25APR03

(U) REFERENCES.

a. (U) Maps and Charts: See Appendix 1 (GIS) to Annex F (Engineer).

b. (U) Documents

(1) (U) VC OPLAN COBRA II

(2) (U) CFLCC OPLAN ECLIPSE II

(3) (U) V Corps Field SOP, November 2002, unclassified.

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. (S/ REL USA GBR AUS) Enemy.

(1) (S/ REL USA GBR AUS) ENEMY SITUATION. Overview. Coalition forces have defeated the regime and conditions have been set to transition to post hostilities. Iraqi military forces are defeated or capitulated, with small, non-compliant RDS or paramilitary elements still located within Baghdad, Tikrit and IVO the former Green Line (most likely continuing to operated in KIRKUK and MOSUL). The nature of the threat changes from a conventional military threat to an asymmetrical threat.

(2) (S/ REL USA GBR AUS) Within our area of operations (AO), the most likely threats are posed by civil unrest, factional violence, terrorism, and remaining elements of non-compliant forces. The situation that constitutes the greatest risk to long term stability and security in the post hostilities environment is associated with the Kurdish, Turkoman and Sunni Arab populations in the north. The greatest risks for sudden violence and deteriorating conditions exist where Kurd, Turkoman and Arab areas meet, specifically in the primary flash point cities of KIRKUK and MOSUL. In the northern areas, tensions will remain high as the Kurds seek to assert their role in a post regime government, to include reversing the effects of Saddam’s “Arabization”. The Kurdish Peshmerga, numbering around 75,000, seized both KIRKUK and MOSUL, but have gradually begun to withdraw as US forces arrive in the region. Turkey has shown restraint to date, choosing instead to covertly supply arms and ammunition to the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF) in order to counter growing Kurdish influence in the region.

(3) (S/ REL USA GBR AUS) Throughout the AO, short-term reprisals against regime associated local authorities are happening and will
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continue. Ethnic or religious violence will really be political in nature and will dissipate as factions achieve a degree of vengeance against the Ba'ath regime. Civil unrest will be focused on activities such as looting in order to fulfill basic needs and will dissipate as basic need services are restored. Regime related officials are seeking to exit the country via the Syrian border, especially from the general areas of Tikrit, Baghdad and Mosul (Tab A Appendix I). Former regime security forces (IZ SSO, intelligence service, etc) will become involved in illicit activity and may attempt to smuggle weapons and /or 1.4a External actions by 1.4b, 1.4d may also pose problems (e.g. instability as they attempt to influence the post regime government. 1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d The threat of this is minimized as US forces establish a presence and 1.4b, 1.4d forces continue to withdraw. They will also closely monitor the Kurdish treatment of the Turkoman populations of IRBIL and KIRKUK and will take action if they are endangered. Within the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) any remaining Ansar al Islam and Badr Corps elements pose a threat to US forces and stability in the area. See the initial mission analysis for Eclipse II posted to the V Corps Plans Home Page for more information on the threat and AO.

B-2
(4) Key flash points associated with the V Corps AO are:

(a) Dahuk. Population 807K. A Kurdish majority with a large number of those being refugees from Turkey. With forces operating in northern Iraq there is potential for conflict between these refugees and forces.

(b) Mosul. Remains the most unstable of all the cities north of Baghdad. Population 1.7 million, made up of mostly Kurds, and smaller Turkoman and Assyrian sects. Kurdish territorial claims are a source of tensions here between the regime and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Major tribal entities in the area are the Agayat tribe (Sunni) (SW Mosul - Pro-regime) and the Jibur confederation (Sunni - Divided loyalties). There is potential for score settling against the Sunni elements due to past oppression by the regime.

(c) Irbil. Population 839K. Headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP’s goal of creating an autonomous
Kurdish state stems from here. In 1996 the KDP joined forces with Iraq to oust the PUK from Irbil. We potentially may see Kurd on Kurd violence as the PUK attempts to retake lost territory.

