CG Samarra Update
26 July 2004

Strategy-Pol/Mil
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اشتراك و تعاون – Partnership and Understanding
24 July Combined Iraqi-MNF-I Strategic Planning Group (SPG) Meeting

- Highlighted strategic dilemma: US have sufficient combat power to re-instate IIF authority on Samarra, but two-days of fighting by US troops would be politically unacceptable; the ISF lack the trained forces to impose their own authority.

- Iraqis believe: “If we are successful in Samarra it will have an impact across the Sunni Triangle and Iraqi. Failure in Samarra would threaten the stability of all Iraq.” [MG Ali-Ghalib]

- SPG identified intelligence as critical:
  - ‘Is Samarra a strategic risk or can it be contained until a political solution and/or strong Iraqi force reaches FOC? When do we need to decide?’ To be discussed at 28 Jul SAC.
  - Need to develop targetable MNF-I intelligence
  - Lack of Iraqi intelligence
  - Need to integrate MNF-I/Iraqi intelligence effort

- A Tactical-level Planning Group led by 1ID is developing new COAs based on Strategic Planning Group and FRAGO direction.

- Iraqi Army and IIF unready until mid-September at earliest. Strategic window of vulnerability.

- A new realism was demonstrated by the Iraqis who admitted that their original IPS plan (COA 2) was ‘weak and will not work against the opposition that we are up against’.

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Amb. Neumann’s Meeting with Minister of Electricity on 24 Jul 04

- Check-point on Samarra bridge is cause of tension. Possibility of moving it is currently being worked at brigade/battalion-level. Leverage? STRATCOM opportunity.

- 832 alleged detainees. 1ID consider number of detainees to be less than 100. MG Miller is providing precise number. Leverage? STRATCOM opportunity.

- Need for one trusted leader and for IIIG to take the political initiative. Local government essential. DCG and Amb. Neumann will follow-up with Deputy PM on 27 Jul.

- The city council is corrupt and needs to be replaced – IIIG action required. DCG and Amb. Neumann will follow-up with Deputy PM on 27 Jul.

- Samarrans want 250 extra police. CPATT is working the overall police numbers: permanent police for Samarra, plus additional 600 to support Samarra operation. Recruitment of new police officers from local area looks viable – decision required for go ahead. STRATCOM opportunity.
An Ideal Endstate
Amb. Neumann and DCG to discuss with Dep PM on 27 Jul

- Samarra returned to legitimate local government control that properly falls under the authority of the central IIG.

- The IPS permanently established in Samarra and capable of keeping law and order.

- The insurgents and FF having been demonstrably defeated or forced to withdraw by the ISF – but without unacceptable bloodshed of innocents and destruction to homes.

- A clear message having been transmitted across the country that the IIG and ISF is in control and that the tide is turning against the insurgents.

- The honor of the city remaining intact – a defeat at the hands of foreign forces (US) having been avoided.

- The Sunni Triangle not inflamed by operations in Samarra, but people convinced of the futility of further insurgent action.

- A significant blow having been inflicted on FF and insurgents.
A Pragmatic Interim Endstate?
Amb. Neumann and DCG to discuss with Dep PM on 27 Jul

- Samarra is not to become another Fallujah
- There must be free movement through Samarra
- There must be no strangulation/encirclement of Baghdad
Five Courses of Action Under Development

COA 1. 1ID OP BATON ROUGE, 600 – 1,200 IPS in support.

COA 2. 1,200 Iraqi Police Force, 400 ING, MNF-I in support.

COA 3. Iraqi Intervention Force, Iraqi Army, IPS in support, MNF-I in support

COA 4. Containment and long-term political solution. New COA.

COA 5. Stick and carrot. (Branch plan to COA 4) New COA.

[COA 6. Covert shock action?] CG to initiate compartmentalized planning.

Not yet at decision point
COAs 1 - 3

COA 1
- Political Risk: X
- Military Risk: ✓

600 – 1,200 Iraqi Police
1ID Brigade Combat Team
2 Iraqi National Guard Battalions (-)

Hard Objective
هدف ضعيف

COA 2
- Political Risk: ✓
- Military Risk: X

Reserve 400 Iraqi National Guard
1ID Brigade Combat Team

1,200 Iraqi Police

Soft Objective
هدف ضعيف

COA 3
- Political Risk: ✓
- Military Risk: ✓?

1ID Brigade Combat Team

Iraqi Police
Iraqi Army and IIF

Objective Unknown
هدف ضعيف

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COA 4 – Containment

Assumptions:
Specific targets in Samarra unknown. 
Samarra is not a strategic threat. 
Insurgency is not spreading.

Characteristics of COA 4:
- Political engagement by IIG. 
- Detainees released? 
- Bridge checkpoint moved? 
- IPS recruited and trained? 
- Incentives for moderates to change sides?

Success depends on intelligence assessment of risk of waiting.
COA 5 – Stick and Carrot  
(Branch Plan to COA 4)

Assumptions:
Strategic threat of insurgency spreading identified. High political risk of CF action, but higher strategic risk of inaction.
Aim: Regain Initiative, then revert to COA 3 / 4.
Requirement: Coord 1MEF (Fallujah knock-on)
Timeline: Fill window of vulnerability, Jul – Sep/Oct

Trigger:
C2 report threat increasing

Response:
IIG increase political tempo

Objective unknown

Politics
Hy STRATCOM
Politics and COA 4

COA 3

COA 4

Political Risk

Political Risk

Military Success


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Partnership and Understanding

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