MAT / PAT / SPAT

This briefing is classified SECRET.

Derived from multiple sources.

ACIN/SPA/TS/ASTs 83 Dec 04x2

Ishtirak wa Tahdhum – Partnership and Understanding
Purpose of OPT

- Finalise concept of operations and identify information required to complete brief for:
  - Briefing Coalition Partners
  - Briefing Iraqis
  - Briefing US CJCS and submitting RFF (To be complete by 01 Jan 05)
Outline

- Overall Strategy
  - Assumptions / Facts
  - Priority / Timeframe
    - Type of Unit
    - Security (CF ability to provide)
  - Detailed Analysis (MAT/SPAT/PAT)
    - Mission
    - Concept of Operations
    - Tasks
    - Manpower: Qualification & Service
    - Fact

- Constraints
  - Security
  - Manpower (incl. Trg and MiVR)
  - Logistics
  - Communications

- C2
  - Risk Assessment
  - Transitional Concept
Background

Mission elements:
- "Isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists" . .
  - This has been the main effort (13% of force for offensive operations)
- "Organizes, trains and equips Iraqi security forces" . .
  - This has been a supporting effort (3% of the force to enable ISF)
- Post Najaf assessment and assumed future performance suggested ISF could be generated and matured without changing priorities
  - Follow on operations suggested otherwise
  - "Our decisive effort was not our main effort"
- Rapidly enhance ISF capacity with broader advisory support and direct access to coalition effects—artillery, rotary and fixed-wing air, intelligence, and logistics—to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations
Intent

- Post-election, MNF-I, in conjunction with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, implement military and police assistance teams
- Rapidly enhance ISF capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations
- Transfer the security line of operation to the ISF, including responsibility for domestic order and counterinsurgency operations

Key elements:
- Partnership relationships between CF and ISF, military and police
- Embed Military and Police Assistance Teams
  - Operate—Train—Operate
  - Training routine: sustainment, leadership, specialty (MTT)
- Build Ministry Capacity in MOI and MOD
  - Include intelligence capabilities, integrated with INIS
Requirements (1/2)

- Determine how, when and resources for implementation
- Implementation—definition and operational concept
  - Partnership
  - Military and Police Assistance Teams
    - Minimum requirement
    - Near term implementation with in-place forces
    - Sustained capability
    - MAT Options:
      - SF plus; Purpose built; Other
      - PAT Options:
        - Police, Special Police, DBE
  - Build ministry (MOI and MOD) capacity: general and intelligence
  - Operational concept for implementation and employment
Requirements (2/2)

- Transition Plan and Timing
  - Post-election or post-TOA MAT/PAT implementation
  - Transition timing from Interim to Sustained MAT/PAT capability
  - Options for transition to sustained MAT/PAT
    - MAT/PAT availability; ISF capacity; etc.
  - Transition Conditions / Criteria
    - MAT/PAT Implementation: priority locations and timing/conditions
    - Transfer security responsibility to ISF (separate action)

- Identify resources
  - On hand resources and immediate enablers for near term implementation
  - Sustained MAT/PAT capability
  - RFF NLT 1 JAN 04

- Issues and enabling actions
  - Iraqi COIN lead
  - Influence over ISF leadership
Initiated by III Corps, using existing assets (MNSTC-I, JSOTF-AP) and necessary "out of hide" capabilities

XVIII Airborne Corps will fall in on this arrangement

To be executed in conjunction with development of partnership arrangements between coalition and ISF units

Coalition involvement through MAT/PAT and partnership activities matures ISF capability to for independent police and army operations

Enables effective transition from local control, to Iraqi coalition control where ISF are capable of independently
  - Maintaining domestic order,
  - Conducting counterinsurgency operations
  - Supporting local and provincial government
  - Enforcing the rule of law, with in extremis coalition support (principally effects)

Finally enabling self reliance with coalition forces in strategic overwatch outside of Iraq
Military Security Transition Concept

1. Current
   - CF
   - Partnership/Local Control
   - Overwatch/Iraqi Control

2. Partnership/Local Control
   - CF
   - ISF
   - MAT

3. Overwatch/Iraqi Control
   - CF
   - ISF
   - MAT

4. Strategic Overwatch
   - CF
   - ISF
   - MAT
Police Security Transition Concept

1. PAT embedded to improve policing
   - Station secured by Coalition and ISF
   - Police patrols and presence enabled by Coalition and ISF security
   - Coalition Quick Reaction Forces