(d) Kirkuk. Population 728K. Saddam's Anfal (1987 campaign against Kurds – 200K killed, 1.5Mil relocated, and 4K villages destroyed) and Arabization (campaign to resettle Arabs in Kurd areas in attempt to reshape demographics into a more pro-regime populous) has created a potential powder keg for Kurd/Arab violence as Kurds attempt to stake out their claims on lost territory and oil fields in the surrounding area. The KDP's goal of an autonomous Kurdish state includes Kirkuk as the capital. The Kurds see this city and surrounding oil infrastructure as their economic future. A stated Turkish goal is to deny the Kurds to occupy and control Kirkuk, and under the auspices of protecting the Turkoman minority, the Turks may conduct conventional or SOF operations to prevent further Kurdish autonomy.

(e) Al Sulaymaniyah. Population 643K. Headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Al Sulaymaniyah is one of numerous refugee camps set up in the wake of Saddam’s Arabization campaign. We can expect many of those refugees to attempt to retake lost territory and possessions following the fall of the regime.

(f) Tikrit. Population 28K. This is Saddam's hometown, a center of gravity for the Ba’ath Party, and retains support for the former regime. The Al Bu Nasir tribe (Saddam's tribe) held prominent positions within the regime, however, over the years Saddam has alienated himself from many of the smaller subunits. With this in mind, loyalties may be divided. Expect residents of Tikrit to be belligerent to Coalition forces who participated in the overthrow of Saddam’s regime in a post-Saddam Iraq.

(g) Samarra. Population 201K. Shia holy city in which is located the Samarra Mosque. The population is a mix of Sunni and Shia. Due to past religious oppression and restrictions enforced by the regime the Shia majority is supportive of regime removal, members of the majority may take this opportunity to settle some old scores once the regime is perceived to have fallen.

(4) (S/ REL US GBR AUS) Baghdad Assessment. The Sunni population, formerly the backbone of the
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regime, will seek to preserve as much power and prestige as possible in the face of perceived post-war changes elevating the role of Shia and Kurds. Possible non-compliant SSO/RDS forces, Ba'ath party elements, and foreign mercenary fighters exist throughout the city. Remaining members of the former regime will attempt to destroy government facilities and documents to hide evidence of war crimes. Some short-term factional infighting between Sunni and Shia personnel within the city are possible, as well as reprisals against former regime security personnel. Criminal activity (looting, gang related) will occur, but decrease over time. Some SSO/ RDS forces seek to go underground and organize "resistance" cells. Others will attempt to leave the city to Syria posing as displaced civilians (see graphic). Other groups, such as 14b, 14th Shia, and Islamic organizations that were previously excluded from the city, are starting to move in and establish headquarters throughout the zones. We expect to see additional organizations move to establish a presence within Baghdad in order to represent the various interests within the new Iraqi Government. Some of these organizations, such as SCIRI, may begin to instigate demonstrations and low-level violence to support its goals.

(5) (S//REL US GBR AUS) North of Baghdad to the Green Line. Small, non-compliant elements of RDS and former Ba'ath still remain in the vicinity of Tikrit and Bayji, simply due to its role as the symbolic center of the regime. These residual forces, coupled with the Tikriti and Durru tribes who strongly supported the Hussein regime, will continue to pose a low level threat to the establishment of a secure ground LOC along Highway 1 north to KIRKUK during the Corps’ transition to the new AO. The area traditionally associated with these two tribes (a triangular area formed by Samarra, Tikrit, and Tuz Khurmatu) will generally be hostile to U.S. presence since the members have lost their position of status with the removal of the regime. Because the population will generally be anti-US, remaining paramilitary / militia or terrorist elements will find safe haven in this region and will pose a consistent low-level threat. Highway 2/3 from Baghdad to KIRKUK may provide a more secure GLOC as it is generally out of the Tikriti/Durri tribal area, and 12 forces via the LOC (elements of 15 and 38 ID) will most likely be compliant/capitulated as VC initiates operations in the AO.

