




CG Samarra Update

26 July 2004





24 July Combined Iraqi-MNF-I Strategic Planning Group (SPG) Meeting

- Highlighted strategic dilemma: US have sufficient combat power to re-instate IIF authority on Samarra, but two-days of fighting by US troops would be politically unacceptable; the ISF lack the trained forces to impose their own authority.
- Iraqis believe: “If we are successful in Samarra it will have an impact across the Sunni Triangle and Iraqi. Failure in Samarra would threaten the stability of all Iraq.” [MG Ali-Ghalib]
- SPG identified intelligence as critical:
 - ‘Is Samarra a strategic risk or can it be contained until a political solution and/or strong Iraqi force reaches FOC? When do we need to decide?’ To be discussed at 28 Jul SAC.
 - Need to develop targetable MNF-I intelligence
 - Lack of Iraqi intelligence
 - Need to integrate MNF-I/Iraqi intelligence effort
- A Tactical-level Planning Group led by 1ID is developing new COAs based on Strategic Planning Group and FRAGO direction.
- Iraqi Army and IIF unready until mid-September at earliest. Strategic window of vulnerability.
- A new realism was demonstrated by the Iraqis who admitted that their original IPS plan (COA 2) was ‘weak and will not work against the opposition that we are up against’.



Amb. Neumann's Meeting with Minister of Electricity on 24 Jul 04

- Check-point on Samarra bridge is cause of tension. Possibility of moving it is currently being worked at brigade/battalion-level. Leverage? STRATCOM opportunity.
- 832 alleged detainees. 1ID consider number of detainees to be less than 100. MG Miller is providing precise number. Leverage? STRATCOM opportunity.
- Need for one trusted leader and for IIG to take the political initiative. Local government essential. DCG and Amb. Neumann will follow-up with Deputy PM on 27 Jul.
- The city council is corrupt and needs to be replaced – IIG action required. DCG and Amb. Neumann will follow-up with Deputy PM on 27 Jul.
- Samarrans want 250 extra police. CPATT is working the overall police numbers: 1.4a permanent police for Samarra, plus additional 600 to support Samarra operation. Recruitment of new police officers from local area looks viable – **decision required for go ahead.** STRATCOM opportunity.



An Ideal Endstate

Amb. Neumann and DCG to discuss with Dep PM on 27 Jul

- Samarra returned to legitimate local government control that properly falls under the authority of the central IIG.
- The IPS permanently established in Samarra and capable of keeping law and order.
- The insurgents and FF having been demonstrably defeated or forced to withdraw by the ISF – but without unacceptable bloodshed of innocents and destruction to homes.
- A clear message having been transmitted across the country that the IIG and ISF is in control and that the tide is turning against the insurgents.
- The honor of the city remaining intact – a defeat at the hands of foreign forces (US) having been avoided.
- The Sunni Triangle not inflamed by operations in Samarra, but people convinced of the futility of further insurgent action.
- A significant blow having been inflicted on FF and insurgents.



A Pragmatic Interim Endstate?

Amb. Neumann and DCG to discuss with Dep PM on 27 Jul

- Samarra is not to become another Fallujah
- There must be free movement through Samarra
- There must be no strangulation/encirclement of Baghdad

Approved for Release



Five Courses of Action Under Development

COA 1. 11D OP BATON ROUGE, 600 – 1,200 IPS in support.

COA 2. 1,200 Iraqi Police Force, 400 ING, MNF-I in support.

COA 3. Iraqi Intervention Force, Iraqi Army, IPS in support, MNF-I in support

COA 4. Containment and long-term political solution. New COA.

COA 5. Stick and carrot. (Branch plan to COA 4) New COA.

[COA 6. Covert shock action?] CG to initiate compartmentalized planning.

Not yet at decision point




COAs 1 - 3

COA 1

Political Risk **✗**


Military Risk **✓**



COA 2

Political Risk **✓**

Military Risk **✗**



COA 3

Political Risk **✓**

Military Risk **✓?**





COA 4 – Containment

Assumptions:

Specific targets in Samarra unknown.
Samarra is not a strategic threat.
Insurgency is not spreading.

Characteristics of COA 4:

- Political engagement by IIG.
- Detainees released?
- Bridge checkpoint moved?
- IPS recruited and trained?
- Incentives for moderates to change sides?

Success depends on **intelligence assessment** of risk of waiting.



COA 5 – Stick and Carrot

(Branch Plan to COA 4)

Assumptions:

Strategic threat of insurgency spreading identified.
High political risk of CF action, but higher strategic risk of inaction.

Aim: Regain Initiative, then revert to COA 3 / 4.

Requirement: Coord 1MEF (Fallujah knock-on)

Timeline: Fill window of vulnerability,
Jul – Sep/Oct