2. PAT embedded to improve policing
   - Station secured by ISF
   - Police patrols and presence enabled by ISF
   - Coalition and ISF Quick Reaction Forces

3. PAT remains embedded to mentor policing
   - Station secured by Police
   - Police-only patrols and presence
   - ISF Quick Reaction Forces

4. PAT no longer embedded
   - Station secured by Police
   - Police-only patrols and presence
   - Quick Reaction Forces no longer required
Police Security Transition Concept

1. Support
   - Rebuild
   - Sustain
   - Support/Rebuild
   - Decreasing CF Support
   - Sustained PAT effort

2. Support
   - Rebuild
   - Sustain
   - Support/Rebuild
   - Decreasing CF Support
   - Sustained PAT effort

3. Support
   - Rebuild
   - Sustain
   - Support/Rebuild
   - Less CF support
   - Sustained PAT effort

4. Support
   - Rebuild
   - Sustain
   - Support/Rebuild
   - Decrease CF presence
   - Sustained PAT effort

Focus Coalition resources where needed most
Strategic / Operational Lessons

This briefing is classified
SECRET

Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL OR: X1

Jihirlak wa Tahubum – Partnership and Understanding
Lessons from 2nd Battle for Fallujah

The battle represents the first large-scale demonstration of Iraqi military effectiveness, signifying a major step toward an Iraqi military capable of fighting the insurgency. I MEF should take four actions to sustain this positive trend:

- Assign Iraqi forces tasks within their capabilities
- Strongly back Iraqi forces with US combat power and embedded US cadres
- Develop Iraqi leadership through extensive training and advisors
- Rotate Iraqi units in order to provide sufficient time for rest and recuperation
Planning Assumptions

This briefing is classified

SECRET

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL: OR: X1

ACM/SPA/T1/A/ATx 33 Dec 04 x2

Jasirak wa Tahabum – Partnership and Understanding

SECRET/REL MCI L
Assumptions

- Building trust and effect requires long-term continuity of support
- Loss of CF due to inadequate FP is not acceptable
- Embedded forces need sufficient capacity for immediate 24/7 security and planned / practiced Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
- Generic model to be tailored to specific requirements
- Security augmented by local Coalition Forces where required
- ISF challenged areas include Leadership/Planning/Coordination/Execution at all levels
- Iraqi forces have basic level and experience of command and planning
- Iraqi forces will have completed basic training and will have been equipped prior to team involvement. This standard will be specified, quantified and achieved prior to MAT involvement and / or operations
- ISF will not be constantly committed to operations; Operate - Train - Operate
- In addition to teams CF will partnership ISF units
- Coalition nations may prefer / insist to remain in assigned Areas of Responsibility if deployed for MAT / PAT support
Assumptions Contd

- Teams will require training before deployment
- Intimidation will continue to be a factor
- Basic levels of competence at platoon and company tactics if given space and time to train
- Iraqis will embrace concept, wish to move to a professional force and will accept advice
- NTM-I will provide basic officer and staff college training
- AIF / Anti Western Media will seek to portray this as US / MNF-I takeover / reduction of independence of Iraqi forces and continued occupation by CF
  - Need to avoid mission creep that would support this
  - Need for IO involvement to include IOG messages
- If IDF is required, errors in targeting, even if done by ISF, will be exploited as MNF-I failures
  - Need to retain C2 of CF fires

Evidence from initial stages of fFilujah / Mosul
### Facts

- Reliability of ISF in combat is, in many cases, to be proven
- ISF has been / may have been penetrated by AIF
- Local IPS leadership critical for success/failure (Najaf and Karbala).
- No station augmented with CF MP support has fallen to AIF in last 5 months
- AIF is becoming increasingly more sophisticated in their attacks against IPS stations. (Does above fact remain valid?)
- Iraqi police intelligence capability is imperative for success
- MOI special police commandos, special border force, CF generated POB, ERU, and 8th Mech (not regular IPS) will require a separate advisory team to meet their skills. They have not done the 8 week BPC.
- IPS is functioning in some areas
- Ongoing intimidation degrades ISF effectiveness
- Language barrier will impede effectiveness

