Compartmented Plan
Update
11 May 2002
Assumed Mission

Conduct offensive operations in IRAQ to support the overthrow of the regime, destroy WMD capability, and reduce the threat to the Iraqi people, the region, and the US. On order, conduct follow-on operations to facilitate transition from war to peace.
Strategy

- Objective -- Support overthrow of the Iraqi regime
- Endstate --
  - Regime leadership and powerbase destroyed
  - No WMD infrastructure remains; technical capacity is controlled
  - Territorial integrity intact; no ability to threaten neighbors
  - Acceptable provisional / permanent government in place
- Enabling tasks --
  - Support / empower cooperative Opposition Groups
  - Facilitate and support a new, acceptable government of Iraq
  - Protect those who assist US efforts
  - Destroy Iraqi WMD capability
  - Gather intelligence on Global Terrorism, detain terrorists and war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime
  - Reshape Iraqi military in order to help secure conditions for long-term regional stability
Iraqi Military Capability

- Iraqi military strength has eroded since DESERT STORM
  - Limited ability of air / air defense assets to fight as an integrated system
  - Limited ability to synchronize large-scale combined arms ops
  - Marginal coastal defense capability
  - Retains ability to use WMD locally and regionally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre DS</th>
<th>Post DS</th>
<th>mid-90s</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>3,800</td>
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<td>Tactical Aircraft</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>310</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA-2/3/6 Batteries</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships (Guided missile combatants)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage decline

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Overarching Concept

Execution of Multiple Lines Of Operation
Create and maintain pressure on Saddam and his supporters

Lines of Operation
- Operational Fires
- SOF Operations
- Opnl. Maneuver
- Information Ops
- UW/Spt OGs
- Political - Military
- Civil-Military Ops

Slices
- Leadership
- Internal Security / Regime Intel
- WMD Infrastructure
- R & D
- Missile Prod., MX., & Delivery
- Republican Guard Forces / SRG
- Territory (South, North, West)
- Select Regular Army
- Commercial & Dipl Leverage
- Civilian Population

Objectives
- Isolate Saddam, eliminate his ability to use WMD, and create conditions for military and popular uprisings, opportunite strikes

Endstate
- Regime Change
- WMD Removal

Bottom Line - Synchronized movement along parallel lines to exploit the fragile nature of the regime

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Desired Effect

Direct U.S. Attack
(SOF / Operational Fires and Maneuver)

Eliminate Saddam’s regime through the destruction of his Security Apparatus, exposing Saddam to the threat of a popular uprising, coup, assassination, or direct attack by U.S. Forces, while eliminating Iraq’s WMD threat.

Assassination

Popular Uprising

Coup
Operational Concept

Preparation

Complete Posturing of Initial Force

PHASE I

30 DAYS

60 DAYS

PHASE II

45 DAYS

Attack Regime

Complete Regime Destruction

PHASE III

90 DAYS

Post-hostilities

PHASE IV

UNKNOWN

Strategic and Operational Information Operations

C - Day

C + 60

C + 105

C + 195

D-DAY

C-Day = Day Force-Flow Begins

D-Day = Day Attack Begins

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Phase I

ENABLING ACTIONS

Continue Middle East Peace Process

- Focus diplomatic energy to build support for regime change
- Secure diplomatic clearances for basing / staging / overflight / enroute movement
- Continue to work post-regime government strategy
- Continue strategic information operations
- Deploy CENTCOM Contingency Forward Headquarters (CFH)
- Continue contingency preparations (fill PWR shortages; anthrax immunizations; posture APS fleets; increase Reserve Force activation levels; conduct site surveys)

90 DAYS

Issue Executive Order

Activate CRAF-1

Execute Stop-Loss (All Services)

