Intelligence Update
Agenda

- Ramadi
- Lake Thar Thar
- Salman Pak Update
- PIR Update
- SIR Update
Key Take Aways

Ramadi

- Insurgents continue to take advantage of sparse, rural areas which offer a less significant MNF presence and safe haven to reside and plan future attacks.
- Sahawa Al Anbar/Thawar Al Anbar (SAA/TAA), Coalition Forces and ISF operations targeting the insurgency continue to have an impact on AQI's freedom of movement in and around Ramadi, forcing a migration outward from the area.
- Forced migration has caused the shifting of primarily MNF-W TTPs into MNF-N and Baghdad.
- AQI's murder and intimidation tactics are having the reverse effect, causing the populace of Ramadi to unite against AQI, increasing the IA/IP recruiting numbers and participation in the SAA/TAA groups.
- AQI will attempt to maintain their foothold in Ramadi and the Al Anbar Province in order to maintain control of the capital of the only predominantly Sunni province and a key LOC to Syria.
- AQI's cellular structure allows rapid replacement of leadership with minimal impact on ongoing operations.
- Sniper operations remain a significant threat in Ramadi due to its more efficient risk benefit ratio; its low cost, minimal training required and it causes confusion and uncertainty.

SAA/TAA have vowed to target any insurgents that do not have the best interests of the people of Ramadi in mind. Mostly, this applies to factions of AQI, however, would also apply to any other insurgents that target innocent civilians.
Insurgents are reported as paying children and teenagers to aid in attacks against Coalition Forces and ISF. The children are paid to be lookouts, distractions, or sometimes emplacers.

AQM have been targeting IP stations and ISF that show open opposition to the insurgency. Key attacks include the suicide attack on the IP station being constructed in a known insurgent area and the multiple attacks on the IP station named after the Army Captain.

Insurgents create checkpoints in Ramadi in areas where CF/ISF presence is minimal in order to gain knowledge from civilians through interrogations.

**SAA/TAA/ISF operations to target AQM**

Late September TAA targets and kills approximately 20 AQM leaders in a Ramadi mosque

TAA/SAA conducting joint operations with IA/JP

raiding known insurgent areas

recruiting civilians into IA/JP

**AQM Movement**

Thar Thar Area or surrounding areas where CF/ISF to not present

- Training camps
- VBIED factories
- Safe Havens

Use Civil facilities

- Ramadi Women and Children Hospital/ Youth Center
- Ramadi General Hospital
- Caches
- Safe Havens
- Forged medical treatment of injured insurgents
- Back door medical facilities

Anbar University
- Recruit
- Caches

**What have we seen?**

**Trends**

- Use of Children
- Targeting IP stations/ ISF
- Snipers
- Murder and Intimidation Campaign
- Insurgent Checkpoints (CP)
- Targeting of key leadership
- SVBIEDs
- Chlorine attacks and scares against civilians and ISF
- Black Market/ Fuel theft

People of Ramadi turn to the insurgency for basic necessities, often getting supplies from AQM cheaper on the black market than in the shops of Ramadi merchants.
Center of the Al Anbar-Euphrates River Corridor
  Connects to Hit, Haditha, and Al Qaim to the west
  Connects to Habbiniyah and Fallujah to the east
  Connects to Rutbah, Jordanian Border, and the Syrian Border to the South west
MSR MOBILE and ASR Michigan travel through
  Good standing bridges cross the waterways along these two roads
Historically, urban areas such as Ramadi are not controlled by one tribe but often have multiple tribes living together with no real hierarchy established. The Albu Ghanem tribal members make up the majority of the population east of Ramadi but they do not exert much influence because of the mixture of other tribes living there.