---

**Evidence from initial stages of Fallujah / Mosul**
Current status from (b)(6) + BUA 13 Dec:

OUTLINE STRUCTURE
Army Div x 2: 3 Bdes each of 3 Lt Inf Bns; currently no integral support
Mech Div x 2: 3 Bdes (1 Armor, 2 x Mech) each of 3 Bns. Each Div has 1 x Signal Bn and 1 x Recce Bn. Each Bde has 1 x Engr Bn and 1 x Support Bn. 1 x Logistic Bde with 1 x integral support Bn.
ING Div x 6: 18 x Bdes. Number of Bns vary.
Presidential Bde: 1 Bde, 4 Lt Bns
Support Bdes: 5 Bdes, subsidiary structure not yet known.

CURRENT STATUS
Divs: Require MAT by end of Jan: 3 x IAF, 6 x ING = 9
Require MAT by end of Jun: 1 Mech Div

Bdes: Require MAT by end of Jan: 9 x IAF, 1 x Mech, 19 x ING, 1 x Pres Bde, =30
Require MAT by end of Jun: 5 x Support Bdes
Require by TBC 2 x Mech
Bdes, 2 x Logistic Bdes

Bns: Require MAT by end of Feb: 27 (18 current + 9 in training), 2 x Mech, 42 x ING, 4x Pres Bns, 1 x Tpt Bn = 76
Require MAT by end of Jun: 1 x Mech Bn
Other Bns TBC
Priorities
Scope of Analysis

- Formations based on numbers included in brief to PM Allawi on future structure of Iraqi MOD forces
- Formations not included; support provided or not considered
  - Iraqi Special Operations Forces (CJSOTF 6 FID Teams)
  - Costal Defence (UK Royal Navy)
  - Iraqi Airforce (*RFF needs to be restated / reinforced*)
- Formations not included; support to be confirmed
  - Training Command
  - Clarification needed on size of Support Command (Intelligence Bde, Signals Bde, Transport Bde, Engineer Bde, Logistics Bde)
  - Specialist Companies eg Div Recce
- Model of MAT/SPAT based on Light Infantry Battalion, adapt for other structures. This may reduce the manpower required for security, but increase that needed for specialist training
- Manpower for PAT based on CG’s direction
Current status from (b)(6) + BUA 13 Dec:

OUTLINE STRUCTURE
Army Div x 2: 3 Bdes each of 3 Lt Inf Bns; currently no integral support
Mech Div x 2: 3 Bdes (1 Armor, 2 x Mech) each of 3 Bns. Each Div has 1 x Signal Bn and 1 x Recce Bn. Each Bde has 1 x Engr Bn and 1 x Support Bn. 1 x Logistic Bde with 1 x integral support Bn.
ING Div x 6: 18 x Bdes. Number of Bns vary.
Presidential Bde: 1 Bde, 4 Lt Bns
Support Bdes: 5 Bdes, subsidiary structure not yet known.

CURRENT STATUS
Divs: Require MAT by end of Jan: 3 x IAF, 6 x ING = 9
      Require MAT by end of Jun: 1 Mech Div

Bdes: Require MAT by end of Jan: 9 x IAF, 1 x Mech, 19 x ING, 1 x Pres Bde, =30
Require MAT by end of Jun: 5 x Support Bdes
      Require by TBC  2 x Mech
Bdes , 2 x Logistic Bdes

Bns: Require MAT by end of Feb: 27 (18 current + 9 in
      training), 2 x Mech, 42 x ING, 4x Pres Bns, 1 x Tpt Bn = 76
      Require MAT by end of Jun: 1 x Mech Bn
      Other Bns TBC
## Iraqi Police Fill Priorities

### Conventional IPS
- Troubled Areas still holding out
  (Baghdad, Salah Ad din, Babil, Ninawa, Diyala)
- Areas where police are being re-introduced
  (Al Anbar)
- Potential future troubled areas
- Calm areas (as resources permit)

### Special Police
- Police Commandos, Police Mech Bde, Public Order Bde, Special Border Force
- DBE:
  - Al anbar, Ninewah, Wasit, Diyalah, Basrah, Maysan
  - Border Support Teams (BSTs) provided at Points of Entry (POEs)
Specific Teams

