

EYES ONLY

CC-CAG

18 November 2003

Memorandum for: General Abizaid

Subject: Iraqi Police

Issue: It is increasingly clear that IPS is a potential point of failure in Iraq.

Discussion:

- The national program was accelerated, but insufficient resources were committed to the project.
- US military pledged support in general terms, but requirements were never developed by Ministry of Interior with specificity and support is falling short.
 - Trainer requirements not identified.
 - Inter-theater transportation for candidates (USAF says cannot confirm flights until the day prior to departure for [1.4b, 1.4d]).
- Ministry of Interior is overwhelmed and does not have the personnel or equipment to manage or execute the program.
 - Only 27 personnel of 117 authorized.
 - No landline communications, only 13 workstations.
 - Insufficient personnel to do management training for police leadership.
 - Doubtful that the contracted police mentors (1500) will arrive in sufficient time.
- Reports that police are corrupt and ineffective. Progress in training is not standardized and there is no internal investigative function.
- Police lack necessary equipment to be effective. Equipment promised since June has not arrived. Ministry of Interior lacks logistical capability to solve the problem.
- CJTF-4 is fully committed to IPS training, but cannot give additional support (they do not have the assets).
- Police are arguably most vital to long term stability and security in Iraq and critical to our ability to disengage from urban areas. Next six months will be critical and program will fail without intervention.

Recommendation:

- Because shifting responsibility for police to CENTCOM/CJTF-4 seems infeasible politically, it is critical that military forces reinforce the effort to prevent failure.
- Form a TF Restore Iraqi Police to reinforce the Ministry of Interior's capacity. Charge the Task Force with assessing and filling personnel shortages, expediting transportation and logistical requirements, and providing expertise.
- Obtain an MOI assessment of what more personnel and resources are needed.
- Because of the urgency of the situation, ask the Army to give the mission to the MP school and provide general officer leadership to the Task Force.
- Direct J6 to assess MOI's communications and automation needs and provide material out of US CENTCOM's budget (reimburse later) to fix the problem now.
- After these initial efforts, ask Customs/Homeland Defense to establish similar task forces for Iraqi Border Police and Customs.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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