POTUS UPDATE

29 March 2002
Agenda

- Planning review
- Issue discussion
- Review of strategic timing
- New planning guidance
- Preparatory actions
- Conditioning Saddam
- Shootdown response options
- Next Steps
Set Strategic Conditions:
- BGen Stalder (DJ5) was my representative on the VPOTUS visit to AOR.
- Reviewed the Joint Staff developed Pol-Mil plan -- concerned about transition from regime collapse to effective new Government.
- CENTCOM requesting assistance by OSD to establish acceptable arrangement for combat aircraft and force presence in QATAR prior to offensive operations. OSD staffers in office view negotiations as a priority and are working hard

Set Operational Conditions:
- Moving Class I, IIIP, and IV into theater for 5000 pax x 60 days of supply; to arrive early May--originally procured for Horn of Africa; Moved 48 containers of IPDS and installing 2.5M gallon fuel farm in Kuwait. Containerizing FALCON-78 ammunition.
- Pre-positioning Equipment:
  - Accelerated maintenance schedule of prepositioned equipment afloat. Initiating APS-5Q download in Kuwait prior to EXORD.
  - Re-loading USS DAHL with Corps / Theater stocks; arrive in theater 31 MAY 02.
  - $25M allocated to fill APS-5Q ASL/PLL shortages; Filling equipment shortfalls of APS-5Q and APS-3 from APS-2.
- Deploying remainder of the 3 ID Brigade Task Force to Kuwait from Ft. Stewart.

Continue Planning and Rehearsals:
- Reviewed required actions in AFGHANISTAN, and Components concept of operation at commander's conference in Ramstein. Monthly follow-on meeting planned.
- Published ORDER for Components; copy provided to JCS today.
- Participated in JCS Wargame focused on Strategic and Operational considerations. CENTCOM plan was well received and considered as part of GWOT.
- Initial TPFDD developed in FEB; refinement conference planned for 3-14 June.
- Developed C2 structure; essential component is CJTF-AFG
Strategic Timing

What preparatory actions/decisions need to occur prior to operations...

How do we condition Saddam during this time...

What if...

Response to pilot shutdown...

3/27/2002
### Timing Considerations -- Operational

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**Intelligence Build**

**Operational Capability**
### Minimum Support Required

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Basing</th>
<th>Overflight</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Full support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Full support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Full support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK (D’Gar)</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey *</td>
<td>Full aircraft / SOF</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE *</td>
<td>Support aircraft</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain *</td>
<td>Support / ISR aircraft</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA *</td>
<td>Limited support / ISR aircraft only</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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#### JOA
**Staging for Operations**

#### Enroute
**Beddown / Refuel**

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* Expansion beyond current footprint or additional basing / support may be possible

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Unilateral Coalition Support Assumptions

Next slide
Preparatory Actions
Conditioning Saddam
Conditioning Saddam

C-Day

D-Day

- US Kinetic Activity / Force Movement
- Iraqi Level of Reaction

Generate Force Deployment / Activity
"Spikes" in order to:
- Desensitize Iraqi regime to our movements
- Force Iraqi expenditure of time, money, effort
- Refine our targeting
- Enhance deception
- Allow for equipment build-up

Iraqi Anticipation of D-Day

Deception Theme:
"Desert Storm Build-up"

Execute

OSW Response

- Carrier exercise in the N. Arabian
- CTF-50 Afghanistan
- BCT deployment

- APS-3 download
- ARG-MEU exercise
- Move CENTCOM HQ

OSW Response

- Aggressive OSW / OGW
- Carrier Exercises in North Arabian Sea

- Activate CRAFT
- Select reserve mobilization
- Deploy generated task force
- Prepare follow-on forces for deployment

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Options in Event of US Aircraft Shootdown

- **COAT Desert Badge**: Execute approved target sets:
  - C2+
  - MDSC3
  - WMD / TRM delivery
  - Ground Logistics

- **COA 2 Desert Badge**: Execute Desert Badge and enablers:
  - C2+
  - SAMs
  - EW Radars
  - Fighter Aircraft

- **COA 3 Desert Badge**: Execute Desert Badge and initial target sets:
  - Regime Leadership
  - Regime Security
  - SRG/RGF/C
  - Battlefield Prep

Recover Pilot
Execute targets that threaten pilot or recovery effort

1-2 Days
Continue with plan (spikes)

5-7 Days
Continue with plan (spikes)

10 Days + sustained RO’s (30-60 days)
Series of Expanding RO-4’s AirWar efforts

Approved for Release
## Desert Badger Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Operational Factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desert Badger</td>
<td>Duration—1-2 days, Target sets: C2, IADS/C3, WMD / TBM delivery, Ground/Logistics</td>
<td>Low risk to pilot, Minimal impact on resources for plan, Minimal shaping activities, Minimal risk of escalation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Badger +</td>
<td>Duration—5-7 days, Target sets: Desert Badger and C2+, Naval, SAMs, WMD+, EW Radars+, Fighter aircraft</td>
<td>Low risk to pilot, Moderate impact on PGMs, Moderate shaping activities (IADs), Significant risk of early escalation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Badger ++</td>
<td>Duration—10 days and sustained RO ~90 days, Target sets: Desert Badger + and regime leadership, regime security, SRG/RFGC, Battlefield Prep+</td>
<td>Moderate initial risk to pilot, Significant impact on plan (changes concept), Significant shaping activities, Early escalation- Air War starts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Desert Badger- CSAR only</td>
<td>Duration—Immediate response, Target sets- N/A</td>
<td>Moderate going to low risk to pilot, No impact on plan, Minimal risk of escalation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic Considerations for Desert Badger

Must consider the status of...