Here are the tribes and the group that they are affiliated with. I would like to point out though, that just because the tribe is affiliated with the group it does not mean that everyone in that tribe is. Many tribes use to and still do have ties to the insurgency.
Ramadi Infrastructure

Infrastructure
- Four Water Treatment Plants that filter and maintain water supply to the city
  - Assessed source of chlorine from recent attacks
- Four bridges that provide passages over the river as well as entrance and exit to Ramadi
- There is only one power station that provides electricity to the city.
  - Approximately 9 hours of electricity a day

- Against Key Infrastructure – ISF and MNF OPs, COPs and Security Stations remain the primary targets for probing attacks and targets of opportunity. These attacks primarily consist of IDF, RPG, and SAF, to maximize the amount of damage, insurgents may also combine the use of SVBIEDs. Approximately 9 hours of electricity a day

AQI has disrupted the normal patterns of economic life in Anbar through its campaign of violence and intimidation. AQI is also deeply involved in economic crimes such as hijacking, highway extortion, black marketing, and control of gasoline stations. Middle class, professionals, and senior clerics, and tribal sheikhs have fled Anbar to other areas both inside and outside of Iraq for an increased sense of security. Markets are rudimentary, agriculture is on the subsistence level, and the banking system in Anbar is dysfunctional. Unemployment is around 40% to 60% and at least eight state-owned companies are idle or operating below capacity due to an unreliable electricity supply and unusable or outdated equipment.

(C) Anbar lacks telephone service due to attacks upon cell phone towers, ground cables, and switch centers. However, a public-private venture is scheduled to begin the roll-out of a wireless local loop cell phone service in the first quarter of 2007. The province has not received consistent USO resources for war damage compensation and for post-battle reconstruction.

(B) According to preliminary studies, oil and gas deposits appear to be present in the western part of the province; however, a definitive study has yet to be conducted. The presence of hydrocarbon resources in Anbar is promising as it could potentially provide a sense of empowerment to the Sunni.

(U) Economy severely crippled.
- Main reasons fighting, insurgent dominance, and criminal activity.
- No plans for its revitalization in the near future due to lack of security and instability.

(U) Past main sources of employment.
- Glass Factory and Ceramic Factory were the main sources of income for the city employing over 4000 workers and staff.
- The Glass Factory is currently used as Iraq Security Forces recruiting station and training center.
- Other factories that employed Ramadi residents that have since closed or partially operational include, but are not limited to:
  - Potato Factory (near the Glass Factory)
  - Metal production facility
  - Oil distribution center.

(U) Individual employment opportunities include:
Shops and stores, street peddlers, and business ownership (gas stations, transportation). Farmers in the vicinity of Ramadi grow and sell dates and vegetables for sale at local markets and distribution to neighboring cities and provinces. Distribution of goods to other cities and provinces are limited due to insurgent interdiction.
### AR RAMADI DISTRICTS

1. 8-KILO DISTRICT
2. TAMM DISTRICT
3. AL WAZIR DISTRICT
4. AL HAYE DISTRICT
5. HAY AL DHOBO DISTRICT OFFICERS' DISTRICT
6. THAVLAT DISTRICT
7. AL MUKHEN DISTRICT
8. AL SIBTHAN DISTRICT
9. DATANA DISTRICT
10. AL ARDOUL DISTRICT
11. HAY AL DHOBO THANTYA BID OFFICERS' DISTRICT
12. SINAI INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT
13. AL RAKAN DISTRICT ARA POLICE HOUSING AREA
14. AL MELLAH LARGE STORAGE DISTRICT
15. AL MIJAB DISTRICT
16. SOFIA DISTRICT
17. JESRAA AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT
MAJOR PLAYERS, LEADERS AND INFLUENCES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AQI</th>
<th>JTJ</th>
<th>AS</th>
<th>(b)(6)</th>
<th>AQI</th>
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Ramadi Threat Disposition
The largest concentrations of AO are in AO Power exist primarily in the Iskan district with some also in the P9, and P6-P7 sectors. Multiple source reporting indicates that AIF fled the Ma'laab area and largely maintain safe haven in the Iskan district, particularly in regards to HVI presence responsible for coordinating and facilitating lethal and nonlethal targeting. These primarily JTJ cells have operational coordination between JTJ cells in Hay al-Dhubat Thanya and Malaab and regularly conduct operations throughout the entire city of Ramadi. Reporting regarding the Abd al Rahman mosques compound has likely been exaggerated; however, the IED attacks and discoveries targeting the exfiltration route indicate that AIF have stockpiles of speed bumps and concentrations nearby, likely north in the L2 sector. The increase in IED attacks is likely attributable to shifts of IED attacks from the Ma'laab district back to cells now maintaining safe haven in the Iskan and Hay al-Dhubat Thanya districts. Within the Iskan district, there are likely three SAF cells, 2 IED cells, and 1 transient IDF cell.
Page 13 redacted for the following reason:
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
### Attacks for the Last 30 Days

