



Reconciliation and the Abu Ghuraib ISF

Problem Statement: How do we re-organize the ISF in
Abu Ghuraib to support reconciliation?

The overall classification of this briefing is ~~SECRET//REL to USA, MCFI~~

~~Approved by: 1CB G2~~

~~Classified by: Multiple Sources~~

~~Reason: EO 12958 (as amended) 1.4(a), (c) and (d)~~

~~Declassify on: 20170510~~

As of: 16 May 07

ACTO: b 3), b 6)

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Introduction

- **Purpose**
 - Present the Command Group with developed courses of action for re-organizing the Abu Ghuraib ISF IOT support reconciliation
- **Decision**
 - Approve COA
- **Staff**
 - Develop and Publish FRAGOs as appropriate

SECRET//REL USA, MCRN247549

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~~SECRET//REL U.S.A.; MCFWID-1706-10~~

Situation



Sunni insurgent leaders in Abu Ghuraib are willing to continue working with CF/ISF towards reconciliation, but require concessions. They see 3/6 IA and the commander, BG Nassir, as too aggressive in targeting Sunnis. As a prerequisite to future talks, the situation could be rectified by moving all or portions of 3/6 IA out of Abu Ghuraib, moving BG Nassir out of his leadership position, or a combination.

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 SECRET//REL-USA, MOP//2643548 Analysis 	
Facts • Sunni rejectionists working with CF believe 3/6 IA is too aggressive in targeting Sunnis • BG Nassir must leave Abu Ghuraib one way or another • BG Nassir is well connected and well liked within the ISF • 3/6 IA has been in AB since MAR06 • 2/3/6 IA is perceived as the most 'aggressive' BN in Abu Ghuraib • 2/2/1 NP operates on RTE Tampa in MND-C's OE • 3/2 IA is due to arrive at FOB Constitution on 8JUN07	Assumptions • A change in Abu Ghuraib will demonstrate that the GoI is willing to make changes IOT further reconciliation • If there are no ISF changes in Abu Ghuraib, Sunni participation in reconciliation will wane • 3/6 IA will not leave FOB Constitution • 2/2/1 NP should be replaced on RTE Tampa if they relocate
Constraints • 3/2 IA is planned to move into FOB Constitution in JUN07. • With 3/2 IA in FOB Constitution, there is room for 1000 more PAX.	Risks • Loss of 15 months continuity if 3/6 IA units leave Abu Ghuraib

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PFD and APR TRA DATA



UNIT	PFD	LDR ASSESSMENT	RELIGION	CDR LOYALTY	RELIABILITY	OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
2-1 NP	345		SHIA			
1-2-1 NP	390		SHIA			
2-2-1 NP	395		SHIA			
3-2-1 NP	249		SUNNI			
	1379					
3-6 IA	416		SUNNI			
1-3-6 IA	645		SUNNI			
2-3-6 IA	415		SUNNI			
3-3-6 IA	659		SHIA			
	2135					
4-1 IA	300		SUNNIA-KURDS			
1-4-1 IA	344		SUNNIA-KURDS			
2-4-1 IA	556		SUNNIA-KURDS			
	1200					

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~~SECRET//REL USA, MCFM241064~~ **LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT**

UNIT NAME	COMMANDER'S NAME	Religion
E1. 3/6 IA BDE	BG NASSIR AHMED GANAM AL OGALIY	SUNNI

E2. **COMPETENCE**

TASK	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
PROVIDES GUIDANCE	●	Provides clear guidance to his officers and soldiers
ENSURES UNIT'S MEMBERS ARE PROPERLY CARED FOR	●	Cares about his soldiers, their food, and their living conditions
CAPABLE OF MAKING TOUGH DECISIONS	●	Is capable of making tough decisions, without hesitation
REPORTS CORRUPTION	●	Yes, and has thrown soldiers in jail for soliciting bribes
IS NOT CORRUPT	●	The MITT has not observed any corruption

E3. **INFLUENCE**

TASK	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
COORDINATES WITH ADJACENT COMMANDERS	●	Coordinates well with adjacent CF, IA, and IP
MAINTAINS PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ISF	●	Maintain professional relations with ISF personnel, including IA, however, there is no relationship with the IP in his AO
IS RESPECTED BY MEMBERS OF THE UNIT	●	He is definitely respected by the IA officers and soldiers
SUPPORTS HIS CHAIN OF COMMAND	●	He supports his chain of command, and notifies his division commander when the prime minister or MOD calls him directly
Tolerates militia in AO	●	There is no evidence of any militia in the IS (IA) AO

E4. **OVERALL** ●

E5. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FOR SUBORDINATE LEADERS & KEY STAFF PERSONNEL:

Bn Xq (b)(3), (b)(6) continues to work diligently in his role that is given him

S3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Used more as an observer than a planner, competent in their role

S4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Understands his job, competent. Constantly keeping ahead of personnel issues


S2, b. 3, b. 6 Competent officer, hindered by personnel shortages and turn over, BF consumes most of his time

S4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Competent logistics officer. Working diligently to correct the logistical issues within the BDE. CLV shortages are a primary concern

S6 b. 6

	NOT EFFECTIVE
	SLIGHTLY
	MODERATELY EFFECTIVE
	EFFECTIVE

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



Courses of Action





- COA1: 3/6 IA replaces 2-1 NP in Rashid West and 2-1 NP assumes Abu Ghuraib
- COA2: 2/3/6 IA replaces 2-2-1 NP on RTE Tampa and 2-2-1 NP moves to Abu Ghuraib*
- COA3: 3/2 IA replaces 3/6 IA in Abu Ghuraib in June when 3/2 IA (-) arrives at FOB Constitution
- COA 4: 4/1 IA replaces 3/6 IA in Abu Ghuraib

* Requires BG Nassir to be promoted and/or transferred out of 3/6 IA









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Course of Action Comparison



COA \ Criteria	Problem Unit Removed	Basing Aligned	Operational Environment Continuity	Maintains current force strength
3/6 IA and 2/1 NP <i>full swap</i>	+	-	-	○ - 500 more units in West status
★ 3/6 IA and 2/1 NP <i>1x BN swap and BG Nassir transferred</i>	○	+	+	+
3/6 IA and 3/2 IA <i>swap</i>	+	+	○	○ - 500 more units in West status
3/6 IA and 4/1 IA <i>full swap</i>	+	+	○	○ - 500 more units in West status

+ Yes, meets criteria
 ○ Developing
 - No, does not meet criteria

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Recommendation



2/3/6 IA replaces 2-2-1 NP on RTE Tampa and 2-2-1 NP moves to Abu Ghuraib

- 2/3/6 IA and 2/2/1 NP swap OE
- 2/3/6 IA based in West Rashid and 2/2/1 NP based in Abu Ghuraib
- BG Nassir promoted and/or transferred out of 3/6 IA

Advantages:

- Largest problem BN removed from Abu Ghuraib
- Minimal basing re-alignment (1xBN)
- Maintains continuity in Abu Ghuraib and West Rashid minus 1xBN

Disadvantages:

- May not appease Sunnis in Abu Ghuraib
- Requires BG Nassir to leave 3/6 IA
- Does not maintain unit integrity or CoC

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AS OF: 10 March 07

ACTO (b)(3), (b)(6)

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