large groups of civilians

Assessment: With increased security at traditional targets such as open markets, AQI intends to cause mass casualties by attacking groups of civilians at fuel stations. Expect HP attacks to continue targeting gas stations in Baghdad with intent to cause mass casualties, especially among Shi’Îa civilians
AQI Bridge Strategy

- No Iraq-wide "Bridge Plan" identified
  - Bridge attacks another AQI tool, similar to VBIEDs, assassinations, chlorine
  - Successful attacks result in proliferation of tactic with evolving methods from VBIEDs to IEDs near bridge supports

- Likely differing objectives for attacks
  - In north and periphery of Baghdad to disrupt JAM, CF movement, cut LOCs
  - Used as diversionary tactic in Mosul
  - To divide Baghdad, cut off Shi’ a from in east and Shi’ a support zones in south
  - Several attacks VIC bridges assessed as targeting CF, ISF

- Attacks generate anti-AQI sentiment
  - Restricts commerce, movement, flow of medical aid
  - Most bridge attacks negatively impact both Sunni and Shi’a

Assessment: Bridge target selection localized, based on tactical situation and target access; specific targets not directed by AQI senior leadership. Successful bridge attacks support AQI strategic aims to discredit CF, Gol; however, destruction of infrastructure negatively impacts daily lives of local Sunnis, eroding AQI support.
UNHCR Reports Refugee Numbers Highest in Five Years

- (U) World refugee population grew in 2006 by 14% to almost 10 million
  - Growth attributed primarily to the crisis in Iraq
  - Iraq the second largest group under UNHCR mandate with 1.5 million refugees
  - Another 2 million Iraqis estimated as displaced within Iraq’s borders
- (U) Iraqis rank first in asylum claims for 2006 while total numbers declined worldwide
  - Iraqi asylum applications to industrialized countries rose 77% in 2006 to 22,000, though still less than half the peak in 2002 prior to OIF
  - Sweden No. 1 destination for Iraqis seeking asylum with 9,000 applications

(C//REL) Assessment: Expect an increase in the flow of Iraqi refugees in the coming weeks following conclusion of academic year, as families with more educated members are also those likely to have sufficient means to flee
Intelligence Highlight

- Targeting of Shi’a civilians at Ghai Lhani Mosque (Shi’a)
  - 19 June, STBIED detonated in Rusafa
    - 50 civilians killed, 125 civilians injured
    - STBIED filled with propane tanks detonated on curb outside mosque following midday prayers
  - Continuing intent to target civilian concentrations
    - Previous HP attacks in area have targeted mass civilian gatherings
      - Mosque 28 May
      - Bus depot near market 18 Apr
    - Attempting to incite sectarian violence through casualties, damage to mosque

Assessment: Expect some JAM elements to conduct reprisal attacks against Sunni targets, possibly Sunni mosques and civilians, following yesterday’s HP attack in Rusafa. AQI will continue attempts to incite sectarian violence with attacks against civilian concentrations, including those at Shi’a mosques, in order to discredit CF, ISF.
Turkish National Security Council (TNSC)

- (U) TNSC meeting today to consider counter-terrorism options:
  - Cross Border Operations (CBO)
  - Buffer Zone into Iraq
  - Turkish Security Zones
  - Martial law
- (U) Turkish Political Context
  - Elections
    - Parliamentary - 22 Jul
    - Presidential – autumn 2007, date TBD
  - Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish General Staff (TGS) relations
    - Neither wants responsibility for, or political repercussions of, high-risk CBO decision
    - PM Erdogan made press statements to encourage public confidence in AKP
    - TGS posturing in attempt to portray AKP as weak on terrorism

(S//REL) Assessment: CBO unlikely due to proximity of elections, AKP desire to maintain status quo, and effects on international relations. Expect small-scale artillery attacks to continue, with Turkish media amplifying effects. Turkish rhetoric designed to pressure GoI, CF to take action against Kongra Gel (PKK)
Iran to Continue Discussions with IAEA and EU

- (U) Ali Larijani to meet with IAEA Director ElBaradei in Vienna 22 June
  - Tehran portrays meeting as focused on “strengthening of cooperation between IAEA and Iran”
  - Iranian position on enrichment unchanged
- (U) Larijani to meet with EU’s Javier Solana in Lisbon 23 June
  - Iranian Parliamentarian believes third round of talks demonstrates previous negotiations have been successful
  - Previous meetings described as positive, despite lack of specific outcomes

