Reconciliation and the Abu Ghuraib ISF

Problem Statement: How do we re-organize the ISF in Abu Ghuraib to support reconciliation?
Introduction

- **Purpose**
  - Present the Command Group with developed courses of action for re-organizing the Abu Ghuraib ISF IOT support reconciliation

- **Decision**
  - Approve COA

- **Staff**
  - Develop and Publish FRAGOs as appropriate
Situation

Sunni insurgent leaders in Abu Ghuraib are willing to continue working with CF/ISF towards reconciliation, but require concessions. They see 3/6 IA and the commander, BG Nassir, as too aggressive in targeting Sunnis. As a prerequisite to future talks, the situation could be rectified by moving all or portions of 3/6 IA out of Abu Ghuraib, moving BG Nassir out of his leadership position, or a combination.
### Analysis

#### Facts
- Sunni rejectionists working with CF believe 3/6 IA is too aggressive in targeting Sunnis.
- BG Nassir must leave Abu Ghuraib one way or another.
- BG Nassir is well connected and well liked within the ISF.
- 3/6 IA has been in AB since MAR06.
- 2/3/6 IA is perceived as the most 'aggressive' BN in Abu Ghuraib.
- 2/2/1 NP operates on RTE Tampa in MND-C's OE.
- 3/2 IA is due to arrive at FOB Constitution on 8JUN07.

#### Assumptions
- A change in Abu Ghuraib will demonstrate that the GoI is willing to make changes IOT further reconciliation.
- If there are no ISF changes in Abu Ghuraib, Sunni participation in reconciliation will wane.
- 3/6 IA will not leave FOB Constitution.
- 2/2/1 NP should be replaced on RTE Tampa if they relocate.

#### Constraints
- 3/2 IA is planned to move into FOB Constitution in JUN07.
- With 3/2 IA in FOB Constitution, there is room for 1000 more PAX.

#### Risks
- Loss of 15 months continuity if 3/6 IA units leave Abu Ghuraib.
### PFD and APR TRA DATA

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PED</th>
<th>LDG ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>LDG LOYALTY</th>
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### Leadership Assessment

#### E1: 3/6 IA BDE

**Commander Name:** BG NASSIR AHMED GANAM AL OGAITY  
**Religion:** SUNNI

#### E2: Competence

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<th>Task</th>
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<td>Provides clear guidance to his officers</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Ensures units member are properly cared</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

**Review:** The MTT has not observed any corruption.

#### E3: Influence

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<td>Coordinates with adjacent commanders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintains professional relationship with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains professionalism with other units</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is respected by member of the unit</td>
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<td>Supports H/L chain of command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tolerates mistakes in AO</td>
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</table>

**Review:** There is no existence of any mistakes in AO.

#### E4: Overall

- **Not Effective**
- **Slightly**
- **Relatively Effective**
- **Effective**
Courses of Action

- COA1: 3/6 IA replaces 2-1 NP in Rashid West and 2-1 NP assumes Abu Ghuraib

- COA2: 2/3/6 IA replaces 2-2-1 NP on RTE Tampa and 2-2-1 NP moves to Abu Ghuraib*

- COA3: 3/2 IA replaces 3/6 IA in Abu Ghuraib in June when 3/2 IA (-) arrives at FOB Constitution

- COA 4: 4/1 IA replaces 3/6 IA in Abu Ghuraib

* Requires BG Nassir to be promoted and/or transferred out of 3/6 IA
COA1

- 3/6 IA and 2/1 NP swap OE, to include responsibility for RTE Tampa south of VBC
- 3/6 IA and 2/1 NP remain where they are currently based

Advantages:
- Problem unit removed from Abu Ghuraib in its entirety
- No basing re-alignment
- Maintains unit integrity and CoC
- Adds ~400 jundis to West Rashid

Disadvantages:
- Units will not be based in their OE
- Increased transit to and from FOB
- West Rashid will have 2 x IA BDEs and only 1 x NP BN
- 4th different unit in West Rashid in as many months
COA2

- 2/3/6 IA and 2/2/1 NP swap OE
- 2/3/6 IA based in West Rashid and 2/2/1 NP based in Abu Ghuraib
- BG Nassir promoted and/or transferred out of 3/6 IA

Advantages:
- Largest problem BN removed from Abu Ghuraib
- Minimal basing re-alignment (1xBN)
- Maintains continuity in Abu Ghuraib and West Rashid minus 1xBN

Disadvantages:
- May not appease Sunnis in Abu Ghuraib
- Requires BG Nassir to leave 3/6 IA
- Does not maintain unit integrity or CoC
COA3

- 3/2 IA arrives 8 JUN 07 to replace 1/2 IA in West Rashid, and will be based with 3/6 IA in FOB Constitution
- 3/6 IA replaces 1/2 IA in West Rashid
- 3/2 IA replaces 3/6 IA in Abu Ghuraib

Advantages:
- Problem unit removed from Abu Ghuraib in its entirety
- No basing re-alignment
- Maintains unit integrity and CoC

Disadvantages:
- 3/6 IA will not be based in their OE
- Increased transit for 3/6 IA to and from FOB
- 4th different unit in West Rashid in as many months
- No full BDE HQ in Abu Ghuraib
- ~500 less jundis in Abu Ghuraib
COA3

- 4/1 IA replaces 3/6 IA in Abu Ghuraib
- 3/6 IA replaces 1/2 IA in West Rashid
- 3/2 IA replaces 4/1 IA in Rusafa

Advantages:
- Problem unit removed from Abu Ghuraib in its entirety
- 4/1 IA moves closer to its parent unit west of Baghdad
- Maintains unit integrity and CoC

Disadvantages:
- 3/6 IA will not be based in their OE
- Increased transit for 3/6 IA to and from FOB
- 3/2 IA will not have its full BDE HQ
- ~800 less jundi in Abu Ghuraib
### Course of Action Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Problem Unit Removed</th>
<th>Basing Aligned</th>
<th>Operational Environment Continuity</th>
<th>Maintains current force strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/6 IA and 2/1 NP full swap</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/6 IA and 2/1 NP 1xBN swap and BG Nassir transferred</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/6 IA and 4/1 IA full swap</td>
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<td>+</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- + Yes, meets criteria
- 0 Developing
- - No, does not meet criteria
Recommendation

- 2/3/6 IA and 2/2/1 NP swap OE
- 2/3/6 IA based in West Rashid and 2/2/1 NP based in Abu Ghurair
- BG Nassir promoted and/or transferred out of 3/6 IA

Advantages:
- Largest problem BN removed
  from Abu Ghurair
- Minimal basing re-alignment
  (1xBN)
- Maintains continuity in Abu
  Ghurair and West Rashid
  moves 1xBN

Disadvantages:
- May not appease Sunnis in Abu
  Ghurair
- Requires BG Nassir to leave 3/6 IA
- Does not maintain unit integrity or
  CoC
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Problem Statement: How do we re-organize the ISF in Abu Ghuraib to support reconciliation?

The overall classification of this briefing is SECRET/REL to USA, MEFI.

Approved by: ICD 02

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As of: 12 May 08

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