(U) SUBJECT: Transferring Security Responsibility

1. **(S//REL) Purpose.** Provide a response to the National Security Team Meeting memo by [redacted] dated 2 Dec 06

2. **(S//REL) Background information:**
   - It is important to appreciate enduring strategic success will only be achieved by Iraqis.
   - The fundamental conflict is about the division of political and economic power among ethnic and sectarian groups.
   - Sectarian violence is the greatest threat to accomplishing our strategic objectives.
     - Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and illegal armed groups the greatest sectarian violence accelerants.
   - The tolerance of both the GoI and Iraqi people for Coalition authority is diminishing.
   - The GoI has already expressed its desire to assume accelerated security responsibilities.
   - Accelerated transition supports GoI wish to acquire security responsibilities and provides impetus to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capability, but it comes at increased risk.
   - Increased risk can, and will be, mitigated with embedded transition teams, Coalition Force (CF) security forces in overwatch, and a reconciliation program initiated.
   - At the end of 2007, the Coalition will be in a transformed relationship; having adapted to its new role in support of the GoI with the UNSCR mandate complete.

3. **(S//REL) Discussion / Analysis:**
   a. **(S//REL) Assessment of likely consequences of transferring the mission of quelling sectarian violence to the Iraqis.**
      
      (1). **(S//REL) Likely outcomes:**
      - Embedded transition teams will raise key capabilities that enable the Iraqi Government (GoI) to assume the security mission.
      - The move of CF to overwatch decreases our footprint and presence.
      - There is the potential for a reduction in violence due to Iraqi-led solutions being developed.
      - There is a very real potential for increased violence in the short term as ISF are moved into positions of security responsibility calling for heretofore unpracticed operations.
      - Withdrawal of CF from the cities creates greater reliance on, and capacity development of, Iraqi C2 and logistics systems.
      - Adversary groups (both Shi'a and Sunni) will attempt to gain information operations advantage both during and immediately following transition.

      (2). **(S//REL) Risk:**
      - Sectarian loyalties override professional obligations; while most likely in some Iraqi Police (IP) units, a concern in Iraqi Army (IA) units as well.
      - Increased intimidation and murders leading to neighborhood sectarian clearing programs.
      - Open and extended confrontation with irreconcilable illegal armed groups by both ISF and CF.
      - Shi'a provocation drives Sunni moderates to AQI.
      - Inadequate GoI logistics prevents ISF deployments potentially creating dependency on CF.
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b. (S//REL) Proposals of how we might mitigate the risks of the approach.

- Resource requirements specified by the High Level Working Group for Acceleration
- Implement plan to accelerate transition of security responsibility.
  - Enhance ISF by increased number and size of robust transition teams; still maintain CF focus on strike capability for intelligence-led operations.
- Fully resource both Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Ministerial Assistance Teams while maximizing reconstruction and development funding.
- Develop and implement a national reconciliation program.
- Support the safe execution of provincial elections and constitutional referendum.
- Increase and/or initiate regional engagement with both [146]
- Mitigate the effects of transitioning Coalition missions by deploying a "Covering Force" during the transition period (approximately Jan – Apr 07)
- "Surge" operations a mixed blessing; if GoI asked for breathing space, might be useful.
- Strategic deployment timelines delay CF arrival until March/April however.
- ISF deployments heretofore problematic.

c. (S//REL) what are the central elements of and key resources required to execute a fully-resourced contingency strategy in the Sunni majority provinces?

- Fully resourced transition teams (military, provincial, and ministerial).
- Implementation of a national reconciliation program.
  - Associated National Compact (de-Baathification reform, amnesty, etc) would assist.
- Successful completion of provincial elections and constitutional referendum.
- Support the passing of key legislation providing for basic rights and power sharing.

4. Conclusions. None. For Information.