MAT / SPAT / PAT
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEAMS (MAT)

This briefing is classified
SECRET
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL: OR: X1

Jahitrak wa Tathum – Partnership and Understanding

Approved for Release
Concept of MAT Operations

- Coalition force partnership with ISF in sector
- MAT will be fully embedded with Iraqi forces
- Continuity of training and mentoring support essential all year around; constant engagement
- Modular assistance required for specific operations (made possible by Operate - Train - Operate)
- Foster co-operation with other elements of ISF
Tasks

- Provision of Coalition Force effects based on Battlefield Operating Systems
- Key function to improve planning, co-ordination and execution, includes provision of reliable communications
- Role model. Mentorship and leadership
- Achieved success by shifting emphasis from facilitating effects to training to mentoring
- Provision of 'ground truth', assessment of current ability
- Assessment of future capability and potential of units and individuals
- Liaison
- Training
- Reassurance
## Light Infantry MAT Composition
**(including minimal effects)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>+ Effects</th>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>+ Effects</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>+ Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>O-4, E-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>O-5, E-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>O-6, E-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver</td>
<td>O-3, E-8/9</td>
<td></td>
<td>O-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>O-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td></td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>O-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>O-3, E-7</td>
<td>O-3, E-7</td>
<td>O-4, E-8/7</td>
<td>O-3, E-7</td>
<td>O-5, E-7/8</td>
<td>O-3, E-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>O-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Support</td>
<td>O-3, E-7</td>
<td>O-3, 2 x E-8/7</td>
<td>O-3, E-7,E-8/7</td>
<td>O-3, 2 x E-6/7</td>
<td>O-4, E-7/8</td>
<td>O-3, E-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1xO-4, 4xO-3, 1xE-8/9, 2xE-7, 1xE-5 = 10</td>
<td>2xO-5, 1xE-7, 2xE-8/7 = 5</td>
<td>1xO-5, 3xE-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-7, 2xE-8/7, 1xE-6 = 10</td>
<td>2xO-3, 1xE-7, 2xE-8/7 = 5</td>
<td>1xO-5 + 1xO-4 + 1xE-3, 2xE-7 = 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total Commitment: Battalion 15x130=1950, Brigade 15x36=540, Division 13x10=130, TOTAL = 2620*
Comments on basic MAT

- CJSTF concern that tasking CDA to proposed Battalion structure does not best use of their abilities; their focus is at platoon level

- MNF-I: if Captain team leader approved at Battalion level US Bn task force can create 10 Bn MATs and 2 Bde MATs but not able to create same number of teams implement during 'Bridge' period if MNF-I concept used

- Intelligence
  - Need to create a network not a hierarchy
  - Importance of creation: can be staffed by some non-intel personnel
  - Problem of manpower; solve now 'in hide'; use of personnel in key; retrain

- Logistic requirement to support due to Title 10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum Equipment Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>■ <strong>Weapons.</strong> Personal weapons and, per team, for vehicle / base defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- M240B x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- M-2 .50cal x 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mk 19 x 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ <strong>Communications, per team:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Internal Team: ICOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- VHF/HF/SATCOM: Area dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ground to Air: ETACS radios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- IRAQNA or MCI Cell phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- IRIIDIUM phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ <strong>Vehicles:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- M1114 (HMMWV hardened) x3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Medical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Location dependant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Blue force tracker / FBCB2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAT - Concerns

- Lack of embedded support at Company level is:
  - Counter to lessons from successful COIN ops
  - Counter to current US / UK practice with other indigenous armies
  - Counter to current focus of 6 FID Teams provided by ODAs to 2 SF Bns to allow concentration on low level tactics to achieve success
  - 26 FIDcs currently working with ISF; concentrating on pit level training

Recommendations: If manpower precludes extending current force to company
  - Reduce emphasis on Division level; minimal manpower saving
  - Concentrate effort on key divisions; proven retention?
  - Staggered approach; initial team reduces after 2 months but as Military Security Transition moves to Strategic Overwatch may also need to be grown as no easily accessible CF QRF

- Over emphasis on provision of Fire Support; primarily needed for planned operation. ECAS for emergencies.