(C//REL) Assessment: Iran continues efforts to split international community in attempt to prevent consensus for increased sanctions. Progress from upcoming meetings unlikely.
• Foreign Fig attack on Pa
  – Reported sniper fire
  – 5 Saudi, 2
  – Separate r Mosq cl VBIED att
• Prior Golde
  – 13 JUN 07 assessed as AQI
  – 22 FEB 06 AQI claimed responsibility
• CIOC issued Situational Awareness 20 1556D JUN 07

Assessment: AQI has capability to coordinate attacks against PB Olson, Golden Mosque with objective of impeding response to the mosque. Expect continued attempts to attack Golden Mosque and other targets perceived as likely to reignite sectarian violence, demonstrate CF, Gol inability to provide security
Reactions to Clashes in Amarah

- PM Maliki reportedly authorized attacks on OMS, forbade reconciliatory actions, likely such as ceasefire, with JAM in Amarah until JAM withdrew

- Sadrist CoR member Hasan al-Rubai angry some Sadrists wanted to blame Gol for CF operations in Amarah

- Special Groups logisitcian Abu Dharr and associates headed to likely Amarah as of 16 June

- JAM commander Ahmad Shaybani believes CF will conduct operations on 20-21 June in Diwaniyah similar to Amarah
  - Reportedly information came from associate working with CF
  - Shaybani waiting on orders from OMS leadership

Assessment: Sadrists likely to characterize CF, Gol operations as attacks on Iraqi civilians and rally public behind OMS/JAM for protection. Expect potential ceasefires to be short lived as OMS/JAM conflicts with competing Shi’a groups unlikely to decrease
Continuing Independence of Southern JAM

- Diwaniyah JAM commanded by Kifah al-Gharayti
  - Deliberate decision to ignore Sadr’s orders
  - Reliant on 1.4b for weapons, training
  - Revenue generated through organized crime
  - Subordinates loyal to Gharayti

- Nasiriya OMS/JAM led by Aws al-Khafaji
  - Despite seniority in national OMS, Khafaji’s fighting with ISF inconsistent with Sadr’s directives
  - Attacks and cease-fires driven by local considerations, not broader OMS ideology
  - Public distancing from 1.4b likely contrary to actual local situation

- Basrah JAM managed by committee, commander not yet replaced
  - Financial strength through organized crime
  - Reliant on 1.4b for logistics, training

Assessment: Units nominally loyal to Sadr, but reinterpret or ignore guidance to pursue locally driven agendas contrary to emerging OMS vision for JAM. Despite forming new oversight committees, Sadr will encounter extreme difficulty reasserting control over key southern cities, as JAM units continue to respond to local influences, enabled by 1.4b and/or criminally generated revenue
Intelligence Highlight

- TBIED, likely suicide, in Sulayman Bak, south of Tuz
  - Targeted Mayor’s compound, likely for cooperation with CF
  - 12x CIV killed, 53x CIV injured, 1x ISF WIA, 1x suspected AIF detained
- Majority of attacks in area targeting CF, ISF
  - 11 of 13 since Feb 07 targeted CF/ISF
- TTP suggests AQI responsible
  - 08 Jun 07 HP attack north of Tuz
  - STBIED, PBIEID VIC Daquq targeted CIV

Assessment: AQI likely conducted attack in order to discredit successes of OP PHANTOM THUNDER. Targeting of civilians suggests AQI attempt to intimidate locals in order to establish control of the area, including LOC along ASR Cheyenne. Expect an increase in attacks near Tuz following recent completion of OP BRONCO RIPPER, as AQI perceives control of area as vital link to elements in Northern Iraq
Responses to Fighting In Nasiriyah

- JAM commander Ahmad al-Shaybani sought media coverage
  - Intended to portray JAM defending public against CF attacks, not fighting TSU
- 16 June, Nasiriyah Tactical Support Unit (TSU) leader Abu Liqa arrested unidentified JAM, sparking series of attacks/counter-attacks
  - JAM members allegedly reinforced from Basrah, Diwaniyah
- Lull in fighting reported late 19 June
- Previous reporting indicated JAM intent to assassinate Abu Liqa