**Attacks**
07 Feb – 10 Mar

<table>
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<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFIRE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Fire</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper Ops</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Map details**:
- The map shows attacks for the last 30 days with various symbols representing different types of attacks.
- The map covers a specific geographic area with numerous marked points indicating attack locations.

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**Graph**:
- A bar graph showing the distribution of attacks by type (IED, IDF, SAFIRE, Direct Fire, Sniper Ops).
- The graph includes a legend and labels for each bar representing the number of attacks.

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**Legend**:
- **Red Triangle**: IED (101 attacks)
- **Red Down Triangle**: IDF (42 attacks)
- **Red Diamond**: SAFIRE (11 attacks)
- **Red Circle**: Direct Fire (310 attacks)
- **Red Cross**: Sniper Ops (7 attacks)

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**Map Key**:
- The map includes a key to identify different types of attacks with corresponding symbols and counts.

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**Conclusion**:
- The analysis indicates a high number of Direct Fire attacks, with a relatively lower number of IED and IDF attacks.
- The SAFIRE and Sniper Ops attacks are minimal compared to other types.

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**Note**: This document contains classified information and is approved for release.
Ramadi IED Threat Assessment

- CWIEd is the most common type of IED found within Ramadi
  - VOIED-pressure plate/speed bump next most common
- About 6% of IEDs, underbelly IED accounted for 57% of all KIA theater-wide
  - MNF-W experienced the most incidents in February
- The most common reported method of concealment for IEDs near Ramadi is dirt.
- Two areas primarily stand out for IED attacks
  - Al Qadar Mosque is known as an insurgent safe haven
  - Area IVO Melab District saw a large increase in IED activity for February

Summarization slide. CWIEds are the most common type of IEDs found in and around Ramadi. While not reported in its own category, the most deadly IED is the Under Belly attack. The Under Belly Attack can be either a CWIEd or VOIED. Most IEDs are concealed using dirt. The two major hot spots from the last month, Feb, are IVO of Al Qadar Mosque, a known insurgent safe haven, and Melab District. There have been NO AAIEds report within the last 90 days.

Overview of all IED events/types for Feb to include CF casualties. Will be further broken down into type of IED and method of concealment. Of note, the boxes indicate areas of increased IED activity in/around Ramadi. The top box is a known insurgent safe haven. The bottom is an area that is not known to be an insurgent safe haven but saw an increase in activity during Feb.

ADDITIONAL IED TYPE NOT REPORTED AS OWN CATEGORY IS UNDERBELLY ATTACKS.

NORMALLY CLASSIFIED AS CWIEd OR VOIED-PRESSURE PLATE/SPEED BUMP AS THESE ARE THE METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH UNDERBELLY ATTACKS

UNDERBELLY ATTACKS ONLY MAKE UP 6% OF ALL IED RELATED
INCIDENTS IN IRAQ BUT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR 57% OF ALL KIA AND 45% OF ALL WIA FOR FEBRUARY.
Way Ahead

- Incorporation of SAA/TAO members into the ISF
- Social Services implemented
  - Requested by the Anbar Emergency Council
    - Employment for young males
  - Exportation of the SAA/TAO model
  - Embolden tribes
  - Incorporate SAA/Iraqi Awakening Movement into GOI
- Closure of the gap between units
  - Denial of the Lake Thar Thar safe haven
  - Decrease migration of TTPs to other MNDs

C2 Assessment: As the SAA transitions into a political party, they must be incorporated into the political process. Failure to encompass the emerging Iraqi Awakening Movement will likely result in the tribes of the west becoming pitted against the GOI. CF/ISF operations will continue to shape the battlespace; clearing threat areas and establishing new security positions to prevent hardening support to AqI by local citizens. Operations within insurgent hotspots will continue to create disorder and provoked retaliatory attacks in all areas of Ramadi.

