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ISSUE: Question from CENTCOM: "What is the plan to increase Iraqi Police Forces?"

DISCUSSION: This question was submitted to CFLCC/CJTF-7. The response by CFLCC to CENTCOM was deemed "Insufficient." After the CJTF-7 TOA, the question was resubmitted to the PMO.

RESPONSE: The CJTF-7 plan is to continue conducting joint operations with Iraqi police, to continue to look for ways to legitimize their operations through training in the classroom and on the job. The CJTF-7 staff is working closely with the Coalition Provisional Authority to identify equipment and infrastructure needs and to get necessary funds, contracts, and contractors to fill in the void left by the former regime. Doing this will facilitate a steady build-up of the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) and expedite the restoration of law and order for the Iraqi people.

The problem is in what we call a "Do Loop." There are a number of factors that determine how many Iraqi Police can return to work. When the former regime fell, nearly all of the Police stations were looted and burned out. The police were ill equipped to do anything about it.

The Coalition Provisional Authority Interior Ministry, conducted an assessment in May 2003, to determine the condition of the Iraqi Police Force. The current projection is that it will take 5.9 years to fully restore the Iraqi Police Services.

In order to jump-start the process, the Coalition issued out a call on 4 MAY 03 for former Iraqi police officers to return to work. Using Baghdad as an example, over 9,500 officers have returned to work in the first 48 days. However the greatest challenges are in equipping them.

To restore police legitimacy and increase capability to the police services, there are a number of requirements, some of which are below:

1. Each officer needs a side arm for the conduct of his duties. The IPS does not have the required amount of weapons needed to conduct operations safely. In Baghdad alone they are several thousand short. AK-47's are also in short supply. Police in the I MEF area of operations (South Central Iraq) are short over 3,000 rifles. Currently as weapons are seized or discovered, they are turned over to logistics personnel who in turn distribute them for issue to the police. The police and coalition forces are not simply facing criminals with pistols and knives. Criminals are armed with AK-47's, RPG's, and grenades. The police are not equipped to deal with that level of threat.

2. There is no communications system in place. Iraqi Police are dependent on the Coalition forces for communications in a joint patrol capacity. 3,000 hand-held radios, vehicle radios, base stations, repeaters, and antennas are on order. The optimistic date for Baghdad communications to be operational is 15 July 2003. This will help the city greatly but will fall short of Endstate numbers. This is only for the city of Baghdad at a cost of \$16.1 million. Every city in Iraq is in a similar situation.

3. Baghdad currently has 180 of 716 required police vehicles. Most were stolen or destroyed by looters. The process to acquire replacements is a matter of the Coalition Provisional Authority having access to funds to purchase new vehicles. 200 vehicles are on order, which will help improve the mobility and response time for emergencies.

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4. All IPS Stations are in need of repair and restoration. Soldiers and rehired Iraqi police have worked hard to reestablish something that would serve as a functional station. In Baghdad 33 of 52 stations will be operational by June 30, 2003. However, there are no phones, no furniture, no equipment, and in many cases no power. We directed our subordinate commands to conduct an assessment in their Area of Operations to determine requirements and establish priorities for restoration. Contract funds are slow in processing and the timelines for completion are long.

SUMMARY: This is a picture of the city of Baghdad. We are looking at similar circumstances across Iraq. We cannot expect the Iraqi Police to go out on patrol without the tools to make them successful. Without a weapon, communications, body armor, training, and serviceable facilities, the police will not be effective. Every day police are targets. Several have been killed or wounded in the line of duty already. Without proper equipment or facilities it is counter productive to recruit more police. We are not capable of effectively employing those that have already returned to work in many parts of Iraq.

The timely flow of money is the critical piece of this equation. CPA is working hard every day to get the necessary funds and contracts but the process is slow and cumbersome. Legitimacy and growth of the new IPS are inseparably connected with our capability to deliver the needed equipment, training and facilities in a timely manner.

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