

~~SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI~~

CJTF-7 Red Cell

A Red Cell Special Memorandum

14 December 2003

Iraq: Security Threats over the Next Six Months

~~(S//REL TO USA and MCFI)~~ *The capture of Saddam Husayn will have a sharp temporary effect on anti-Coalition activities. There will be near-term impacts on operations that may force the FRE to become more covert, isolate trans-regional activities, slow current rate of expansion, or force groups to transform into more terrorist-like organizations. Nevertheless, core anti-Coalition elements near-term goals will continue to focus on Coalition failure and ultimate withdrawal from Iraq. The FRE will concentrate on attacks on soft targets: Iraqis and civilians cooperating with the Coalition. The FRE will also continue to tap into Iraqi dissatisfaction of Coalition rebuilding efforts.*

(U) Six month assessment

~~(S//REL)~~ Anti-Coalition elements will possibly lower operational tempo in the near-term in order to assess the situation, ensure key cell leadership is not vulnerable, and then attempt to regain the initiative with spectacular attacks on selected targets. As the impact of the capture of Saddam fades, FRE leadership must consolidate its support base, reassess its influence without Saddam, and tap into Sunni dissatisfaction with the slow rate of rebuilding efforts of the Coalition. They will conduct activities aimed at ensuring failure of an emerging government and Coalition withdrawal. Some Iraqi Sunnis, especially those associated with the Baath Party feel disenfranchised because they perceive they have no representation in the Iraqi Governing Council and no future role in Iraq. FRE goals over the next six months include:

- Spectacular attacks on Coalition forces, potential Coalition members, the Coalition Provisional Authority, international community organizations, non-governmental organizations, emerging Iraqi governmental institutions, police, military, and infrastructure
- Leverage foreigners and terrorist organizations operating in Iraq to conduct high-risk, or suicide attacks on selected targets
- Attack kerosene supply to ensure dissatisfaction with Coalition progress
- Attempt to re-establish a high rate of attacks on Coalition after Saddam capture
- Seek to take advantage of significant increase of Coalition assets on MSR's / ASR's associated with move from Kuwait to MSC AOR's.
- Attack aircraft; military and civilian
- Targets selected for maximum IO value – film successful attacks
- Coerce and co-opt tribal elements; leverage CPA mis-steps
- Attack, co-opt and infiltrate Iraqi military, police and security forces; political entities and government agencies.
- Possible kidnappings of civilian and military personnel
- Emergence of 'anti-Coalition' political entities

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(U) Effective FRE Activities:

~~(S//REL)~~ The FRE has been effective in its influence operations among the Iraqi people. Their understanding of the mores, culture, language and fault lines have enabled them to tap into the rhetoric, fears, conspiracy theories, and rumors that abound in Iraqi society. They have also created the perception of momentum among the Iraqi people. The capture of Saddam will be a great setback that must be overcome with more successful spectacular attacks directed at the Coalition.

- Target selection - terrorist type attacks on areas that cannot be protected effectively
- Attacks on effective high IO pay-off targets – aircraft, police stations, Coalition, civilian targets

(U) Effective Coalition Activities

~~(S//REL)~~ Capture of High Value Targets (HVT) including Saddam Husayn. Initial forays into engagement activities with Sunni tribes and leaders seem to be having effects on FRE operations, especially in western Iraq. Prolonged engagement activities with the Shia, combined with long-term relationships with the Kurds have effectively kept FRE activities in the north and south at a minimum. Rebuilding efforts that will improve Iraqi quality of life in the immediate future may have the largest impact on Iraqi citizens now that Saddam is out of Iraqi politics forever.

- CPA is forming the Office of Provisional Outreach that will include tribal engagement and the airing of Sunni grievances against the Coalition
- Military tribal engagement and humanitarian and civil-military operations have had an effect among the populace
- Limited border security operations have disrupted entry by foreign fighters
- Iraqis must perceive that a supreme effort is being undertaken by the Coalition, especially the US, to rebuild Iraq; electricity, water, sewage, medical, economy

(U) Threats to civilian workers

~~(S//REL)~~ Civilian workers, or anyone assisting the Coalition or emerging government are a threat to the FRE, as they bring stability. The FRE's potential main center of gravity is the acquiescence of the Sunni population to their control, goals, and operations. In order to maintain this, the FRE must be able to assemble a monolithic and anti-Coalition Sunni population by attempting to drive out the Coalition, stall an emerging government, and increase Sunni dissatisfaction with the rebuilding process. Civilian employees contribute to the threat against the FRE in that regard. The FRE must attempt to conduct selected attacks on civilian targets.

- Increase attacks to expel civilian technocrats, aid workers, or advisors from Iraq
- Continue to attack Iraqi "collaborators"; political leaders, security and law enforcement officials, judges, and workers in Coalition compounds

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