- Figures do not include support to specialist platoons: Independent Recce / Mortars / Medical / Signals
SPAT Concept of Operations

- Coalition force partnership with ISF in sector
- SPAT will be fully embedded with Iraqi forces
- Continuity of training and mentoring support essential all year around; constant engagement
- Allow MoI Special Police (SP) to set conditions for return to normality
- Achieved by:
  - Boost SPAT to include IPLOs if SP are in policing role (PO battalions)
  - Carry out limited retraining of SP to enable them to complete / facilitate basic policing
  - IO campaign stresses primacy of civil (police) role
  - Buys breathing space for concurrent development of standard IPS
- Allows gradual progression: Military control => military / SP => SPIPS => IPS
Tasks

- Liaison particularly as they will move in and out of different MSC areas
- Provision of Coalition Force effects based on Battlefield Operating Systems and Policing Functions
- Key function to improve planning, co-ordination and execution, includes provision of reliable communications
- Role model. Mentorship and leadership
- Achieved success by shifting emphasis from facilitating effects to training to mentoring
- Provision of ‘ground truth’, assessment of current ability
- Assessment of future capability and potential of units and individuals
- Reassurance
# Proposed SPAT Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>CDO Battalion</th>
<th>Mech Bn</th>
<th>PO Bn</th>
<th>Special Border Force Bn</th>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Border Brigade</th>
<th>Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>O-4, E-5</td>
<td>O-4, E-5</td>
<td>O-4, E-5</td>
<td>O-4, E-5</td>
<td>O-5, E-6</td>
<td>O-5, E-6</td>
<td>O-6, E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver</td>
<td>O-3, E-8</td>
<td>O-3, E-8</td>
<td>O-3, E-8</td>
<td>O-3, E-8</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>O-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>E-6/7</td>
<td>E-6/7</td>
<td>E-6/7</td>
<td>E-6/7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>O-4, E-7</td>
<td>O-4, E-7</td>
<td>O-3, E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>O-4, E-8</td>
<td>O-4, E-8</td>
<td>O-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police Spt</th>
<th>IPLO</th>
<th>IPLO</th>
<th>IPLO</th>
<th>DHS</th>
<th>IPLO</th>
<th>DHS</th>
<th>IPLO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1xO-4, 2xO-3, 1xE-8, 1xE-7, 1xE-6 = 7 + IPLO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals**

Department of State

\[ \text{TOTAL} = \text{TOTAL} \]

**Notes:**

- IPLO: International Police Law Enforcement Officer
- DHS: Department of Homeland Security

\[ \text{international police law enforcement officers} \]

\[ \text{partnership and understanding} \]
## Minimum Equipment Requirements

- **Weapons**: Personal weapons and, per team, for vehicle / base defense
  - M240B x 2
  - M-2 .50cal x 1
  - Mk 19 x 1
- **Communications**, per team:
  - Internal Team: ICOM
  - VHF/HF/SATCOM: Area dependent
  - Ground to Air: ETACS radios
  - IRAQNA or MCI Cell phone
  - IRIUM phone
- **Vehicles**:
  - M1114 (HMMWV hardened) x3
  - Medical
    - Location dependant
  - Blue force tracker / FBCB2
SPAT - Concerns

- Weakness of intelligence support
- Timeline needs to be speeded up to improve liaison and support
- Rapid timeline may improve cohesion/chances of retaining special police if there are political changes
Operating principles

- Coalition force partnership with ISF in sector
- PATs live in police station or nearby secured area
- Required security may reduce as increased confidence and ability of IPS
- Significant IPLO and MP input
### PAT Tasks

- Security advice, leadership and mentorship
  - Base defense
  - Tactics Techniques and Procedures
  - Weapons training
  - Medic (Combat Life Saver) training
  - OPSEC including knowledge of own patterns
- Intelligence Function
  - Threat analysis
  - Patrol pre-brief, debriefing, reporting
  - Forensics intelligence
  - Surveillance and counter surveillance
  - Interrogation oversight
- Communications