Sustainment Packages Deploy (by Sea) from CONUS / Europe

JRSOI Ships $145.5 M

Begin Space Conditioning

Month 1

POTUS Decision to execute Unconventional Operations

(b) 50 USC § 3607

C-Day (Begin Major Deployment) **

Month 2

Reposition Air Assets in Theater

Begin Aggressive OSW / ONW

Deploy Two Additional Carrier Battle-Groups **

Month 3

Initial Start Force - Combat Ready

D-DAY

As of: 11 MAY 2002

** Unambiguous Actions
Initial Start Force...
(Force For Phase II) D-Day

# Attack Aircraft: 537
# Attack Helos: 170
# Personnel: 183K
(Ground Forces - 130K / SOF - 4K)
# Tanks: 552

Kuwait

V Corps (2 Div +)
3rd Infantry Div
1st Armor Div (+)
1 Bde / 101st AA
11 Avn Regiment
V Corps Artillery
3 COSCOM

1 MEF (1 Div +)
1st MARDIV
3rd MAW
Amph MEB
ARG-MEU
1 FSSG

JSOTF South
SF Group

JSOACC HQ
AF SOF Det

Naval SOF TF

JTF-CM HQ

Marine Log Cmd

C2 Aircraft (all services)
ISR Aircraft

1 x KC135 Sqdn
1 x KC130 Sqdn (USMC)

Bahrain

CFMCC HQ
MPRA / NSW

MARCENT HQ
Naval SOF TF

AF SOF Det

ISR Aircraft

1 x A-10 Sqdn
1 x KC135 Sqdn

MARCENT

CFOSOC OC

CFACC

CFMCC

North Arabian Gulf
3 x CVBG
TLAM shooters
(21 surface combatants)
1 x ARG - MEU

UAE
ISR Aircraft
KC10A Sqdn
C130 Wing (100 Act)

Masirah, Oman
AF SOF Det

Seeb, Oman
4 x KC135 Sqdn
C2 Aircraft

Diego Garcia
B-52 Sqdn
KC-10 Sqdn

Afyon, Turkey
KC135 Sqdn

Incirlik, Turkey
4 x F15 Sqn
2 x F16 Sqn
1 x KC135 Sqn

Burnas, Bulgaria
KC10 Sqn

Diyarbakir, Turkey
JSOTF North
SF Group
AF SOF Det
1 x A-10 Sqn
1 x KC135 Sqn

Souda Bay, Crete
KC135 Sqn

Mediterranean
2 x CVBG
TLAM shooters
(14 surface combatants)
### Necessary Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Basing</th>
<th>Overflight</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Full support *</td>
<td>Full Support *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Full support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Full support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (D’Gar)</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Full aircraft / SOF *</td>
<td>Full Support *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Support aircraft</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JOA**

Staging for Operations

* = Essential to the plan. Loss of other support increases risk and extends operational timelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited support / ISR aircraft only</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Enroute

Beddown / Refuel

While no single country is essential, plan requires at least the current level of support at European and Mediterranean bases. (Overnight, fuel, maintenance stops)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Support aircraft</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>Full Support</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As of: 11 MAY 2002
## Current Assessment of Regional Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Use of bases</th>
<th>Use of airspace</th>
<th>Sharing of Intelligence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Limit or halt</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Limit or halt</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Limit or halt</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source of Assessment**: April 2002

As of: 11 MAY 2002
**Phase II Action...**

**AIR / NAVAL OPERATIONS**
- Destroy Enabling Targets (Iraqi Air Defense)
- Destroy / Degrade Iraqi Regime Leadership
- Degrade Iraqi security forces
- Destroy / Degrade Iraqi WMD delivery and production capability
- Defeat / Destroy Iraqi forces in zone

**GROUND OPERATIONS**
- Secure bridgeheads across Euphrates River
- Seize southern oil fields
- Defeat / destroy Iraqi forces in zone
- Secure co-opted Iraqi forces
- Isolate Baghdad (in south, then west / north)
- Seize/recover WMD/material & Conduct SSE operations