- Diplomatic efforts to get Saddam to accept intrusive inspections
- Ability to generate regional political support
- IO / deception plan
- Worldwide military commitments
Next Steps ...

- Set Strategic Conditions
  - Actively address Israeli / Palestinian cease-fire
  - Secure necessary support from allies and regional partners
  - Finalize declaratory policy and determine when to notify allies and make public announcements
  - Review Industrial-Base/ business sector support requirements
  - Determine future Iraqi Government strategy
  - Determine date/requirement for increased mobilization
  - Determine strategic risk mitigation measures

- Set Operational Conditions
  - Designate / deploy CJTF-Afghanistan
  - Posture in-theater and PREPO forces and equipment
  - Finalize planning for activity / movement “spikes”

- Continue Planning and Rehearsals
  - Conduct monthly Commanders Conferences
  - C4 conference 2-4 April
  - Logistics conference 22-26 April
  - Refine movement requirements (3-14 June)
  - Review / revise current response options / contingency plans
  - Finalize exercise plans

SECRETL RL TO USA, AUS and GBR… 3/27/2002
Back up Slides
## Timing Considerations -- Summary

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### Three Options...

- **EXORD**
  - Phase I: 90 days
  - 0 Day
  - Phase II: 45 days
  - Phase III: 90 days

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### Operations

- EXORD plus 90 days & Preferred Munitions
- Weather Patterns

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**3/27/2002**
This is a graphic depiction of our overall strategy

Simultaneous Execution across Multiple Lines Of Operations
- DOD and USCENTCOM synchronize actions. Create multiple events / crises designed to trigger regime change by overwhelming Saddam's ability to recognize, analyze and respond to USG actions

Create and maintain pressure on Saddam and his supporters
- Synergy and speed are greatest threats to regime
- Combination is key; NOT individual events / targets
- Saddam is regime's center of gravity
Sample synergistic events
  - Sabotage
  - Disarray in inner circle
  - Ramped up opposition group activities in the north, west and south
  - Kinetic Strikes
  - Ground offensive in the south
SAP programs

NEXT SLIDE
Here is the overall phasing, focused on initiating the attack as rapidly as possible with a robust force.

- If the President were to approve the concept today (01 Feb 02), in 75 to 90 days we could execute (15-30 April).
- We need 30 days from today (01 Feb 02) to complete planning.
- Followed by 45-60 days to posture the force.
- 20-45 days to attack the regime.
- And up to 90 days to complete regime destruction.

* A date to key on is Saddam’s birthday - 28 April.

Next slide
Phase I - Plan and Set Initial Start Force

- Continue detailed planning
- Secure regional support for operations
- Set conditions for successful force movement
- Enhance intelligence capability and targeting fidelity
- Prepare opposition groups
- Degrade Iraqi regime’s influence and deceive Iraqi leadership
- Deploy initial start force including sustainment

OEF / OSW / ONW

# Attack Aircraft: 214  # Attack Aircraft: 537
# Attack Helos: 24    # Attack Helos: 162
# Personnel: 60K     # Personnel: 183K
# Tanks: 58           # Tanks: 375

Duration ~ 90 Days

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Phase II - Attack Regime

- Initiate combat operations
- Degrade / destroy Iraqi Regime Leadership
- Degrade / destroy Iraqi WMD capabilities
- Degrade Iraqi security forces
- Seize key terrain and maintain operational momentum
- Degrade / co-opt Iraqi regular army and republican guard forces
- Support opposition groups favoring U.S. objectives in Iraq
- Posture forces for regime destruction

**OEF / OSW / ONW**

- # Attack Aircraft: 214
- # Attack Helos: 24
- # Personnel: 60K
- # Tanks: 58

**Build During PH II**

- # Attack Aircraft: 537
- # Attack Helos: 162
- # Personnel: 183K
- # Tanks: 375

Duration ~ 45 Days
Phase III - Complete Regime Destruction

- Remove regime leadership
- Install provisional / permanent government
- Complete destruction of resisting military forces
- Secure known Iraqi WMD facilities and systems
- Posture forces for post-hostilities operations

OEF / OSW / ONW

# Attack Aircraft: 214
# Attack Helos: 24
# Personnel: 60K
# Tanks: 58

Build During PH III

# Attack Aircraft: 537
# Attack Helos: 162
# Personnel: 189K
# Tanks: 375

Duration ~ 90 Days

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Phase IV - Post-Hostilities

- Secure WMD facilities
- Support establishment of a professional Iraqi military
- Transition civil-military operations to international community / provisional government
- Gather intelligence, detain terrorists and war criminals, and free unjustly detained individuals inside Iraq
- Redeploy forces

OEF / OSW / ONW

- # Attack Aircraft: 214
- # Attack Helos: 24
- # Personnel: 60K
- # Tanks: 58

Duration - Unknown

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