- Police Functions (IPS listed below)
  - Patrolling
  - Administration / Internal Affairs
  - Dispatch / Communications
  - Reports / Records
  - Investigation / Crime Scene
  - Logistics / Armory
  - Special Police Services
  - SWAT / Narcotics
  - Public relations / Crime stoppers
- Improve IPS Command and Control
- Role Model
- Liaison
- Translation
- Reassurance
## Proposed Team Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Ldr</th>
<th>&lt;50</th>
<th>50-100</th>
<th>100-150</th>
<th>150-200</th>
<th>200-250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Advisor*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Specialist / Rifleman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection Security Advisor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translator (Non CF)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CF TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The majority of these to be provided by the IPUs
* At least one member of each team must be CSS trained / At least one member of each team must be Commo trained / Intel function provided by Police advisor

** Force Protection requirements normally mandate additional personnel and vehicles

---

Approved for Release
PAT Minimum Equipment Requirements

- Weapons: Personal weapons and, per team, for vehicle / base defense
  - M240B x 2
  - M-2 .50cal x 1
  - Mk 19 x 1
- Communications, per team:
  - Internal Team: ICOM
  - VHF/HF/SATCOM: Area dependent
  - Ground to Air: ETACS radios
  - IRAQNA or MCI Cell phone
- Vehicles:
  - M1114 (HMMWV hardened) x3
  - Medical
  - Location dependent
  - Blue Force Tracker / FBCB2
**Concerns**

- Security. Size of team will reduce organic security while role of IPS – need for ‘community policing’ & shift working will increase vulnerability
- Size of teams demands external security
- Lack of dedicated support intelligence
- Vetting of IPS needed
- Provision of police support
  - MPs are scarce resource
  - IPLOs require funding and lead time

- Command and Control: dispersed nature; complicated by military and IPLO teams working within MoI units

- Size of team does not allow for 24/7 presence
Constraints

Security/ Manpower (including MWR & Training)/
External Support/ Logistic / Communications
Constraint - Team Security

- Requires security support from local coalition force commanders.
- Threat driven
- All security relies initially on ISF thereafter MAT / SPAT team size means primary security backed up by RRF (less than 10 mins) but PAT’s primary security is likely to be CRF (less than 10 mins)
- Basing plan seeks reduction in sites as MNF-I and ISF restructure; this requires company FOBs
- Secure accommodations, on site with ISF but with appropriate life support. For PATs
  - On site preferred. IPLO may be an issue
  - Some police stations will not allow for expansion for hardening / accommodation
- Transportation to and from barracks to be minimized
  - Hardened vehicle required
- Rapid Reaction (from both CF & ISF)
  - Proximity/response time
  - Communications
  - Echeloned
  - Effects: Fires Support Close Air Support / Attack Aviation / Indirect Fire
- MEDEVAC
- Personnel Recovery Plans

These requirements may drive/prevent the deployment of teams and forces allocated to them.
Constraint – Suitable Manpower Team Skills Requirement

- Individual Key Skills Required, trained and assessed prior to deployment
  - All team (skills): Weapon / Fieldcraft / Basic Language / Patrol Medic (CLS)/cultural sensitivity
- Team members Characteristics
  - Preference must be for volunteers; need for incentives for programme
  - Key to selection is identification of Primary function, mentoring / leadership?
  - Facilitate effects? Training? Ops? Facilitating effects to training to mentoring
  - Maturity / adaptability needed to ensure MAT does not overburden capability thereby reducing confidence
  - Effect of living conditions; removed from expectations – requirement for separate logistic and morale support? Or degree thereof? MAT size may allow for rotation: PAT doesn’t require 1/3rd extra manpower
  - Train and advise; skilled at job but able to adapt experience to met IZ forces – realism and simplicity
  - Tour length? Staggered RIP/TOA => Continuity
- Effect on the home base
Constraint – Team Training Requirement

- Confirmation of who trains what basic skills where
- Need for continuation training in country
- Need for team building
- IPLO training a particular problem; not all familiar with weaponry etc
- Need to observe baseline training of ISF to know standard expected in units
Constraint - Additional Functions needed to support MAT / SPAT

- Coalition Force Direct support to MAT / SPAT
  - Security Support
  - Rapid Reaction Force
  - Command, Control & Communications including support to Joint Co-ordination Centers (JCC) and National JCC
  - Logistics
  - Morale, Welfare and Recreation

- ISF to provide
  - Dedicated team interpreters (not provided from local unit / area; role for Peshmerga?)
  - Life Support
  - Rapid Reaction Force