**SOF OPERATIONS**
- Direct Action against high-value targets (WMD, C2, ADA)
- Unconventional Warfare Ops with Opposition Groups (Kurds, Shia, Sunni) to disrupt / co-opt Iraqi conventional forces
- Suppress TBM to prevent WMD use
- Seize/recover WMD/materials
- Interdict attacks against Kurds
Initial Target Summary

63 Regime Leadership and C3
- Disrupt and Confuse Leadership

54 Regime Security & Intelligence
- Degrade Ability to Protect the Regime

38 WMD / TBM Production & Delivery
- Reduce Threat to Coalition Forces & Regional Neighbors

71 RGFC / SRG
- Reduce Ability to Protect the Regime

52 Select RA Units
- Reduce Ability to Protect the Regime

13 Infrastructure
- Degrade Enemy Force Mobility

90 Enabling Targets (IADS, Naval, Etc)
- Reduce Primary Threat to High Value Coalition A/C and Naval Forces

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Phase III Actions
D+45 to ~ D+135

AIR / NAVAL OPERATIONS
- Destroy / Degrade Iraqi Regime Leadership
- Degrade Iraqi security forces
- Destroy / Degrade Iraqi WMD delivery and production capability
- Defeat / Destroy Iraqi forces in zone

SOF OPERATIONS
- Direct Action against high-value targets (WMD, C2, ADA)
- Conduct SSE operations
- Unconventional Warfare Ops with Opposition Groups ( Kurds, Shia, Sunni) to disrupt / co-opt Iraqi conventional forces
- Secure known WMD sites
- Interdict attacks against Kurds

GROUND OPERATIONS
- Kill, apprehend, marginalize Iraqi leadership
- Isolate Baghdad in order to set military conditions for provisional government to assume power
- Secure known WMD sites & conduct SSE operations
- Defeat / destroy Iraqi forces in zone
- Secure co-opted Iraqi forces

1 - Isolate Baghdad / Defeat or Co-opt remaining RGFC/RA units in the North
2 - Destroy remaining opposing Iraqi forces vic Baghdad
3 - Destroy remaining pockets of resistance
   - Eliminate WMD Capability
Force at Beginning of Phase III (D+45)

# Attack Aircraft: 591
# Attack Helos: 282
# Personnel: 220K
(Ground Forces - 162K / SOF - 4K)
# Tanks: 763

Global Support
- Global Power
  16 B2 - Whiteman AFB
- Global Reach
  Ramstein, Ger
  Moron, Spain
  Aviano and Sigonella, Italy
  Souda Bay, Greece

V Corps (3 Div +)
  3rd Infantry Div
  1st Armor Div (-)
  1 Bde / 101st AA
  11 Avn Regiment
  V Corps Artillery
  3 COSCOM

MEF (1 Div +)
  1st MARDIV
  3rd MAW
  Amph MEB
  ARG-MEU
  1 FSSG

JTF-CM HQ
- Marine Log Cmd

Kuwait
- JSOACC HQ
  AF SOF Det
- Naval SOF TF

JSOTF-South SF Group

Bahrain
- C2 Aircraft (all services)
- ISR Aircraft
- 1 x KC135 Sqdn
- 1 x KC130 Sqdn (USMC)

CFLCC MARCENT CFSOCC
CFACC CFMCC

North Arabian Gulf
- 3 x CVBG
- TLAM shooters
  (21 surface combatants)
- 1 x ARG - MEU

Kuwait
- JSOACC HQ
  AF SOF Det
- Naval SOF TF

UAE
- ISR Aircraft
  KC10A Sqdn
  C130 Wing (100 Act)

Oman
- Masirah, Oman
  ISR Aircraft
  C2 Aircraft
- Seeb, Oman
  4 x KC135 Sqdn
  C2 Aircraft

15
Force at End of Phase III (If Required) (D+135)

# Attack Aircraft: 591
# Attack Helos: 306
# Personnel: 254K
(Ground Forces - 164K / SOF - 4K)
# Tanks: 1257

North Arabian Gulf
3 x CVBG
TLAM shooters
(21 surface combatants)
1 x ARG - MEU

Global Support

- Global Power
  16 B2 - Whitman AFB

- Global Reach
  Ramstein, Ger
  Moron, Spain
  Aviano and Sigonella, Italy
  Souda Bay, Greece

Kuwait

- V Corps (5 Div +)
  3rd Infantry Div
  1st Armor Div
  101st AA Division
  11 Avn Regiment
  V Corps Artillery
  3 COSCOM
  2nd ACR
  3rd ACR

- 1st Cavalry Div
- Heavy or Light Division

- 1 MEF (1 Div +)
  1st MARDIV
  3rd MAW
  Amph MEB
  ARG-MEU
  1 FSSG

- JSOACC HQ
- AF SOF Det
- Naval SOF TF

Bahrain

- JTF-CM HQ

- Marine Log Cmd

- Kuwait
  1 x F16 Sqdn
  2 x A-10 Sqdn

- JSOTF-South
  SF Group

- Naval SOF TF
  C2 Aircraft (all services)
  ISR Aircraft
  1 x KC135 Sqdn
  1 x KC130 Sqdn (USMC)

- UAE
  ISR Aircraft
  KC10A Sqdn
  C130 Wing (100 Act)

- Masirah, Oman
  ISR Aircraft
  SOF Aircraft

- Thumrait, Oman
  B1 Sqdn
  ISR Aircraft

- Diego Garcia
  B-52 Sqdn
  KC-10 Sqdn

- Qatar
  CFSOCC HQ

- Al Udeid, Qatar
  5 x F15 Sqdn
  4 x F16 Sqdn
  9 x KC10 Sqdn

- OMAN
  Masirah, Oman
  AF SOF Det

- Seeb, Oman
  4 x KC135 Sqdn
  C2 Aircraft
**Phase IV Actions**

- SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF IRAQI MILITARY FORCES
- SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL/PERMANENT IRAQI GOVERNMENT
- ENSURE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ
- TRANSITION CIVIL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS / NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS / HOST NATION
- ENSURE WMD CAPABILITY DESTROYED
- GATHER INTELLIGENCE, DETAIN TERRORISTS AND WAR CRIMINALS, FREE INDIVIDUALS UNJUSTLY DETAINED
- RE-DEPLOY FORCES
**Conditioning Saddam...**

**C-Day**

- US Kinetic Activity / Force Movement
- Iraqi Level of Reaction

**D-Day**

- Iraqi Anticipation of D-Day

**Deception Theme:**
“Desert Storm Build-up”

**Execute**

- Aggressive OSW / ONW
- Carrier Exercise in North Arabian Sea
- Activate CRAF
- Select reserve mobilization
- Deploy initial start force
- Prepare follow-on forces for deployment

---

Generate Force Deployment / Activity “Spikes” in order to...
- Desensitize Iraqi regime to our movements
- Force Iraqi expenditure of time, money, effort
- Refine our targeting
- Enhance Deception
- Allow for equipment build-up

---

- Carrier port-call in the N. Arabian
- CJTF-Afghanistan
- BCT deployment

Base additional ONW/OSW ACFT in Turkey, Kuwait
APS-3 download
ARG-MEU exercise
Move CENTCOM’s Contingency (Fwd) HQ - (CFH)

---

As of: 11 MAY 2002

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Approved for Release
• Scale of offensive operation determines forces required
• **Contingency plan** execution is **tailored** to match strategic timing and current strategic environment
• As scale of offensive operations increases
  - Duration increases
  - Level of risk increases
  - Level of effort increases
Example of Flexible Contingency Plan...

**Trigger Event**

- Continue OSW/ONW. Use RO's as Required
- Desert Badger
  - Execute approved
  - Day 1 target sets:
    - C2
    - IADS/C3
  - Day 2 target sets:
    - WMD
    - Ground/Logistics

- Desert Badger+
  - Execute Desert Badger and additional targets:
    - C2+ Naval
    - IADS/C3 + WMD+
    - SAMs
    - Fighter aircraft

- Desert Badger++
  - Execute Desert Badger+ and initial target sets:
    - Regime Leadership
    - Regime Security
    - SRG/RGFC
    - Battlefield Prep +

---

**Strategic Environment Constrains Military Response**

- Continue with plan (spikes)

**Strategic Timing Constrains Robust Military Response**

- Continue with plan (spikes)
- 5-7 days
- Desert Badger + Additional Targets
- 10 Days + sustained RO's (~90 days)
- Desert Badger + Additional Targets + Initial targets

---

**Preparatory Air Campaign**

- Strategic Timing Facilitates Robust Military Response

---

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Strategic Actions

- Focus diplomatic energy to build support for regime change
- Secure diplomatic clearances for basing / staging / overflight / en route movement -- Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi (overflight) essential
- Continue to work post-regime government strategy
- Continue strategic information operations
- Fund required enabling actions
Operational Actions

- Acquire initial funding for CENTCOM contingency forward headquarters (CFH) ($83M)
- Continue the commercialization of OEF C4I infrastructure ($27M)
- Begin compartmentalized analysis of fuel sourcing capabilities
- Begin movement and download of select pre-position equipment to Kuwait.
  - Take actions to improve fleet readiness ($785.3M)
- Request funding and materials for construction of critical facilities.
- Take actions to begin filling army and joint personnel augmentation requirements (Early Activation of Reserves)
- Continue the synchronization of OSW and ONW ISR efforts with EUCOM to develop a coherent picture of Iraqi activities.
Phase II Daily Weight of Effort

Initial Strikes (D-D+3)

Sorties

Target Sets

Detailed Planning Continues...

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Phase II - Daily Weight of Effort

D+ 4 and On

Sorties

Target Sets

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

RG/RA/SRG ARMOR/ARTY

TST

CA: Counter Air
CI: Counter Information
CL: Counter Land
SR: Security Forces
SL: Strategic Leadership
SS: Strategic Sustainment
SW: Strategic WMD
HA: Humanitarian Assist
SPT: Tanker / DCA / EW

Detailed Planning Continues...

As of: 11 MAY 2002
## Army PREPO War Reserves Shortages Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Supply</th>
<th>Required</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Shortage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>$463.9M</td>
<td>$149.7M</td>
<td>$314.2M</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>$439.3M</td>
<td>$133.7M</td>
<td>$305.6M</td>
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<tr>
<td>III(P)</td>
<td>$16.8M</td>
<td>$0.4M</td>
<td>$16.4M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>$28.8M</td>
<td>$7.7M</td>
<td>$21.1M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>$102.4M</td>
<td>$52.5M</td>
<td>$49.9M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX (ASL)</td>
<td>$93.0M</td>
<td>$14.9M</td>
<td>$78.1M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL SHORTAGE: $785.3 Million**
CFH Start-Up Cost

- CDHQ Infrastructure - $3.6M
  - Force Protection Measures - $750K
  - CENTCOM Billeting - ~$4M
  - Dining Facility Enhancements - $750K
  - MWR Building - $736K
  - Multi-purpose Building (MPB) - $350K
- Communications - $52.5M
- CDHQ Contractor Support - $3M
- CDHQ Movement Costs (Sea: 120K, Air: 3-7M)

Additional Costs Anticipated:
- Trailers / Additional Office Space
- Contracted Services

Rough Total = $83M
Force Deployment Construct

IN-PLACE FORCES

ADDITIVE FORCES
BUILDING TO THE
INITIAL START FORCE
BY D-DAY

1 x Carrier Groups / TLAM Shooters
1 x Mech Brigade
1 x Marine Expeditionary Unit
USAF in Theater

FOLLOW-ON FORCES
(Added over time)

1 x Heavy Division
101st Div (Air Assault) (-)
1 x Heavy BCT
2 x ACR
1 Division (Heavy or Light)

Army Corps HQ (2 Div +)
2 x Heavy Div (-)
1 x Bde (Air Assault)
SOF Forces
1 Marine Expeditionary Force HQ
3 x Marine Brigades
1 x Marine Expeditionary Unit
4 x Carrier Groups / TLAM Shooters
Additional USAF attack aircraft and Tankers
Global Power (bombers)

As of: 11 MAY 2002
DESERt BAdGER Concept Summary

Phase I

(Phase I)

4 Hours

To Launch

Initial TLAM Strikes

• Target Sets:
  - Regime C2
  - High Value EW RADAR

Follow-On TLAM /

Available TACAIR Strikes

• Available within 1.4a hrs

Target Sets:

• Regime C2
• High value missile production
• Military Comms
• IADS that threaten CSAR or enable ACAIR
  - If TLAM available

TACAIR STRIKES

• Target Sets:
  - High value missile production
  - ARMOR
  - High value missile production
  - Targets of Opportunity
  - TLAM (as directed by NCA)
  - Regime C2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I (H - H+ 1.4a)</th>
<th>PHASE II (H+ 1.4a - H+ 1.9a)</th>
<th>TOTAL PH I-II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TGTS/DMPIS</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>118 - 132</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLAM C</td>
<td>~56</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGM-65</td>
<td>~26</td>
<td>~82</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDAM</td>
<td>Depends</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>LGB</td>
<td>On</td>
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<td>MK-82</td>
<td>AEF #</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>&amp; CVW</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLAM-ER</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41-55</td>
<td>210</td>
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SORTIES

8 - 20 ~58 - 76 ~90
Expanded DESERT BADGER Concept Summary

(Assumes Shootdown occurs prior to N-Day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TGTS/DMPIS</th>
<th>PHASE III</th>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
<th>TOTAL PH I-IV</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TLAM C</td>
<td>~1800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>~98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-65</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>270</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDAM</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1210</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGB</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK-82</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1100</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLAM-ER</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>CALCM</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-130/142</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORTIES</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>~1600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Desert Badger +

**Critical Military Enablers**
- Baghdad Temp ADEF HQ Taji
- 51st WCR (Taji) C2 and C3
- 52nd WCR (Taqqaddum) C2 and C3
- 4 Long-Range Radars
- 62 SAM sites

**WMD Delivery (2)**
- Samarra East Airfield (L-29’s)
- SSM Brigade (Baghdad Bks)

**Helo Airfields (5)**
- K1 (RA)
- K2 (RA)
- Rasheed (RG)
- Qasr Tall Muhl (SRG)
- Al Taji (RA)

**HET Parks (3)**
- Abu Ghurayb
- Fort Rashidiah
- Taji Military Barracks

**Naval Targets (4)**
- Basrah Naval Base North (C2, Mine Storage)
- Khor Az Zubayr Port Fac (Naval Craft-Mines)
- Al Faw Radrel (EW)
- Al Faw Bunker Complex (RG/EW)

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Desert Badger++

Regime Leadership
- Includes Leadership Locations, C3 and Media

Regime Security & Intelligence
- Special Security Organization (SSO)
- Directorate of General Security (DGS)
- Iraqi Intel Service (IIS)
- Directorate of Military Intel (DMI)

Special Republican Guard (SRG)
- SRG Garrisons
- WMD Production and R&D
  - Taji Steel Fabrication Plant
  - Ibn Al Haytham
  - Habbaniyah I
  - Habbaniyah II

Hammurabi Ar Div
- Div HQ’s
- 3 Bde’s
- 4 FA

Medina Ar Div
- Div HQ
- 3 Bde’s
- 4 FA

Baghdad Inf Div
- Div HQ
- 3 Bde’s
- 4 FA

Adnan Ar Div
- Div HQ’s
- 3 Bde’s
- 4 FA

1 RA Corps HQ

1 RA Corps HQ

10th Ar Div
- Div HQ
- 3 Bde’s
- 4 FA

11th Inf Div
- Div HQ
- 3 FA

14th Inf Div
- Div HQ
- 2 Bde’s
- 4 FA

18th Inf Div
- Div HQ
- 3 Bde’s
- 5 MRL/FA

6th Ar Div
- Div HQ
- 3 Bde’s
- 4 FA

11th Inf Div
- Div HQ
- 3 FA

III RA Corps HQ

51st ID (M)
- Div HQ
- 3 Bde’s
- 4 FA

Al Basrah

Mosul

Baghdad

BAGHDAD
Iraqi Population Density

Est. Population 2001: 23,332,000

Est. Persons Per Square mile

- 5,000 - 14,000
- 201 - 500
- 101 - 200
- 50 - 100
- <50

UNCLASSIFIED
Basrah International Airport
Status: Operational
Runway length: 13074Ft Concrete
C-17 / C-141 / KC-135 / C-130 capable
Day-Night operations (with augmentation--additional lighting, MHE, navigational aids)
Fuel Storage up to 277,000 gal (based on existing tanks) (2M gal storage in city of Basrah)
MOG is TALCE dependent, not ramp-space constrained
Airfield can beddown 30 heavy transports / 40 medium transports, 100 fighters (Apron Space = 1.9MSQFT)
Maritime Ports

Khor Az Zubayr
- Status: Active/Long Term Potential
- Capacity: 13,272 STONS Per Day
- Limitations:
  - Limited Draft
  - Channel depth unverified
  - Greater than 60 days to clear channel obstructions
  - Served by road / rail

Basrah
- Status: Active/Long Term Potential
- Capacity: 20,778 STONS Per Day
- Limitations:
  - Limited Draft
  - Access limited by wreckage in the Shatt Al Arab waterway
  - Greater than 60 days to clear channel obstructions
  - Served by road / rail

Umm Qasr
- Status: Active/Near Term Military Potential
- Capacity: 27,955 STONs Per Day
- Limitations:
  - Limited Draft
  - Channel condition unverified
  - (+) RO/RO and container ship without verification
  - (+) Served by road / rail

Al Faw / Fao
- Status: Active - Limited to POL / Crude only
- Capacity: Unknown
- Limitations:
  - Limited Draft
  - Damaged / Restricted by total lack of critical infrastructure (i.e. cranes, storage)
  - Served by road

Abu Flus
- Status: Active (limited)
- Capacity: 2,083 STONS Per Day
- Limitations:
  - Limited Draft
  - Heavily damaged during the Iran-Iraq war
  - Greater than 60 days to clear channel obstructions
  - Served by road

As of: 11 MAY 2002

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
Umm Qasr SPOD

Umm Qasr:
Status: Operational, channel draft must be verified
Capabilities: Capable of strategic lift support and handling break-bulk, container, and dry-bulk cargo. Capacity is 27,955 STONS per day.
This port is road-rail served and fence secured.
FSS / LMSR possible only at high tide and pending channel draft verification
Can support select RORO / Container

As of: 11 MAY 2002
Iraq

Oilfield Exports / Revenues

Kirkuk Oil Fields
(30% of legal exports, 95% of illegal exports)

Oil Exports / Revenues
- Legal exports (OFF) bring ~$10 billion annually in goods & services (no revenues to regime)
- Most illegal revenue (~$2.1 billion annually) from:
  - Kirkuk (~$2 billion)
  - Rumalia (~$50-$100 million)

Rumalia Oil Fields
(70% of legal exports, 5% of illegal exports)

As of: 11 MAY 2002