

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USC/CA/NTL/GBR~~

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SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-001

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-001

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE REPORTS. (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE:

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 111730 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY:

- INTRODUCTORY SESSIONS TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT AND DISCUSS FOCUS OF FUTURE SESSIONS.

THE SESSION WAS SPENT INFORMING DETAINEE THAT A PLAN NEEDED TO BE CREATED ON HOW HE WOULD ACCOMPLISH CHANGING LEADERS' VIEWS OF CF. THERE ALSO NEEDS TO BE A CHANGE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN SUNNI AND SHIA AS WELL. DETAINEE UNDERSTANDS THAT HE NEEDS TO ASSIST WITH CREATING A PLAN TO IMPLEMENT THESE CHANGES AND FUTURE SESSIONS WILL FOCUS OF IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS CREATING THE CURRENT SITUATION ALONG WITH WHAT SOLUTIONS ARE NEEDED TO RESOLVE THEM.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USC/CA/NTL/GBR~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-002

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-002

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE REPORTS. (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE:

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 121730 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY:

- THIS SESSION WAS USED TO ASSIGN DETAINEE QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS WHILE IN HIS CELL.

DETAINEE WAS GIVEN THREE QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS THE PERCEPTION OF CF AND THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ. DETAINEE WAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

WHAT IS THE CURRENT PERCEPTION OF COALITION FORCES IN THE SHIA COMMUNITY?

WHAT ISSUES / ACTIONS DRAW NEGATIVE ATTENTION TO COALITION FORCES IN THE SHIA COMMUNITY?

WHAT ARE THE IDEAL CONDITIONS FOR A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COALITION FORCES AND THE SHIA COMMUNITY?

DETAINEE'S ANSWERS WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE NEXT INTERROGATION BEFORE REDIRECTING HIS FOCUS.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USCANNZ/ODR~~

Q00Q

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-003 (b)(6)

REFS: 200243-003

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(8) 50 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: NI228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 141730 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE PROVIDED HIS RESPONSE ON THE SHI'A COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF CF.
- DETAINEE WAS GIVEN NEW QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS WHILE IN HIS CELL.

THE SHI'A COMMUNITY GENERALLY NOW SEES CF AS OCCUPIERS. THIS VIEW IS A RESULT OF CF USING FORCE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS LIKE THE BATTLE IN AN NAJAF. THIS USE OF FORCE CAUSED MANY PEOPLE TO SEEK A MILITARY RESOLUTION TO CF PRESENCE. THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF COURSE WANT A POLITICAL RESOLUTION WHILE THE MILITARY LEADERS SEEK MILITARY RESOLUTION RESPECTIVELY.

THE MISTAKES CF HAVE MADE ON PERSONAL AND POLITICAL LEVELS HAVE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF CF. ABU GHURAYB WAS A PERSONAL MISTAKE MADE BY INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE WHICH GAVE THE MEDIA AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK NEGATIVELY ABOUT CF.

BECAUSE CF REFUSE TO SET A TIME FOR WITHDRAWAL, THE SHI'A COMMUNITY UNDERSTANDS THIS TO MEAN THAT CF WANT TO REMAIN HERE INDEFINITELY. THIS ONCE AGAIN REINFORCES THE TITLE ((OCCUPIERS)). IF CF SET A TIME TO WITHDRAWAL AND SAID THAT IT WOULD ONLY STAY IN IRAQ IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT REQUESTED IT, THEN THAT WOULD ELIMINATE ONE FACET OF THE OCCUPYING FORCE PERSONA.

SHI'A IDEOLOGY AND THE SHI'A COMMUNITY ARE NOT HATEFUL. OFFENSIVE JIHAD IS FORBIDDEN, WHICH IS WHY YOU DO NOT SEE SHI'A CONDUCTING ATTACKS OR BOMBINGS LIKE WHAT OCCURRED WITH THE TWIN TOWERS IN NEW YORK OR THE BOMBING IN LONDON. DEFENSIVE JIHAD IS THE ONLY ALLOWABLE JIHAD BY SHI'A LAW; THIS MEANS THE DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND FROM OCCUPYING FORCES.

THE FIRST THING THAT NEEDS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN IRAQ IS SECURITY, FOLLOWED BY POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. BRINGING BACK THE ELECTRICITY, MEDICAL FACILITIES, AND INDUSTRIAL PLANTS THAT WERE PRESENT UNDER SADDAM WOULD BE A GOOD START. THIS WOULD ASSIST IN BRINGING FOREIGN BUSINESSES TO IRAQ FOR INVESTMENT. IRAQ COULD BECOME THE PREMIER COUNTRY FOR INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST JUST LIKE GERMANY IN EUROPE AND JAPAN IN THE EAST. (COLLECTOR COMMENT: ADDITIONAL DETAILS WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN THE FULL TRANSLATION IS COMPLETE.)

DETAINEE WAS GIVEN THREE QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS REGARDING SECTARIAN VIOLENCE. DETAINEE WAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN IRAQ?

HOW ARE THE FOREIGNERS (WAHABI ARABS) AFFECTING THE SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN IRAQ?

WHAT AFFECT (GOOD OR BAD) THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS (SUNNI AND SHI'A) HAVE HAD ON SECTARIAN VIOLENCE? (DISCUSS WHAT EFFECT THE SITUATION BETWEEN AYATOLLAH HAJRI AND MUQTADA AL-SADR HAS HAD ON SECTARIAN VIOLENCE.)

DETAINEE WILL BE GIVEN A COUPLE OF DAYS TO WRITE HIS ANSWERS BEFORE DOING A REVIEW AND REDIRECTING HIS FOCUS ONCE AGAIN.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2

REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/AFS/CAN/NZ/GBR~~

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SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-004

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-004

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS

INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE:

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 151730 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE PROVIDED HIS RESPONSE ON THE ORIGINS OF SECTARIAN
VIOLENCE IN IRAQ.
- DETAINEE DID NOT RECOGNIZE PHOTOS PRESENTED

DETAINEE PROVIDED HIS ANSWERS REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF SECTARIAN
VIOLENCE IN IRAQ. THE REMAINDER OF THE SESSIONS WAS SPENT EXPLAINING
WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND PREPARING
DETAINEE FOR A DISCUSSION ON MUQTADA AL-SADR.

MORE INFORMATION WILL BE AVAILABLE WITH THE TRANSLATION OF DETAINEE'S
ANSWERS.

DETAINEE'S BROTHER, (b)(6) WAS
KIDNAPPED FROM THE ABU GHURAYB AREA NEAR AL-KHANDHARI ON JUNE 5,
2006. HE WAS KIDNAPPED WITH HIS FRIEND (b)(6)

(b)(6)

DETAINEE DID NOT RECOGNIZE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING PICTURES

1. (b)(6)
- 2.
- 3.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CC/JZ

REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/AFS/CAN/NZ/GBR~~

Q000

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-005

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-005

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS

INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE:

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 161730 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY:

- EXPLAINED THE RECONCILIATION PROGRAM TO DETAINEE
- DISCUSSED METHODS TO TEACH SHI'A IN PRISON ABOUT RIGHT PATH IN
ISLAM.
- DISCUSSED SHI'A LEADERS ALREADY IN CUSTODY THAT WOULD BE
SUITABLE TO CONSULT WITH FOR A RELIGIOUS COUNCIL INSIDE PRISON
- BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE RETURN OF MUQTADA AL-SADR AND HIS
INTENTIONS IN IRAQ.

THIS WAS A COMBINED SESSION WITH DETAINEE AND HIS BROTHER (b)(6)
(200242). THE RECONCILIATION PROGRAM WAS EXPLAINED TO DETAINEE WITH
EMPHASIS ON THE REHABILITATION OF PRISONERS AS HIS CURRENT FOCUS
FOLLOWED BY RE-INTEGRATION INTO SOCIETY AS A RELIGIOUS LEADER
INFLUENCING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR THE BETTERMENT OF THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT. DETAINEE WAS CONCERNED WITH THE SOCIAL LEVEL OF THE
PRISONERS HE WOULD BE SPEAKING WITH INSIDE THE PRISON SO HE DOES NOT
LOSE FACE FOR TALKING TO SOMEONE BELOW HIS LEVEL. THIS MAY ALSO BE
RESOLVED BY PLACING DETAINEE INTO THE GENERAL POPULATION SO HE IS
SEEN AS BEING FORCED INTO THE SOCIAL CONDITION. ULTIMATELY THE BEST
SOLUTION REACHED WAS TO HAVE DETAINEE MEET WITH A SELECT GROUP OF
LEADERS FROM THE SHI'A COMPOUNDS AND PROVIDE LESSONS ON ISLAM FOR THE
LEADERS TO TAKE BACK AND PASS ON TO THE GENERAL POPULATION. THIS
WOULD PROVIDE A PLATFORM TO DISTRIBUTE THE LESSONS CREATED DURING
FUTURE SESSIONS.

DETAINEE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS IN CUSTODY WHO
WOULD BE HIGH ENOUGH FOR DETAINEE TO SPEAK WITH:

(b)(6)

THE SHIITE POPULATIONS IN GENERAL, LIKE ALL IRAQIS, VIEW THE COALITION FORCES AS AN OCCUPIER WITH NO DISTINCTION IN THIS REGARD FROM CLERGY, MILITARY OR POLITICIANS, BUT SOME OF THEM SAY THIS OPENLY WHILE OTHERS DO NOT. YET ALL ARE CERTAIN THAT THE RESOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED POLITICALLY TO END THE OCCUPATION WITHOUT NEED FOR OTHER METHODS. YET SOME MILITARY LEADERS AND CLERGY STUDENTS BELIEVE THAT ARMED RESISTANCE IS THE RIGHT PATH TO END THIS OCCUPATION AND THAT ALL THE POLITICAL APPROACHES ARE POWERLESS TO STOP THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL GREED OF THE COALITION FORCES. OF COURSE THIS VIEW DID NOT EXIST AT THE BEGINNING OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD REGIME. ALL SHIITES WERE JOYFUL WHEN THESE FORCES ENTERED THIS COUNTRY WITH THE INTENTION TO SAVE US FROM THE DICTATORSHIP OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. BUT THINGS CHANGED GRADUALLY, BIT BY BIT, BECAUSE OF THE BAD MANAGEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT (PAUL BREMER) WHO LISTENED TO THE ADVICE OF SOME POLITICIANS WHO CONSIDERED THEIR OWN INTERESTS FAR AWAY FROM THE INTERESTS OF THE (IRAQI) PEOPLE OR THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. IN ANY EVENT, THE FIRST CONFRONTATION THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE SHIITES WAS WITH THE AL-SADR MOVEMENT. THE WORDS OF ADVICE TO THE AMERICANS WERE THAT THOSE PEOPLE (AL-SADR MOVEMENT) ARE TROUBLE MAKERS, THEY ARE WEAK, AND WE SHOULD SHIFT THE COUNTRY FROM THEIR ATROCITIES. BASED ON THIS ASSUMPTION, THE AMERICANS ACTED VIGOROUSLY BY CLOSING AL-HAWZA

NEWSPAPER AND ARRESTING (b)(6) AND GOT INVOLVED IN TWO FIGHTS THE FIRST AND SECOND BATTLES OF AN-NAJAF. WHEN THAT BATTLE TOOK PLACE IN AN NAJAF, AN NAJAF WAS A VERY RESPECTED PLACE IN THE SHIITE COMMUNITY AND WAS CONSIDERED ONE OF THE HOLIEST SHRINES ON EARTH. THE OVERUSE OF THE MILITARY POWER AND REJECTING ALL POLITICAL SOLUTIONS HAVE LED TO THE BELIEF FROM THE SHIITE COMMUNITY THAT CF ARE OCCUPYING FORCES. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE VIEW BY AL-SADR MOVEMENT. OF COURSE JUDGING CERTAIN CONDITIONS OR CERTAIN FORCES IN ORDER TO LOOK AT THEM AS OCCUPYING FORCES IS NOT BASED ON HOW THOSE FORCES BEHAVE OR WHAT KIND OF MECHANISM THEY USE WITH THE EVENTS. THE QUESTION IS NOT WHAT KIND OF LANGUAGE WE USE. IT IS JUST VERY IMPORTANT TO KNOW THAT IRAQI SOCIETY AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE ARE RELIGIOUS PEOPLE AND THEY ARE LOYAL TO THEIR CLERGY. THEY ARE NOT MUCH IN FAVOR OF ANY PARTIES ON THE FIELD BECAUSE THAT IS NOT THEIR INTEREST. WE CAN DIVIDE ALL SHIITES IN IRAQ INTO TWO CATEGORIES: THE AL-SADR GROUP WHICH FOLLOWS AL-SADR AND THE SECOND GROUP THAT FOLLOWS AL-SISTANI. THE SISTANI FOLLOWERS ARE VERY FIRM, CLEAR, AND PRACTICAL. THEY ARE ALSO CLEAR AS TO WHAT DIRECTION THEY ARE HEADING. BUT THE FOLLOWERS OF AL-SADR ARE SOMEWHAT CONFUSED, UNSTABLE BOTH RELIGIOUSLY AND POLITICALLY. THE REASON IS THEY DO NOT HAVE THE PROPER RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP SO THEY ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN AL-SADR AND (b)(6) AND SHAYKH AL-YAGUBI. THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM IS WITH THOSE WHOM FOLLOW MAS BECAUSE HE HIMSELF IS NOT STABLE, BUT HE IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING HIS MIND AND THAT REFLECTS ON HIS FOLLOWERS. ONE DAY HE WILL TELL YOU THAT THE AMERICAN FORCES OR CF ARE AN OCCUPYING FORCE AND HE WILL TELL YOU THAT WE SHOULD RESIST BY POLITICAL MEANS. THEN HE WILL DRAW BACK FROM THAT CONCLUSION AND TELL YOU THAT WE MUST RESIST BY MILITARY MEANS. THIS MIND CHANGING CREATES TOO MUCH WASTE, OBSTACLES, AND HARDSHIPS BECAUSE YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND HIS RIGHT CLEAR THINKING IN ORDER TO DIALOGUE OR CONVERSE WITH HIM. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROBLEM IS MUCH GREATER THAN IF HE HAD A NEGATIVE ASSUMPTION OR UNDERSTANDING OF THINGS.

THE MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECTS THAT COULD BE VIEWED NEGATIVELY AGAINST CF ARE THE SAME SUBJECTS AND MISTAKES THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED, IN GENERAL. THE PROBLEM IS THE ADAPTATION OF MILITARY MEANS TO REACH A POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND REJECTING A POLITICAL CHOICE IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO CURRENT PROBLEMS. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT SOME OF THOSE MISTAKES WERE INDIVIDUALLY CONDUCTED AND THEY WERE NOT A POLITICAL AGENDA ADOPTED BY WHICH PANIC SUGGESTS. THE ABU GHURAYB ISSUE AND THE SUBJECT OF RAIDS THAT GO IN MAHMUDIYAH WERE WHAT THE MEDIA HAS CONCENTRATED ON HEAVILY AND MADE IT A GREAT ISSUE IN THE MINDS OF THE CITIZENS OF IRAQ. I BELIEVE THAT THE PUNISHMENT AGAINST THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE MAHMUDIYAH CASE WAS FAIR, BUT IN THE CASE OF ABU GHURAYB PRISON, IT WAS NOT ENOUGH AND WAS NOT CONVINCING IN THE VIEW OF AN IRAQI CITIZEN. THAT CREATED FEELINGS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE LOOKING OUT FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS EVEN IF THEIR SOLDIERS ARE THE AGGRESSOR AND THE IRAQI CITIZEN HAS NO VALUE OR IMPORTANCE. THE CASE OF ABU GHURAYB WAS NOT SOLVED IN A PROPER MANNER AND THIS INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT BY SOME AMERICAN SOLDIERS STAINED THE WHOLE AMERICAN ARMY.

IF WE GO BACK TO THE QUESTION OF WHY WE INSIST ON SCHEDULING A WITHDRAWAL OR PULLOUT (OF TROOPS) IS NOT THE RIGHT ONE. THE QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THIS KIND OF WAY, "WHY NOT INSIST ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES?" IN REALITY, THE INSISTENCE NOT TO PUT A SCHEDULE TO WITHDRAW CONFIRMS THAT AMERICAN FORCES HAVE NO INTENTION

SISTANI VS SADR

MAS IS NOT STABLE

TO PULL OUT AND IN THEIR MINDS, THAT THEY WANT TO STAY A VERY LONG TIME, MAYBE FOREVER, AND THIS MEANS THEY ARE OCCUPYING FORCES. SOME THINK THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SCHEDULING AND NOT SCHEDULING ACTUALLY IS VERY SIMPLE AND ONLY PLAYING WITH WORDS AND IS NOT PRACTICAL. FOR EXAMPLE, THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WILL STATE THAT THEY WANT TO STAY UNLESS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT REQUESTS OUR DEPARTURE. OR THEY WILL SAY THAT WE WISH TO PULL OUR FORCES UNLESS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WANTS US TO STAY. THE ANSWER IS THE SAME BUT THE MEANING IS DIFFERENT. SO WE GO BACK TO THE QUESTION AGAIN, WHY NOT INSIST ON SCHEDULING THE WITHDRAWAL? FOR EXAMPLE THE ANSWER WILL BE THAT WE ANTICIPATE STAYING ONE MORE YEAR UNLESS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WANTS US TO STAY AND THEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL REQUEST THAT STAY LONGER.

***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****
IF THEY SEE IT AS NECESSARY

IN REGARDS TO PERMITTING THE SHIITES TO BE PERMITTED TO FIGHT A SELF DEFENSE FIGHT THROUGH THE SHARIA LAW, I HAVE TO MAKE ONE THING CLEAR BEFORE I DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE. SHIITES ARE NOT AGGRESSIVE, NOR ARE THEY EXTREME AGAINST THE AMERICANS OR ANY OTHERS, THE REASON FOR THIS IS THE SHARIA LAW. THE SHARIA LAW THAT WAS ADOPTED BY THE SHI'A REFERS TO THE AL JIHAD IN TWO DIFFERENT WAYS. FIRST IS THE OFFENSIVE JIHAD AND THE SECOND IS THE DEFENSIVE JIHAD. OFFENSIVE JIHAD MEANS THAT YOU START AN OFFENSIVE ON THE OTHER SIDE AND THIS IS VIEWED BY ALL SHIITE CLERGY AS NOT BEING IN THEIR MAGISTERIAL AREA AND THERE IS ONLY ONE AVAILABLE IMAM TO MAKE THAT DECISION. AND BECAUSE THIS AVAILABLE IMAM DOES NOT EXIST, NO ONE CAN MAKE THAT DECISION. THEREFORE, NO SHI'A WENT TO THE TRADE CENTER IN NEW YORK TO BLOW IT UP NOR WERE THERE ANY IN THE METRO TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN LONDON OR ANYWHERE ELSE. BUT THE DEFENSIVE JIHAD IN THEIR VIEW IS PERMITTED. THE DEFENSIVE JIHAD MEANS THAT YOU DEFEND YOURSELF WHEN YOU ARE EXPOSED TO DANGER IN EXACTLY THE CONDITIONS WE ARE IN NOW. IF YOU ARE LIVING IN YOUR COUNTRY AND SOME FOREIGN FORCES CAME AND ATTACKED YOU AND OCCUPIED YOUR COUNTRY, THEN YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO FIGHT BACK AND DEFEND YOURSELF. OF COURSE THIS SITUATION IS DEFERRED IF YOU KNOW THAT THE FORCES DO NOT WANT TO STAY, CHANGE THEIR OFFENSIVE NATURE, AND IT WANTS TO PULL OUT IN PEACE WITHOUT HURTING THE OTHER SIDE. AT THIS POINT WE COULD SAY YOU COULD REACH A TREATY BASED ON THIS ASSUMPTION. AS IT IS SAID IN THE KORAN, IF THEY SEEK PEACE, THEN SEEK IT, AND IF THE OTHER SIDE TRULY WANTS PEACE THEN YOU HAVE TO AGREE EVEN IF THIS IS ACTUALLY NOT CLEARLY VISIBLE FROM THE OTHER SIDE. AS I PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE SHIITE COMMUNITY DOES NOT HAVE IDEOLOGY TOWARD THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OR ANY OTHER SOCIETY IN THE WORLD, BUT THEY VIEW THEM ALL AS THE SAME. WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THEM POSITIVELY, COOPERATIVELY FOR THE GREATER GOOD. BUT THE SHIITE IDEOLOGY IS AGGRESSIVE TOWARD THE OCCUPIER. SO FIRST YOU SHOULD CONVINCE THE SHIITE POPULATION THAT AMERICAN FORCES ARE NOT AN OCCUPYING FORCE AND THIS IS VERY HARD. OR CONVINCE THEM THAT AMERICAN FORCES DO NOT WANT TO CONTINUE THE OCCUPATION AND NEED TO WITHDRAW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT THERE ARE SOME OBSTACLES WITH THIS REGARD. ONE OF THE OBSTACLES IS AN UNSTABLE IRAQ IN TERMS OF THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WILLING TO HELP IRAQ IN MANY AREAS AND SHOULD THINK OF HOW THIS COUNTRY COULD PROSPER. MY PERSONAL BELIEF TOWARD THAT GOAL IS TO CORRECT THE PREVIOUS MISTAKES OF THE PAST. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE MANY CIVILIANS WHO HAVE BEEN KILLED BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY

- offensive jihad
allows the Muslim
to decide if war
is necessary
- how do you explain
this then?