**Assessment:** Lull in fighting unlikely to hold due to Abu Liqa’s willingness to confront JAM because of efforts to undermine provincial security. JAM likely using pause as means to rearm, regroup. Increased CF activity could cause JAM to concentrate forces in Nasiriyah, decreasing presence in surrounding areas
Insurgent and Extremist Propaganda

- Insurgents responding to CF actions; not focusing on attack claims
  - IAI claims occupier, followers creating rift between mujahidin, attempting to confuse Iraqi populace
  - ISI asserts General Petraeus is amid “psychological crisis,” lying to media
  - ISI denies CF surge is occurring; alleges increase only in number of vehicles with fewer soldiers in each

- Insurgent leaders calling for self-restraint following Samarra bombing, deflecting blame toward non-Sunnis
  - IAI, New Ba’ath Party, and Hamas-Iraq blame CF and
  - ISI claims Gol, cooperating in conspiracy against Sunnis
  - Mujahidin Army accuses Gol of minarets’ destruction

Assessment: Shift from offensive to responsive propaganda suggests AQI concern with CF IO, loss of popular support. Insurgent groups attempting to deflect criticism arising from Samarra mosque attack through attempt to convince population of CF, GOI,
Iranian Negotiations: Compromise or Concealment?

- (U) Ali Larijani meeting with IAEA Director ElBaradei in Vienna 22 June considered "satisfying," demonstrating "good progress"
  - Larijani to provide answers on past nuclear activities to IAEA within next few months – offer conditional based on end of UNSC involvement
  - ElBaradei labeled meeting as "quite satisfactory" but reported no breakthrough in the core dispute
- (U) Iranian Interior Ministry denies IRNA press reporting
  - IRNA quoted Interior Minister Pourmodhammadi as saying Iran had "100 Kg" of enriched uranium materials in storage
  - Iranian MoI Public Relations denies IRNA reporting, claims amounts and numbers never given

(C//REL) Assessment: Unlikely this round of negotiations will persuade Iran to cooperate with the international community. Iran will likely continue to conceal details of program from IAEA, UN in order to continue uranium enrichment
Threat Update

- Continued reporting of planned complex attack in Mosul
  - Targets: IA, IP stations; electricity stations
  - Timing: 20-26 JUN, specifically in middle of night; originally planned for 12-20 JUN
  - Method: VBIED, IDF, RPG, SAF
- Attack reportedly modeled on 16 MAY 07 complex attacks
  - Multiple VBIED, SAF, IDF, bridge attacks
- Multiple previous threats targeting IP stations
- CIIOC issued Situational Awareness 22 1725D JUN 07

Assessment: Reporting, TTPs, target methodology indicates AAS, AQI planned attack, though delay in planning suggests continuing leadership difficulties following recent targeting. Expect continued attempt to sustain HP attacks in MND-N, specifically targeting ISF. Mosul retains strategic importance as AQI LOC from Syria.
JAM Struggles with Insubordination, Likely Special Groups

- As of mid-June JAM, Special Groups members disobeying new commander’s orders following arrest of Ibrahim al-Hilfi
  - Members placed IEDs in Sadr City after commander denied granting approval
    - Members claimed to have permission from JAM’s Military Supervisory Council head Fallah al-Shanati
    - Shanati denied giving authorization
- Previous reporting indicates Shanati’s contradictory directives to JAM
  - Denied approving 12 June anti-CF attacks from inside Baghdad
  - Directed JAM to attack CF in Baghdad 13 June

Assessment: Inexperienced Baghdad JAM leaders coupled with inconsistent enforcement of Sadr’s direction contributing to JAM disloyalty. Expect lower-level JAM elements, especially Special Groups, to continue attacks against CF in Baghdad residential areas, disobey Sadr’s orders in absence of trusted, experienced leaders and clear command hierarchy
MYA and Al-Duri Reach Out in Anbar

- New Ba’ath Party (NBP) Reaches Out to Hamas-Iraq (HI)
  - NBP leader Muhammad Yunis Ahmad provides good-faith money for Hamas-Iraq recruiting efforts
  - Overtures for joint anti-CF attacks after AQI expelled
  - Hamas-Iraq increasing recruiting effort; claims will be sole provider of security for Sunnis when CF depart

- Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri’s ties to Iraqi Scholars Movement
  - Iraqi Scholars Movement est. in Ramadi by Abd al-Latif Hamim, known insurgency financier

Assessment: Former regime leaders likely emboldened by improving security situation in Anbar. MYA and al-Duri will likely reach out to resistance groups in attempt to expand influence as part of strategic goal of regaining political stature within Iraq. Though efforts will continue, expect NBP, HI to have limited recruitment success in Anbar, due to lack of public support, perception of little difference between HI, AQI
Sadr’s Information Offensive

- 25 May: MAS reappeared following return from Iran, criticized GoI shortcomings in providing basic services
- 02 Jun: JAM paraded GoI ministerial vehicles through Sadr City
- 09 Jun: MAS pledged to “disown” any JAM harming innocent Iraqi civilians
- 13 Jun: Aws al-Khafaji interview with Al-Malaf Press, claimed CF interrogators stated GoI is expected to fall
- 13-14 Jun: MAS blamed CF, GoI for Samarra mosque bombing; Sadrist bloc suspended parliamentary participation
- 05 Jul: Planned march to Samarra, Sunnis invited “with open arms”
  - If security is successful, Sadr will take credit
  - If attack occurs, MAS will blame CF, GoI for inability to protect Iraqi people

Assessment: Expect further attempts to portray GoI as unstable, in contrast to purported growing legitimacy, popularity of Sadrist Trend. Sadr’s risk taking with civilians’ safety through march to Samarra vulnerable to IO exploitation
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

16 June – 22 June 2007

- 78 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 187 killed
    - 150 injured

- 71 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 132 killed
  - 39% of total casualties
  - 71% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 19 deaths

June 2007 Outlook

- 423 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,177 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 682 projected execution deaths

**Assessment:** Incidents in Baghdad, Diyala, Basrah provinces decreased last week after initial reactions to Samarra bombing subsided. Total casualties increased due to attack on Shi’a civilians at Ghai’lani Mosque in Baghdad, only sectarian HP attack last week. HP attacks remain focused on infrastructure, ISF; HP sectarian attacks at lowest level since Fardh al-Qanoon began
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths (Baghdad Districts)

Baghdad District Incidents 09 JUN 07 – 15 JUN 07

- 49 Sectarian Incidents
- 52 Total Killed
- 43 Execution Incidents
- 51 Total Killed

Assessment: Sectarian incidents remained low across Baghdad; majority of activity occurring in West Rashid, Adhamiyah. AQI continues efforts to incite sectarian violence in Adhamiyah with fliers promoting attacks on workers of safe neighborhood project. JAM continues pressure in Saydiyah to purge West Rashid of remaining Sunnis. Expect sectarian violence to remain at lower levels in coming week as JAM elements prepare for march to Samarra, AQI elements remain under pressure from CF, ISF operations.

Baghdad District Incidents 16 JUN 07 – 22 JUN 07

- 49 Sectarian Incidents
- 130 Total Killed
- 47 Execution Incidents
- 75 Total Killed
Iran: Break in Stalemate or More of the Same?

- (U) Ali Larijani met with EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana 23 June
  - Larijani: New UN sanctions could end talks with EU
- (U) Unpublicized meeting between Larijani and IAEA Director ElBaradei in Vienna 24 June
  - Iran invited IAEA to send inspection team to Tehran
  - Larijani suggested 120 days to respond to IAEA
  - Solana rejected proposition, countered “Weeks – and not very many”

(//REL) Assessment: Iran feels mounting pressure from looming increased UNSC sanctions; attempting to prolong process while encouraging perception of progress in order to delay sanctions
Attack on Tribal Reconciliation Meeting in Baghdad

- Suicide Attack at Mansour Hotel
  - SVVEST detonated in lobby targeting tribal leaders, reconciliation meeting occurred 24 June
  - 10x CIV killed, 11x CIV injured
  - Dead include:
    - Sheikh Fassal Rakan Nejrus al-Gaoud (Sunni, former Anbar Governor, former Dep. MoA)
    - Sheikh Tariq al-Assafi (Sunni, Deputy Director of SAI)
    - Abdul Azizi al-Fahdawi (Sunni, possibly Sheikh)
    - Khamis abd al-Kareem (Sunni, possibly Sheikh)
    - Hussain al-Sha’alan (Shi’a, possibly Sheikh, NOT CoR)
    - LTG Aziz al-Yasiry (Shi’a, Head of Democratic Party)
    - Rahim al-Maliki (producer, anchor al-Iraqiya TV)

