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From: [b 6]
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2004 12:42 PM
To: Sanchez, Ricardo LTG CJTF 4/JCORPS CDR; Sanchez, Ricardo S., (LTG)
Cc: [b 3 b(6)] Weber, Joseph F. (O-8); 'Fast, Barbara MG CJTF 4
C2'; Sargeant, Stephen T. (O-7); [b 3 b(6)] CJTF 4/CG XO';
[b (3), (b)(6)]
Subject: Mark T. (O-7)
Fallujah Discussion (~~SECRET~~)

Importance: High

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: NONE

Please File ALL

Sir,

This morning we discussed "next steps" in Fallujah. I have a meeting with Amb Holzman during the Fallujah discussion this afternoon, so please let me offer a couple thoughts on paper:

The recent despicable acts deserve a strong and unequivocal response. Most disconcerting is the level of popular participation. This suggests that we have two challenges - 1) find the perpetrators; and 2) draw a line in the sand for the rest of the community - "You are with us or you are against us".

I would stress - to this collection of warfighters - that we should make sure to extend an opportunity to be "with us". I support the idea of convening key leaders, giving them a deadline - 48 hours - by which to produce the perpetrators, or face visible, palpable consequences.

This will be in some ways a replay of Gen Abizaid's ultimatum to Fallujah leaders on 8 November 2003 (I am forwarding CPA's MFR on NIPR). That morning began with an IED attack outside Fallujah against a Bradley, which burned to a charred hulk. Gen Abizaid met later in the day with some 70 tribal and religious leaders. His message was that the patience of the coalition was at an end. If they could not get control of the violence in their communities, the Coalition would do so by opening an offensive campaign in and around Fallujah.

Gen Abizaid concluded that November meeting with the following points about the way forward:

- Gen Abizaid would like to meet with the group again in several weeks
- CF will form a committee of former officers to advise us on security issues
- CF will form an ICDC BDE, including former IZ officers, vetted
- CF will endorse the idea of an observer role for Governors on the IGC
- CF will work to improve our relations with the police, and will generally conduct operations only with the police
- CF will redouble efforts to revitalize the economy
- CF will expand the size of the border police
- CF will be ready to pull forces out of Iraqi cities but only when Iraqis can demonstrate they will cooperate with our forces
- CF will work with Iraqi educators to learn more about customs and culture
- CF will review names of detainees to see who can be released.

That "demarche", together with continuing operations, achieved some results. If we are contemplating some form of ultimatum, we should study Gen Abizaid's November visit, because it is likely that some of the same Iraqi leaders will be in the room. I would defer to the cultural/ Iraq experts, but it seems to me that we have set a high standard by having Gen Abizaid deliver the message once.

Since November, there are new developments in terms of interlocutors, and we should consider what it makes sense to leverage.

CPA COO initiated the Fallujah Working Group, a body focused on infrastructure and economic projects, including CPA

and the unit on the ground (82nd then MEF). We should consider 1) making use of the FWG's key Fallujah interlocutors and 2) "holding hostage" further work unless cooperation is offered; and as with Buford, being ready to pour in resources if the community cooperates. The FWG has done some good thinking we might tap into about constructive practical steps.

Several political leaders have offered to provide a bridge into the Fallujan community. The most tangible is Talabani, who informed you directly about the new National Labor Association, whose members appear to be credible community leaders, eager for the occupation to end but willing to work constructively toward that goal. (On NIPR, I repeat-send the letter dated 8 March 2004 from the NLO to Talabani.) Several days ago, Talabani and Barzani convened a "reconciliation" meeting in Irbil, to which Talabani invited the leaders of this group. So far, Talabani has made clear his preference that he continue to mediate our relationship with the NLO; i.e. that the Coalition not engage directly. But enough is enough - now would be the time to ask Talabani how we can engage, in the next 24 hours; or to engage directly, as the unit on the ground may be doing.

(The Iraqi National Gathering also offered that we choose a city - Fallujah was one possibility - and they would use contacts to try to restore order. And Sharif Ali originally offered to deliver Fallujah. Neither effort has shown signs of material results.)

In addition, I would hope that those Iraqi units who stood proudly with IMEF and the 82nd at the TOA some days ago; those ICDC and IPS who have taken casualties already as part of this partnership; would stand firmly with us. It would be useful if the MOI would say a word to strengthen their resolve, to back up the dialogue we are surely already having on the ground. I am not sure that Badran is ever very good at stiffening anyone else's spine, but if ever there was a time for leadership, this is it - it is the right thing to do.

VR [b 6]

[(b)(3), (b)(6)]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: NONE

Tracking:

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| Recipient | Read |
| Sanchez, Ricardo LTG CJT1 [4] CORPS CDR | |
| Sanchez, Ricardo S., (LTG) | |
| [b 3, b 6] | |
| Weber, Joseph F. (O-8) | |
| Fast, Barbara MG CJT1 [4] [2] | |
| Sargeant, Stephen T. (O-7) | |
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