(S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) SUBJECT: Enhancing Western Sunni Tribal Members Support to the ISF.

1. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) PURPOSE. To determine the feasibility of western Sunni tribal members serving as desert scouts, or in another capacity, under the ITG in support of ongoing ISF operations near Al Qa’im.

2. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) BLUF. MNF-I should recommend to the ITG that it enlist select western Sunni Tribes for service into the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) to act as a constabulary force to operate with Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces to counter the threat and maintain security in Iraq. This COA recognizes select western Sunni tribes will serve as a local constabulary, engages Sunni tribes in service to the ITG and precludes problems in integrating select Sunni tribes into the ISF. Direct accession of select Western Sunni Tribes into ISF is also a viable and executable alternative that becomes increasing attractive if a strategy can be developed to ensure the long-term integration and inclusion of Sunni tribe members into the ISF.

3. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) BACKGROUND. Since MAY 05 select western Sunni tribes, including Katab al-Hamza (KH), have been in armed conflict with AQI for control of the town of Husaybah located in the Western Euphrates River Valley Area. AQI has invested considerable resources to retake control of the greater Al Qa’im area. Intelligence reports indicate Sunni tribal members – as many as 1,000 -- are increasing disillusioned with AQI and are formulating plans to expel FF. Enlisting the support of select western Sunni tribes could assist the ISF in defeating FF within this area. This paper identifies four COAs that would allow the ITG to: (1) provide an “air of legitimacy” to these western Sunni tribes; and (2) provide these western Sunni tribes with more formal support.

4. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) DISCUSSION. The four courses of action for enlisting western tribal militias to support the ISF include:

   a. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) COA 1: Hiring Select Western Sunni Tribes as Security Contractors. The ITG contracts these tribes as a security service with duty as desert scouts. The ITG, in conjunction with MNSTC-I, will ensure they receive rapid training (to include Law of Armed Conflict training [LOAC]), equipping and arming of its members to effectively complement designated CF or ISF units within Al Qa’im. The tribes would have access to the full range of combat support and logistics support. The ITG would conduct a targeted I/O campaign to publicize Sunni inclusion in on-going operations to assist the ISF.

      (1) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Advantages:
      • Timely; able to ensure select western Sunni tribes can quickly contribute to ongoing combat operations.
      • MNSTC-I can train, equip and arm up to 1,000 fighters.
(2) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Disadvantages:
- Ad hoc command and control structure diminishes the overall authority of the ITG over these tribes, including no command responsibility for LOAC violations.
- Circumvents requirements for a security company (e.g., KH or other tribes) to be licensed and regulated IAW CPA Order 91 and CPA Memo 17.
- Precedence; first time ITG has contracted for security services in support of ongoing combat operations; could be perceived as ITG contracting a surrogate or mercenary force.
- MNF-I is ultimately responsible for their actions and conduct in accordance with LOAC.
- Does not support overall efforts to standardize, professionalize, and nationalize the Iraqi Army.

b. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) COA 2: Integrating Select Western Sunni Tribal Members into ISF through Established Recruitment Procedures. Select western Sunni tribal militia members enlist IAW the TAL and CPA. These members enlist individually and are trained by MNSTC-I prior to assignment (assignment to al-Qa’im area requires ITG special approval).

(1) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Advantages:
- Training, equipping and arming IAW TAL and CPA.
- Ensures the overall authority and command structure of these tribal members under the ITG.
- Demonstrates ITG’s direct support for Sunni tribal engagement.
- Supports overall efforts to standardize, professionalize, and nationalize the Iraqi Army.

(2) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Disadvantages:
- Lacks timeliness; unable to impact current operations.
- Sets precedence for local tribal members to stay in a geographic area that may be detrimental to long-term ITG authority.

c. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) COA 3: Direct Accession of Select Western Sunni Tribes into ISF. ISF enlists select tribes as a group into the Iraqi Army. They undergo rapid accession into the ISF and are quickly trained, equipped and armed by MNSTC-I prior to assignment. The ITG must be prepared to address the effective long-term integration of select Sunni tribes into the ISF, including integrating a tribal group into an ethnically diverse ISF and the possible future stationing of these forces away from their normal geographic location. The ITG must work to shape the perceptions and expectations of the Iraqi people, the ISF and these tribes to ensure all understand the rationale and purpose for enlisting the service of these tribes into the Iraqi Army.

(1) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Advantages:
- Timeliness; able to ensure tribal militias immediately address the ITG’s most pressing security problem, defeating FF in al-Anbar province.
- MNSTC-I able to quickly train, equip and arm these select tribes.
- Ensures the overall authority and command structure of these tribes under the ITG.
- Demonstrates ITG’s direct support for Sunni tribal engagement.
(2) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Disadvantages:
- Sets precedence for entire tribe to stay in a geographic area as a part of the ISF -- may be detrimental to long-term ITG authority.
- Select Sunni tribal motivation to join the ISF may center on goals at odds with the ISF (e.g. receiving training, equipment and arms to improve future tribal standing vice building a democracy).

d. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) COA 4: Enlist Select Western Sunni Tribes into the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps under CPA Order 28 and 73. The ICDC is a voluntary service not to exceed 12 months (unless there is a national emergency), falls under the auspices of the MoD, and serves as a constabulary force to operate with ISF and CF to counter the threat and maintain security in Iraq. As part of the ICDC, select tribes will counter organized groups and individuals employing violence against the people of Iraq and their national infrastructure. MNSTC-I will ensure they receive rapid training (to include Law of Armed Conflict training [LOAC]), equipping and arming of its members to complement designated ISF or CF units within Al Qa'im.

(1) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Advantages:
- Timely; able to ensure select tribes can quickly contribute to ongoing combat operations.
- MNSTC-I can train, equip and arm these select tribes.
- Provides command structure and authority over these tribes under the ITG.
- Serves as a constabulary force and ISF recognizes they will remain within a specific location during service – avoids future concerns about integrating tribes into ISF at a different geographic location.

(2) (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) Disadvantages
- ICDC transitioned last year to National Guard that was integrated into IA. Revitalizing the ICDC will require discussions with MoD and their approval.
- Sets precedent by mobilizing tribal militia into the ICDC/IA as a single unintegrated unit.
- Does not support overall efforts to standardize, professionalize, and nationalize the Iraqi Army.

5. (S//REL USA, AUS, GBR) RECOMMENDATION: MNF-I should recommend to the ITG that it enlist select western Sunni Tribes for service into the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) to act as a constabulary force to operate with Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces to counter the threat and maintain security in Iraq. This COA recognizes select western Sunni tribes will serve as a local constabulary, engages Sunni tribes in service to the ITG and precludes problems in integrating select Sunni tribes into the ISF. Direct accession of select Western Sunni Tribes into ISF is also a viable and executable alternative that becomes increasing attractive if a strategy can be developed to ensure the long-term integration and inclusion of Sunni tribe members into the ISF.

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