(6) (S//REL US GBR AUS) Along the former Green Line, RA forces have abandoned their equipment and fled the area. The greatest threat to V Corps operations is the large amount of military weaponry and ammunition that is scattered throughout the AO. Noncompliant forces and other bad actors will have easy access to this equipment in the near term until it can be recovered. Reports indicated that Ba'ath Party militia and RDS/paramilitary forces in both Kirkuk and Mosul had organized forces and cached supplies in order to defend the urban areas. While these cities are under U.S. control, it is likely that small elements remain embedded in the urban terrain. While their numbers are most likely small, they will be well equipped with weapons abandoned by the capitulated RA forces.
This will include demolitions/mines, hand held anti tank and air defense systems as well as mortars and possibly some cached artillery pieces.

(7) (S/REL USA GBR AUS) Conditions in the key Green Line cities of Mosul and Kirkuk have been very different to date, even though they shared many of the same ethnic and political problems. To date, we have seen very little of the expected acts of reprisal and ethnic violence in Kirkuk. However, Kurds in particular will be prone to settle some long-standing scores, and isolated acts remain likely, particularly in Kirkuk. This trend could continue at a low level for several months. In Mosul, the lack of a significant US presence has bolstered the resistance of a small but determine RDS / pro-regime element. Numerous reports indicate that Mosul remains the most unstable of all the cities north of Baghdad. As US presence in the city expands, we expect to see the threat transition to smaller, more isolated incidents of reprisal and ethnic violence. Second, the area along the Green Line has been a confrontation zone for many years. Weapons abound, caches, and minefields will be throughout the area. Both cities sit astride key LOCs dominating northern Iraq, making them "magnets" for smuggling (a way of life in the area), weapons trafficking and terrorist activity, primarily to Syria. Finally, the Kurdish tribes in Mosul and Kirkuk will be supportive of the US presence, but there will be Sunni tribes that will be disaffected because of their loss of position in the area (though not as severe as in Tikrit). The ability of the Sunni and Kurdish Tribal leaders to work together will directly affect the success of a new government in these cities. While many of the upper level civic and security leaders will depart, we expect the majority of "mid-level" bureaucrats and infrastructure technicians to remain in place. The challenge to U.S. forces will be sorting out the competing personalities that claim to be legitimate representatives of religious, ethnic, or tribal groups, of which tribes will be the most significant. Key to all this will be the status of Kurds in a post-regime government, after 10+ years of autonomy and continuously improving conditions.

(8) (S/REL USA GBR AUS) Kurdish Forces and Intentions. TheKDPEmpire

Who are the Kurdish Peshmerga? PUK

-75,000 armed fighters between PUK and KDP

-Heavy infantry
-Infantry

-U.S. offensive

-Minimal heavy weapons
-Tough mountain fighters
-Military academies, British
-Style - Tradition of strong leaders
-Special Forces are capable

Opportunistic Fighters: Better at defense than offense. Periodic fighting between KDP and PUK. PUK currently fighting AI.

-Secular martyrs. Given their history of oppression, the Kurds celebrate resistance against insurmountable odds, from the fatalistic meaning of the very word peshmerge: "one who faces death." to their common sayings: "A man is born to be slaughtered" or "fighting is better than idleness."

-Mossad trainer claimed: "Put a Kurd atop a mountain with a rifle, pita bread, and onions, and hell stop a whole column of troops for you."

-Will we have to disarm them? Will they integrate into military or have a special role – border security, reserve force, etc?

