CCJ3 Information Paper
Foreign Fighter and Terrorist Interdiction

Purpose: (S) Provide CDR information for HASC/SASC testimony with regard to preventing foreign fighters and terrorists from entering Iraq.

Background: (S) CDR requests following information: “What are we doing to prevent foreign fighters and terrorists from entering Iraq?”

Discussion: (S) The border is porous, but initiatives to secure Iraqi border Land Ports of Entry, control the entry of non-Iraqi males on the [1.4b] border, address border issues with [1.4b] and execute CJTF [1.4b] Operation CHAMBERLAIN will disrupt the flow of foreign fighters and terrorists into Iraq.

1. (S) Along the entire Iraqi border, CJTF [1.4b] has identified four types of border Land Ports of Entry (POE):
   - Class A: Officially designated location for commercial traffic entering the country, fully manned with customs and immigration inspectors on both sides of the national boundary. (16 total)
   - Class B: Personnel crossing points reflecting traditional traffic between neighboring towns on opposite sides of the border, usually with minimal manning. (11 total)
   - Denial Point (DP): A location requiring observation to prevent personnel and vehicle traffic from crossing the border through natural or man-made routes (e.g., old pilgrimage or smuggling routes). Traffic at Denial Points is re-routed to the nearest Class A or Class B POE. (18 total)
   - Blocked Denial Point: A denial point that does not have a convenient Class A or Class B POE. (3 total)

2. (S) Current Coalition border control efforts:
   - 101st AA - There are 16 (six Class A and ten Class B) POEs and one Denial Point in this sector, manned by approximately 1000 Iraqis (roughly 400 border guards and 600 police/customs agents). Turkey is providing tight control and the Peshmerga are improving control.
   - 4ID - Two Class A POEs and two Denial Points are continuously manned with 185 US personnel and [1.4b] Iraqi border police and/or customs agents. [1.4b] provides only loose control along the eastern border. Iraqi border control is improving in the northeast.
   - MND (CS) - One Class A POE and one Denial Point are manned by six to eight Iraqi guards between 0800 and 1700 local, and two to three Iraqi guards sleep in the guard castle at the sites. An infantry company conducts random inspections two to four times per week. The two blocked Denial Points on the [1.4b] border are unmanned. The [1.4b] are providing tight control in the vicinity of roads and trails, but there are no Iraqi police complimenting their efforts.
   - MND (SE) - The MND has dedicated 114 Coalition force personnel and 238 Iraqis to man three Class A and one Class B POEs and 14 Denial Points. In the...
the east and southeast the roads remain largely unguarded. The Kuwaitis are providing very tight control along their border.

3ACR - Four Class A POEs are manned by 102 Iraqis, 60 of which are working at the Turaybil border crossing. 1.4b is providing tight control at Turaybil and Iraq is also improving its control. The 1.4b order is loosely controlled but the Iraqi guards are improving their control.

- Aerial surveillance of the border is conducted on a random basis across all assigned sectors.

3. (S) Starting the first week of October 2003, CJTF-I will prevent males of all non-Iraqi nationalities, aged 16-45, from entering Iraq through Syria, except those clearly engaged in legitimate commerce. To enter Iraq, males aged 16-45 must possess appropriate documentation.

4. (S) The recent meeting with 1.4b officials yielded the following border requirements:

- Man pre-war Iraqi border posts. Currently it is not feasible to man the Iraqi posts with Coalition forces, but the posts will be manned as Iraqi border enforcement personnel become available.

- Man three historical smuggling routes with U.S. or Coalition forces at 1.4b.

- Establish CJTF-I POC for quick coordination when border issues occur.

5. (S) Operation CHAMBERLAIN will commence 3 OCT 03 to defeat foreign fighters and terrorists attempting to infiltrate Iraq. Key tasks:

- Identify infiltration routes, C2 assets and logistics support infrastructure that support infiltration.

- Facilitate the establishment of Iraqi manned border points capable of denying infiltration through legitimate Points of Entry (POE).

- Destroy the C2 and logistics support infrastructure that supports the infiltration of foreign fighters and terrorists into Iraq.

- Disrupt the flow of foreign fighters and terrorists into Iraq and engage them in areas of our choice.

6. (S) The CPA Supplemental submitted in September 2003 requests $150M and establishes a goal of 13,600 personnel in three bureaus, with a timeline for completion of 18 months.

- Border Customs and Police - 1.4a personnel
- Border Inspections personnel
- Nationality and Civil Affairs personnel

**Recommendation:** (S) CDR use these data points to explain Coalition efforts to interdict foreign fighters and terrorists at Iraqi borders.

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