- Targeting, methodology indicate AQI
  - Ongoing efforts to intimidate Sunni tribes in former safe havens of Anbar, disrupt reconciliation

Assessment: Expect emboldened Sunni tribal resolve to rid Anbar of AQI; coercion possibly more effective in mixed provinces. Attack will result in reconciliation leaders’ heightened personal security measures; future meetings will likely be impeded by emissaries’ reluctance to travel
Kurdish AQI Network Increasing Attacks

- Kurdish AQI network targeting KRG, ISF in MND-N
- Assessed attack activity:
  - 21 June Sulayman Bak (S)TBIED targeting mayor’s compound
  - 8 June Daquq STBIED, PBIED targeting mosque, clinic
  - 13 May Makhmur STBIED targeting KDP building
  - Claimed 9 May Irbil STBIED targeting Mol building
  - Ongoing border attacks against ISF

Assessment: Objective remains destabilization of KRG. AQI likely encouraging network to sustain attacks, increase tempo; allows AQI leadership to focus local assets elsewhere. Expect continued HP attacks, skirmishes with Iraqi border posts in attempt to ensure AQI freedom of maneuver from...
Iran to Launch English-Language Satellite Channel

(U) 24-hour Press TV news channel will “break the global media stranglehold of Western outlets, show the other side of the story”

- Broadcasting to begin 2 July
- 26 correspondents around the globe
- Programming: news every half hour, talk shows, documentaries

(U) Mohammad Sarafrad, VP of Iran's state broadcast company asserts main goal is to present “an alternative view”

- U.S. government used the 9/11 terrorist attacks to “legitimize is invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq”
- “Western media has been trying to distort the news about the Muslim world”
- Iranian “English-language news channel to counteract the lies of the Western media”

(UNCLASSIFIED)

(C//REL) Assessment: Expect Iran to employ Press TV for targeting of Western audiences in attempt to portray other English-language media as propaganda
PRC Iraqi Debt Forgiveness, Reconstruction Aid

- PRC offers near-total debt forgiveness
  - $8B Chinese debt 11% of total Iraqi foreign debt
  - $1.2B Saddam-era oil exploration contract revived

- Chinese motivation – oil and emerging Iraq markets
  - Iraq has third-largest proven oil reserves
  - Iraqi officials aim to triple production by 2015
  - Package to include training in economics, electrical power, diplomacy, management

- PRC state-owned oil companies low risk aversion
  - PRC history of high-risk oil ventures (i.e. Sudan)
  - Chinese companies have expressed readiness to participate in oil industry reconstruction

Assessment: PRC offer of foreign debt forgiveness, aid package signals substantial commitment to Iraqi economy, restoration of oil production. Stake in oil development likely to prompt PRC to take increased interest in stabilization of Iraqi security situation to protect investment
Possible Threat to Iraqi Civilians During Asia Cup Final

• Attacks likely during or after Asian Cup Final on 29 July
  – First ever Asia Cup final for Iraq
  – Soccer is Iraq’s national sport
• Expected large crowds provide AQI opportunity to conduct mass casualty attack
• Possible threats include SAF, VBIED and cover of celebratory fire to target and kill civilians
• Attacks on 25 July after Semi-Finals Match:
  – Two VBIED attacks targeting Fans, 50x Civ killed
  – Celebratory gunfire, 1x Civ killed, 17 wounded

Assessment: Considering event’s significance, regardless of game’s outcome, effective attack would likely receive wide-spread domestic, international media attention. Any attack likely to incite further popular resentment against GOI, CF.
Sadrists Intend to Isolate ISCI, Da’wa

- Sadrists reportedly desire to renew UIA without ISCI, Da’wa
  - Response to grouping of ISCI, Da’wa, Kurds
  - Proposed “Sadrist” UIA will reportedly retain same principles
    - Focus on Arab identity, rejecting sectarianism
    - No indications of orders from Sadr for political maneuvering
- Sadrists returned to parliament 14 July
  - “Gol has met our demands”
  - Statement followed meeting with Kurdish leaders in Sulaymaniyah
  - No indications of approval from Sadr