OPERATIONS, AND NO ONE HAS BEEN REIMBURSED FOR THIS DAMAGE. ALSO, THERE ARE TOO MANY PRISONERS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED. CONVERSELY, THE ARRESTING METHOD IS STILL CONTINUALLY ACTIVE. THE PROBLEM WITH THE SECURITY SITUATION IS THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM. WITH THIS SITUATION YOU CANNOT BUILD AN ECONOMY OR ESTABLISH ANY GAIN. IF WE ASSUME THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WILL BE IMPROVED OR ESTABLISHED, THEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED. BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IS NO GOOD TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY AND SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS, WE ASSUME THERE MUST BE SOME CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA. I HAVE STATED SOME OBSERVATIONS AND CHANGES AND HAVE CONVEYED SOME THOUGHTS TO MISS TINA IN PREVIOUS STATEMENTS. YOU COULD GO BACK TO MY PREVIOUS STATEMENTS.

WHAT IS LEFT IN THE END IS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH IS THE EASIEST PART OF THE SUBJECT BECAUSE OF THE MANY THOUGHTS AND PROJECTS THAT WE COULD PROVIDE. IT IS ALSO EASY BECAUSE THE IRAQI LANDS HAVE A LOT OF RESOURCES, SKILLS, AND TREASURES WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE IRAQ LIKE GERMANY AND EUROPE. AFTERWARDS, IRAQ WILL BECOME AN IDOL OR SOMETHING, TO FOLLOW ECONOMICALLY OR OTHERWISE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ECONOMICALLY, WE SHOULD REPAIR ALL THE FACTORIES THAT USED TO EXIST BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME, AND THERE ARE SO MANY LIKE THE FOOD FACTORY, MEDICINE FACTORY, ELECTRIC SUPPLIES AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL. THEN WE BUILD NEW PROJECTS THAT COULD BE BENEFICIAL TO EASE PEOPLE'S LIVES. I KNOW THERE ARE A LOT OF FOREIGN INVESTORS WHO WISH TO INVEST INSIDE OF IRAQ AND THERE ARE SO MANY PROJECTS AND THOUGHTS THAT ARE READY TO BE ESTABLISHED HERE. AS I SAID, WHAT IS PREVENTING THEM FROM DOING SO IS THE SECURITY SITUATION.

((END OF TRANSLATION))

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, NZ, CBR~~

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SUBJ SDE TIR 200243-008

(b)(6)

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS SDE TIR 200243-008

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS

INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (U) OF 98 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE

(b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-008

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-03

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 181 00 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM 1.4b EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

1.4b

TO FORCE A WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS. THIS WOULD PLACE AMERICAN FORCES IN A CRITICAL SITUATION AND INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A WITHDRAWAL BY AMERICANS.

ABU MUSTAFAH AL-SHAYBANI IS NOT A SADRIST AND DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW IF HE HAS ANY CONNECTIONS TO THE [1.4b] SHAYBANI IS CONSIDERED BADR.

4) [REDACTED]
5) (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON 1.5(A)

1.4b

SPECIAL GROUPS DOES NOT RECEIVE ANY TECHNICAL TRAINING ON PRODUCING WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVES. THEY CAN COPY THE SMALL EXPLOSIVES BUT THE PROBLEM IS THEY CANNOT COPY THE REMOTES. WITHOUT THE REMOTES THEY HAVE TO USE WIRES AND THAT IS NO GOOD IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT. WIRES ARE FINE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE BUT REMOTE DETONATION IS NEEDED FOR THE CITY AREAS. PLUS, C-4 IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE IN IRAQ SO IT IS MORE PRACTICAL TO SIMPLY BUY THE COMPLETED BOMBS WITH REMOTES. SPECIAL GROUPS HAS REQUESTED TRAINING ON REMOTES BUT WAS DENIED. THE REMOTES ARE AVAILABLE ONLY FROM [1.4b]

THE MOST RESPECTED SHIA LEADERS RANKED FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST ARE AS FOLLOWS.

1) SISTANI

2) [REDACTED]

3) (b)(6)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USC/USAF/USMC/USN~~

SECTION 1 OF 2

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-009 (b)(6)

REFS: 200243-009

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(6) ~~USC~~ § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 211530 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM 1.4b EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED HIS HISTORY WITH MAS
- DETAINEE PROVIDED HIS OPINION ON THE DIRECTION MAS HAS TAKEN IN THE PAST

DETAINEE FIRST CAME TO KNOW MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) IN THE HAWZA SCHOOL IN 1995. DETAINEE AND MAS WERE ON THE RIGHTS THROUGH SHARIA LAW COMMITTEE TOGETHER. THEY CONTINUED THEIR FRIENDSHIP AFTER MUHAMMAD AL-SADR'S DEATH DURING SADDAM'S REGIME. MANY SADRISTS FLED IRAQ BUT DETAINEE AND MAS STAYED. MAS ACCEPTED AND ADHERED TO MUCH OF DETAINEE'S ADVICE WHICH MADE THEIR RELATIONSHIP GROW EVEN MORE.

AFTER MUHAMMAD AL-SADR'S DEATH, THE RIGHTFUL SUCCESSOR WAS AYATOLLAH HA'ARI. HA'ARI APPOINTED MAS AS HIS OVERALL OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHICH GAVE MAS A LOT OF POPULARITY. (b)(6) TOOK MAS'S PLACE AS THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND ADVISED HA'ARI TO KEEP THE SADR OFFICES OPEN AND OPERATE THEM UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE HA'ARI OFFICES. (b)(6) OPENED THE OFFICES OF SAYYID AL HA'ARI AND HA'ARI TOOK CONTROL OF THE OFFICES OF THE MARTYRED SADR. ACCORDING TO SHARIAH LAW, ONCE THE SUCCESSOR TAKES OVER THE OFFICES ARE TO BE CHANGED TO FOLLOW THE SUCCESSOR'S NAME AND REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SUCCESSOR. (b)(6) ADVICE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THE POPULARITY AND POWER OF THE MARTYRED SADR AMONGST THE PEOPLE WHILE STILL MAINTAINING HA'ARI'S POWER. THE OFFICES OF THE MARTYRED SADR TOOK UP CIVIL SERVICES ALL OVER IRAQ WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KURDISTAN AND THE SUNNI TRIANGLE. THESE SERVICES INCLUDED PROTECTING GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, CLEANING THE AREAS UP, TAKING CARE OF TRAFFIC AND GENERAL CIVIL DUTIES. THIS MADE THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYRED SADR VERY POPULAR WITH THE PEOPLE.

(b)(6) 1.4b BUT CONDUCTED HIS STUDIES IN AN NAJAF (b)(6) IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF HA'ARI AND IS QUALIFIED TO BE AN AYATOLLAH BUT HAS NOT DECLARED IT.

WHEN THE TWO BATTLES IN AN NAJAF OCCURRED, HA'ARI WAS NOT IN IRAQ, AND MAS TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUBLICLY PROMOTE HIS SUPPORT FOR RESISTANCE. WITH HIS PREVIOUS POSITION AS AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYRED SADR, HIS FAMILY NAME, AND HIS SIDING WITH THE POPULAR OPINION AT THE TIME PLACED MAS IN A POSITION TO CHALLENGE HA'ARI AND TAKE CONTROL OF THE OFFICES OF THE MARTYRED SADR.

MAS CALLS THE OFFICE HE CONTROLS THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYRED SADR, WHILE MANY PEOPLE CALL IT THE OFFICE OF MUQTADA AL-SADR. MAS USES THE NAME WHICH REFERS BACK TO HIS FATHER IN ORDER TO GIVE RESPECT AND TO MAINTAIN THE FAMILY LINEAGE FOR THE PUBLIC. RIGHTFULLY, THESE OFFICES SHOULD NOT BE UNDER HIS CONTROL ACCORDING TO HIS FATHER'S DECREE OF THE SUCCESSOR AND THEREBY UNDER SHARIAH LAW.

MUQTADA AL-SADR'S OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT IS WHAT MAINTAINS HIS POPULARITY. HE CANNOT COMPETE WITH CURRENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS LIKE HAKIM JAFARI, MALIKI, ETC. BECAUSE THEY HAVE FAR GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICS AND INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. WHEN MAS JOINED THE GOVERNMENT HE LOST POPULARITY AND POWER WITH THE PEOPLE. HE WITHDREW FROM THE GOVERNMENT, TAKING HIS MINISTERS AND LEAVING ONLY HIS PEOPLE IN PARLIAMENT IN ORDER TO MOVE BACK TO AN OPPOSING POSITION WHERE HE COULD REGAIN HIS POPULARITY AND POWER WITH THE PEOPLE. THIS MOVE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GOVERNMENT WAS THE RESULT OF ADVICE FROM (b)(6) (b)(6) IN LEBANON (b)(6) DID THE SAME THING WITH HIS GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON WHICH PRODUCED FAVORABLE RESULTS FOR HIM. MAS IDOLIZES (b)(6) AND ASPIRES TO REACH HIS LEVEL AS A LEADER IN IRAQ.

(b)(6), 1.4b

HARATH AL-DHARI HAS ALREADY EXTENDED HIS WISHES TO CREATE A TRUCE WITH SADR IN ORDER TO THWART [1.4b] IN IRAQ. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES PREVIOUSLY INVITED MAS TO BOLSTER THE SUNNI RELATIONS IN IRAQ, BUT MAS DECLINED THE INVITATION. THE GULF STATES WANT MAS TO SUPPORT THE SUNNI CAUSE TO PRESERVE SUNNI RIGHTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND IN THE GENERAL IRAQI POPULATION. AL-DHARI PLEDGED TO GAIN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR MAS THAT WOULD MATCH [1.4b] FUNDING IN EXCHANGE FOR MAS CUTTING [1.4b] TIES. MAS IS TRYING TO BALANCE HIS POSITION WITH BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO GAIN FROM BOTH [1.4b] AND AL-DHARI.

MAS IS LOOKING TO CREATE HIS OWN GOVERNMENT TO SUITE HIS OWN NEEDS. HE NEEDS TO GAIN SUNNI SUPPORT AND CF SUPPORT IN ORDER TO REMOVE PRIME MINISTER MALIKI FROM THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. THE SUNNI DO NOT LIKE MALIKI AND SADR DOES NOT CARE FOR HIM EITHER DUE TO RECENT POSITIONS MALIKI HAS TAKEN AGAINST SADR.

ONCE MAS GETS EVERYTHING HE WANTS ESTABLISHED HE WILL LEAVE THE COUNTRY ONCE AGAIN. THE FIRST TIME HE LEFT WAS NOT PROPER BECAUSE HE FLED FOR FEAR OF BEING CAPTURED BY CF. THIS WAS PROBABLY FROM THE ADVICE OF [1.4b] WHO IS ALSO SCARED OF BEING CAPTURED BY CF. THIS TIME WHEN MAS LEAVES, HE MUST DO IT RIGHT WHICH MEANS HE WILL NEED AN INVITATION FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY TO VISIT. [1.4b] IS A POTENTIAL TO EXTEND THIS INVITATION. ONCE OUT OF THE COUNTRY, MAS WILL END UP IN [1.4b] AND CLAIM HE NEEDS TO STAY IN [1.4b] TO COMPLETE HIS DEGREE. AT THAT POINT MAS WILL NOT RETURN TO IRAQ.

BEFORE DETAINEE WAS CAPTURED HE FORMED A COMMITTEE OF OLD SADR MEMBERS, FROM MUHAMMAD SADR'S TIME, WHO ARE DISENCHANTED WITH MAS. THE COMMON GOAL AMONG THEM IS TO END THE DICTATORSHIP OF MAS AND RE-ESTABLISH THE RIGHT THINGS IN THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYRED SADR. THE COMMITTEE NEEDS THE BACKING OF AYATOLLAH HA'ARI IN ORDER TO POWER UNDER THE SHARI'A LAW.

DETAINEE WAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO WRITE ABOUT OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS:

1. HOW WOULD MUQTADA AL-SADR HOLD THE SHI'A GROUP TO A CEASEFIRE?
2. HOW WOULD THE [1.4b] INSERT THEIR INFLUENCE TO MAINTAIN INSTABILITY DURING A CEASEFIRE?
3. HOW WOULD MUQTADA A-SADR UNIFY ALL SHI'A GROUPS UNDER ONE UMBRELLA IN ORDER TO DRIVE OUT CF?

1.4b, (b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ?
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAJAG/CAN/NEZ/DDR~~

SECTION 1 OF 2

QQQQ

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-010

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-010

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DD FORMS OR USC § 8507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE:

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 23 2200 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM [1.4b] EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED PLAN TO PREACH AGAINST MUQTADA AL-SADR IN PRISON.

THIS SESSION WAS USED TO CLARIFY THE RECONCILIATION PROGRAM FOR DETAINEE AND CLARIFY THE DESIRED RESULTS FROM HIM AND HIS BROTHER [1.4b] (ISN: 200242). DETAINEE AGREED WITH THE FOLLOWING GOALS FOR HIS PARTICIPATION:

- 1) TAKE POWER FROM MAS AND REDUCE HIS POSITION IN IRAQ.
- 2) BRING AYATOLLAH HA'ARI BACK TO THE PUBLIC EYE AND IN OPPOSITION TO MAS.
- 3) RALLY SUPPORT OF PUBLIC FOR AYATOLLAH HA'ARI TO RESTORE HIS POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHARI'A LAW.
- 4) IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SHI'A COMMUNITY AND CF.
- 5) IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SHI'A COMMUNITY AND GOI.

DETAINEE SEES THREE MAIN PROBLEMS EFFECTING PEACE IN IRAQ. THE VIEW OF FOREIGN FORCES AS OCCUPYING FORCES, PEOPLE SEEKING POWER BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY, AND GANGS KILLING AND KIDNAPPING PEOPLE. THE EASIEST PROBLEM TO SOLVE IS THE GANGS, THEY SHOULD BE CAPTURED AND PUNISHED ACCORDING TO IRAQI LAW. THEY ARE CRIMINALS THAT OPERATE SIMILAR TO THE MAFIA. THE NEXT EASIEST PROBLEM TO SOLVE IS WITH THE VIEW OF OCCUPYING FORCES. CONVINCING THE PEOPLE THAT CF ARE NOT AN OCCUPYING FORCE WILL BE DIFFICULT, BUT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN TWO WAYS.

- 1) CONVINCING THE PEOPLE CF ARE NOT OCCUPIERS AND WANT TO LEAVE

IRAQ BEFORE CF CAN LEAVE CERTAIN GOALS NEED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AND WITHDRAWAL WILL OCCUR. STOP PERFORMING OPERATIONS AS THE PRIMARY AGGRESSOR. OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED BY IRAQI FORCES WITH CF IN SUPPORT. CF SHOULD ALSO STOP PATROLLING THE STREETS INSIDE OF CITIES BECAUSE THAT DRAWS THE ATTACKING FORCES INTO THE CITY AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS ARE KILLED AS A RESULT.

2) CREATE A TREATY WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY LIKE (b)(6). THE TREATY WOULD REASSURE THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ THAT CF WILL WITHDRAW IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE TIME FRAME IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WITH THIS. THE TREATY MUST UTILIZE THE POLITICAL INTERMEDIARY TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE OF CF'S PROMISE TO WITHDRAW AND GIVE HIS OWN PROMISE TO THE PEOPLE THAT IT WILL OCCUR. THE INTERMEDIARY CAN NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE WITH OPPOSITION WHILE THE DESIRED GOALS OF CF ARE ACCOMPLISHED LEADING UP TO THEIR WITHDRAWAL. IN EXCHANGE, CF MIGHT RELEASE THE PRISONERS WITH NO BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS AS A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH. IN ADDITION, CF SHOULD COMPENSATE THE CIVILIANS WHO LOST FAMILY MEMBERS AND PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF THIS WAR.

FOR DETAINEES CONTRIBUTION WHILE IN PRISON, HE CAN LEAD A COMMITTEE INSIDE THE PRISON TO TEACH THE PRISONERS AGAINST MAS. DETAINEE CAN MEET WITH SELECT SHIA RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND MILITARY LEADERS TO COMMUNICATE CF'S INTENTIONS TO WITHDRAW AND MAS' INTENTIONS TO GAIN POWER FOR SELFISH REASONS. THIS WILL HELP CHANGE THE VIEW OF CF AS AN OCCUPYING FORCE AND HELP WITH DETAINEE'S IDEA ON HOW TO BRING AYATOLLAH HA'ARI BACK INTO POWER OF THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYRED SADR.

AYATOLLAH HA'ARI CANNOT ACCOMPLISH OUSTING MAS ON HIS OWN. MAS HAS GROWN TOO POWERFUL WITH THE PEOPLE IN NOT ONLY THE POLITICAL ARENA BUT THE RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL ARENAS AS WELL. DETAINEE SUGGESTS BRINGING (b)(6) BACK TO THE POLITICAL SPOTLIGHT TO OPPOSE MAS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA. (b)(6) WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO MAS IN ORDER TO TAKE SOME OF POWER THERE. OF COURSE AYATOLLAH HA'ARI IS A RESPECTED RELIGIOUS PERSON WHO CAN USE SHARIA LAW TO REGAIN HIS POSITION AND POWER WITHIN OMS WITH THE SUPPORT OF CF AND GOI THESE PEOPLE COULD REDUCE SADR'S POWER AND POPULARITY IN IRAQ DRASTICALLY.

DETAINEE WOULD LIKE TO FORM A COMMITTEE INSIDE OF THE PRISON THAT WOULD PROVIDE OTHER PRISONERS GUIDANCE AGAINST MAS. THIS GUIDANCE WOULD BE BASED ON THE RELIGIOUS PRESTIGE DETAINEE AND THE OTHERS ON THE COMMITTEE HOLD. ADDITIONALLY, DETAINEE WOULD LIKE A MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE THAT HE KNOWS BEGAN SPEAKING AGAINST MAS BEFORE HIS ARREST. THE PRISONERS HE WOULD LIKE ON THE COMMITTEE ARE HASSAN SALIM (MILITARY INFLUENCE IN SADR CITY), HADI AL-DARRAJI (RELIGIOUS / POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN SADR CITY), 'ALINU'MANI (RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN WASSIT), SAYYID 'ADNAN AL-DULAYMI (RELIGIOUS / MILITARY INFLUENCE IN HILAH), AND HAKIM AL-ZAMALI (FORMER DEPUTY HEALTH MINISTER - POLITICAL INFLUENCE).

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****/

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO US: AUCS CAN/MZC/DBR~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-011

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-011

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE REPORTS OF USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200103 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 25 2200 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED PLAN TO PREACH AGAINST MUQTADA AL-SADR IN PRISON.

SOME OF THE SADRISTS FLED FROM IRAQ TO QUM AND HAVE NOT RETURNED. TWO INFLUENTIAL INDIVIDUALS THAT WERE STUDENTS OF MUHAMMAD SADR ARE (b)(6) AND AYATOLLAH FADIL AL-MALIKI. THEY ARE SCHOLARS FROM THE HAWZA SCHOOL IN DIFFERENT SECTIONS THAT BOTH OPPOSE (b)(6) IN IRAQ. (b)(6) HAS BEEN ON TV AND HAS PRODUCED CD'S FOR THE SHIA COMMUNITY.

MAS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM CF IS UNDERSTANDABLE BECAUSE IT IS IN REACTION TO CF OCCUPYING IRAQ. MAS VISITING (b)(6) FOR A FEW DAYS TO A WEEK IS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LONGER PERIODS OF TIME ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. MUHAMMAD BAQIR SADR WAS CLEARLY OPPOSED TO (b)(6) IN IRAQ AND STATED THAT PUBLICLY TO HAVE MAS SPEND SO LONG IN (b)(6) WAS A MISTAKE AND A DAMAGING ACT TO HIS REPUTATION. WHEN CF ANNOUNCED THAT MAS HAD GONE TO (b)(6) THE SADRISTS DID NOT BELIEVE THEM. WHEN (b)(6) ANNOUNCED THE SAME INFORMATION IN A COUNCIL FORMAT IT WAS TAKEN AS REAL. ANNOUNCING SADR'S STRONG TIES TO (b)(6) IN CONFLICT WITH HIS FATHER'S DESIRES, MUST BE ANNOUNCED BY A SADRIST IN ORDER TO BE RECEIVED WELL.

DETAINEE SUGGESTED USING A VIDEO OF MUHAMMAD BAQIR SADR'S SPEECH THAT STATED THE PERSON WHO LEADS THE SHIA PEOPLE IN IRAQ MUST BE AN AYATOLLAH, AT THAT POINT SHOW A PICTURE OF AYATOLLAH HA'ARI. HE CONTINUED THAT THE RELIGIOUS LEADER OF IRAQ CANNOT BE ANYTHING LESS THAN AN AYATOLLAH BECAUSE IT WILL LEAD TO DESTRUCTION, THIS IS WHERE A PICTURE OF MAS CAN BE SHOWN WITH PICTURES OF HIS RESULTING DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ.