- Additional advisors / trainers to ISF
  - Logistics
  - Contracting
  - Equipment Maintenance Specialists
  - Medics
  - Financial/Resource Management
  - Legal
  - Communication
  - Public Affairs
  - Engineering
  - Civil Affairs
### Additional Functions needed to support PAT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As per MAT / SPAT but note:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fractured nature of deployment and possibility that teams will be commanded at a lower level requires a more robust, hands on C3 organization in addition to team structure than MAT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need for Intelligence support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPLO / IPS support for specialist police functions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Constraint – Logistics**

- Title 10 means that logistics for US forces will be supplied not reliance on ISF.
- Current problems of security for logistic support may be replaced by dispersion / remoteness from MSC logistic base as handover to ISF takes place and MNF presence reduces.
Constraint – Communications

- Need for secure communications links for FP and passage of information/intelligence; to include voice and data
- Communications enablers may be critical – not accounted for in this force package
- TBC
Command and Control

TO BE REVIEWED BY MNC-I

● Requires balance between unity of effort and speed of response
● Although overall CF manpower commitment is low span of command and regional distribution is wide.
● Situation complicated as SPATs/PATs are supporting MoI units.
● Except SPATs all forces are under MNC-I command.
● Options are to place MATs under command of MSCs (speed of response) or create separate command chain (unity of effort).
● Compromise
  - LNOs from Div MAT to MSC (where still in area) to create speed of response. Do Bns/Bdes report to MSC chain of command if placed OCPON?
  - Separate chain of command from Div MAT to MNC-I (MAT unity of effort, leading to commonality)?
  - Where in MNC-I does Div MAT report? When this is identified / established what functions does this branch have?
    ▶ Does it require regional focus?
    ▶ Does it need to include all staff functions (small but maybe large if includes training support to meet required external support) or rejoin Corps staff branches (danger focus will be staff and likely to address MSC priorities before ID)?
● Do Bde/Div Teams need to be increased to allow supervision of MATs? These could be given provincial / regional responsibility, in addition these Provincial / Regional Assistance Teams (PRATs) could have a specialist training function.
● MNC-I Staff Focus?
Risk Assessment

This briefing is classified SECRET

Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL: OR: X1

ACIN/SPA/TA/ATN 33 Dec 04.x
Jahitirak wa Tashum – Partnership and Understanding

SECRET/WEL/MPIF
## Additional Considerations

### Coalition Forces
- Non-US CF need to be brought ‘on side’; best approached by giving the mission / tasks to partners allowing them to decide how to achieve. For effective scoping problem for CJCS requires confirmation of:
  - Which CF countries will participate
  - Roles / limitations imposed by ROE
  - Increased complication of C2 / support to MAT if deployed outside own nations MSC?
  - Will the teams be multi-nation or all single country

### Different ways to skin the cat
- Some nations may have key skills
  - Allegedly Iraqi forces find UK / Commonwealth logistics system easier: model forces of previous regime were based on. Possible role due to ROE for AUS?
  - Mech Bns will be equipped with FSU equipment. Base Mech Div Teams on those countries with experience of FSU equipment? BU/HUPL?

### Use of contractors in lower risk areas

| 1.4a, 1.4d |  
DECISIONS ON ALL THE FOLLOWING WILL INFLUENCE THE MANPOWER BILL FOR MAT

- Model of MAT based on Lt IN Bn; adapt for other structures. This may reduce the manpower required for security, but increase that needed for specialist training.
- What is basing policy; key for C3i links is distance from / co-location of Bdes / Div HQ.
- What are likely bases for Iraqi forces? Do teams need to be adapted for this, i.e. Baghdad?
- What types of COIN tasks are most likely? Should this be focus of training? Need to define METL by type of unit/region? How often is this likely to involve IDF? Can this be provided incrementally?
- Need clarification of what support is provided to JCC / PJCC particularly as MCSs withdraw and C2 passes to Iraqi forces.
- Relationship between ground holding function (IPS ?) and other IZ forces.
- Largest untapped [14c]
- Spreading manpower too thin to the point of ineffectiveness.
- What assumptions are invalid?

HOW DO YOU AVOID CREATING DEPENDENCY, BOTH ON EF PERSONNEL FOR LEADERSHIP AND THEIR ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS.