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MNF-I CMD GRP XO

From: Dempsey, Martin LTG
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 11:06 AM
To: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG
Cc: Chiarelli Peter W LTG MNC-I CG; Cichowski Kurt A MG MNFI SPA Deputy Chief of Staff; Fastabend David A MG MNFI STRAT OPS; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF
Subject: Two Questions

Classification: SECRET

Caveats: NONE

Sir,

My perspective on the two questions:

1. **What does it mean to "take care of JAM."** This is a really important question. I think we need to agree that JAM is, in fact, both an organization and a movement. I think we need to agree that it is not a monolithic or homogenous thing but rather three distinct groups loosely affiliated with each other. These groups are:
 - A large group of impressionable, mostly unemployed young men who like the idea of being part of some organization and protecting their neighborhoods and their religion
 - A group of criminal opportunists who take advantage of the instability in Iraq to make money under the guise of contributing to the larger Shia agenda. This group will kidnap, kill, extort, and manufacture bombs for profit.
 - A small group of Shia religious extremists who consider all other sects of Islam to be infidels. This group is just as dangerous as Al Qaeda and the Takfiri on the Sunni side.

"Taking care of JAM" must begin with an intense intelligence effort to separate these groups and identify their leaders. We must determine the extent to which Muqtada al Sadr is in control of these disparate groups. Although we've been at this for three years, it remains unclear how much influence he wields over his lieutenants. Once we understand the organization, we must target the leaders of the second and third groups as aggressively as we target the leaders of AQ and AAS.

A broad attack against JAM is both unwise and ill-advised. We've fought JAM twice in the past three years, and we have inflicted horrendous casualties on them. However, a broad attack simply mobilizes the group of impressionable, unemployed young men to the fight—young men willing to die by the hundreds—but we make no enduring progress in fighting them.

While a broad attack against JAM is unwise, limiting JAM freedom of movement is absolutely necessary. So, too, is an aggressive Information Operations Campaign discrediting JAM's leaders. This will sell well if it comes from the GoI and far less well if it comes from us.

To summarize, we should "take care" of JAM by:

- Gaining a common intelligence picture of the threat.
- Seeking concurrence of the GoI to eliminate leaders of the two criminal and extremist groups, but letting them know that the threat is against us and we must act to eliminate it.
- Seeking concurrence of the GoI to limit JAM freedom of movement, but letting them know that based on the threat against us we intend to impose limitations as necessary.

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2. If the PM asks for additional assistance in Baghdad, what would it look like and where would it come from. I've expressed my thoughts on this in the past—if more troops are needed, they should be Iraqi troops. If the ultimate goal of adding force structure is to settle the situation to enable better dialogue toward reconciliation, then the introduction of additional CF forces is the wrong answer. They will not reconcile simply because we are separating them. They will reconcile because it is affecting all of their lives equally. That demands an Iraqi solution.

Nothing further.

V/R Marty

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

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