The overall threat to CF in Ramadi is HIGH. The overall threat to stability in Ramadi is HIGH. Ramadi is the capital and center of commerence of Anbar Province. The cities political and economic significance along ongoing reconstruction/revitalization efforts make Ramadi a valuable and symbolic venue for AIF attacks. With a population of approximately 450,000, Ramadi is home to approximately 30% of the populace of Anbar Province.

The principal threat to CF in Ramadi is Al Qaeda in Iraq and Jamaat al-Tawhid al-Jihad (AQI/JTJ). The cooperation between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the anti-AQI groups Sahawa al-Anbar (SAA) and Thawar al-Anbar (TAO) is increasing stability in Ramadi compared to that of the past.

The key infrastructures targeted are ISF and MNF OPs, COPs and Security Stations remain targets for probing attacks and targets of opportunity. Tribal, religious and government leadership also remain to be prime target for insurgents. These attacks primarily consist of IDF, RPG, and SAF; to maximize the amount of damage, insurgents may also combine the use of SVBIEDs.

Enduring Operations employed by MNF partnered with ISF continue to shape the battlespace; clearing threat areas and establishing new security positions prove to prevent AIF festering and hearten support of local civilians. Operations within insurgent hotspots has also created disorder and provoked retaliatory attacks against MNF/ISF static positions.

The disruptions of insurgents’ C2/safe havens have been stepping stones influencing the number of un-supporting tribes and the formation of SAA/TAO as of Jun 06 to currently. Moreover, has lead to ISF/MNF to gain and facilitate a permanent presence in these areas also enabling humanitarian operations. Ultimately helping to counter AIF freedom of movement, prevented AIF from threatening tribes and conserving local conviction.

AQI will continue their Murder and Intimidation campaign (M&I) targeting ISF units and the local populace with the intent of destabilizing the Iraqi Government and impeding the goal of a legitimate Iraqi Security Force. Intimidation efforts by AQI to quell security and humanitarian efforts in their neighborhoods seem to infuriate rather than frighten the local populace.

Insurgents will continue to take advantage of sparse, rural areas which offer a less significant MNF presence and safe haven to reside and plan future attacks.
Lake Thar Thar
Exploiting the Seams
Key Take Aways

Lake Thar Thar Area

- The SE Lake Thar Thar area is an AQIZ leadership safe haven and a primary LOC to several major cities.
- Area remains a safe haven for AQI elements as they exploit reduced Coalition footprint in the area.
- AQI elements use Lake Thar Thar area as a staging point to move along MNF-W, MND-N, and MND-B AO seams
  - Primarily exploiting gap between MND-N and MND-B to facilitate movement
  - Minimal forces in these areas allows for greater freedom of movement
  - Freedom of movement through SAD to Diyala and into northern provinces
- The disruption and denial of this key terrain and chokepoint will have a significant impact upon AQIZ/FF freedom of movement.
Multi-faceted area
- Major hub for continued AQIZ/FF activity
- Sanctuary from CF during operations
  - Use local population to provide cover for their presence
- Facilitates movement along key LOCs exploiting MND/FF seams
  - Taking advantage of reduced CF footprint in the area
- Strategic chokepoint between Anbar & Salah Ad Din Province

MND-B and MNF-W seams: There have been several aircraft shot down along the seam and supporting areas belonging to both the MND-B as well as MNF-W. This area lacks Coalition Force presence and therefore allows insurgents freedom of movement between both MND-B as well as MNF-W along both primary and secondary lines of communication. Aircraft will remain at risk as long as there is no Coalition Force presence in the area. Terrain allows insurgents the ability to traverse over large areas via 4x4 truck with mounted anti-aircraft systems.