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) will be tempted to maintain a strong presence in and around the key cities and oil infrastructure now that the
Green Line has fallen, but will most likely obey US military and Kurdish political directives to show restraint and withdraw. The only circumstances that would cause them to move back into the cities or surrounding area would be violence directed against the Kurdish population. A coalition presence mitigates this possibility. Their post hostilities goals are to ensure Kurdish autonomy (at a minimum), protect Kurdish populations and possibly secure territory or facilities that make an independent Kurdish State viable. Both parties have recently entered into agreements to unify their political and military structures and appear united against two enemies, the Iraqi regime and the Turks, both of which have historically oppressed Kurds. Peshmerga fighters are lightly equipped, but very proficient in small unit tactics and fighting in mountainous terrain. They are currently in conflict with the terrorist faction Ansar al Islam (AI) in the eastern area of the KAZ (PUK Peshmerga) and are claiming readiness to defend against any major Turkish invasion (beyond the normal area Turks battle the KADEK/PKK). It is unclear what the KDP/PUK position will be regarding integrating or disarming the Peshmerga fighters as a new Iraqi military is formed. Most likely they will seek to retain the Peshmerga in some role (border guards, reserve force) at least until they are satisfied that Kurds will have a satisfactory role in the new government. For an assessment of the political and military actions (TTP) in the seizure of Kirkuk on 10 April, see the initial JAC assessment, Iraq/Kurds The Fall of Kirkuk: Preliminary Analysis.

(9) (S/ REL US GBR AUS) Kurdish claims have consistently recognized the area around KIRKUK (and sometimes MOSUL) as their territory. They sometimes refer to KIRKUK as the Kurdish Jerusalem, though their claims to KIRKUK are really more about the oil fields than historical significance. Turks also consider KIRKUK (to include MOSUL) within their sphere of influence, and call the post WWI loss of the area (Ottoman Empire division by Allies) “the great injustice”. Over the past decade the Kurds in the KAZ have developed a working political, social and military structure. What they lack in order to become a viable independent state is an economic basis – the KIRKUK oil fields could provide that. This has caused tensions to escalate between Kurds and Turks, who oppose any independent Kurdish state in a post war Iraq. Anti-Turk sentiment in the KAZ is running high, with recent demonstrations in Irbil estimated at 100,000. Many of these tensions will dissipate at the coalition establishes a clear presence in the AO.
Surrounding KIRKUK and extending NNW toward Mosul is the second most productive oil field in Iraq. Reports indicate the oil fields and supporting key nodes (pumping stations, Gas Oil Separation Plants – 11 total in the KIRKUK area, 15 total in the AO) have been prepared for demolition. While the fields are secure, the demolition and mining remains a hazard in the area. Further information and analysis on the northern oil fields and key associated nodes is available through the CFLCC Term Fusion Cell.

Now that the regime has fallen, property disputes and factional violence will occur as Kurds and Turkomans try to reclaim from Arab residents, homes lost during Baghdad’s decades-old “Arabization” campaign (~100,000 displaced from KIRKUK alone). Many Arabs may be displaced (mostly southward) in the ensuing violence, especially in the region stretching from Mosul, southeast through KIRKUK, to Khanaqin on the Iranian border. Most of the records that would prove/disprove these property claims have been destroyed, further...
frustrating the displaced Kurds and Turkomans. This will be one of the first challenges a new government will have to handle, and the return of these displaced persons may coincide with our arrival in the AO, or soon thereafter. To the north, the Turks are poised to prevent any form of Iraqi Kurdish independence; wary of the effects it would have on their own predominantly Kurdish population in eastern Turkey. See the following for overall background information on the Kurdish situation in the north.

The Impact of Saddam’s “Arabization” in the North

Kurds are inextricably tied to their land.

Saddam forcibly moved over 100,000 in the last several decades, arguably far more.

Many will want to return.

After the regime falls, thousands of previously displaced Kurds and Turkomans will try to reclaim their former homes. In most cases, Sunnis Arabs live in those homes now.

It may start before we arrive in Phase IV/B, and will pose one of our first stability challenges.