DETAINEE ALSO SUGGESTED REOPENING THE HAWZA NEWSPAPER WITH THE PREVIOUS EDITOR, SHAYIKH 'ABBAS AL-RUBAI. CF HAD ORIGINALLY SHUT THE NEWSPAPER DOWN BASED ON ADVICE FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BUT THEN REOPENED THE NEWSPAPER AT A LATER TIME. AL-RUBAI WAS THE PERSONAL SECRETARY OF MUHAMMAD BAQIR SADR AND IS A WELL RESPECTED INDIVIDUAL. AL-RUBAI BEGAN PUBLISHING WRITINGS AGAINST MAS WHICH RESULTED IN MAS SHUTTING THE HAWZA NEWSPAPER DOWN. IF CF APPROACHED AL-RUBAI ABOUT REOPENING THE NEWSPAPER THERE IS A POTENTIAL ANTI MAS PLATFORM WITH WIDE DISTRIBUTION

HAWZA
NEWSPAPER

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA W/NO PUBLISHING~~

Q000

SUBJ SDE TIR 200243-012

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-012

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASESING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE REPORTS FOR USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 26 2200 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM [1.4b] EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY:

DETAINEE DISCUSSED PLAN TO PREACH AGAINST MUQTADA AL-SADR IN PRISON

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAFUS CANAHL GDR~~

Q000

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-013

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-013

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG # NI228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 27 1730 JUN 03

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY

- THIS SESSION FOCUSED ON KIDNAPPING

THE FOCUS OF THIS INTERROGATION WAS ONCE AGAIN (b)(6) DETAINEE CAME UP WITH AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN THAT INVOLVED SPEAKING WITH ONE OF THE OTHER DETAINEES THAT HE WAS CAPTURED WITH AND EXPLAINING HOW TO GET IN CONTACT WITH THE RIGHT PEOPLE. DETAINEE STILL REFUSES TO GIVE INTERROGATOR NAMES FOR ANY OF THE PEOPLE THAT MAY BE CONTACTED BUT IS WILLING TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND NAMES TO ANOTHER IRAQI BEING RELEASED. DETAINEE ALSO REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO RELEASE LAYTH FOR A TWO TO THREE DAY PERIOD WITH THE PROMISE THAT (b)(6) WILL RETURN WITHIN THAT TIME ACCOMPANIED BY (b)(6) IF (b)(6) CANNOT LOCATE HIM THEN HE WILL BRING BACK ANYONE WHO REFUSES TO GIVE (b)(6) UP. IN ADDITION, (b)(6) WILL ALSO BRING BACK A FILE CONTAINING INFORMATION ON AQIZ PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH HIS BROTHER'S KIDNAPPING. THIS FILE WAS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AND CONTAINS DETAILED INFORMATION ON TAWHEED-WA-AL-JIHAD (TWJ) MEMBERS, THE LOCATION OF AN AQIZ PRISON, NAMES, ALONG WITH DESCRIPTIONS AND ADDRESSES OF TWJ MEMBERS.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSC/ANZLDR~~

Q000

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-014

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-014

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD/USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 28 1730 JUN 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM [1.4b] EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

- THIS SESSION FOCUSED ON KIDNAPPING

DETAINEE WAS NOT AWARE OF [1.4b] KIDNAPPING, BUT BASED ON THE AREA HE WAS KIDNAPPED FROM DETAINEE SUSPECTS THE OPERATION WAS CARRIED OUT BY [1.4b] GROUP IN BASRAH. [1.4b] IS A FOLLOWER OF JALIL AL-NURI. [1.4b] IS CURRENTLY IN CF CUSTODY AND DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHO REPLACED [1.4b] WHEN HE WAS CAPTURED. (COLLECTOR COMMENT: DETAINEE LIKELY KNOWS WHO REPLACED [1.4b] BUT THEY MUST NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH DETAINEE'S INTEREST AS HE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM UP)

DETAINEE AND JALIL AL NURI DO NOT HAVE A GOOD RELATIONSHIP. THEY BOTH WENT TO THE SAME HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY BUT CONTINUED DOWN SEPARATE PATHS WHEN DETAINEE WENT TO THE HAWZA. AS DETAINEE MOVED UP THROUGH THE RANKS AND BECAME CLOSE TO THE MARTYRED SADR, JALIL AL-NURI BECAME JEALOUS. AFTER THE FALL OF THE REGIME, JALIL AL-NURI BEGAN SPEAKING AGAINST DETAINEE.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2

REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSC/ANZLDR~~

Q000

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-016

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-016

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD/USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 04 1330 JUL 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM [1.4b] EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED COMMUNICATIONS FOR SPECIAL GROUPS
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED TRANSPORTING WEAPONS ACROSS BORDER

SPECIAL GROUPS IS DIVIDED INTO THREE REGIONS: SOUTHERN, CENTRAL AND BAGHDAD. THERE IS MINIMAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN REGIONS BUT WHEN IT OCCURS IT IS DONE BY CELL PHONE. THE REGIONAL COMMANDERS WOULD CALL DETAINEE IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY WHERE THEY NEEDED SPIRITUAL ADVICE, WEAPONS OR SOMETHING IMPORTANT BUT OTHERWISE DID NOT MAKE ANY CONTACT. THEY WOULD MAKE CONTACT BY MOBILE PHONE EITHER CALLING OR SENDING A TEXT MESSAGE.

1.4b

SHAYIKH JABBAR AND SHAYIKH MUHAMMAD AL-SA'ADI HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY IN

CHARGE OF THE COUNCIL THAT LEADS JAM AND SPECIAL GROUPS FOR ABOUT A YEAR NOW. DETAINEE IS NO LONGER OFFICIALLY IN CHARGE BUT HE IS MORE RESPECTED AND OFTEN CONSULTED MORE BY THE THREE REGIONAL LEADERS THAN JA'BAR OR SA'ADI.

APPROXIMATELY 90% OF THE LEADERSHIP IN JAM AND SPECIAL GROUPS RESPECT DETAINEE MORE THAN MAS WHILE MOST NORMAL JAM MEMBERS RESPECT MAS MORE. THIS WAS THE REASON THAT MAS REPLACED DETAINEE ON THE COUNCIL THAT OVERSEES THE OMS OFFICES, JAM AND SPECIAL GROUPS - FEAR AND JEALOUSY.

MAS ATTEMPTED TO SETUP THE GOLDEN BRIGADES IN THE PAST BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL IN DOING SO. 'ABBAS AL-KHUPI WAS IN CHARGE OF THE BATTALIONS AT THAT TIME BUT HE FLED IRAQ AND WENT TO (b)(6) BECAUSE MANY PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE HIM AND HE FELL OUT OF FAVOR WITH MAS. DETAINEE DOES NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD RETURN TO IRAQ. DETAINEE DOES NOT BELIEVE (b)(6) WOULD RETURN TO IRAQ AND ATTEMPT IN SETTING THIS BRIGADE UP BECAUSE HE IS FEARFUL OF BEING CAPTURED.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANY22/GBR~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-018 (b)(6)

REFS: 200243-018

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD/OSD (b)(3) 90 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: NI228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 11 1730 JUL 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED HIS TRAVELS TO (b)(6)
- DETAINEE DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE PHOTO PRESENTED

DETAINEE TRAVELED FROM IRAQ TO (b)(6) THROUGH (b)(6) APPROXIMATELY FIVE TIMES. HE WAS PICKED UP FROM THE BORDER BY (b)(6) ONCE AND THE OTHER TIMES HE WAS PICKED UP BY ONE OF (b)(6) MEN. (b)(6) WAS THE ONE WHO PICKED DETAINEE UP MOST OFTEN. (b)(6) WORKED FOR (b)(6) FROM (b)(6) WHEN DETAINEE ARRIVED INTO (b)(6) HE WAS TAKEN TO A HOUSE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE RIVER WHERE HE STAYED A FEW HOURS UNTIL HIS FLIGHT TO (b)(6). ONCE THE TIME FOR HIS FLIGHT CAME HE WOULD TRAVEL TO THE AIRPORT IN (b)(6) AND FLY COMMERCIAL AIR TO (b)(6). THE FIRST TIME DETAINEE TRAVELED FROM (b)(6) HE WAS ESCORTED BY (b)(6) AND PICKED UP FROM THE AIRPORT BY (b)(6). DETAINEE FLEW ALONE ON SUCCESSIVE TRIPS AND WAS PICKED UP BY (b)(6) AT THE (b)(6) AIRPORT. (b)(6) WOULD CALL AHEAD AND MAKE SURE (b)(6) HAD THE INFORMATION TO COLLECT DETAINEE FROM THE AIRPORT. ONCE IN (b)(6) DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO AN APARTMENT ON THE NORTH SIDE OF (b)(6) BUT INSIDE OF THE CITY LIMITS. THE APARTMENT FACED THE MOUNTAINS AND WAS IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA. THERE WAS A MOSQUE TO THE WEST OF THE BUILDING BUT DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE NAME OF THE MOSQUE IS.

(b)(6), 1.4b

VARIED BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC BUT DID NOT TAKE MORE THAN TWO HOURS ON ANY OF THE TRIPS

1.4b, (b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANNZLOR~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-019 (b)(6) TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-019

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(3)(B) USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO. 200243-019

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CATEGORY: 2A

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1238A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

INTERROGATOR: CC

DATE/TIME: 14 1730 JUL 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

INTERPRETER: SA

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM 1.4b EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED DECENTRALIZED NATURE OF SPECIAL GROUPS
- DETAINEE REITERATED HIS STORY FOR NIGHT OF CAPTURE

ASA'IB AL-HAQ IS A MEDIA GROUP THAT WORKS FOR EITHER (b)(6) OR THE AL-KHOMEINI GROUP. THERE ARE NUMEROUS MEDIA GROUPS THAT OPERATE WITH INSURGENT GROUPS. GROUPS THAT OPERATE WITH SHIA ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT USE THE NAME OF THE GROUP THEY ARE WORKING WITH BUT CHOOSE A SHIA NAME OF THEIR OWN THAT ARE NOT RELATED TO ANY MILITARY GROUP. JAM SPECIAL GROUPS IS A DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION WITH COMMANDERS IN EACH OF THE THREE REGIONS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED. EACH REGION SELECTS THEIR OWN MEDIA GROUP AND THE TYPE OF MEDIA OPERATIONS THEY WANT TO CONDUCT.

INITIALLY, SPECIAL GROUPS WAS THE OFFICIAL NAME OF THE ORGANIZATION DETAINEE LEADS. BECAUSE THERE WERE NUMEROUS OTHER ORGANIZATIONS THAT REACHED 50 IN ARMED PERSONNEL AND BEGAN CALLING THEMSELVES SPECIAL GROUPS, MAS CHANGED THE NAME OF THE OFFICIAL JAM SPECIAL GROUPS TO SPECIAL BATTALIONS.

THERE WERE PLANS TO CREATE A SADR TREND SATELLITE TV CHANNEL CALLED KUPAH. THIS WAS AGREED UPON BETWEEN MAS AND 1.4b BUT NO STATION HAS BEEN CREATED YET.

THE NIGHT DETAINEE WAS CAPTURED HE WAS PRESENT AT THE HOME IN PREPARATION FOR A FUNERAL TO OCCUR THE NEXT DAY. DETAINEE WAS ALSO

AT THE HOME TO MEET WITH TWO OF THE REGIONAL LEADERS OF SPECIAL GROUPS. (b)(6) ALONG WITH THE 14b ADVISOR. (b)(6) THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS A PLAN THAT (b)(6) HAD COME TO PRESENT BUT DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THAT PLAN WAS. DETAINEE DENIES ANY PRIOR DISCUSSION OF THE PLAN OR KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IT INVOLVED. THERE WAS ALSO SUPPOSED TO BE A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE STRUCTURE AND BREAKDOWN OF SPECIAL GROUPS TO CLOSER RESEMBLE 14b. 14b DETAINEE WAS CAPTURED BEFORE THE MEETING WAS TO OCCUR. (COLLECTOR'S COMMENT: DETAINEE RECALLED THAT THERE WERE MAPS AND PICTURES OF PLACES IN 14b. END COMMENT.)

DETAINEE SUSPECTS THAT IF MAS LEFT IRAQ TO GO TO 14b IN SECRET HE WILL BE GONE FOR THE SEASON OF RAMADAN. BECAUSE HE LEFT IN SECRET THERE IS STILL A GOOD CHANCE THAT HE WILL RETURN BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL RETURN BEFORE THE END OF RAMADAN.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANNZLDBR~~

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SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-020 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-020

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(3) (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-020

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: NL278A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 200100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 151530 JUL 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM 14b. EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DESCRIBED THE IMAM KHUMAYNI TRAINING CAMP

DETAINEE VISITED THE IMAM KHUMAYNI CAMP APPROXIMATELY TWO TO TWO AND A HALF HOURS EAST OF 14b. THE CAMP WAS USED TO TRAIN IRAQI INSURGENTS AND DETAINEE WENT TO THE CAMP TO VISIT AND RECEIVE TRAINING ON THE KALASHNIKOV RIFLE. THE CAMP IS IN AN AGRICULTURAL AREA THAT IS BORDERED BY MOUNTAINS TO THE NORTH. DETAINEE CANNOT REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE TOWN NEAR THE CAMP.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAF/USC/AMC/USC/USC~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-021 (b)(6) TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-021

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE REPORTS. USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-021

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 18 1530 JUL 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DESCRIBED THE ABU AYTA TRIBE

THE ABU AYTA TRIBE IS A SUB-TRIBE OF THE MUHAMMADAWI TRIBE. THE ABU AYTA TRIBE LIVES IN THE MARSH LANDS ALONG THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER NEAR AL-AMARAH. THERE ARE TRIBAL MEMBERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER AND THEIR CONSIDERED BEDOUINS. THEY LIVE A 100% TRADITIONAL TRIBAL LIFESTYLE AND DO NOT CARE ABOUT LAWS. SADDAM HUSAYN COULD NOT CONTROL THEM AND HE DRAINED THE MARSH LANDS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THEM BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. THEY ARE SMUGGLERS WHO ARE NOT MOTIVATED BY ANYTHING OTHER THAN MONEY. THEY SMUGGLE MONEY, PEOPLE AND ANYTHING ELSE ACROSS THE BORDER. GHARRAWI AND MANY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS USE THIS TRIBE TO MOVE ITEMS BOTH IN AND OUT OF IRAQ. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW OF THIS TRIBE WORKING WITH THE (b)(6) GOVERNMENT BUT SUSPECTS THAT THEY DEAL WITH A POINT OF CONTACT IN THE GOVERNMENT TO FILL SMUGGLING NEEDS AS NECESSARY. AYTA MEANS SHOUT AND THIS TRIBE IS KNOWN TO CAUSE TROUBLE. ABU AYTA TRIBE IS SHIA AND WELL KNOWN BY ALL SHIA. THEY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN CLASHES WITH THE IRAQI ARMY DURING SADDAM HUSAYN'S REGIME. (SOURCE COMMENT: THEY ARE BARBARIANS, IF TWO ABU AYTA WOMEN GET INTO A FIGHT THEY USE MORTARS AND RPG'S AGAINST EACH OTHER. THEY'RE DANGEROUS. END COMMENT) THE ABU AYTA TRIBE WILL NOT LEAVE THE MARSH LANDS BECAUSE THEY CANNOT SURVIVE AWAY FROM THE WATER. THEIR ANIMALS LIKE WATER BUFFALO NEED TO BE CLOSE TO WATERWAYS TO STAY HYDRATED AND ALIVE. ALSO, THE TRIBE HAS A DIET WHICH IS VERY DEPENDENT ON FISH AND OTHER WATER CREATURES. SADDAM WAS UNABLE TO MOVE HEAVY EQUIPMENT AGAINST THE ABU AYTA TRIBE BECAUSE OF THE WATERWAYS BEING A NATURAL DEFENSE.

MUHAMMAD AL-URABI IS THE SHAYIKH OF THE MUHAMMADAWI TRIBE. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHO THE TRIBAL LEADER OF THE ABU AYTA TRIBE IS.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2

REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO US/AMERICAN EYES ONLY~~

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SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-022 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-022

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE REPORTS. USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

REPORT NO. 200243-022

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 20 1330 JUL 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON GHARRAWI NETWORK
- DETAINEE REVIEWED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN (b)(6) AND MUQTADA
AL-SADR.

GHARRAWI TRIES TO KEEP HIS NETWORK INDEPENDENT SO HE IS NOT RELIANT
ON ANY GOVERNMENT OR ORGANIZATION. THERE ARE TWO PRIMARY SECTIONS,
ONE IN (b)(6) AND THE OTHER IN AL-AMARRAH, IRAQ. GHARRAWI
SELECTS THE PEOPLE WHO WORK IN HIS NETWORK. THE PEOPLE IN (b)(6) ARE
CLOSE FRIENDS OF GHARRAWI AND HAVE BEEN PART OF HIS NETWORK SINCE THE
EARLY 1980'S. THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT IN IRAQ IS (b)(6) WHO
HAS A STAFF WORKING IN AL-AMARRAH THAT DELIVERS TO ALL PROVINCES IN
IRAQ. (b)(6) IS OFFICIALLY A MEMBER OF SPECIAL GROUPS BUT HE
EFFECTIVELY RECEIVES HIS ORDERS FROM GHARRAWI. (b)(6) CAN BE
CONTACTED BY PHONE OR BY PERSONAL MESSENGER. (b)(6) NORMALLY
RECEIVES THE WEAPONS AT THE BORDER BUT OCCASIONALLY IS TOLD TO GO
PICKUP THE WEAPONS FROM BADR. SOME BADR PEOPLE HAVE DIRECT CONTACT
WITH GHARRAWI AND BRING WEAPONS IN TO DISTRIBUTE IN IRAQ. (b)(6)
NOT ONLY DEALS WITH SADRISTS BUT NUMEROUS GROUPS IN IRAQ.

SHAYRANI AND GHARRAWI ARE FRIENDS BUT RUN SEPARATE NETWORKS WHICH DO
COOPERATE TOGETHER AT TIMES.

MUHAMMAD TABTABA' IS A SPIRITUAL LEADER WITH NO MILITARY OR
POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS. MAS PREVIOUSLY PROHIBITED (b)(6) FROM
DEALING WITH ANY MILITARY UNITS SO HE COULD MAINTAIN HIS FOCUS ON
FRIDAY PRAYER. DETAINEE DOES NOT BELIEVE (b)(6) WOULD HAVE
ANYTHING TO DO WITH SPECIAL GROUPS BECAUSE HE IS A PEACEFUL MAN WHO

IS FOR THE RELIGION ALONE. ADDITIONALLY, DETAINEE DOES NOT BELIEVE
IT IS IN TABTABA'S NATURE TO DEAL WITH SPECIAL GROUPS.

(b)(6) SPOKE WITH DETAINEE ABOUT MAS SHORTLY BEFORE A
FRIDAY PRAYER AND (b)(6) USED SOME OF THE MATERIAL FOR HIS SPEECH
IN THE AL-KHUFIA MOSQUE TO PREACH AGAINST MAS. (b)(6) GAVE A
SPEECH NOW KNOWN AS "THE SPEECH OF THE CALF." THIS SPEECH SPOKE OF A
BULL WHO WAS EQUIVALENT TO AN AYATOLLAH AND RIGHTFULLY CAPABLE OF
RUNNING THE COUNTRY FROM A RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE, IN COMPARISON TO A
CALF TRYING TO RUN THE COUNTRY IN THE PLACE OF A BULL. AN AYATOLLAH
IS A COMPLETE PERSON WITH ALL THE NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS BUT
A CALF ONLY HAS ASPIRATIONS TO BE A BULL ONE DAY. (b)(6) NEVER
MENTIONED MAS BUT THE INFERENCE WAS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO EVERYONE.
MAS BLAMED DETAINEE FOR THIS SPEECH AND ORDERED (b)(6) TO
ASSASSINATE DETAINEE. MAS BLAMED DETAINEE BECAUSE 3-4 YEARS PRIOR
DETAINEE AND MAS HAD A SIMILAR CONVERSATION ABOUT THE COMPARISON OF
HE CALF AND BULL THAT MAS REMEMBERED.

BEFORE DETAINEE WAS CAPTURED HE WAS TRYING TO PULL SENIOR LEADERSHIP
AWAY FROM MAS IN ORDER TO WEAKEN HIS POSITION. THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP
WAS REFERRED TO AS TIER ONE BECAUSE THEY HAD DIRECT ACCESS TO THE
MARTYRED MUHAMMAD SADIQ AL-SADR AND HIS TEACHINGS. THE ONLY TIER ONE
WHO REMAINED WAS SHAYIKH JABBAR WHILE ALL THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP HAS
BEEN SELECTED FROM THE SECOND AND THIRD TIERS OF SADRISTS. (b)(6)
(b)(6) WAS A SECOND OR THIRD TIER PERSON BUT IS NOW FIRST TIER
WITH MAS.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

CALF & BULL

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USCANNEL ODR~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-023 (b)(6) TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-023

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (S) FOR USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-023

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 24 1330 JUL 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DESCRIBED THE TUNNEL SYSTEM IN AL-NAJAF
- DETAINEE PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON THE GHARRAWI NETWORK

SHAH'ABBAS SAFAYI FROM (b)(6) BUILT AN UNDERGROUND CANAL CALLED THE SHAH'ABBAS CANAL FROM THE EUPHRATES, IN KHUFAH, UP TO AL-NAJAF. THE CANAL IS APPROXIMATELY TEN KILOMETERS IN DISTANCE AND ALL UNDERGROUND. THE ELEVATION GRADE FROM KHUFAH TO AL-NAJAF IS UP HILL ALL THE WAY. THERE IS A DROP-OFF IN ELEVATION JUST PAST THE IMAM 'ALI SHRINE WHERE THE CANAL ENDED. WHEN THE CANAL REACHED AL-NAJAF IT WAS SPLIT IN BRANCHES TO REACH THE HOUSES. THERE ORIGINALLY WERE NO HOUSES IN AL-NAJAF BECAUSE THERE WAS NO RIVER OR WATER SUPPLY THERE. ONCE THE UNDERGROUND CANAL WAS CONSTRUCTED THERE WERE NUMEROUS HOUSES BUILT AROUND THE SHRINE. THE HOUSES ARE BROKEN DOWN INTO FOUR AREAS, AL-HUWAYSH, AL-LEBRAK, AL-IMARRAH, AND AL-MISHRAK. PEOPLE LIVING IN THESE AREAS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE NATIVES TO AL-NAJAF, ANYONE LIVING OUTSIDE OF THESE AREAS IS JUST VISITING.