Numerous sources and intelligence summaries report possible insurgent activity IVO Lake Tharthar/ Habbanah Dam and hardened facilities (bunker complexes) around the eastern edge of Lake Tharthar between 2000-2006.

- Several structures of interest have been prosecuted via US/Coalition air strikes following the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom between Mar-Apr 2003. Many of these structures may have possibly had subterranean, beneath them especially those identified as former palaces of Saddam hardened facilities
- Current SI analysis confirms activity by various high-level insurgent personalities concerning a variety of questionable subjects at more than one areas of interest during July-Aug 2006 timeframe
- Calls are being placed by numerous persons and directly relate to insurgent activities
- National imagery collections clearly identify suspect activity in areas of interest IVO Lake Tharthar over the past 2 months

QIO NSW/GP-AP and RCT-5 units, in coordination with TF-VAL conduct direct action operations and SSE IVO southern Lake Tharthar in order to capture/kill AQIZ/FF and disrupt AQIZ/FF sanctuary. B+1 establish temporary combat outpost and ECP IVO Tharthar Dam in order to control key terrain and deny AQIZ freedom of movement and safehaven.

The SE Lake Tharthar area is an AQIZ leadership safe haven and a primary LOC to several major cities. The disruption and denial of this key terrain and chokepoint will have a significant impact upon AQIZ/FF freedom of movement.

Road pattern: random, many secondary non-improved roads; one improved-surface road (Route Corvair) runs alongside canal, another (ASR Golden) runs SW to NE; all roads are much trafficked. Mech is also go to slow-go off-road.
Berms: varying height/usually 3-4ft found around old defensive positions, near road systems; often used in cache placement.

Waterway: prior ops discovered canal system likely used for material movement E to W, mooring points along length of Tigris-Thar canal. Other canals running through center of NSZ (wadis) and corresponding berms assessed to need further investigation/exploitation.

Farmland: Area consists of primarily desert terrain with sporadic developed irrigation ditches and wheat crop – poss by some poppy fields.

Secret compartments within structures: indicators include discoloration in concrete, new wiring in old structures, ventilation pipes with no apparent connection, "farmers" with no farmland or irrigation nearby. Also, presence of tire tracks with no visible structures or reason for travel.

1.4c

The Thar Thar area east of the Thar Thar Dam consists of sporadic communal villages. The area is marked by wide open expanses of desert with little landmarks except the rubble of the previous regime’s resort. This area was home to one of Saddam Hussein’s favorite palaces. The area surrounding the palace consisted of guest houses, amphitheaters, and residences for groundkeepers, guards, and other workers. There was also a large gas station in the area that served as a main refueling site. All of this infrastructure is now gone. There is nothing left of any of the residences except rubble. Some residents claim this occurred during the initial stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom while others stated that following the fall of Saddam, thieves and those angry with Saddam came in with heavy earth movers and then looted and destroyed any building associated with Saddam. Guard towers still stand and show testament to villagers claims that no one was permitted to enter the area then known as Saddam or Saddamiyah. Residents and visiting Bedouins claim approaching the area without permission would have resulted in certain death under the pervious regime. The rubble has even been picked clean by thieves and scavengers. Pipes, bricks, wiring, anything of value or use has been removed from the former resort.

1.4d

There are two small villages southwest of the dam which leave a large number of what appears to be vacant buildings. The locations of the village are at //MGRS 14a and //MGRS 14b. One of the villages goes by the of Thar Thar Village. Dam security personnel are currently being recruited from Thar Thar Village. Previous reporting also states the harboring of insurgents in an area by the name of "Fishing Village." This village could be one of the two listed above, however, the area known to the locals as Fishing Village is nothing but a group of tents that fishermen utilize while in the area fishing.