**Assessment:** Sadrists possibly have begun taking political action without guidance from Saad. Desire to transform UIA likely attempt to politically separate ISCI, Da’wa from Kurds, strengthen Sadrist ties with Kurds, other parties, and Marja’iyah, specifically Sistani.
1920 Revolution Brigade Fight Against AQI Intensifying

- 1920 Rev Bde incidents of conflict against AQI have spread, intensified
  - Fighting between groups now reported in Anbar, Diyala, Salah Ad Din provinces

- Unclear if 1920 Rev Bde attacks on ISF, CF have correspondingly decreased
  - Reporting suggests elements of 1920 Rev Bde now focusing efforts on AQI

Assessment: AQI’s continual lack of regard for Sunni civilian casualties, on-going murder and intimidation campaign against opposition has further alienated 1920 Rev Bde, Sunni community. 1920 Rev Bde appears to be transitioning efforts against AQI in campaign likely to intensify.
U.N. Inspection Teams in Middle East

- (U) U.N. ends Iraq weapons monitoring
  - UNSC resolution to terminate UNMOVIC approved Friday by 14-0 vote
  - Russia abstained, no “clear answers to the existence of weapons of mass destruction”
  - (U) Clears path for transfer of unallocated oil-for-food funds to Iraq’s Development Fund, estimated at $60M

- (U) IAEA inspectors set to travel to Iran in coming weeks
  - Outcome of last week’s meeting between Larijani and ElBaradei
  - Two-month timeline for negotiating new plan to “resolving outstanding issues”
  - Tehran disputed “inspection” role of IAEA delegation

(C//REL) Assessment: Expect international community to continue to view inspection regimes as valuable to diplomatic nonproliferation efforts
Mass Grave SW of Amiriyah, Anbar

- 35-40 LN corpses found in 10 grave sites
  - Informant alleged Amiriyah, Ferris IP had killed 25-50 Falluja IP, led CF to grave site
  - 16 corpses PID as members of Albu Issa Tribe
  - CF estimate bodies on site approx. 4 days

Assessment: Albu Issa Tribe known to oppose AQI. Likely AQI murder and intimidation campaign in response to lack of tribal support.
March Anti-Sadr Marches Postponed, Possibly Cancelled

(U) Sadr representatives Shaykh As'ad al-Nasiri, Shaykh Salah al-Ubaydi announced on 29 June Sadr's decision to postpone or cancel 5 July march

- Primary reason given was alleged Gol announcement stating it was unable to secure march route
- Cited multiple requests by various political parties to postpone or cancel the march
- Framed decision as beneficial to all Iraqis
- Left open possibility of march on later, unspecified date

(S//REL) Sadr debated decision for several days with close aides

(S//REL) JAM commander Ahmad al-Shaybani upset by decision

(S//REL) Assessment: Cancellation allows Sadr to criticize Gol for being unable to provide timely security. Mitigates personal risk and prevents JAM elements from being drawn into sectarian fighting should AQI attack while in Sunni areas. Leaves opportunity for attempt to embarrass Gol, if unable to provide security for future march. Expect continued efforts to portray Sadr as benevolent nationalist
New Group, Same Name: al-Jaysh al-Islami

- 1920 Rev Bde and Ansar al-Sunna reportedly merged efforts to combat AQI under name “al-Jaysh al-Islami”
  - New al-Jaysh al-Islami reportedly supported by local Iraqi population
  - Newest element by this name reported in Muqdadiyah, Diyala

- Previously, Jaysh al-Islami, Jaysh Muhammad, Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Rev Bde, and Jaysh al-Mujahidin allegedly agreed to unite under the name Jaysh al-Islam in Anbar
  - Group reportedly formed to combat AQI within Anbar province, likely followed by CF, upon elimination of AQI threat
  - Group opposed AQI due to belief AQI was responsible for sectarian violence, murder of innocent civilians
  - Formed under the leadership of Sheikh ‘Abdallah al-Janabi

**Assessment:** Unlikely new organization in Muqdadiyah is an element of the pre-existing Jaysh al-Islam organization in Anbar. Although both groups proclaim an anti-AQI stance, emergent group is likely localized, using recognized name in effort to strengthen credibility, reputation.