BECAUSE OF THE INTENSE HEAT IN AL-NAJAF MOST OF THE HOUSES HAVE BASEMENTS. SOME HOUSES HAVE BASEMENTS THAT ARE ONE, TWO OR THREE FLOORS DEEP INTO THE GROUND. THE HOUSES IN AL-HUWAYSH, AL-LEBRAK, AL-IMARRAH, AND AL-MISHRAK AREAS HAVE TUNNELS THAT GO FROM BASEMENT TO BASEMENT BETWEEN MOST OF THE HOUSES. THESE TUNNELS WERE ORIGINALLY INTENDED FOR THE WOMEN OF THE AREA TO GO FROM HOUSE TO HOUSE TO VISIT OTHER WOMEN WITHOUT GOING OUTSIDE TO BE SEEN. THE 20TH BRIGADE USED THE TUNNELS TO EVADE THE BRITISH AND CONTINUE FIGHTING.

THE SECOND IN CHARGE OF THE GHARRAWI ORGANIZATION IN (b)(6) IS (b)(6)

(b)(6) STAYS IN AL-AMARRAH WHILE IN IRAQ AND IT IS UNKNOWN WHERE HE STAYS IN (b)(6). (b)(6) IS THE MAIN CONTACT FOR THE GHARRAWI NETWORK IN IRAQ WITH THREE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAPPEN TO BE THE THREE REGIONAL COMMANDERS FOR SPECIAL GROUPS. THERE IS A CONSTANT NEED FOR WEAPONS FOR SPECIAL GROUPS AND TYPICALLY THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDERS, UNDER THE REGIONAL COMMANDERS CONTACT (b)(6) DIRECTLY TO SUBMIT THESE REQUESTS. NEITHER THE REGIONAL OR PROVINCIAL COMMANDERS HAVE A DIRECT ACCESS TO CONTACTS IN (b)(6) WHEN PROVINCIAL COMMANDERS NEED WEAPONS THEY CONTACT THE REGIONAL COMMANDER BY CELL PHONE OR TEXT MESSAGE TO ARRANGE A MEETING. THE SAME COMMUNICATION METHOD IS USED TO CONTACT (b)(6) AS WELL.

THE ABU AYTA TRIBE SMUGGLES WEAPONS AND PEOPLE ACROSS THE BORDER TO AND FROM (b)(6) IRAQ. GHARRAWI USES THE ABU AYTA TRIBE TO TRANSPORT WEAPONS AND THE SHAYBANI NETWORK POSSIBLY USES THEM TOO BUT DETAINEE IS NOT 100% SURE ON SHAYBANI. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW OF THE ABU AYTA TRIBE SMUGGLING ANYTHING FOR SUNNIS OR SMUGGLING SUNNI PEOPLE ACROSS THE BORDER. DETAINEE SUSPECTS THAT IF THERE IS ANY SUPPORT GOING TO SUNNIS FROM (b)(6) IT WOULD BE DONE THROUGH THE BADR ORGANIZATION. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW OF ANY COOPERATIVE EFFORT BETWEEN SUNNI AND SHI'A IN ANY REGARD WHERE WEAPONS OR TRAINING IS CONCERNED. DETAINEE DOES THINK IT IS LOGICAL FOR SHI'A AND SUNNI TO WORK TOGETHER THROUGH THE BADR ORGANIZATION WHEN IT COMES TO SMUGGLING WEAPONS INTO IRAQ. THIS OPINION IS BASED OFF THE FACT THAT (b)(6) IS KNOWN ON OCCASION TO RETRIEVE WEAPONS FROM BADR BY ORDER OF GHARRAWI. DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE TO SUPPORT THIS THEORY BUT PRESENTED IT AS A LOGICAL CONCLUSION.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2

REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/AFSCAN/2100R~~

Q000

SUBJ SDE TIR 200243-025 (b)(6)

REFS 200243-025

NOTE MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOWRY 98 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS NONE

SHAYIKH UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 09 1530 AUG 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS

1.4c

DETAINEE ONLY KNOWS OF ONE SHIA GROUP THAT WOULD HAVE THE SKILL AND CAPABILITY TO ATTACK CF AIRCRAFT. THE KHOMENEINI GROUP, IRAQIS WITH OLD AND LONG STANDING RELATIONS WITH (b)(6) IS THE MOST LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN AN ATTACK ON A CF HELICOPTER.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

Q000

SUBJ SDE TIR 200243-027 (b)(6)

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS SDE TIR 200243-027

NOTE MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOWRY 98 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS NONE

SHEIKH UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME 17 1930 SEP 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYRED SADR

THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYRED SADR (OMS) HAS A POLITICAL COMMITTEE THAT IS RUN BY ABD-AL-MAHDI AL-MUTAYRI AKA ABU FIRAS AL-MUTAYRI. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE CONTROLS ALL OF THE SADRIST POLITICAL OFFICIALS INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (GOI). THERE ARE STILL 30 SADRISTS INSIDE THE GOI AS PARLIAMENT MEMBERS. THESE PARLIAMENT MEMBERS INCLUDE PEOPLE SUCH AS BAHÄ AL-ARAJI, NASSAR AL-RUBA'I, FILAH HASSAN AL-SHINAYSHIN AND SALAM AL-MALIKI. ALL OF THESE PEOPLE ARE POLITICIANS AND ARE NOT RELIGIOUS LEADERS, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN TO THE HAWZA BUT DO FOLLOW THE RELIGION LIKE MOST IRAQIS.

THE DAWAH PARTY IS DIVIDED INTO THREE SECTIONS OR PARTIES KNOWN AS THE CENTRAL DAWAH PARTY, DAWAH TANZIM AL-IRAQ AND ANSAR AL-DAWAH. THE CENTRAL DAWAH PARTY IS LEAD BY NURI AL-MALIKI, DAWAH AL-TANZIM IS LEAD BY ABD-AL-KARIM AL-AYNAYZI, AND ANSAR AL-DAWAH IS LEAD BY JAFARI. AS A WHOLE, ALL THREE SECTIONS AGREE ON MAIN POINTS FOR POLITICAL GOALS IN IRAQ, BUT EACH SECTION OR PARTY HAS THEIR OWN REPRESENTATION IN THE GOVERNMENT. NONE OF THE DAWAH PARTIES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE SADRISTS BUT THERE IS LONG STANDING TIES BETWEEN THE OMS AND DAWAH BASED ON THE PARTY ORIGINS WITH MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR. OMS AND DAWAH HAVE DIFFERENT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND HAVE HAD DISPUTES IN THE PAST. THEIR RELATIONSHIP IS SOMETIMES GOOD AND OTHER TIMES IT IS BAD.

THE FADILAH PARTY IS CONSIDERED TO BE SADRISTS. THE FADILAH PARTY IS LEAD BY (b)(6) BUT THE ROOTS OF THE PARTY COME FROM MUHAMMAD SADR. THE PARTY SPLIT A LONG TIME AGO AND (b)(6) SPLIT OFF FROM MUHAMMAD SADR.

SEE DUNE.F
DU FADILAH

THE SARKHIYIN ARE CONSIDERED TO BE SADKISTS AND ARE LEAD BY (b)(6)
(b)(6) THEY ARE NOT A POLITICAL PARTY AND DO NOT HAVE ANY POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION IN THE GOI.

THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF OMS RECEIVES DIRECTION FROM THE NAJAF OMS
THIS DIRECTION IS THEN PASSED ONTO THE POLITICIANS IN THE GOI TO
FOLLOW THROUGH. THE PARLIAMENT MEMBERS ARE THE ONES WHO ACTUALLY DO
THE WORK AND IMPLEMENT ANY ORDERS. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE ONLY
PROVIDES OVERSIGHT AND SUPERVISES THE POLITICIANS.

DETAINEE WAS GIVEN A HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT TO WRITE ABOUT THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS

- 1) HOW CAN THE GOI WORK BETTER WITH OMS?
- 2) IF MAS GAINS A POSITION IN THE GOI, HOW WOULD THIS AFFECT THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOI AND OMS?

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJZ
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USC/USC/USC/USC~~

Q000

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-028 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-028

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4b
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG # NI2284-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 28 0300 SEP 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY

DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE IDEA BEHIND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON
SISTANI AND HIS CLERICS.

AYATOLLAH SISTANI IS THE MOST POWERFUL AYATOLLAH IN IRAQ. HE IS IN
CHARGE OF THE HAWZA IN NAJAF WHERE HE LIVES. HE IS ALWAYS SURROUNDED
BY PEOPLE WHO LOVE HIM AND PROTECT HIM FROM HARM. THE RECENT
ASSASSINATION OF SISTANI'S CLERICS IS AN ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN SISTANI
AND DISRUPT THE GROWING CONVERGENCE UNDER SISTANI. THE SHIA
POPULATION IS BEGINNING TO COME TOGETHER UNDER SISTANI AND GIVE HIM
THE RESPECT OF A RELIGIOUS LEADER. MAS HAS IMPROVED HIS RELATIONSHIP
WITH SISTANI AFTER CHANGING HIS VIEW TO SEE SISTANI AS A USEFUL ALLY.

DETAINEE BELIEVES THAT THE PEOPLE TRYING TO KILL SISTANI MAY BE
BACKED BY (b)(6) 1.4b BECAUSE THE SUNNIS ARE NOT ALIGNED TOGETHER
AND THERE IS NO OVERALL LEADER. THE SUNNIS ARE NOT EFFECTIVE IN
GAINING POWER IN THE GOVERNMENT OR TERRITORIES IN IRAQ. IN CONTRAST,
THE SHIA ARE BEGINNING TO ALIGN TOGETHER UNDER SISTANI AND CREATE A
UNITED FRONT. ANOTHER SUNNI NATION LIKE (b)(6) 1.4b WOULD BENEFIT
IN GETTING RID OF SISTANI BY CREATING DISORDER AND FIGHTING AMONGST
THE SHIA. WITHOUT SISTANI, THERE WOULD BE A FIGHT FOR POWER AND THE
SHIA WOULD BE IN THE SAME STATE AS THE SUNNI. TAKING OUT SISTANI
RESTORES BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO ISLAMIC SECTS AND GIVE THE SUNNIS A
CHANCE TO GAIN POWER IN IRAQ. (b)(6) 1.4b COULD ALSO BENEFIT FROM SISTANI
BEING ASSASSINATED; AYATOLLAH KHAMENI WOULD BE THE HIGHEST AYATOLLAH
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE IRAQIS MAY NEVER FOLLOW HIM BUT IT WOULD
GIVE (b)(6) 1.4b THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK INTO THEM DOING SO.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJZ REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANNZGBR~~

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SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-029 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-029

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOCUMENTS ON
REPORTING (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507, 1.4c

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 29 1530 SEP 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PICC

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE RESULTS IF SISTANI WERE MARTYRED

THE TYPE OF GOVERNMENT SEEN IN IRAN IS NOT LIKELY TO OCCUR IN IRAQ.
THERE ARE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN THE SHI'A SECT OF ISLAM; THE
WILAYAH AL-'AMA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT BELIEVES THAT RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS
MUST BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS. THIS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IS PRESERVED BY
AYATOLLAH FADLALLAH IN LEBANON, AYATOLLAH KHAMENI IN IRAN AND
AYATOLLAH HA'IRI IN IRAQ. THE MARTYRED MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR AND
MARTYRED MUHAMMAD SADIQ AL-SADR WERE BOTH FROM THIS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
AS WELL. DETAINEE AND MAS ARE FROM THE SAME LINE OF THOUGHT AS WELL.
THE SECOND SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IS THE (b)(6) THAT BELIEVES
RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO GET DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH
POLITICS. UNDER THIS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT, RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS CAN
ADVISE POLITICIANS BUT CANNOT BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE DECISION
MAKING PROCESS. BASED ON THEIR RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION AND
UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM, IT IS FORBIDDEN TO BE A WALI AL-'AM. THIS
SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IS PRESERVED BY (b)(6)

(b)(6)

IN THE EVENT THAT SISTANI WERE TO BECOME MARTYRED THERE WOULD BE A
GREAT DEAL OF TURMOIL IN THE SHI'A COMMUNITY. THE IRAQI PEOPLE STILL
WOULD NOT ACCEPT AYATOLLAH KHAMENI AS THE WALI AL-'AM IN IRAQ.
AYATOLLAH HA'IRI IS THE ONLY PERSON IN IRAQ WITH ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO
CLAIM WALI AL-'AM OF IRAQ BUT HIS HEALTH IS TOO WEAK FOR HIM TO TAKE
THE POSITION. PEOPLE STILL RESPECT HIM BUT WOULD NOT SUPPORT HIM AS
THE WALI AL-'AM WHEN HE SEEMS WEAK IN PHYSICAL APPEARANCE. AYATOLLAH
KHAMENI COULD BE DECLARED WALI AL-'AM FOR ALL SHI'A IN IRAQ AND (b)(6)
IF BOTH (b)(6) AND MAS BOTH DECLARED KHAMENI AS THE
WALI AL-'AM. GIVEN (b)(6) OBVIOUS DEVOTION AND SUPPORT TO KHAMENI,

MAS WOULD BE THE KEY TO KHAMENI'S SUCCESS IN BECOMING WALI AL-'AM FOR
ALL SHI'A

AS LONG AS SISTANI IS AROUND AS THE SUPREME SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADER IN
IRAQ THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF VELEYAT-E FAQIL COMING TO FRUITION.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUS/CANZL/GBR~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-030 (b)(6) TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-030

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(3) 96 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 01 1530 OCT 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE TALKED ABOUT (b)(6) 1.4b IRAQI RELATIONS AMONG COMMON PEOPLE

1.4b, (b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUS/CANZL/GBR~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-032 (b)(6) TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-032

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(3) 96 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 10 1530 OCT 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY:

- TRANSLATION OF DETAINEE'S PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL TO WORK ON SECTARIAN ISSUES INSIDE THE PRISON.

((TRANSCRIPTION BELOW))

COUNCIL OF BROTHERHOOD AND RECONCILIATION

IN THE NAME OF ALMIGHTY

GOD SAID IN HIS HOLY BOOK, "THE BELIEVERS ARE BROTHERS, MAKE PACIFICATION BETWEEN YOUR BROTHERS". GOD MOST HIGH IS TRUE

THE IRAQI PEOPLE ARE EXCEPTIONAL FROM THE ANCIENT HISTORY, BECAUSE OF THE RELIGION, NATIONAL, SECTARIAN DIVERSE FORMATIVE, EVEN INTELLECTUALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY ARE DIVERSE, IN THIS GREAT COUNTRY EXIST ALL MONOTHEISM RELIGION, LIKE JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM AND COEXIST THE ARABS, KURDS AND TURKMEN THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES ON THIS LAND, THRIVED ALL SECTARIAN ISLAMIC BELIEFS BETWEEN THE SUNNI AND THE SHITE. ALSO, EXPLORE ALL KINDS OF IDEOLOGY FROM THE ANCIENT DAYS TO MODERATE TIMES, ALL THIS DIVERSITY WAS THE SOURCE OF STRENGTH, UNITY, AND SOLIDARITY, ADDING TO THESE FACTORS THE UNITY OF IRAQI TRIBE AND SOCIAL MAKEUP OF IRAQI FAMILY THAT WAS A FACTOR UNTIL VERY RECENT TIMES, ONE LAND ONE PEOPLE, HOMOGENEOUS IN SPITE OF THE CATASTROPHE AND DISASTERS WHICH THIS COUNTRY WENT THROUGH, THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY JUST LIKE THE OCCURRENCE NOW IN SPITE OF ALL THIS AND THE VICIOUSNESS OF THE CONSPIRACY OF OTHERS, AND THE VULGARITY OF THE ATTACK FROM EVERYWHERE, IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, THE UNITY OF IRAQI PEOPLE REFUSES TO BE SEPARATED OR SPORADIC, COPING WITH SADNESS, PAIN, CONFUSION, AND EXTREME SUFFERING IN SOME PARTS OF

THIS LAND BUT THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE NOT LOWERED TO A CIVIL WAR WHICH WAS CONSPIRED BY ITS ENEMY, NOR (DID THEY) ACCEPT THE IDEA OF DIVIDING THE COUNTRY. IT IS OBVIOUS IN EVERY IRAQI CONSCIENCE AND PATRIOT'S HEART, A FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY AND IMPORTANCE OF UNITY, HOLINESS OF HIS RELIGION AND NATIONALISM, FOR THOSE REASONS WHICH LED FREE MEN OF IRAQ, WHO ARE IN DETENTION AND PRESENT TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF THEIR PEOPLE AND COUNTRY, TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE REASON OR THE CAUSE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION THAT APPLIED TO THE NEEDS OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE. BY EXPLORING WAYS TO EXECUTE THE REMEDY WHICH IS BADLY NEEDED, BY STARTING THIS SMALL PROJECT WITH AMBITION TO MAKE IT BIGGER AND WIDER TO INVOLVE ALL FABRICS OF IRAQI SOCIETY, HOPING THAT IRAQ WILL BECOME FREE AND INDEPENDENT FOR ALL IRAQIS. THROUGH PARLIAMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND BY ADDRESSING THE ISSUE WITH OUR GROUP, WE CAME TO THIS CONCLUSION:

FIRST, CREATE A COUNCIL OF BROTHERHOOD AND RECONCILIATION, TO BE FORMED, FROM ALL SECTS, TRIBES, (POLITICAL) PARTIES, WHICH WILL TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY ON THEIR SHOULDERS TO INVOKE THE SPIRIT OF LOVE, FORGIVENESS, BROTHERHOOD BETWEEN IRAQI PEOPLE, REPAIRING THE DAMAGED BUILDINGS THAT ARE IN RUINS AS A MATTER OF UNITY, AVOIDING THE PREVIOUS MISTAKES, STANDING AGAINST WHOMEVER TRIES TO DRILL A WEDGE BETWEEN THESE GOOD PEOPLE. THIS COUNCIL IS TO BE FORMED FROM WELL-KNOWN CLERGY LEADERS, POLITICIANS, AND TRIBAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PRISONS, WHO ARE CONFIDENT IN THEIR CAPABILITY TO POSITIVELY INFLUENCE IN THEIR ARENA, WITH THOUGHTS IN FEW POINTS:

- 1 - THIS COUNCIL WILL ENJOY DEPENDENCY FOR ITS PATRIOT'S HOLINESS BECAUSE OF THE NOBILITY OF ITS GOAL.
- 2 - THIS COUNCIL WILL COORDINATE ITS ACTIVITY WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT, AND IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FOLLOWING THE SUBJECTS TO EXECUTE THE AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BE AGREED UPON.
- 3 - THE FIRST STEP OF THE ACTIVITY OF THIS COUNCIL TO BE STARTED FROM THE AMERICAN AND IRAQI PRISONS, AND AFTER ACHIEVING THE SUCCESSFULNESS IN THE MATTER, AND THEN WE APPLY THIS EXPERIENCE TO OUTSIDE THE WALLS.
- 4 - THE FORMATION OF THE COUNCIL WILL BE MADE FROM THREE BODIES:
 - A) MUSLIM CLERGY FROM ALL SECTS
 - B) TRIBAL BODY LEADERS,
 - C) POLITICAL BODY OF ALL DIFFERENT GROUPS AND PARTIES
- 5 - AS THE FIRST STAGE FOR THE COUNCIL TO HAVE REPRESENTATION BY ITS MEMBERS IN ALL AMERICAN AND IRAQI PRISONS, AND THE SECOND STAGE WILL BE IN ALL IRAQI CITIES COUNTIES AND LOCAL JAILS.
- 6 - TO PERMIT THE COUNCIL TO ACCEPT MEMBERS FROM OUTSIDE COMMUNITIES, IF THE COUNCIL APPROVES THEM.
- 7 - THE COUNCIL WILL GUARANTEE THE DIGNITY AND FREEDOM OF BELIEF AND FREE THINKING TO ALL IRAQIS.
- 8 - WRITING THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS ORGANIZATION BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE MEMBERS IN ORDER TO ORGANIZE ITS ACTIVITY.

PEACE BE WITH

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SHEIKH QAYIS AL-KHAZALI
25TH RAMADAN 1428 HU
6 OF OCTOBER 2007

((END OF TRANSCRIPTION))

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON 1 5(A)

Approved for Release

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANNZLDR~~

SECTION 1 OF 2

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-033 (b)(6) TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-033

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(5) USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)
ALIAS: NONE
SHEIKH: UNKNOWN
CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02
DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07
DATE/TIME: 20 1530 OCT 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY

- TRANSLATION OF DETAINEES PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL CONSTITUTION

((TRANSLATION BELOW))

BROTHERHOOD COUNCIL AND RECONCILIATION

SUBJECT:

1 - CLARIFICATION OF BROTHERHOOD COUNCIL AND RECONCILIATION: IT IS
AN EDUCATIONAL COUNCIL, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY TO EDUCATE, DIRECT,
CLARIFY AND PROMOTE THE BROTHERLY SPIRIT AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE IRAQI PEOPLE, INCLUDING ALL THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY FROM ALL SECTS
OF RELIGION, AND NATIONALITY. THE GOAL IS TO REJECT VIOLENCE AND
SECTARIAN RESENTMENT.