(12) (S//REL US GBR AUS) Terrorist Organizations (Also see Tab D, App 1 for details on AI and KADEK). Ansar al-Islam (AI) is the major Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization in the region, with many similar attributes/beliefs as the Afghan Taliban. AI is clearly anti-US. Coalition air strikes and subsequent ground operations have severely degraded the capability of AI, but have not eradicated the organization as a whole. The AI has been in constant conflict with the PUK Peshmerga. We can expect this group, along with other smaller fundamentalist terrorist groups in the region, to conduct asymmetric attacks on US/coalition forces and Kurds along LOCs and in unprotected areas. There is also a known Al Qaida enclave of approximately 250 members in strength providing training, financial aid, and support to the AI organization. While the AI region (vic Halabjah in the KAZ) is not initially in the Corps AO post hostilities, VC will assume the area in Phase II. The terrain in this area is very restrictive. It has provided safe haven for small groups,
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Border crossers and smugglers for centuries. AI will most likely move back and forth across the rugged to evade US targeting. Because of this, it is likely the remaining elements of AI will remain active in the mountainous border area. It is also likely that former regime security forces (SSO/IIS/DMI) will establish links with AI to supply arms and expertise, which will increase their size and lethality. Later in SASO, this AI enclave would most likely target any US forces west of Sulaymaniyah, a Tier 2 city. has also detained several key AI leaders, but generally still allows remaining elements in the border area. will not oppose US operations against AI within Iraq. See Iraq/Kurds Halabja Region Power Dynamics After AI's Defeat (1).

(13) (S/ REL US GBR AUS) The terrorist organization KADEK (formerly PKK) uses the mountainous border zone in Northern Iraq as a haven from the Turkish military and a base of operations. Approximately 2,000-4,000 KADEK fighters are currently in the border area, down significantly from previous years. Since 1998, KADEK has occupied small camps in the extremely rugged Qandil Mountains of northeastern Iraq along the Iranian border, within PKK-controlled territory. KADEK's military headquarters is also in this area. While the group has small units operating in the Sersen Valley (KDP area along the Turkish border), they have no permanent camps there due to Turkish military operations. KADEK has not targeted U.S. forces in the past and is unlikely to do so during post-hostilities unless directly confronted. They will most likely remain in the rugged mountains, dispersed in small groups and avoiding contact.

(14) (S/ REL US GBR AUS) Between Kirkuk and Mosul is the small town of Makhmur, where the Iraqi regime established a refugee camp for Turkish Kurds. Approximately 10,000 Turkish Kurds live in this camp, assumed displaced from eastern Turkey. The Iraqis developed the camp into a training facility and base for KADEK fighters. Iraq has placed ADA assets around the camp to protect it from the Turkish Air Force. Current estimates place ~250 fighters within the camp. While it is unlikely the 12 forces will be present, a large number of the refugees and perhaps the fighters will. V Corps forces will be in close proximity to this camp during post-hostilities, starting in Stage 1. Undoubtedly Turkey will insist that coalition forces disband the camp and detain the fighters.
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(15) S/ REL US GBR AUS: It is likely that Al Qaida elements and associated fighters from external countries will exploit the unstable environment in Northern Iraq after hostilities in order to target US forces. Within our AO, reports have indicated Al Qaida activity across the borders in 1.4b, 1.4d. Traditionally, these areas 1.4b, 1.4d have been havens of terrorist groups and provide easy access into our AO, especially across the hard to control and survey mountainous borders with 1.4b, 1.4d. It is also likely that remnants of regime security and paramilitary organizations will seek out these organizations in a post hostilities environment in order to provide sanctuary, weapons or actively resist the Coalition presence. Mosul, Tikrit and Kirkuk are all likely operating areas due to the civil unrest, instability, presence of US forces and supporting LOCs.

(16) S/ REL US GBR AUS: Remnants of the regime security will attempt to link up with terrorist elements for the purposes of providing intelligence or transferring/selling 1.4b. Within our AO, the border is the most likely location for former regime elements to attempt
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to remove 1.4a from Iraq. Numerous reports have indicated regime affiliated persons have sought sanctuary in Syria, with the northern crossing vicinity MOSUL being particularly active.