Coalition Forces operations continue to find that once areas are cleared by CF in the Thar Thar area, AQI returns. Operations conducted in Sept 06 than again in Dec 06. Reporting reflects previously raided locations may be in use again.
Safe Haven Overview

- AIF return to previously cleared safe havens
  - 1.4c indicates areas are still used as safe havens
  - Reuse of safe havens provide increased ability to blend with local populace
  - Maintain SA to evade MNF patrols within the area
- Terrain noted as being trafficable by any type of vehicle
  - Allows for increased freedom of movement

Multiple areas identified through reporting as being used by AQI as safe havens. Here are few areas that have been previously identified and raided during Sept and Dec 06. These areas provide a fertile area which AQI can transition from. These areas provide cover, blending with the local populace and waiting out CF operations as well as facilitate movement into other areas.

Known

1.4c Indicate S Lake Thar Thar is used as sanctuary for AQIZ leadership and insurgent activity.
Insurgents have SA to evade large-scale MNF patrols in the area
AQIZ uses local population and fishing as a cover for their presence
Thar Thar Dam bridge is a critical chokepoint connecting Al Anbar and Salah Ad Din provinces

ZARQAWI AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED AQIZ LEADERS WERE REPORTEDLY USING THE PENINSULA AREA SOUTHEAST OF LAKE THAR THAR AS A SAFEHAVEN. ZARQAWI... NOTED THAT THE THAR ThAR AREA FACILITATED STRATEGIC RAPID ACCESS TO AR RAMADI, KHALIDIYAH, AS SAQLAWIYAH, AL FALLUJAH, AND SALAH AD DIN GOVERNORATE.

Coalition Forces operations continue to find that once areas are cleared by CF in the Thar Thar area, AQI returns.
Operations conducted in Sept 06 than again in Dec 06. Reporting is beginning to reflect previously raided locations are in use again. These areas are used as staging points for further movement along MND/F seams into SAD, Diyala,

- The desert region was noted as being trafficable by any type of vehicle

Raids have yielded vbieds, torture houses, detainment areas

060916 Black Flag 2 - At 1.4a another shooting range was located where insurgents painted targets on buildings and shoot at the buildings. Multiple ranges were located all over the Peninsula region. At this particular range 7.62mm x 54 brass was located. This area was close to where A Company located a VBIED hidden within an old abandoned Takfiri HQ building during the Recon in Force mission, May 2006.

060916 Black Flag 2 - At 1.4a located a building, which appeared to be a torture house. In the house was discovered (13) IP uniforms, a log book w/ interrogation notes, and confession that appeared to be written by the victims. In addition there were handcuffs and blood splattered around an area where a wire noise was attached to the ceiling.

060915 Black Flag 2 - At 1.4a located a possible meeting place for insurgent leaders as stated
by an LN. Propaganda was found at this residence written on the walls. A fisherman and his son were at this residence but no insurgents were located.

060916 Black Flag 2 - At 14a spotted a suspicious tanker truck which seemed to be placed inside a garage IOT conceal it from CF. EOD was called upon IOT investigate the vehicle. After EOD searched the vehicle, they concluded that it was not a VBIED. After further exploitation, it was determined that the truck was a waste disposal vehicle, filled with diesel fuel. Probable that this was a VBIED in the making.

060915 Black Flag 2 - At 14a discovered an insurgent test fire range. A building had targets spray painted on the walls and there were numerous bullet holes in the wall.
These areas are used as staging points for further movement along MND/F seams into SAD, Diyala,
Conclusion

- Extremists ability to exploit the seams present between MNF-W, MND-N and MND-B allows for movement between MNDs, virtually undetected, provides safe haven and staging points to areas north and east.
- Evidence of exploitation of the seams is seen in the migration of traditional MNF-W TTPs to both MND-N and MND-B.
- Reduced Coalition footprint in SE Lake Thar Thar area provides safe havens for AQI leadership and militant elements.

C2 Assessment: Successful operations by CF and ISF within MNF-W will continue the forced migration of AQI and other Sunni extremists to familiar safe havens in the SE Lake Thar Thar area. The reduced CF footprint and proximity to relatively unguarded seams between MNF-W, MND-N and MND-B allows AQI to maintain freedom of movement both in staging attacks and in deploying fighters and VBIEs into other regions, especially Baghdad and Diyala.