2 - ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL PLEDGE, AS A MORAL VALUE, TO WORK
INDEPENDENTLY FAR AWAY FROM ANY CONNECTION TO ANY POLITICAL OR
RELIGIOUS PARTY SEEKING THE HIGHER INTERESTS OF THE NATION. COUNCIL
MEMBERS WILL NOT CONFUSE THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNCIL WITH THE
INTERESTS OF THE PARTY THEY BELONG TO.

3 - THE BODY OF THE COUNCIL WILL BE FORMED BY THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS

1. PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.
2. VICE PRESIDENT.
3. SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL.
4. 15 MEMBERS OF CENTRALIZED SHURA BODY.

THE GENERAL BODY WILL BE FORMED AS FOLLOWS

1. RELIGIOUS BODY WITH FOUR MEMBERS.
2. TRIBAL BODY WITH FOUR MEMBERS.
3. POLITICAL BODY WITH FOUR MEMBERS.
4. MEDIA BODY WITH THE THREE MEMBERS.
5. PUBLIC-RELATIONS BODY WITH THE THREE MEMBERS.
6. BODY TO FOLLOW UP ON DETAINEE PROBLEMS AND INTERESTS.
7. AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY INCLUDING FINANCIAL.
8. SOCIAL BODY WITH FOUR MEMBERS.

4 - DUTIES: THE PRESIDENT WILL MANAGE ALL COUNCIL SESSIONS WITH
AUTHORITY TO CONTACT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE PRESIDENT MAY MAKE
AGREEMENTS WITH THE OTHER COUNCILS IF THEY EXIST, AND ALL AGREEMENTS
MADE WILL NOT BE VALID UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE CENTRAL
SHURA MEMBERS. ALSO THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SIGN
FINANCIAL ISSUES WITH FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK MEMBERS.

THE PRESIDENT WILL BE FORCED TO RESIGN IF HE INCITES ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING:

1. PHYSICAL DEFECTION.
2. SICKNESS.
3. BAD CONDUCT.
4. ABUSING HIS AUTHORITY.
5. IMPROPER BEHAVIOR INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL.

THE PRESIDENT MAY ALSO BE FORCED TO RESIGN THROUGH A 2/3 VOTE BY THE
CENTRAL SHURA COUNCIL.

THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE APPOINTED BY CENTRAL SHURA COUNCIL, AND HE
WILL MANAGE THE MAIN BODY OF THE COMMITTEE, SCHEDULING THEIR WEEKLY
MEETING, AND PROVIDE THE FINAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT IN
ORDER TO TAKE PROPER DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO THE CASES THAT NEED
DECISIONS.

THE SECRETARY SHOULD ATTEND ALL COUNCIL MEETINGS AND ACCOMPANY THE
COUNCIL PRESIDENT IN ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL MEETINGS. MANAGE
ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO AND FROM THE COUNCIL. THE SECRETARY WILL BE
APPOINTED BY THE NOMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL WITH
AGREEMENT FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL MEMBERS.

MEMBERS OF COMMITTEES WILL BE APPOINTED BY AGREEMENT WITH MEMBERS OF
THE SHURA COUNCIL ACCORDING TO THE HIGHER NATIONAL INTEREST. THIS
WORK AND ITS SOPHISTICATION APPLIED TO THE PRESIDENT'S WHICH THEY ARE
MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL SHURA COUNCIL. (COLLECTOR COMMENT: THIS LAST
SENTENCE IS A LITERAL TRANSLATION).

THE MEDIA COMMITTEE WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE SUGGESTED AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE MEMBERS OF THE SHURA COUNCIL. THE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****/

MEDIA COMMITTEE IS TO ADOPT A CREATIVE FRAMEWORK WHEREBY THEIR
CONDUCT WILL BE MONITORED BY THE PRESIDENT AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF
THE SHURA COUNCIL.

THE VOTE WILL BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE MAJORITY AFTER THE COMPILATION OF THE LEGAL CODES, IN ORDER TO APPROVE THE STATEMENTS AND DECISIONS, WITH EXCEPTIONS OF CODE FOUR VERSE A. INCLUDING NEW MEMBERS TO THE COUNCIL WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH AGREEMENT FROM MEMBERS OF SHURA COUNCIL. IT IS FEASIBLE FOR MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO RESIGN IF THEY PRESENT CONVINCING EVIDENCE WHETHER FOR MEDICAL OR SECURITY REASONS.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL BE DENIED ANY RIGHT TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT THROUGH ANY MEDIA TOOL UNLESS IT'S COORDINATED WITH THE COUNCIL AND THE PRESIDENT. THE COUNCIL'S MEMBERS WILL PLEDGE TO WORK WITHOUT ANY CONSIDERATION TO THEIR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS TIES.

THE PRESIDENT IS OBLIGED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY PROTECTION TO MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, PROVIDING PROPER FINANCIAL NEEDS IN ORDER TO MANAGE ALL COUNCIL ACTIVITIES AND WORK. PROVIDE SPECIAL ID CARDS AND WEAPON CARRYING LICENSES, WITH INSURANCE FROM AMERICAN AUTHORITY NOT TO INTERVENE OR DETAIN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. THE COUNCIL WILL ESTABLISH OFFICES IN HOTSPOT AREAS, AS A FIRST STEP, AND TO HAVE MEMBERS FROM ALL THREE COMMITTEES IN ALL AMERICAN AND IRAQI DETENTION FACILITIES.

DAILY MEETINGS FOR MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL BE HELD STARTING FROM THE CURRENT MONTH. THE PRESIDENT HAS THE RIGHT TO REQUEST EMERGENCY MEETINGS. ALSO THE MEMBERS WILL HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS IF THREE MEMBERS REQUESTED THE MEETING THROUGH OFFICIAL WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE COUNCIL WILL ACCEPT ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL GIFTS AND AID FROM THE GOVERNMENT WITH APPROVAL FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED THE MISSION.

THE COUNCIL WILL REJECT ANY MEMBERS WITH IRAQI BLOOD ON HIS HANDS.

COORDINATION OF THE VISITATION TO DETENTION FACILITIES, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL AND TO SUBMIT A FULL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AFTER THAT VISITATION, AND THE REPORT IS TO BE SUBMITTED NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS AT THE MAXIMUM. ALL THE MEETINGS AND SESSIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OUTSIDE THE OFFICES SHOULD BE DOCUMENTED WITH A DETAILED REPORT AND SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

COORDINATION WITH AMERICAN AUTHORITY AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE CONDUCTED THROUGH COUNCIL PRESIDENT.

THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE OPEN TO THE TRIBAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL OFFICIALS IN SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY THE ONES WHO CAN HELP THE PROJECT, AND ARE WILLING TO JOIN THE COUNCIL. ESTABLISHING SPECIAL OFFICES UNDER THE TITLE (OFFICE OF BROTHERHOOD AND RECONCILIATION) IN DETENTION FACILITIES FOR THE TRAINING AND EDUCATING DETAINEES BEFORE RELEASING THEM TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

THE AMERICAN AUTHORITY WILL TEST THE DETAINEES, AGREEING (WITH THE COUNCIL) ON THE MECHANISM USED, IN ORDER TO VERIFY QUALIFICATION OF DETAINEES AFTER ATTENDING THIS EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM INCLUDING NEW MEMBERS TO THE SHURA COUNCIL WILL BE BY NOMINATION OF

THE PRESIDENT OR THE MAIN BODY OFFICIALS; IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COUNCIL THERE MUST BE MAJORITY AGREEMENT (APPROVAL) BY COUNCIL MEMBER.

DISCHARGING ANY MEMBER SHOULD BE ACCORDING TO THE CODE 4 VERSE A, WITH APPROVAL BY MAJORITY VOTE.

THE RIGHT TO ADD OR CANCEL ANY CODE FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION WILL BE POSSIBLE THROUGH VOTE OF COUNCIL MEMBERS.

((END OF TRANSLATION))

(b)(6)
CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANNZL GDR~~

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SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-034 (b)(6) TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT

REFS: SDE TIR 200243-034

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD IR OR (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 25 1530 OCT 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIE) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (1.4b) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON THE KHAMANI GROUP

THE KHAMANI GROUP IS KNOWN AS THE (b)(6) GROUP. THE MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP ARE IRAQIS WHO IMITATE THE FAITH OF AYATOLLAH KHAMANI AND FOLLOW HIS FATWAS AND RELIGIOUS OPINIONS. SOME OF THESE PEOPLE SEE AYATOLLAH KHAMANI AS THE MARJA AL-ALA WHILE OTHERS SEE HIM AS THE WALI AL-AM, BUT THEY ARE ALL LOYAL TO THE AYATOLLAH AND ARE THEREFORE CONSIDERED CLOSE TO THE (1.4b) GOVERNMENT. THERE IS POSSIBLY A SMALLER GROUP THAT IS ACTUALLY WITHIN THE (b)(6) (b)(6) GROUP THAT IS KNOWN AS THE KHAMANI GROUP BUT DETAINEE IS ONLY 50% SURE ABOUT THIS. THE NAME FOR (b)(6) GROUP HAS BEEN INTERCHANGEABLE WITH THE KHAMANI GROUP.

(b)(6), 1.4b

(b)(6) CAME TO MEET MUQTADA AL-SADR IN 2003 WHEN MAS CAME TO (1.4b) FOR A VISIT ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S DEATH. (b)(6) SAW MAS AS AN IMPORTANT PERSON AND WANTED TO GREET HIM PERSONALLY.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USC/AN/GBR~~

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SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-035

(b)(6)

REFS: 200243-035

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS

INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD IR OR
REPORTING (b)(3) 31 USC § 3507, 1.4c

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE:

(b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 05 1330 NOV 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM 1.4b EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY

- TRANSLATION OF DETAINEES VIEW ON HOW THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND
THE AL-SADR OFFICE CAN WORK TOGETHER

((TRANSLATION BELOW))

THERE IS NO SECRET THAT THE OFFICIAL OFFICE OF AL-SADR HAS A HUGE
MASS OF SUPPORTERS, AND IF WE NEED TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER IN THE
RIGHT, PRACTICAL WAY WE HAVE TO EVALUATE THE NEED OF HIS FOLLOWERS
AND THEIR DEMANDS. WE CAN SAY THAT THOSE MASSES OF FOLLOWERS
SUFFERED FROM PERSECUTION, POLITICAL IGNORANCE, AND ECONOMIC
DEPRIVATION UNDER THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, LIKE ALL OTHER GROUPS OF
PEOPLE IN IRAQ. WE CAN SAY THAT THE OLD CONDITIONS APPLY TO THE
MODERN GOVERNMENT THOUGH IN THE LESSER EXTENT AND IN SOMEWHAT
DIFFERENT FATES.

THIS IS HOW AL-SADR MOVEMENT FUNCTIONS IN THE IRAQI COALITION
GOVERNMENT, WHERE THE POLITICAL DOMINATION AND POWER ARE IN THE HANDS
OF AN ISLAMIC HIGHER COUNCIL WHOSE MEMBERS DOMINATE THE CONTROL OF
ALL POSITIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND CITY COUNCILS. NOT TO MENTION
THE AL-DAWA PARTY IS HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING SOME CITY
COUNCILS IN SOME OF THE STATE PROVINCES. THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THAT
THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SHOULD STOP
THIS KIND OF BEHAVIOR, WHICH IGNORES POLITICAL RIGHTS OF OTHER
PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN GOVERNING BODIES. ALSO, STOP DOMINATING
THE IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE POSITIONS WITH THEIR (DAWA PARTY) MEMBERS
ONLY AND ALLOW THE MASS POPULATION (OF THE OFFICE OF AL-SADR
SUPPORTERS), WHOSE NUMBERS EXCEED ALL OTHER EXISTING PARTIES, TO
PARTAKE IN AN ACTIVE ROLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. ALSO, WE THINK THAT
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF NEW ELECTIONS WITH

REGARDS TO ELECTING CITY COUNCILS IN ORDER TO GIVE A CHANCE FOR THE
PEOPLE TO ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THEIR PROVINCES AND CITIES.
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DEMANDS THAT AL-SADR HAS IS TO PROVIDE
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES TO THEIR AREA. THIS IS MAINLY BASIC
NECESSITIES SUCH AS ELECTRIC AND ENERGY SOURCES SUCH AS FUEL AND
OTHER MEANS OF LIFE SUSTAINING NEEDS. NEITHER THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT
NOR THE PREVIOUS ONE PROVIDED (THESE NECESSITIES) OR PRESENTED A PLAN
WITH SUCH A GOAL. IF SUCH SERVICES WERE TO BE PROVIDED IT WOULD HAVE
A TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON THE MOVEMENT. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DEAL
WISELY WITH THE MOVEMENT WHEN PROBLEMS OCCUR, LIKE THE INCIDENTS THAT
HAPPENED IN KARBALA. WHEN SUCH A MATTER SURFACES IN THE FUTURE IT
SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN A PROACTIVE WAY IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE
PROBLEM, WITHOUT ANY VIOLENCE, AND IT NEED NOT ESCALATE TO AN EXTREME
REACTION, BUT TO CALM DOWN THE SITUATION THROUGH DIALOGUE AND
UNDERSTANDING. IT'S HARD TO IMAGINE THAT MR. MUQTADA AL-SADR WILL
ACCEPT ANY POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY SINCE HE CONSIDERS
HIMSELF A LEADER OF A HUGE NUMBER OF THE POPULATION, NOT TO MENTION
THAT HE HAD THREE MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND 30 PARLIAMENT
MEMBERS. WE COULD IMAGINE THAT THE PRESIDENCY POSITION IS SUGGESTED
TO HIM OR TO OFFER HIM MEMBERSHIP IN WHAT WE CALL NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL FOR THIS POSITION WILL ALLOW HIM TO DEAL AND REACT WITH
HIGHER RANKING OFFICIALS, AND MAYBE THAT WILL EASE THEIR FEELING OF
INJUSTICE THAT HAPPENED TO THEM OR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THEIR FUTURE.
IN RETURN SUCH A MOVE WILL HAVE A TREMENDOUS POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE
GOVERNMENT AND OVER ALL SITUATIONS IN VERY IMPORTANT PARTS OF IRAQ.
THAT WILL EASE THE TENSION BETWEEN THE CURRENT RIVALS AND WILL SOLVE
A LOT OF ISSUES PEACEFULLY AND EFFECTIVELY. TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THAT BY ELIMINATING MR. AL-SADR'S FIERY RHETORIC AND SPEECHES, IT MAY
LEAD HIM TO MORE ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR BOTH POLITICALLY AND SOCIALLY.
HE WILL SEE HIMSELF AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE GOVERNMENT WHERE HE COULD
REPRESENT HIS FOLLOWER'S DEMANDS IN MORE CIVIL AND APPROPRIATE
MANNER, OVER ALL THAT WILL BE A TWO-WAY BENEFIT FOR ALL AND SHARING
MUTUAL INTEREST FOR THE GENERAL GOOD OF IRAQ.

((END OF TRANSLATION))

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/AFS/CANZL/GBR~~

Q000
SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-036

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-036 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(3), (b)(6), 1.4c
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-036

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20.0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 14.1530 NOV 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED (b)(6)

(b)(6) IS IN CONTROL OF THE KHOMEINI, SPECIAL, AND
SOME OF THE BADR CORPS GROUPS. BADR CORPS HAS GONE THE WAY OF
POLITICS, BUT STILL MAINTAINS SOME MILITANT GROUPS. SOME OF THESE
MILITANT GROUPS HAVE FALLEN UNDER (b)(6)
(COLLECTOR'S COMMENT: DETAINEE CHANGED THE TOPIC AND BECAME SOMEWHAT
NERVOUS WHEN ASKED ABOUT THIS SUBJECT).

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2

REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/AFS/CANZL/GBR~~

Q000
SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-037

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-037 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(3), (b)(6), USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-037

ALIAS: NONE

SHEIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20.0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 19.1330 NOV 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE RECENT ATTACK ON FOB CALLAHAN.

THE RECENT ATTACK ON FOB CALLAHAN DOES NOT LOOK LIKE IT WAS CONDUCTED
BY SHIA MILITANTS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. THERE ARE SUNNI AREAS THAT SURROUND SADR CITY AS WELL AS
RUSTIMAYAH.
2. SHIA HAVE NEVER USED TRUCKS IN ATTACKS.
3. SHIA DO NOT CONDUCT SUICIDE MISSIONS AND THIS MISSION LOOKED
LIKE A SUICIDE MISSION.
4. SHIA WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO BENEFIT FROM AN ATTACK THAT
ORIGINATED IN SADR CITY. THE CEASE FIRE SEEMS TO BE WORKING, SO WHY
WOULD THEY WANT TO DISRUPT THAT?
5. THE ENGINEERING OF THE WEAPON LOOKS LIKE SOMETHING THAT MAY
HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN THE WEAPONS DESIGN FACTORY UNDER THE FORMER
SADDAM REGIME. THE ONLY PEOPLE THAT COULD WORK THERE WERE SUNNI
BECAUSE SADDAM DID NOT TRUST THE SHIA. IT WOULD TAKE A LOT OF
TESTING TO GET EVERYTHING JUST RIGHT TO CREATE SUCH DEVASTATION.

(COLLECTOR COMMENTS: DETAINEE WAS VERY SURPRISED WHEN INTERROGATOR
TOLD HIM THAT THE ATTACK CAME FROM SADR CITY. HE STATED HE THOUGHT
THERE WAS A CEASE FIRE AND THEN ASKED IF THE ATTACK ENDED THE CEASE
FIRE. DETAINEE WAS ASSURED THAT THIS DID NOT END THE CEASE FIRE AND
THAT CF WERE STILL LOOKING INTO WHO ACTUALLY CONDUCTED THE ATTACK.)

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

(b)(6)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/AFSC/ANZL/SDR~~

0000
SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-038

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-038 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-038
ALIAS: NONE
SHAYIKH, UNKNOWN
CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02
DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07
DATE/TIME: 27 1330 NOV 07
LANGUAGE USED: AD
MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON THE CREATION OF SPECIAL
GROUPS

(b)(6), 1.4b

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2 REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANNZDOBR~~

0000
SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-039

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-039 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-039

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 281530CNOV07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON A POTENTIAL UNION BETWEEN

(b)(6)

THERE ARE TWO REASONS THAT (b)(6) WOULD OPPOSE
MUQTADA AL-SADR. THEY ARE TIRED OF THE MISTAKES THAT MAS HAS
COMMITTED AS A LEADER IN IRAQ AND HIS LACK OF ATTENTION TO THE ISSUES
DEALING WITH THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE. THE SECOND REASON IS THAT
MAS IS NOT IN THE COUNTRY. THERE IS NOT A HUGE DIFFERENCE AMONG THE
POLITICAL AGENDAS OF (b)(6) SO IT IS REASONABLE
FOR THEM TO UNIFY AGAINST MAS. SHIBI IS CONSIDERED A POLITICIAN AND
HAS A RELATIONSHIP WITH AHMAD AL-CHALABI IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ
(GOI). (b)(6) WAS A HAWZA STUDENT WITH INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE
PROVINCES INCLUDING CITIES LIKE KUT AND HULAH. (b)(6) ALSO HAS A
RELATIONSHIP WITH POLITICIANS LIKE DR. ABD-AL-MULTALAB IN THE GOI.
(b)(6) HAS STRONG TIES IN THE SOUTH, ESPECIALLY IN AMARRAH AND
BASRAH. HE SHARES THE SAME IDEOLOGY AS DETAINEE AND (b)(6).
(b)(6) IS YOUNG AND NOT AS RESPECTED BECAUSE OF HIS
YOUTHFUL APPEARANCE BUT THAT IS HIS ONLY WEAK POINT. ALL THREE ARE
SADRISTS AND WORK IN DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. BECAUSE THEY
ARE FROM DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS, IT MAKES THEM MORE POWERFUL TO
COMBINE FORCES AGAINST MAS. NONE OF THEM ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO
CONFRONT MAS INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THEY CAN WEAKEN HIM BY TAKING SOME OF
HIS FOLLOWERS USING THEIR BROAD BASE OF SUPPORTERS.

(b)(6) BOTH WENT TO THE HAWZA AND MAY
KNOW OF EACH OTHER BUT DO NOT HAVE A STRONG RELATIONSHIP BECAUSE

(b)(6) AND DETAINEE SO CLOSELY FOLLOW
THE SAME IDEOLOGY THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERED ONE FORCE IF THEY WERE TO
UNITE. IF (b)(6) JOIN TOGETHER, THEY WOULD FORM A MORE
IMPORTANT ALLIANCE BECAUSE OF THEIR BACKGROUNDS.

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO US/CAUSCAN/21/88R~~

QQQQ
SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-040

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-040 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD/OSD USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-040

ALIAS: NONE

SHAIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 291330CNOV 07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (1.4b) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE BASIS FOR ACCEPTING (1.4b)

1.4b, (b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

(b)(6)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/AFS/CAN/NZL/DBR~~

SECTION 1 OF 2
QQQQ
SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-041

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-041 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DODI, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)
REPORT NO: 200243-041
ALIAS: NONE
SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN
CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02
DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07
DATE/TIME: 211530CDEC07
LANGUAGE USED: AD
MAPS USED: NONE
SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA-
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE DIVISION WITHIN THE SADRIST MOVEMENT
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE POTENTIAL FAILURES FROM CF/GOI NEGOTIATIONS
WITH (b)(6) AND MAS.

MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) IS LOSING A LOT OF SUPPORT FROM MANY
INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE SADRIST MOVEMENT. CLOSE SUPPORTERS PULLED
AWAY BECAUSE MAS EXHIBITED ERRATIC BEHAVIOR AND LEADERSHIP. HE HAS
DEMONSTRATED THROUGH TIME THAT HE IS NOT FOCUSED, ORGANIZED, OR
COMPETENT. HE DOES NOT TAKE ADVICE FROM OTHERS AND OFTEN ACTS
UNILATERALLY AND MAKES DECISIONS ON HIS OWN ON MATTERS WHICH HE IS
NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ON.

AS A RESULT, TWO DISTINCT SIDES HAVE FORMED WITHIN THE SADRIST
MOVEMENT. THERE IS MAS AND THOSE WHO ARE LOYAL TO HIM. THIS SIDE
ACCEPTS HIM AS THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR
POLITICAL INTERESTS. THEN THERE IS THE COLLECTION OF FORMER
ASSOCIATES AND SUPPORTERS OF MAS, WHO STILL SUBSCRIBE TO THE
TEACHINGS AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR, BUT HAVE
DETERMINED THAT MAS IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE LEADER OR THE PROPER
SUCCESSOR TO HIS FATHER. IF THE CF AND GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (GOI)
INTEND TO ENGAGE THE SADRISTS AND OPEN A LINE OF COMMUNICATION OR
DIALOGUE, THEY MUST ENGAGE THESE TWO FACTIONS. MAS WANTS TO BE HEARD
AND BE CONSIDERED BY CF AND GOI. HE CAN OFFER THE INFLUENCE HE HAS
WITH SADRISTS AND OTHER SHI'A TO REDUCE THE VIOLENCE AND STABILIZE

THE SECURITY SITUATION. THIS IS NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE HE HAS A
SOLUTION HE CAN OFFER IN RETURN FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT BECAUSE HE CAN
INCITE MORE VIOLENCE IF HE IS NOT SATISFACTORILY CONSIDERED.

(SOURCE COMMENT: GOI/CF SHOULD ENGAGE MAS AND OPEN A DIALOGUE NOT
JUST BECAUSE HE HAS SOLUTIONS TO THE SHI'A ISSUES IN IRAQ, BUT
BECAUSE HE CAN AND WILL MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE, AS A RESPONSE, IF
HE IS NOT RECOGNIZED.)

(COLLECTOR COMMENT: THE INTERVIEWER ASKED THE DETAINEE WHO WOULD BE
A LIKELY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GROUP OF SADRISTS WHO HAVE DEVIATED
FROM MAS. AT THIS POINT THE DETAINEE'S BROTHER (ISN 200242)
INTERJECTED AND STATED THAT (b)(6) WOULD BE THE ONE. THE
DETAINEE IMMEDIATELY REACTED TO THIS TOWARDS HIS BROTHER AND THEN
COMPOSED HIMSELF ENOUGH TO SAY "MAYBE", AND THEN SUGGESTED THAT
ANYONE AMONG THE TOP PEOPLE IN THIS GROUP COULD BE THE ONE.)

1.4b

(COLLECTOR COMMENT: THE DETAINEE MADE TWO CLEAR POINTS: 1) THE SG
PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH MAS OR (b)(6) AND
2) THERE IS ANOTHER SOURCE FROM WHERE SG CAN ACQUIRE WEAPONS. THE
DETAINEE WOULD NOT ELABORATE ON HIS SECOND POINT. HE ASKED THAT THE
INTERVIEWER GIVE IT SOME THOUGHT AND, PERHAPS, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS.
HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER WHEN THE INTERVIEWER RETURNS
WITH SOME THEORIES. THE INTERVIEWER MENTIONED (b)(6) 1.4b
(b)(6) AND THE DETAINEE SAID "MAYBE" BUT HE WOULD LIKE FOR FURTHER
THOUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO IT. HIS BEHAVIOR SUGGESTED THAT LH IS NOT THE
SOURCE. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SUGGEST IT YET, PERHAPS IT IS THE GOI.
THERE ARE MANY JAM MEMBERS KNOW TO BE EMBEDDED IN KEY GOI MINISTRIES
AND AGENCIES.)

(b)(6)

SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-041

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-041 (b)(6)
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****/

INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DODI, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507
REPORTING.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)
REPORT NO: 200243-01
ALIAS: NONE
SHAYKH: UNKNOWN
CATEGORY: 2A
CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02
DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07
INTERROGATOR: JA
DATE/TIME: 211530C DEC 07
LANGUAGE USED: AD
INTERPRETER: GA
MAPS USED: NONE
SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE DIVISION WITHIN THE SADRIST MOVEMENT
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE POTENTIAL FAILURES FROM CF/GOI NEGOTIATIONS WITH (b)(6) AND MAS

MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) IS LOSING A LOT OF SUPPORT FROM MANY INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE SADRIST MOVEMENT. CLOSE SUPPORTERS PULLED AWAY BECAUSE MAS EXHIBITED ERRATIC BEHAVIOR AND LEADERSHIP. HE HAS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH TIME THAT HE IS NOT FOCUSED, ORGANIZED, OR COMPETENT. HE DOES NOT TAKE ADVICE FROM OTHERS AND OFTEN ACTS UNILATERALLY AND MAKES DECISIONS ON HIS OWN ON MATTERS WHICH HE IS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ON.

AS A RESULT, TWO DISTINCT SIDES HAVE FORMED WITHIN THE SADRIST MOVEMENT. THERE IS MAS AND THOSE WHO ARE LOYAL TO HIM. THIS SIDE ACCEPTS HIM AS THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL INTERESTS. THEN THERE IS THE COLLECTION OF FORMER ASSOCIATES AND SUPPORTERS OF MAS, WHO STILL SUBSCRIBE TO THE TEACHINGS AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR, BUT HAVE DETERMINED THAT MAS IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE LEADER OR THE PROPER SUCCESSOR TO HIS FATHER. IF THE CF AND GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (GOI) INTEND TO ENGAGE THE SADRISTS AND OPEN A LINE OF COMMUNICATION OR DIALOGUE, THEY MUST ENGAGE THESE TWO FACTIONS. MAS WANTS TO BE HEARD AND BE CONSIDERED BY CF AND GOI. HE CAN OFFER THE INFLUENCE HE HAS WITH SADRISTS AND OTHER SHIA TO REDUCE THE VIOLENCE AND STABILIZE THE SECURITY SITUATION. THIS IS NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE HE HAS A SOLUTION HE CAN OFFER IN RETURN FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT BECAUSE HE CAN INCITE MORE VIOLENCE IF HE IS NOT SATISFACTORILY CONSIDERED.

(SOURCE COMMENT: GOI/CF SHOULD ENGAGE MAS AND OPEN A DIALOGUE NOT JUST BECAUSE HE HAS SOLUTIONS TO THE SHIA ISSUES IN IRAQ, BUT BECAUSE HE CAN AND WILL MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE, AS A RESPONSE, IF HE IS NOT RECOGNIZED.)

(COLLECTOR COMMENT: THE INTERVIEWER ASKED THE DETAINEE WHO WOULD BE A LIKELY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GROUP OF SADRISTS WHO HAVE DEVIATED

FROM MAS. AT THIS POINT THE DETAINEE'S BROTHER (ISN 200242) INTERJECTED AND STATED THAT AKRAM AL-KABI WOULD BE THE ONE. THE DETAINEE IMMEDIATELY REACTED TO THIS TOWARDS HIS BROTHER AND THEN COMPOSED HIMSELF ENOUGH TO SAY "MAYBE", AND THEN SUGGESTED THAT ANYONE AMONG THE TOP PEOPLE IN THIS GROUP COULD BE THE ONE.)

(COLLECTOR COMMENT: THE DETAINEE MADE TWO CLEAR POINTS: 1) THE SG PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH MAS OR (b)(6) AND 2) THERE IS ANOTHER SOURCE FROM WHERE SG CAN ACQUIRE WEAPONS. THE DETAINEE WOULD NOT ELABORATE ON HIS SECOND POINT. HE ASKED THAT THE INTERVIEWER GIVE IT SOME THOUGHT AND, PERHAPS, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER WHEN THE INTERVIEWER RETURNS WITH SOME THEORIES. THE INTERVIEWER MENTIONED (b)(6) AND THE DETAINEE SAID "MAYBE" BUT HE WOULD LIKE FOR FURTHER THOUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO IT. HIS BEHAVIOR SUGGESTED THAT LH IS NOT THE SOURCE, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SUGGEST IT YET, PERHAPS IT IS THE GOI THERE ARE MANY JAM MEMBERS KNOW TO BE EMBEDDED IN KEY GOI MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES.)

CLASSIFIED BY CCJ2
REASON 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAVALCANNEL OBR~~

UQQQ

SERIAL SDE TIR 200243-042

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-042 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (U) REPORTS USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-042

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: NI228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 241530CDEC07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (U) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED CONDITIONS FOR WHEN CF SHOULD BEGIN A PHASED
WITHDRAWAL.
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED WHAT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ SHOULD LOOK LIKE IN
SIX MONTHS.

CF SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM IRAQ. THEIR PRESENCE AND OCCUPATION-RELATED
ACTIVITIES ARE THE REASONS WHY THERE IS RESENTMENT AMONG SHIA. THIS
IS THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE START OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS (SG).
HOWEVER, THE WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE PHASED, BECAUSE A RAPID
REDEPLOYMENT WOULD BE TOO DISRUPTIVE AND NOT COINCIDE WITH THE
CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY.

PRIOR TO BEGINNING WITHDRAWAL, THERE NEEDS TO BE CERTAIN CONDITIONS
PRESENT. VIOLENCE NEEDS TO DECREASE AND THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO BE
ESTABLISHED ENOUGH TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO PEOPLE. IN ADDITION, THREE
MAJOR GROUPS HAVE TO BE ENGAGED WITHIN THE SHIA COMMUNITY: THE
SADRISTS, FADILA (YAKUB GROUP), AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SISTANI
OFFICE.

THERE ARE CERTAIN ACTIONS THAT CERTAIN ACTORS MUST TAKE OVER THE NEXT
SIX MONTHS. (U) MUST CEASE INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ, AND THEIR DETAINEES
SHOULD BE RELEASED. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ SHOULD FIGURE OUT HOW
THEY CAN SOLVE THE POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH EXIST WITH DIFFERENT GROUPS
AND INTERESTS. CF SHOULD BEGIN TO WITHDRAW GRADUALLY, AND SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO KEEP A FEW INSTALLATIONS IN THE COUNTRY (SIMILAR TO
GERMANY). FINALLY, COMMUNITY LEADERS SHOULD TAKE CHARGE OF THEIR

CONSTITUENCIES AND ENSURE THEY ABIDE BY ANY MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
MADE.

(COLLECTOR COMMENT: THE DETAINEE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE ARE
POINTS ON WHICH THE INTERESTS OF CF COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF SPECIAL
GROUPS. AT CERTAIN POINTS IT SEEMED AS IF HE WAS BECOMING AWARE OF
NEW PERSPECTIVES WHICH HE WAS NOT ABLE TO PREVIOUSLY HAVE.)

(b)(6)
CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

- US PREFERENCE LIKE
IN GERMANY

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANNZGDR~~

0000

SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-043

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-043 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(3) USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-043

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 261530CDEC07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE SPECIAL GROUPS.
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED WHY THE SPECIAL GROUPS CAN CONTINUE OPERATIONS
EVEN WITHOUT (b)(6)
- DETAINEE STATED THE INTERESTS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS

(b)(6) AND MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) HAVE ACCESS TO THE SPECIAL GROUPS
(SG). MAS HAS A WEAKER INFLUENCE. THIS IS BECAUSE OF HIS LOST
CREDIBILITY WITH SG BASED ON HIS INCONSISTENCIES IN LEADERSHIP AND
DECISION-MAKING. MAS LOST INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OVER THE SG IN THE
BEGINNING OF 2006. ADNAN AL-SHAHMANI OF THE IRAQI NATIONAL GATHERING
HAS A LINE OF COMMUNICATION TO THE SG (b)(6)

(b)(6) SHOULD BE THE CURRENT LEADERS/REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SG

IF (b)(6) ELECTS TO NOT SUPPLY THE SG, SG WILL STILL BE ABLE TO
CONTINUE OPERATING IN IRAQ. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS IN WHICH THEY
CAN SUSTAIN ACTIVITIES. THEY MAY RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM ANOTHER THIRD
PARTY, SUCH AS ANY COUNTRY WHICH VIEWS CF AS AN ENEMY OR HAS AN
INTEREST IN KEEPING CF ENGAGED IN IRAQ. NON-STATE ORGANIZATIONS MAY
SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY, LIKE (b)(6). THERE MAY ALSO BE
WEAPONS CACHES WHICH THE SG CAN USE UNTIL THEY ACQUIRE SUPPORT FROM
ANOTHER SOURCE. THEY HAVE A LARGE RECRUITING POOL FROM WHICH TO
SELECT NEW MEMBERS IN THE IRAQI SHIA POPULATION. THERE IS NO
DEPENDENCE ON (b)(6) FOR TRAINING NEW RECRUITS BECAUSE THE TRAINED
PERSONNEL CAN ALSO BE TRAINERS. THE SG DO NOT NEED FUNDING FROM (b)(6)
TO SURVIVE BECAUSE THEY HAVE WAYS OF GENERATING INCOME. THE IRAQI
ECONOMY OFFERS MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE MONEY OUT OF A SMALL

INVESTMENT. TRADE AND COMMERCE CAN SERVE AS TOOLS TO FUND THE SG.

THE SG HAVE ONE PRIMARY INTEREST: THE END OF THE CF OCCUPATION IN
IRAQ. ONCE CF WITHDRAWS, THE SG WILL HAVE SUCCEEDED IN THEIR CAUSE.
THIS ALSO INCLUDES THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES ALONG WITH THE CESSATION
OF RAIDS AND OTHER MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS. THIS WITHDRAWAL
SHOULD ALLOW FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEW MILITARY BASES WITH
PERSONNEL NOT ENGAGED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS.

(CO) LECTOR COMMENT: THE DETAINEE COULD NOT OFFER EXACT MEANS OF
GENERATED FUNDS OTHER THAN TRADITIONAL BUSINESSES. HOWEVER, CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISES TO RAISE MONEY ARE NOT ALLOWED UNDER SHARIAH LAW.

(b)(6)
CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSC/CA/92/DOB~~

QQQQ
SERIAL: SDE TIR 200243-044

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-044 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT AYRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-044

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: N1228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 291930CDEC07

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PI/C.

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED WHY SPECIAL GROUPS COULD BE A USEFUL INSTRUMENT
EVEN AFTER THE CF OCCUPATION.

THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS (SG) IS THE END OF THE CF
OCCUPATION IN IRAQ. BECAUSE THE SG HAVE HAD SUCCESSSES, THEY MAY
SERVE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES EVEN AFTER CF
WITHDRAWS. THE SG MEMBERS ARE SADRISTS WHO OPPOSE MAS AS THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MOVEMENT, AND THEY OPPOSE HIS PHILOSOPHY OR
LACK OF CONSISTENT LEADERSHIP. HOWEVER, THE SG COULD NEVER BE USED
AGAINST MAS IN A MILITARY CAPACITY BECAUSE THE SG HAVE MANY FRIENDS
AND ASSOCIATES WITHIN JAM, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIGHT THOSE
WHO THEY CONSIDER BROTHERS.

THE POLITICAL GOALS OF THE SG WOULD INCLUDE GAINING INFLUENCE WITHIN
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (GOI). THIS WOULD INCLUDE DEFENDING AGAINST
AGGRESSION FROM OTHER GROUPS, SUCH AS THE BADR ORGANIZATION, OR THE
SUPREME COUNCIL. THE THREAT FROM WAHABI SUNNIS MAY ALSO BE A CONCERN
FOR SG. UNTIL THERE IS A STRONGER FEDERALIZED POLICE FORCE, IT MAY
BE UP TO THE SG AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS TO PROPERLY PROTECT THE
CONSTITUENCIES OF DIFFERENT GROUPS WITHIN THE SHIA COMMUNITY AND
IRAQ AS A WHOLE. THE CURRENT POLICE FORCES ARE MOSTLY CORRUPT AND
HAVE JAM OR BADR MEMBERS WHO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OTHER GROUPS.
ALTHOUGH THE SG LEADERSHIP IS SUPPORTIVE OF THE GOI, THE GOVERNMENT
IS NOT YET FULLY CAPABLE OF ENFORCING THE LAW PROPERLY AND PROTECTING
CITIZENS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT INITIALLY WHY THE SG WERE CREATED, IT
WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE TO USE IT AS A TOOL IF NECESSARY.

THE LAST TIME MAS HAD CONTROL OR INFLUENCE OVER THE SG WAS SOMETIME
IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF 2006. THE DETAINEE HAS MET AYATOLLAH
AL-HA'ARI, HOWEVER, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE HE WILL BE RETURNING TO IRAQ
ANYTIME SOON. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE AYATOLLAH IS BEING RESTRICTED
BY (b)(6) FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY. THE AYATOLLAH HAS NOT YET ACCEPTED
THE ROLE AS SADRIST LEADER IN IRAQ.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2

REASON: 1.5(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USA/USC/AMOR~~

OOOQ

SERIAL: 200243-045

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-045 (b)(6) TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS
INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE DOD (b)(5) OR USC § 3507, 1.4c
REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE (b)(6)

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: NI228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 031300JAN08

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP
LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA
JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON
THE KARBALA PJCC

SUMMARY:

- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE DIRECTION HE WOULD TAKE WITH THE SADRIST
MOVEMENT UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP.

THE DETAINEE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE SADRIST MOVEMENT IN A
DIFFERENT DIRECTION THAN MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS). HE WOULD PUSH FOR
STRONGER PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (GOI). HE WOULD
BRING BACK THE MINISTERS WHICH HAVE BEEN PULLED OUT OF THEIR
POSITIONS BY MAS. HE WOULD ALSO CONCENTRATE ON BUILDING A STRONGER
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. MORE OF THE SADRIST PRESENCE
NEEDS TO BE IN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE GOVERNMENT, PARTIALLY
BECAUSE OTHER GROUPS WISH TO BRING DOWN THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WOULD
ENGAGE THE FADILA PARTY AND INDEPENDENT POLITICIANS, BECAUSE THEY ARE
PEOPLE THE SADRISTS CAN WORK WITH. THE ARAB INDEPENDENCE FORMATION
IS ANOTHER GROUP THAT HAS GOOD PEOPLE IN ITS RANKS. THIS INCLUDES
ABD MUTLIK AL-JABURI.

THE DETAINEE WOULD ALSO TAKE A SOCIAL FOCUS WITH THE SADRIST
MOVEMENT. HE WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE IMPORTANT NECESSITIES SUCH AS
ELECTRICITY, WATER, SEWER PROBLEMS, HEALTH CARE, AND OTHER SERVICES.
HE WOULD ALSO WORK ON HELPING IRAQIS BECOME LAND AND HOME OWNERS. HE
WOULD INVEST IN THIS TYPE OF SOCIAL WORK MOSTLY BECAUSE IT IS
NECESSARY AND HELPFUL. HOWEVER, HE ACKNOWLEDGES THE POLITICAL
BENEFITS OF THE GRASSROOTS SUPPORT IT COULD DEVELOP.

THE DETAINEE WOULD WORK ON RELIGIOUS ISSUES AS LEADER OF THE
SADRIST MOVEMENT AS WELL. HE WOULD WORK ON STRENGTHENING THE HAWZA.

THERE IS A STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE BETWEEN THE IRAQI HAWZA IN NAJAF,
IZ AND THE (b)(6) HAWZA IN QOM, IR. IT IS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT (b)(6)
FROM DOMINATING THE SHIA WORLD. HE WOULD FIND WAYS TO INCREASE THE
HAWZA SCHOOLS. HE WOULD DO THIS BY ENCOURAGING YOUTH TO JOIN THE
HAWZA SCHOOLS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR STUDENTS OF HIGHER
TALENT AND APTITUDE.