17) (S//REL US GBR AUS) Intelligence gathering by regional and terrorist organizations will increase in post hostilities IOT influence the new government and determine intentions / disposition of the coalition. Significant portions of the IZ population were used as sources by the former IZ intelligence services - inherent of a police state. Some of these former sources are the key civic, tribal and business leaders V Corps will interact with in post hostilities. A small number may retain contact with their former handlers, or be "passed" / willing to work for another intelligence service IOT augment their income. As interaction with the Iraqi population increases in post hostilities (assessment teams, presence patrols, local contracting), a strong SAEDA program will be necessary.

c. (U) External Threats and Influences.
d. (S//REL US GBR AUS) Enemy Courses of Action (ECOA). These COA's do not address the possibility of Turkish intervention, which remains remote, but would nonetheless result in a different VC course of action.

(1) (S//REL US GBR AUS) Most Likely Enemy Course of Action. Short term internal factional territorial claims and score settling against former regime personnel leads to local rioting and violence in several major urban centers. Terrorist/remaining RDS elements are present in the area targeting US/Coalition forces. Regional intelligence services are active in order to influence the stability and nature of the new government. Small groups of armed deserters are involved in criminal activity throughout the area. Pockets of pro-regime resistance and paramilitary remain in isolated areas. The vast majority of RA forces are capitated. Baghdad: Competition for leadership in post regime government and control of city between Shia and Sunnis will lead to short term factional violence. Former regime security apparatus attempts to leave the city for 1.4b. and some become involved in criminal activity and potentially 1.4d smuggling. Some SSO/SSG and RDS remain and form small resistance cells. Humanitarian assistance concerns remain the most pressing problem for U.S. forces. Tikrit: Small pockets of non-compliant RDS/militia seek to target/interdict LOCs at targets of opportunity. Tikriti and Durri tribesman are hostile to US presence, and many resist the authority of the new Iraqi Government. This resistance will manifest itself in protests, strikes, demonstrations, general lawlessness, and perhaps some direct action interdiction, such as mining the road or small unit ambushes. North: Most RDS and paramilitary leave the area, but
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Small cells remain in the city, utilizing abandoned RA weapons/explosives and targeting coalition forces. Kurdish parties adopt a wait and see approach with the new government and keep the Peshmerga in check. Current positions as the US presence is established. In Kirkuk and to a lesser degree the area NNW toward Mosul, several thousand Kurds intent on reclaiming their homes and reversing Saddam's Arabization resettlement begin to arrive from the KAZ, Ad Diwaniyah and As Samawah, resulting in civil unrest. Kurdish, Turkoman and Arab fractions and tribes jockey for influence in the power vacuum created by the fall of the regime. In the Al Anbar Province, tribal conflicts and criminal activity remain the primary threats to establishing a safe and secure environment. Banditry is common and will continue until a strong regional police force can be established. Tribal issues may evolve as the various confederations jockey for political prominence in the new government. Cities of key concern in the region are Al Qa'im and Ar Ramadi.

(2) {S/ REL US GBR AUS} Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Actions. The conditions above continue to exist with the following variant:

PROLONGED INSTABILITY AND DISCONTENT. Consensus cannot be obtained on a new Iraqi government, causing local factions (Kurds, Shia, Sunni, Turkoman) to revert to protecting their own self-interests and positions. Factional tensions rise, stability and security cannot be achieved, and discontent develops over the perceived ineffective U.S. presence. Peshmerga and KADEK become active in their respective areas of the north to protect their interests. Outside terrorist organizations take advantage of the instability and porous border, and enter the country in large numbers to target U.S. forces and further destabilize the situation. Reconstruction efforts are hampered and public opinion turns against the U.S. presence. The environment fosters trafficking of weapons and cached Terrorist elements seek contact with former SSO in order to obtain weapons used against U.S. forces, or create a humanitarian crisis blamed on the U.S. presence.

e. (U) Friendly Forces. See Annex A

2. (U) MISSION. See Base Order. The V Corps intelligence mission is to provide the commander with timely and accurate intelligence to support his objectives, as stated in this ONPLAN, and to meet the information needs of the staff for operations and planning, in addition to supporting the unique intelligence needs of adjacent units and subordinate commanders. This annex only updates information applicable to post hostilities. COBRA II remains the base document.