MAS HAS MADE POOR CHOICES AS THE LEADER OF THE SADRIST
MOVEMENT. FIRST, AFTER THE CF INVASION HE WANTED TO IMMEDIATELY
DECLARE THE FORMATION OF AN IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS WITHOUT A
BUDGET OR SECURING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. DURING THE TIMES OF
THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR, THE LINE BETWEEN WHAT IS PROHIBITED AND
WHAT IS ALLOWED IN SHIA ISLAM WAS CLEAR. WITH MAS, THAT LINE HAS
BEEN BLURRED. FOR EXAMPLE, KIDNAPPINGS FOR RANSOM WAS PROHIBITED,
BUT NOW IT HAS BECOME A MORE COMMON OCCURRENCE. MAS ALSO NEGLECTED
THE HAWZA. HE HAS NOT PUSHED FOR MORE ATTENDEES. IF THIS CONTINUES,
THE SADRISTS WILL LOSE STUDENTS AND FOLLOWERS TO SISTANI. MOST
IMPORTANTLY, MUHAMMAD AL-SADR CARED ABOUT PEOPLE. MAS IS
SELF-CENTERED AND LOOKS TO SERVE HIMSELF. THIS IS NOT WHAT IS
PRESENTED IN THE MEDIA, BECAUSE IT WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE EFFECTS ON
HIS FOLLOWING.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CCJ2
REASON: 1.3(A)

~~SECRET REL TO USAUSCANTON~~

OOQQ

SERIAL: 200243-046

SUBJ: SDE TIR 200243-046 (b)(6)

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

NOTE: MESSAGE TRANSMITTED FOR PURPOSE OF CT-AVRS DATABASING. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE REPORTED IN EXISTING OR FUTURE (b)(6) USC § 3507, 1.4c REPORTING

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

NAME OF DETAINEE: (b)(6)

REPORT NO: 200243-046

ALIAS: NONE

SHAYIKH: UNKNOWN

CAPTIVE TAG #: NI228A-02

DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 0100 MAR 07

DATE/TIME: 061930Z JAN 08

LANGUAGE USED: AD

MAPS USED: NONE

SIGNIFICANCE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PICC.

SUMMARY:

- DISCUSSED IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MUHAMMAD AL-SADR'S LEADERSHIP OF THE SADRIST MOVEMENT.

- EXPLAINED DIFFERENCE OF MAS AND MUHAMMAD AL-SADR'S LEADERSHIP

THERE WERE THREE AREAS OFFERED BY THE DETAINEE WHICH DEMONSTRATE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR, AND HOW MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) HAS DEVIATED FROM THEM TO LEAD THE SADRIST MOVEMENT

1) RELIGIOUS ISSUES. THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE ASSIDUOUS AND HAVE A LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION SIMILAR TO THE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR. MAS IS GOING IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION, AND DOES NOT ACT WISELY OR WITH RELIGIOUS INSIGHT

2) NEGOTIATIONS AND DIALOGUE. MUHAMMAD AL-SADR BELIEVED IN ACCEPTING OPINIONS AND OPENING DISCUSSIONS ON IMPORTANT DECISIONS. MAS DOES NOT TAKE THIS APPROACH. HE IS MORE DICTATORIAL AND CONTROLLING IN HIS APPROACH. OLDER SADRISTS ARE NOT AS ACCEPTING OF THIS; HOWEVER, YOUNGER SADRISTS ARE MORE TOLERANT OF DEVIATIONS ON JUST ABOUT ANY ISSUE

3) STRENGTHENING THE NAJAF HAWZA. MAINTAINING THE NAJAF HAWZA WAS VERY IMPORTANT DURING THE TIME OF THE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR. THERE WAS TO BE LITTLE OR NO ATTACHMENT TO THE QOM, IR HAWZA. MUHAMMAD AL-SADR ENCOURAGED YOUNG PEOPLE TO BECOME STUDENTS. THE HAWZA WAS STRONG

DURING HIS TIME, THE WEAKENING OF THE NAJAF HAWZA IS A STRATEGIC DANGER. IF (b)(6) HAS THE DOMINANT HAWZA, IT MAY HAVE EFFECTS WHICH RESONATE ACROSS THE SHIA WORLD.

SINCE THE FALL OF THE SADDAM REGIME, MAS HAS CHANGED THE ENTIRE MOVEMENT. HE HAS NO PRINCIPLES AND ONLY WORKS TOWARDS PERSONAL GAIN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE IS MANIPULATING THE MOVEMENT TO SERVE HIMSELF. THE DETAINEE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT MAS HAS GONE TO THE QOM, IR HAWZA TO PURSUE RELIGIOUS STUDIES. THIS SIDE OF MASS CHARACTER BECAME EVIDENT TO THE DETAINEE WHEN HE HID MAS IN BAGHDAD IN THE MIDDLE OF 2004. AFTER MAS FLED FROM NAJAF, THE DETAINEE GOT TO KNOW MAS VERY WELL DURING THIS TIME, AND IT WAS THEN THAT HE DECIDED TO PART WAYS WITH MAS STRATEGICALLY.

ONE NEGATIVE ASPECT OF MAS'S CURRENT PRESENCE IN (b)(6) IS THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE HE MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO. THE SITUATION BETWEEN THE US (b)(6) AND IRAQ MAY HAVE DIRECT IMPLICATIONS ON MAS'S BEHAVIOR BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN DICTATED BY THIS IN THE PAST. BACK IN 2004 WHEN THE US-IRAN RELATIONS WERE UNFAVORABLE, MAS RETURNED FROM (b)(6) AND HE CALLED FOR RESISTANCE OF THE CF OCCUPATION AT A FRIDAY PRAYER. THIS LED TO THE UPRISINGS FROM THE SHIA COMMUNITIES AND THE MILITIAS

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CC12
REASON: 1.5(A)

Approved for Release

Summary

Document source: (b)(6) Ingest/Email Attachment
Ingest/20090108/118 QK (b)(6) Lots Info TIR-TH 1.4a (b)(6)
(b)(6) doc
118 QK (b)(6) Lots Info TIR-TH 1.4a (b)(6) doc

Table Properties

GIVEN NAME (b)(6)
CLAN NAME NONE
TRIBAL NAME (b)(6)
ALIAS NONE
EYE COLOR BROWN
HAIR COLOR BLACK
HEIGHT 5 FEET 8 INCHES
WEIGHT 160 POUNDS
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES (b)(6)
ADDRESS (b)(6) (b)(6) IRAQ
DETAINEE RENTS A HOUSE IN BAGHDAD.
PHONE NUMBER NONE
MOBILE NUMBER INITIALLY CLAIMED TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL
DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE. DETAINEE LATER ADMITTED HIS MOBILE PHONE WAS TAKEN ON THE
OBJECTIVE. HE DID NOT PROVIDE THE NUMBER.
POB BAGHDAD, IZ
DOB (b)(6)
MARITAL STATUS SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE, DIVORCE NOT FINALIZED
NATIONALITY IRAQI
RELIGION SHI'A ISLAM
EDUCATION ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS
TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ
MOSQUE NONE
IMAM NONE
MILITARY EXPERIENCE PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI
DINAR.
SPECIAL SKILLS NONE
OCCUPATION RELIGIOUS LEADER
DETAINEE NUMBER N1228A
FATHER (b)(6)
MOTHER WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)
BROTHERS WNA
SISTERS WNA
WIFE DIVORCED FROM FIRST WIFE, SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE.
CHILDREN (b)(6) (b)(6)
CONOP SETANTA
DTG OF CAPTURE 20 MAR 0300C 2007
PLACE OF CAPTURE BASRAH, IZ
APPREHENDING UNIT TH 1.4a
CURRENT LOCATION TH 4THF
INTERROGATOR (b)(6)
LANGUAGE USED ARABIC
SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS NONE

(b)(6)

Table Locations

Label Country Lat/Lon
IRAQ IRAQ 33.0000000 44.0000000
1.4b

Content

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT
REPORT NUMBER (U) TIR-TH 1.4a
REPORT DATE (U) 04 JUNE 07
REPORTING UNIT (U) TH 4THF
COUNTRY (U) IRAQ (IZ) 1.4b

SOURCE PARAGRAPH (S//REL TO USA AND MCF) //DETAINEE TH 4THF N1228A// A SHI'A IRAQI
MALE IN COALITION FORCES (CF) CUSTODY WITH DIRECT ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION BY
VIRTUE OF DAILY ACTIVITIES. REPORTING RELIABILITY CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED AT THIS
TIME.

SUMMARY (S//REL TO USA AND MCF)

THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
MAP-TRACKED TO MUQTADA AL-SADR'S THREE HOUSES IN NAJAF
DISCUSSED ACTIVITIES OF (b)(6) HEAD OF THE SADR TREND'S ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE

TEXT (S//REL TO USA AND MCF)

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (S//REL TO USA AND MCF)

GIVEN NAME: (b)(6)
FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: (b)(6)
GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: (b)(6)
CLAN NAME: NONE
TRIBAL NAME: (b)(6)
ALIAS: NONE
EYE COLOR: BROWN
HAIR COLOR: BLACK
HEIGHT: 5 FEET 8 INCHES
WEIGHT: 160 POUNDS
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: (b)(6)
ADDRESS (b)(6) (b)(6) IRAQ
DETAINEE RENTS A HOUSE IN BAGHDAD.
PHONE NUMBER: NONE
MOBILE NUMBER: INITIALLY CLAIMED TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL
DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE. DETAINEE LATER ADMITTED HIS MOBILE PHONE WAS TAKEN ON THE
OBJECTIVE. HE DID NOT PROVIDE THE NUMBER.
POB: BAGHDAD, IZ

DOB: (b)(6)
MARITAL STATUS: SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE, DIVORCE NOT FINALIZED
NATIONALITY: IRAQI
RELIGION: SHIA/ISLAM
EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHIA HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ
LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY)
MOSQUE: NONE
IMAM: NONE
MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR
SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE
OCCUPATION: RELIGIOUS LEADER

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP:
4 JUNE 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: N1228A

FATHER: (b)(6)
MOTHER: WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)
BROTHERS: WNA
SISTERS: WNA
WIFE: DIVORCED FROM FIRST WIFE, SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE
CHILDREN: (b)(6)

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP: SETANTA

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ

APPREHENDING UNIT: TF 14a

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-CF GROUP LEADER, ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PROVINCIAL JOINT COORDINATION CENTER (PJCC).

CURRENT LOCATION: TF 14b

WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (SOURCE: ~~to USA and MCF~~): 4 X 9mm handguns: Beretta X49906Z, Browning b26382, Glock GWW88, Crvena 142650 (bent barrel); 1 X CoR 4 x 20 scope; 5 X Magazines, 49 X ball rounds, 15 X hollow tip rounds; 1 X Compass, military grade; 2 X Brown wallets; 1 X watch, silver; 1 X glasses, bronze frame; 1 X silver ring, brown stone, arabic writing; 1 X Electro dot sight (floating dot); 1 X Flashlight, no batteries; 1 X Box of 7 silver rings with stars; 1 X Box of 5 silver rings with arabic writing; 3 X passports; 2 X large black ID cards; 1 X large gray ID card; 1 X large brown ID card; 28 X ID cards; 5 X small notebooks; 2 X notebooks; 2 X phonebooks (1 small black and 1 pocket size black); 1 X laminated blue vehicle registration card; 1 X large stack of documents; 30 X ID card size photos; 22 X Loose photographs; 1 X photo album; 9 X 10,000 Iraqi dinar bills; 60 X 5,000 Iraqi dinar bills; 8 X 1,000 Iraqi dinar bills; 3 X 250 Iraqi dinar bills; 3 X 50 Iraqi dinar bills; 1 X 2,000 Rials Iranian bill; 2 X Blank stamped Iraqi Personal IDs; 3 X silver stickers for Iraqi Personal IDs

INTERROGATOR: (b)(6)

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT): DANIS (IRAQI)

3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (SOURCE: ~~to USA and MCF~~)

A (COLLECTOR COMMENT - COLLECTOR APPROACHED DETAINEE USING AN EMOTIONAL HATE TOWARD MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) APPROACH. DETAINEE APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT MAS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DETAINEE'S ARREST AND CONTINUED DETENTION. END COMMENT.)

MAS THINKS THAT DETAINEE IS HIS ENEMY AND IF DETAINEE IS RELEASED, HE WILL BE MAS'S STRONGEST OPPONENT. DETAINEE FEELS HIS INFLUENCE WILL INCREASE AS A RESULT OF THIS DETENTION WITH CF. DETAINEE BELIEVES HE WAS ARRESTED AND CONTINUES TO LINGER IN DETENTION BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS OF MAS AND (b)(6) MAS'S ASSISTANT. ONCE DETAINEE IS RELEASED, HE WILL SEE THAT (b)(6) IS EXPELLED FROM IRAQ. (SOURCE COMMENT - "KICKING (b)(6) OUT OF THE COUNTRY IS THE MINIMUM I CAN HURT HIM IF I HAVE SOME MERCY ON HIM." END COMMENT.) THIS WILL DIMINISH MAS'S POWER IN IRAQ BECAUSE (b)(6) IS MAS'S MAIN COORDINATOR - HE ARRANGES EVERYTHING FOR MAS, FORCING (b)(6) TO LEAVE IRAQ WILL SEND A DIRECT MESSAGE TO MAS THAT DETAINEE CAN GET RID OF ANY OF HIS CLOSE AIDS.

APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AGO, MAS PURCHASED THE MANSION DIRECTLY TO THE EAST OF THE HOUSE OF THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR. (SOURCE COMMENT - IT IS "A HUGE VILLA" - "A MANSION." END COMMENT.) THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR'S FORMER HOME IS OWNED JOINTLY BY HIS FAMILY. IT IS NOT OWNED SOLELY BY MAS. THERE IS A RUMOR THAT MAS RENTS THE MANSION TO THE EAST OF THAT HOUSE TO USE FOR MEETINGS. IN REALITY, MAS PURCHASED THIS HOUSE FROM AN IRAQI WHO LIVES IN EXILE. IT IS A RICHLY APPOINTED BUILDING. MAS UTILIZES THE MANSION AS A RESIDENCE AND TO GREET NOTEWORTHY OFFICIALS, SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER NURI AL-MALIKI AND VISITORS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. MAS PURCHASED THE MANSION TO HIGHLIGHT, IN THESE CONFIDENTIAL MEETINGS WITH IMPORTANT PERSONS, THAT HE IS A PARTICULARLY PROMINENT PERSON. THE MANSION DIRECTLY ADJUTS THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR'S HOUSE, SO MAS CAN PASS CONVENIENTLY BETWEEN THE TWO RESIDENCES. DETAINEE IS NOT FAMILIAR WITH HOW MAS PAID FOR THE MANSION. MAS IS VERY CAUTIOUS WHEN IT COMES TO DISCUSSING FINANCIAL MATTERS. MAS LIKES MONEY. HE LIKES TO SEE THE MONEY PHYSICALLY ACCUMULATING IN FRONT OF HIM SO HE KEEPS IT AT THIS MANSION, OR POSSIBLY AT ANOTHER HOUSE. (SOURCE COMMENT - "HE LIKES TO SEE [MONEY] EVERY DAY PILING UP." END COMMENT.) DETAINEE MAP TRACKED TO THE FOLLOWING LOCATION OF MAS'S MANSION.

AS MAS RESIDES IN THE AFOREMENTIONED MANSION, THE HOUSE HE OWNS, AND PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN, IS LIKELY VACANT. DETAINEE MAP TRACKED TO THE FOLLOWING PROBABLE LOCATION OF MAS'S HOME.

MAS'S LATE BROTHER, MUSTAFA, ALSO OWNED A HOUSE IN NAJAF. MUSTAFA WAS KILLED IN THE SAME ATTACK THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THEIR FATHER, MUHAMMAD AL-SADR. SINCE MUSTAFA'S DEATH, MUQTADA HAS EXERCISED CONTROL OVER MUSTAFA'S HOUSE, AND IS NOW ITS DE FACTO OWNER. THIS HOUSE MAY NOW BE VACANT. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE HOUSE IS CURRENTLY USED FOR. DETAINEE MAP TRACKED TO THE FOLLOWING PROBABLE LOCATION OF MUSTAFA'S FORMER HOME THAT MAS NOW CONTROLS.

C (COLLECTOR COMMENT - COLLECTOR QUESTIONED DETAINEE ABOUT (b)(6) THE HEAD OF THE SADR TREND'S ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. END COMMENT.)

(b)(6) FAMILY IS VERY RICH AND RESPECTED IN THE SADR TREND. THEY HAVE WORKED IN COMMERCE SINCE THE TIME OF THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR. THE (b)(6) FAMILY BUSINESS IS CENTERED ON MAJOR CONTRACTS AND PROJECTS, INCLUDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAYS, GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, AND ELECTRICAL POWER STATIONS. THE FAMILY MAY ALSO BE INVOLVED WITH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS (NFI). THE (b)(6) BUSINESS IS BASED IN BAGHDAD. THE FAMILY OWNS ONE MAJOR COMPANY BUT DETAINEE CANNOT RECALL ITS NAME. THE COMPANY IS RUN BY A GROUP COMPRISED OF MEMBERS OF THE (b)(6) FAMILY - BROTHERS, COUSINS, AND OTHER RELATIVES.

(b)(6) FAMILY IS COMMITTED TO THE SADR TREND, RELIGIOUSLY SPEAKING, AND (b)(6) VISITED NAJAF TO PAY RELIGIOUS DUES AND DONATIONS TO THE SADR TREND. DESPITE THEIR SINCERE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, NO ONE IN (b)(6) FAMILY STUDIED TO BE A RELIGIOUS FIGURE SUCH AS A HAWZA STUDENT. DETAINEE BELIEVES THAT THE (b)(6) FAMILY SPENDS MOST OF THEIR TIME FOCUSED ON BUSINESS ENDEAVORS. (b)(6) FAMILY CULTIVATED AND MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH MANY STUDENTS OF THE NAJAF HAWZA. THE (b)(6) FAMILY, BECAUSE OF THEIR STRONG RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT, WERE INTERESTED IN MEETING WITH HAWZA STUDENTS AND PROVIDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THEM. MANY HAWZA STUDENTS strove to develop relations with the (b)(6) FAMILY BUT DETAINEE DID NOT DO SO WHILE HE WAS A STUDENT AT THE HAWZA.

DETAINEE MET (b)(6) AFTER THE FALL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME IN BAGHDAD. IN THIS EARLY PERIOD, THE SADR TREND ESTABLISHED AN ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. ZAYDAN WAS VIEWED AS SUITABLE FOR THAT POSITION BECAUSE HE WAS FROM A WEALTHY FAMILY, VERY RELIGIOUS, AND IT WAS THOUGHT HE WOULD HONESTLY, AND WITH INTEGRITY, TAKE CARE OF FINANCIAL MATTERS OF THE TREND. (b)(6) BECAME HEAD OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. HIS MAIN JOB WAS TO INVEST CAPITAL OF THE SADR TREND IN PROJECTS THAT WOULD YIELD A FINANCIAL RETURN IN THE FUTURE. THESE PROJECTS INCLUDED POWER STATIONS, LIGHTING OF HIGHWAYS, AND BUILDING AND MAINTAINING SCHOOLS. CONTRACTS WERE MOSTLY OBTAINED THROUGH A BIDDING PROCESS, BUT (b)(6) HAD AN ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE HIS FAMILY HAD COMPLETED SUCH PROJECTS BEFORE. THESE PROJECTS WERE MONITORED BY THE SADR TREND TO ENSURE THAT THE PROFITS WERE DIRECTED TO MAS. MAS WOULD THEN GIVE A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE PROFITS TO THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE TO PAY THEM FOR THE HARDSHIPS OF WORKING AND TO COVER THEIR EXPENSES.

DETAINEE MET WITH (b)(6) ON BUSINESS, APPROXIMATELY ONCE A MONTH FOR THREE MONTHS WHILE MAS WAS IN BAGHDAD. DETAINEE MET WITH (b)(6) AND EITHER (b)(6) FATHER OR BROTHER AT ONE OF THE KHATHIR'S RESIDENCES. (b)(6) SPOKE WITH DETAINEE TO MAKE COMPLAINTS ABOUT INTERFERENCE BY JAYSH AL-MAHDI (JAM) COMMANDERS WITH PROJECTS OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. (b)(6) REQUESTED A LETTER FROM THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYR SADR (OMS) ORDERING JAM TO STOP INTERFERING WITH THE PROJECTS. JAM COMMANDERS WOULD DEMAND SUBCONTRACTS FROM THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR PROJECTS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE JAM COMMANDERS WITH A LUMP SUM OF MONEY. THE SUBCONTRACTS WERE GIVEN TO JAM, BUT NOT IN SPECIFIC COMMANDERS' NAMES. IN RASAF, THE SUBCONTRACTS WERE DEMANDED SIMPLY TO PROVIDE MONEY TO JAM - NO WORK WAS ACTUALLY DONE. (b)(6) REQUESTS LED TO A LETTER BEING ISSUED TO DIRECT JAM TO STOP INTERFERING. THE LETTER DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH ULTIMATELY THE PROBLEM DECREASED IN MAGNITUDE. IN KARKH, WHERE THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS NOT AS STABLE AS IN RASAF, JAM WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CONTRACTORS WORKING ON PROJECTS UNDER A SUBCONTRACT.

(b)(6) ALSO SOUGHT A LETTER FROM OMS RECOGNIZING THAT THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OFFICIALLY REPRESENTED THE SADR TREND, BECAUSE SOME INDIVIDUALS QUESTIONED WHETHER HE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ON THE TREND'S BEHALF. (b)(6) ULTIMATELY RECEIVED SUCH A LETTER. DETAINEE DOES NOT RECALL WHETHER IT WAS ISSUED WITH MAS'S SEAL OR SIMPLY WITH THE OMS'S SEAL.

DETAINEE HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH (b)(6). AFTER THE INITIAL MEETINGS WHEN DETAINEE MET WITH ZAYDAN ON BUSINESS, DETAINEE SAW HIM PERIODICALLY IN SOCIAL SETTINGS. THEY TRAVELED TOGETHER AS MEMBERS OF LARGE GROUP TO THE HAJJ. (SOURCE COMMENT - "THE GROUPS CONSISTED OF THREE CARS AND A FEW BUSES AS WELL." END COMMENT.) (b)(6) HAS A GOOD SENSE OF HUMOR AND IS A PLEASANT PERSON TO SPEAK TO THOUGH MOST OF THE MEETINGS OF DETAINEE AND (b)(6) HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY VISITATIONS. (b)(6) TYPICALLY RAISED THE ISSUES OF INTERFERENCE WITH JAM AND TROUBLES WITH JAM. (b)(6) IS TIRED OF JAM'S INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS AND IS

READY TO QUIT HIS POSITION AS HEAD OF THE SADR TREND'S ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. (b)(6) NEVER MEETS WITH MAS PERSONALLY. INSTEAD, (b)(6) MEETS WITH (b)(6).

INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES (S/REL to USA and MCF): DIRECT, INCENTIVE OF EARLIER RELEASE AND FEAR OF LONG TERM DETENTION, EMOTIONAL HATE OF FORMER COMRADES (MAS AND (b)(6)).

4. COMMENTS (S/REL to USA and MCF):

INTERROGATOR COMMENTS (S/REL to USA and MCF): DETAINEE COOPERATED FULLY IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS AND DID NOT ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE INTERROGATOR. BASED ON OVER 100 INTERROGATION SESSIONS CONDUCTED TO DATE, THE PROSPECT FOR COLLECTING SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM DETAINEE IS SOMEWHAT LIMITED. ALTHOUGH DETAINEE UNDOUBTEDLY POSSESSES INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT HE HAS NOT PROVIDED, THE VALUE OF ANY TARGETING INFORMATION HE HAS, NOW THAT IT IS MORE THAN 70 DAYS SINCE HIS CAPTURE, MAY BE CORRESPONDINGLY LIMITED.

INTERROGATOR BELIEVES THAT DETAINEE, IF HE IS NOT RELEASED ON GOOD RELATIONS WITH CF, OR IS NOT OTHERWISE ENGAGED CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH CF, MAY REVERT TO A PRIOR PATTERN OF ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A HIGH LEVEL THREAT TO CF. REGARDLESS OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH DETAINEE IS RELEASED, HE IS A RIVAL OF MAS, AND WILL LIKELY RESUME HIS EFFORTS AGAINST MAS AND THOSE WHO ARE ALLIED WITH MAS, INCLUDING (b)(6). GIVEN DETAINEE'S POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE SADR TREND, CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGING HIM IN A RECONCILIATION PROCESS OR OTHER EFFORTS TO DECREASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN CF AND SHIA MILITANTS MAY RESOLVE A HIGH LEVEL THREAT AGAINST CF. DETAINEE HAS PROVEN TO BE A RATIONAL, LOGICAL THINKER, WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN PERSUADED TO COOPERATE IN PROVIDING INFORMATION BASED ON THE BEST OF INTERESTS OF IRAQ AND HIS OWN SELF INTEREST. IF CF IS ABLE TO WIN DETAINEE'S TRUST, A BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP COULD BE CREATED.

INTELLIGENCE VALUE ASSESSMENT (S/REL to USA and MCF): HIGH

DISPOSITION RECOMMENDATION (S/REL to USA and MCF): TRANSFER

SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):

SIPR EMAIL

(b)(6)

NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE transliteration OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): J-1483

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/06/04)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD - NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET (S/REL to USA and MCF)

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-4 SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//X1~~

TIR-TH 1.4a

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//X1~~

Summary

Document source: (b)(6) Email Attachment
Ingest/20090108/121 MAS OMS Income Ref TIRs and Two Committees TIR-TH 1.4a
(b)(6) Doc

121 MAS OMS Income Ref TIRs and Two Committees TIR-TH 1.4a (b)(6)
(b)(6) Doc

Table Properties

GIVEN NAME (b)(6)
CLAN NAME NONE
TRIBAL NAME (b)(6)
ALIAS NONE
EYE COLOR BROWN
HAIR COLOR BLACK
HEIGHT 5 FEET 8 INCHES
WEIGHT 160 POUNDS
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES (b)(6)
(b)(6)
ADDRESS (b)(6)
DETAINEE RENTS A HOUSE IN BAGHDAD
PHONE NUMBER NONE
MOBILE NUMBER INITIALLY CLAIMED TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL
DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE. DETAINEE LATER ADMITTED HIS MOBILE PHONE WAS TAKEN ON THE
OBJECTIVE. HE DID NOT PROVIDE THE NUMBER.
POB BAGHDAD, IZ
DOB (b)(6)
MARITAL STATUS SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE, DIVORCE NOT FINALIZED
NATIONALITY IRAQI
RELIGION SHIA ISLAM
EDUCATION ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHIA HAWZA RELIGIOUS
TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ
MOSQUE NONE
IMAM NONE
MILITARY EXPERIENCE PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI
DINAR
SPECIAL SKILLS NONE
OCCUPATION RELIGIOUS LEADER
DETAINEE NUMBER N1228A
FATHER (b)(6)
MOTHER WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)
BROTHERS WNA
SISTERS WNA
WIFE DIVORCED FROM FIRST WIFE, SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE.
CHILDREN (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
CONOP SETANTA
DTG OF CAPTURE 20 MAR 0300C 2007
PLACE OF CAPTURE BASRAH, IZ
APPREHENDING UNIT TH 1.4a
CURRENT LOCATION TH 1.4a
INTERROGATOR (b)(6)
LANGUAGE USED ARABIC

SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS NONE

(b)(6)

Table: Locations

Label Country Lat/Lon

IRAQ IRAQ 33.00000000 44.00000000

1.4b

Content

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

REPORT NUMBER (U): TIR-TR 1.4a

REPORT DATE (U): 6 JUNE 07

REPORTING UNIT (U): TF 4ASE

COUNTRY (U): IRAQ (IZ): 1.4b

SOURCE PARAGRAPH (S//REL TO USA AND MCF) // DETAINEE TF 1.4a A SHIA IRAQI MALE IN COALITION FORCES (CF) CUSTODY WITH DIRECT ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF DAILY ACTIVITIES. REPORTING RELIABILITY CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED AT THIS TIME.

SUMMARY (S//REL TO USA AND MCF)

THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST INTERROGATION OF NI228A

NO FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT (b)(6) HEAD OF THE SADR TREND'S ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE SADR TREND'S INCOME OR COMMITTEE ON LEGITIMATE RIGHTS

DISCUSSED POTENTIAL AMNESTY FOR INSURGENTS

NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ABOUT RECENT KIDNAPPING OF FIVE CIVILIANS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE

TEXT (S//REL TO USA AND MCF)

1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (S//REL TO USA AND MCF)

GIVEN NAME: (b)(6)

FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: (b)(6)

GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: (b)(6)

CLAN NAME: NONE

TRIBAL NAME: AL-KHAZ'ALI

ALIAS: NONE

EYE COLOR: BROWN

HAIR COLOR: BLACK

HEIGHT: 5 FEET 8 INCHES

WEIGHT: 160 POUNDS

DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

ADDRESS: (b)(6)

DETAINEE RENTS A HOUSE IN BAGHDAD

PHONE NUMBER: NONE

MOBILE NUMBER: INITIALLY CLAIMED TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE. DETAINEE LATER ADMITTED HIS MOBILE PHONE WAS TAKEN ON THE OBJECTIVE. HE DID NOT PROVIDE THE NUMBER.

POB: BAGHDAD, IZ

DOB: (b)(6)

MARITAL STATUS: SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE, DIVORCE NOT FINALIZED

NATIONALITY: IRAQI

RELIGION: SHIA ISLAM

EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT. THE SHIA HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE); ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY)

MOSQUE: NONE

IMAM: NONE

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR

SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE

OCCUPATION: RELIGIOUS LEADER

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 6 JUNE 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: NI228A

FATHER: (b)(6)

MOTHER: WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

BROTHERS: WNA

SISTERS: WNA

WIFE: DIVORCED FROM FIRST WIFE, SEPARATED FROM SECOND WIFE

CHILDREN: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP: SETANTA

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ

APPREHENDING UNIT: TF 1.4a

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-CF GROUP LEADER, ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM (b)(6) EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PROVINCIAL JOINT COORDINATION CENTER (P/JCC)

CURRENT LOCATION: TF 1.4a HQ

WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (S//REL TO USA AND MCF) 4 X 9mm handguns: Beretta X49906Z, Browning b26382, Glock GWW88, Crvena 142650 (bent barrel); 1 X Colt 4 x 20 scope; 5 X Magazines, 49 x ball rounds, 15 x hollow tip rounds; 1 X Compass, military grade; 2 X Brown wallets, 1 X watch, silver, 1 X glasses, bronze frame, 1 X silver ring, brown stone, arabic writing, 1 X Electro dot sight (floating dot), 1 X Flashlight, no batteries, 1 X Box of 7 silver rings with stars, 1 X Box of 5 silver rings with arabic writing, 3 X passports, 2 X large black ID cards, 1 X large gray ID card, 1 X large brown ID card, 28 X ID cards, 5 X small notebooks, 2 X notebooks, 2 X phonebooks (1 small black and 1 pocket size black), 1 X laminated blue vehicle registration card, 1 X large stack of documents, 30 X ID card size photos, 22 X Loose photographs, 1 X photo album, 9 X 10,000 Iraqi dinar bills, 60 X 5,000 Iraqi dinar bills, 8 X 1,000 Iraqi dinar bills, 3 X 250 Iraqi dinar bills, 3 X 50 Iraqi dinar bills, 1 X 2,000 Rials Iranian bill, 2 X Blank stamped Iraqi Personal IDs, 3 X silver stickers for Iraqi Personal IDs

INTERROGATOR: (b)(6)

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC
INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT): (b)(6) (IRAQI)

1 SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (SPEECH TO USA AND MC/F)

A. (COLLECTOR COMMENT - COLLECTOR AGAIN QUESTIONED DETAINEE ABOUT (b)(6) (b)(6) THE HEAD OF THE SADR TREND'S ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, BASED ON SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENTS. DETAINEE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAN HE DID IN A PRIOR SESSION. END COMMENT.) (FIELD COMMENT - REFER TO TIR-TH 14a 14a END COMMENT.) DETAINEE REAFFIRMED THAT (b)(6) HEADS THE SADR TREND'S ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW ANYONE ELSE ON THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW THE NUMBER OF TENDERS THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE BIDS ON IN A MONTH OR QUARTER. DETAINEE IS UNABLE TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF TENDERS THAT THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE BIDS ON. DETAINEE HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE TYPE OF BUSINESSES CONNECTED TO THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OR (b)(6) THAN THE INFORMATION HE PROVIDED IN A PRIOR SESSION. (FIELD COMMENT - REFER TO TIR-TH 14a END COMMENT.)

B. (COLLECTOR COMMENT - COLLECTOR AGAIN QUESTIONED DETAINEE ABOUT THE SADR TREND'S INCOME AND THE COMMITTEE ON LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, BASED ON SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENTS. END COMMENT.) (FIELD COMMENT - REFER TO TIR-TH 14a AND TIR-TH 14a END COMMENT.) DETAINEE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT SHIA MOSQUE DONATIONS TO THE SADR TREND TOTAL 10-15 MILLION U.S. DOLLARS (USD) PER MONTH. (COLLECTOR COMMENT - AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, THE FIGURES IN THE PRECEDING SENTENCE WERE EXAGGERATED BY A FACTOR OF 10. END COMMENT.) THE SADR TREND'S ANNUAL INCOME IS APPROXIMATELY \$36 MILLION USD, AS DETAINEE DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY IN DETAIL. (FIELD COMMENT - REFER TO TIR-TH 14a END COMMENT.) (COLLECTOR COMMENT - DETAINEE'S ESTIMATE OF THE SADR TREND'S ANNUAL INCOME DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY MONEY THAT MUQTADA AL-SADR MIGHT RECEIVE FROM GRAND AYATALLAH AL-SISTANI. END COMMENT.)

DETAINEE REAFFIRMED THE ROLES OF THE SADR TREND'S ECONOMIC COMMITTEE AND COMMITTEE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS THAT HE IDENTIFIED PREVIOUSLY. IN SHORT, THE COMMITTEE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS RECEIVES VARIOUS SOURCES OF INCOME AND THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING CONTRACTS. (FIELD COMMENT - REFER TO TIR-TH 14a END COMMENT.) PROFITS FROM THE COMMITTEE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE BOTH GO TO MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS). FUNDS COLLECTED FROM THE COMMITTEE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS MAY BE INVESTED IN PROJECTS OVERSEEN BY THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, AT MAS'S DISCRETION, BUT THE TWO COMMITTEES DO NOT HAVE A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER. (SOURCE COMMENT - THE COMMITTEES HAVE "NO" DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WHATSOEVER. END COMMENT.)

C. DETAINEE BELIEVES THAT AMNESTY WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR SELECT IRAQIS ENGAGED IN PARAMILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST CF. AMNESTY IS A NECESSARY STEP TO RESOLVING THE ONGOING VIOLENCE. (SOURCE COMMENT - "VIOLENCE WILL NOT END WITHOUT THIS IDEA." END COMMENT.) BY ITSELF, AMNESTY WILL NOT END THE VIOLENCE. IT MUST BE ADVANCED AS PART OF A BROADER PROPOSAL THAT WILL EVIDENCE CPS INTENTION TO LEAVE IRAQ. CF CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WILL DEPART IRAQ, AS OPPOSED TO REMAINING AS INVADERS, IN ONE OF TWO WAYS. FIRST, CF CAN EXPRESS THAT ONCE CERTAIN OBJECTIVES OR CONDITIONS ARE MET, SUCH AS THE CESSATION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF HOSTILITIES, CF WILL DEPART IRAQ. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SHOULD ANNOUNCE THAT ONCE THERE IS PEACE AND SECURITY, AMERICAN FORCES WILL LEAVE. SECOND, CF COULD SET A DATE TO DEPART IRAQ. IN THE ABSENCE OF EITHER OF THESE TWO THINGS, SIMPLY TALKING ABOUT LEAVING IRAQ WILL HELP EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACE. IN IRAQ, THE MEDIA DOES NOT REPORT ON CF'S DESIRE TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. INSTEAD, THE MEDIA BROADCASTS THE CONTRARY POSITION - THAT

CF ARE REMAINING IN IRAQ INDEFINITELY. CF HAS TO STRESS ITS DESIRE TO DEPART THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO AMELIORATE VIOLENCE.

IRAQIS INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF INNOCENT IRAQI CITIZENS PRESENTS AN EMOTIONAL ISSUE THAT WILL COMPLICATE AMNESTY EFFORTS. EVEN IF AN INSURGENT IS GRANTED AMNESTY BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, THE VICTIM'S FAMILY, IF THEY ARE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR, HAS A RIGHT TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION FROM THE PERPETRATOR. IF COMPENSATION IS NOT MADE, THE FAMILY MAY TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. THIS RIGHT COULD NOT AND PERHAPS SHOULD NOT BE PREEMPTED BY AMNESTY PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

WHEN THE IDEA OF AMNESTY WAS DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY, DURING IRAQ'S FIRST INTERIM GOVERNMENT THAT FOLLOWED THE COLLAPSE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME, SOME INSURGENTS REJECTED THE IDEA BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEIR ACTIONS WERE TAKEN LEGITIMATELY IN THE DEFENSE OF THEIR COUNTRY, AND THAT ACCEPTING AN AMNESTY WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR CONDUCT WAS CRIMINAL AND WRONGFUL. MAS, AS WELL AS A PROMINENT SUNNI LEADER, REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF AMNESTY FOR THAT REASON. (SOURCE COMMENT - THEY SAID "WE ARE NOT CRIMINALS. WE BASICALLY DEFEND OUR COUNTRY AND DO NOT NEED OR WANT AMNESTY." END COMMENT.) THUS, THE WORDING OF AN AMNESTY PROPOSAL WILL BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN SECURING ITS ACCEPTANCE. (SOURCE COMMENT - THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SAYING "YOU ARE LIAR" AND "YOU ARE NOT TELLING THE TRUTH!" END COMMENT.) DETAINEE RECOMMENDS THAT CONSIDERABLE TIME BE DEVOTED TO WORDING AN AMNESTY PROPOSAL. ONE ELEMENT COULD BE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BRING ANY CHARGE UNDER IRAQI LAW FOR ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST CF OR IRAQI FORCES AGAINST CERTAIN GROUPS.

SELECT GROUPS SHOULD NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR AMNESTY - AL-QA'IDA (ALSO REPORTED AS "AL-QAEDA") AND FOUR OTHER GROUPS CLOSELY RELATED WITH AL-QA'IDA - TAWID AL-JIHAD, ANSAR AL-SUNNAH, ANSAR AL-ISLAM AND MAJI SHURA MUJAHADIN (PHONETIC) STAND OUT AMONG ALL THE GROUPS AS ONES THAT SHOULD NOT LIKELY BE PERMITTED AMNESTY. DETAINEE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ALL SUNNI MILITANTS SHOULD BE INELIGIBLE FOR RECONCILIATION. SUNNI GROUPS THAT DO NOT FALL WITHIN AL-QA'IDA'S MOLD OR WORK WITH AL-QA'IDA, SUCH AS JAYSH AL-ISLAM, SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR AMNESTY. JAYSH AL-ISLAM AND OTHER SUNNI GROUPS WHO ACTUALLY FIGHT AGAINST AL-QA'IDA, OR ARE WILLING TO DO SO, SHOULD BENEFIT FROM ANY AMNESTY PROPOSAL.

THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF AN AMNESTY IS TIMING - SO THAT IT GOES INTO EFFECT AT A TIME IT WILL DO THE MOST GOOD. MOST OF THE GROUPS WHO WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR AMNESTY MUST AGREE TO THE PROPOSAL BEFORE IT IS FORMALIZED AND ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY.

THE SADR TREND'S SPECIAL GROUPS WILL SUPPORT AMNESTY AS PART OF A BROADER DEAL TO SECURE PEACE IN IRAQ, BUT THE EXTENT OF THEIR SUPPORT DEPENDS IN PART ON HOW MANY SPECIAL GROUP COMMANDERS ARE NOW BEHOLDEN TO MAS. IF MAS OPPOSES AMNESTY, THE COMMANDERS THAT FOLLOW HIM WILL ALSO OPPOSE IT.

D. (COLLECTOR COMMENT - COLLECTOR QUESTIONED DETAINEE ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING OF FIVE CIVILIANS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE. END COMMENT.) IN ORDER TO KIDNAP CIVILIANS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, A GROUP WOULD NOT NEED EXTRAORDINARY CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD NEED GOOD, INSIDE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON WITHIN THAT MINISTRY. OBTAINING GOVERNMENT VEHICLES AND UNIFORMS WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR ANY SHIA GROUP. THEY ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE IF THE GROUP COMMITS THE RESOURCES TO OBTAIN THEM. IF THE KIDNAPPERS FLED TO SADR CITY WITH THE VICTIMS, THE KIDNAPPINGS WERE LIKELY CARRIED OUT BY THE KHAMENEI GROUP OR ONE OF THE GROUPS WITHIN THE SADR TREND. POTENTIAL SUSPECTS IN THE SADR TREND INCLUDE JALIL AL-NURI, (b)(6)

INTERROGATION APPROACH/ TECHNIQUES (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~)
DIRECT, INCENTIVE OF EARLIER RELEASE AND FEAR OF LONG TERM DETENTION, EMOTIONAL
HATE OF FORMER COMRADES (MAS AND WALID AL-ZAMILI)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//XI~~

TIR-TH 14a

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//XI~~

4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~)

INTERROGATOR COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~): DETAINEE COOPERATED FULLY IN
ANSWERING QUESTIONS AND DID NOT APPEAR DECEPTIVE. ALTHOUGH DETAINEE
UNDOUBTEDLY POSSESSES INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT HE HAS NOT PROVIDED, THE
VALUE OF ANY TARGETING INFORMATION HE HAS, NOW THAT IT IS MORE THAN 80 DAYS SINCE
HIS CAPTURE, MAY BE CORRESPONDINGLY LIMITED.

INTERROGATOR BELIEVES THAT DETAINEE, IF HE IS NOT RELEASED ON GOOD RELATIONS WITH
CF, OR IS NOT OTHERWISE ENGAGED CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH CF, MAY REVERT TO A PRIOR
PATTERN OF ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A HIGH LEVEL THREAT TO CF. REGARDLESS
OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH DETAINEE IS RELEASED, HE IS A RIVAL OF MAS, AND WILL
LIKELY RESUME HIS EFFORTS AGAINST MAS AND THOSE WHO ARE ALLIED WITH MAS,
INCLUDING (b)(6). GIVEN DETAINEE'S POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE SADR TREND,
CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGING HIM IN A RECONCILIATION PROCESS OR OTHER EFFORTS TO
DECREASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN CF AND SHIA MILITANTS MAY RESOLVE A HIGH LEVEL
THREAT AGAINST CF. DETAINEE, ACCORDING TO REPORTING AND HIS OWN ADMISSIONS, HAS
TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SADR TREND'S SPECIAL GROUPS AND
WELL AS OTHER KEY INDIVIDUALS IN THE SADR TREND. DETAINEE HAS PROVEN TO BE A
RATIONAL, LOGICAL THINKER, WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN PERSUADED TO COOPERATE IN
PROVIDING INFORMATION BASED ON THE BEST OF INTERESTS OF IRAQ AND HIS OWN SELF
INTEREST.

INTELLIGENCE VALUE ASSESSMENT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~): HIGH

DISPOSITION RECOMMENDATION (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~): TRANSFER

SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U)

SIPR EMAIL:

(b)(6)

NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN
PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN
REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): J-1483

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/06/06)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD - NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-1 SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04

DECL ON: XI

Approved for Release