3. (U) EXECUTION.
a. (S/REL USA GBR AUS) Concept of Intelligence Operations. The V Corps G-2 will direct intelligence operations in order to optimize corps intelligence operations to satisfy the needs of the Corps' commander. V Corps will use organic collection assets and will request theater and national collection coverage in order to collect, report, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence products. Within V Corps, areas of collection focus and analytical responsibilities will be managed by Areas of Intelligence Responsibility (AOIR) and disseminated through operational channels (FRAGOs) to V Corps subordinate units. Initial AOIRs in support of this CONPLAN are identified in Appendix 3 (Collection Management) of this Annex.

b. Intelligence Activities.

(1) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Information Requirements (IR). See Appendix 2 to Annex B (Intelligence).

(a) (S/REL USA GBR AUS) Intelligence operations in support of this OPLAN are to satisfy intelligence requirements in response to the V Corps Commander’s PIR and IRs. The PIR and IR are developed by the V Corps G-2 in conjunction with the other principal staff officers in order to support the V Corps Commander’s decision-making process. Once approved by the V Corps Commander, the PIR comprise clear direction for the intelligence effort.

(b) (S) V Corps has developed and will maintain a list of PIR, which are updated continuously. Ensure all subordinate units know current PIRs and other intelligence requirements (OIRs), and rapidly and accurately report all combat information pertaining to PIRs/OIRs to the V Corps ACE.

(c) (S) Subordinate units are required to submit PIR to V Corps CM&D. V Corps CM&D will crosswalk subordinate unit PIR with the Corps’ PIR and IR to ensure that Corps’ and subordinate unit intelligence requirements are nested. These requirements will be incorporated, to the maximum extent possible, into the Corps’ collection, analysis, and dissemination process.

(2) (U) New Requirements. V Corps and subordinate units will submit new intelligence requirements as the operational or tactical situation dictates. New intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements will be forwarded to V Corps CM&D via RMS or PRISM. Units will use COLISEUM or RWS RFI Homepage as a backup. V Corps CM&D will validate, deconflict, and consolidate requirements and forward to the CFLCC collection manager for action.

(3) (U) Requests for Information (RFI). Forward requests for information (RFIs) to V Corps CM&D via the COLISEUM system on SIPRNET or JDISS. The V Corps CM&D will forward subordinate unit RFIs to the V Corps
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ACE All Source Intelligence (ASI) section to be answered. If the RFI cannot be answered at V Corps, CM&D will validate the request and forward it to the CFLCC JACE via COLISEUM. CM&D will continue to monitor the status of Corps and subordinate unit RFIs until they are closed. Subordinate units to V Corps are required to provide timely feedback to Corps CM&D upon receipt of products that answer their RFI to complete the closure process.

(4) (U) Analysis and Production. V Corps analysis and production activities will be conducted between the V Corps ACE, CFLCC JACE, and other deployed forces. Additional analysis and production support will be provided through reachback to national agencies. See paragraph 3.d of Annex B below for specific production guidance.

(5) (U) Information regarding Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and missions will be controlled within the guidelines of U.S. intelligence community regulations and national disclosure policy. CFLCC will continue to ensure U.S. ISR support is provided in concert with the ISR resources of Allied nations. All efforts should be made to integrate authorized resources of Allied/Coalition partners.

(6) (U) Subordinate commands will provide ISR units/forces in support of the V Corps as specified in this Plan and subsequent tasking messages.

c. (U) Intelligence Systems. No changes.

d. (S) Collection. (See Appendix 3) V Corps G2 will provide collection tasking guidance for all organic and supporting agency ISR systems in support of V Corps intelligence requirements. Subordinate units G2/S2s will prepare and submit collection plans or R&S plans to the V Corps collection manager in order to ensure deconfliction of ISR assets and V Corps ACE analytical requirements. To the maximum extent possible, V Corps and subordinate units will devote organic resources to answer commanders’ PIR. When subordinate units require collection beyond the range of their organic systems in order to satisfy their PIR, they will submit the collection requests via the channels described in this Annex.

(1) (U) Signals Intelligence. - (see COBRA II).

(2) (U) Imagery Intelligence. - (see COBRA II).

(3) (U) Counterintelligence (CI) and HUMINT. Updated information provided, also see COBRA II. The post hostilities environment becomes HUMINT and CI intensive with the majority of Corps assets in GSR role.

e. (U) Processing and Evaluation. No change from COBRA II.
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f. (U) Production. No change from COBRA II. ACE will adjust analytical and production effort to support a SASO environment.

g. (U) Targeting / Effects Support Packages (ESP). Not used.

h. (U) Reporting. No change from COBRA II.

   (1) All V Corps intelligence products will also be posted on the G2 homepage on the SIPRNET at

   (2) (U) The principal report produced by subordinate and supporting commands is the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). The INTCOM will be submitted by subordinate units and supporting commands to V Corps G2 per the reports schedule in the V Corps Field SOP.

   (3) (U) Imagery. No change from COBRA II.

i. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks. See para 3, Base Order and Annex L (ISR).

j. (U) Coordinating Instructions:

   (1) (U) Submit all reports via RMS, UNICS, or SIPRNET.

   (2) (U) Submit daily intelligence summaries to V Corps G2 in accordance with schedule listed in the V Corps FSOP.

   (3) (REL USA GBR AUS) Ensure that forces maintain adequate planning stocks of maps and charts.

   (4) (REL USA GBR AUS) Coordinate all CI and HUMINT activities with the G2X, 205th MI BDE.

   (5) (REL USA GBR AUS) Be prepared to provide intelligence liaison teams.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Basic OPLAN

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Basic OPLAN.

ACKNOWLEDGE
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WALLACE

OFFICIAL: LITG

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Appendices:

1. Intelligence Estimate
   TAB A - General Area of Operations
   Enclosure 1 - Distance Graphic
   TAB B - Enemy Order of Battle (Paramilitary / RDS)
   Enclosure 1 - Recent Paramilitary Photos
   Enclosure 2 - Fedayeen Saddam Patch
   Enclosure 3 - Fedayeen Saddam Tattoo
   Enclosure 4 - Green Line Regular Army Order of Battle
   Enclosure 5 - Suicide Bomber TTP
   TAB C - Enemy Courses of Action
   TAB D - Regional Factions
   Enclosure 1 - Emerging Leaders
   TAB E - Population Demographics and Customs
   TAB F - Tribal Information
   Enclosure 1 - Iraqi Tribes by Governate
   TAB G - Infrastructure Information
   Enclosure 1 - Iraqi Civil Infrastructure
   Enclosure 2 - Iraqi Grain/Food Infrastructure
   Enclosure 3 - Iraqi Water Infrastructure
   Enclosure 4 - Iraqi Oil Infrastructure
   Enclosure 5 - Iraqi Infrastructure C2PC Overlays
   TAB H - MCOO
   Enclosure 1 - Border Crossing Overlay
   Enclosure 2 - 4 Lane Road Overlay
   Enclosure 3 - Bridge Overlay (Icon)
   Enclosure 4 - Bridge Overlay (Named)

2. Priority Intelligence Requirements

3. Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence
   TAB A - High Value Target List
   TAB B - Captured Enemy Material for Exploitation

4. Targeting / Effects Support Packages (ESP) - (Not Used)

5. Intelligence Support to Information Operations
   TAB A - Objectives
   TAB B - Media Sources

6. Intelligence Systems and Architecture - (No change)

7. Imagery Intelligence - (No change, see COBRA II)

8. Collection Management and Dissemination (updates only)
   TAB A - Initial Collection Plan (Distributed separately)
(U) ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO V CORPS (US) OPLAN FINAL VICTORY

TAB B – Initial Collection Emphasis Message (Distributed separately)
TAB C – Named Areas of Interest
TAB D – AOIR C2PC Graphic
9. Signals Intelligence – (No change, see COBRA II)
10. Weather
   TAB A – Climatologic Tables
   TAB B – Illumination Data
   TAB C – Weather Estimate
   TAB D – Weather Warning Criteria