

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO FRAGO ## (OPERATION AL HARIYAH) TO MNC-I OPORD 04-01

1. (U) SITUATION

1.A. (U) ENEMY SITUATION

1.A.1. (U) SUMMARY. REFER TO BASE ORDER.

1.B. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **DISPOSITION.** THE STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF INSURGENTS IN THE POST OPERATION AL-FAJR ENVIRONMENT REMAINS FLUID. INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO FOCUS EFFORTS WITHIN THE RAMADI - BAGHDAD CORRIDOR. OTHERS ARE REPOSITIONING IN WESTERN AL ANBAR, NORTH BABIL AND IN THE SALAH AL DIN AND DIYALA PROVINCES ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BAGHDAD. OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS INSURGENTS HAVE INCREASED OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF BAGHDAD AND ALONG THE SEAMS OF UNIT BOUNDARIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO DRAW MNF-I AWAY FROM FALLUJAH AND INTERDICT FALLUJAH RELATED LINES OF COMMUNICATION. SPECIFIC ATTACKS OCCURRED IN MOSUL, THE ZAAB TRIANGLE (SHARQAT, BAYJI, HAWIJA), BAQUBA, NORTH BABIL, AS SUWAYRAH, AND SALMAN PAK. AMIRIYAH HAS BEEN REPORTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AS A KEY AREA FOR INSURGENTS EITHER EXTRICATED FROM OR UNABLE TO ENTER FALLUJAH. IT IS ASSESSED AS UNLIKELY THAT THE AMZ NETWORK WILL ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH AN ALTERNATE MAJOR SAFE HAVEN OF THE SCOPE AND CRITICALITY OF FALLUJAH. A MORE DECENTRALISED AND MOBILE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE IS LIKELY TO BE IMPLEMENTED OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

1.C. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **KEY TERRAIN.** AREAS ASSESSED AS BEING KEY TERRAIN FOR THE INSURGENCY INCLUDE: THE GREATER BAGHDAD AREA (TARMIYAH, ABU GHRAIB, ABU SHEER, SALMAN PAK AND NORTH BABIL) AND THE RAMADI TO BAGHDAD CORRIDOR (KHALIDIYAH, HABBANIYAH, SAQLAWYAH, KARMAH, AMIRIYAH AND ZAIDON). THIS TERRAIN AFFORDS BOTH ACCESS TO TRANS-NATIONAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND PROXIMITY TO THE POLITICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR IRAQ, BAGHDAD.

1.D. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **THREAT ACTIVITY.** INSURGENT GROUPS THAT HAVE TRADITIONALLY OPERATED WITHIN LIMITED GEOGRAPHIC AREAS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE LOCALIZED OPERATIONS BUT WILL PROBABLY EXPERIENCE DEGRADED ACCESS TO FUNDING, WEAPONS AND TRAINING IN THE NEAR TERM. THESE GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE ATTACKS AGAINST MNF, ISF AND SOFT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY WITHIN THEIR AVAILABLE MEANS. CONTACT WITH OPERATIONAL LEVEL LEADERSHIP AND THE PROVISION OF DIRECTION, RESOURCES AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT MAY TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS TO RE-ESTABLISH. THE CELLULAR STRUCTURE, DISPERSED NODES, AND ROBUST EXTERNAL SUPPORT HAVE PERMITTED FOREIGN TERRORIST NETWORKS A MODERATE DEGREE OF SURVIVABILITY. THE AMZ NETWORK CONTINUES TO PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS.

1.E. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **INTENT.** INCREASED REPORTING IS EVIDENT OF INSURGENT INTENT TO DISRUPT THE IRAQI ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR LATE JANUARY 2005. THE GRAVITATION OF MANY INSURGENTS AND THEIR LEADERSHIP TOWARDS KEY CITIES/POPULATION CENTERS (BAGHDAD AND MOSUL) IS LIKELY IN PREPARATION FOR THE DELIBERATE TARGETING OF ELECTIONS BASED INFRASTRUCTURE, IRAQI POLITICAL ENTITIES AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. THE WIDER INSURGENT INTENT IS CURRENTLY ASSESSED AS PREVENTING THE ELECTIONS OCCURRING RATHER THAN INFLUENCING THE RESULTS. RECENT INCREASED TARGETING OF ISF IN NUMEROUS LOCATIONS IS LIKELY INTENDED TO SET THE CONDITIONS FOR INSURGENT DISRUPTION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. INSURGENT GROUPS MAY

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ATTEMPT TO RE-ESTABLISH INFLUENCE OR CONTROL IN AREAS WHERE THEY HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DENIED OPERATIONAL FREEDOM SUCH AS MOSUL, TAL AFAR, SAMARRA, THAWRA, NAJAF AND FALLUJAH. THE INTENT OF MM AND SPLINTER FACTIONS IN THE COMING WEEKS REMAINS UNCERTAIN. SOME REPORTING SUGGESTS PREPARATIONS BY MM AND SPLINTER GROUPS TO COMMENCE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BUT AT THE DISCRETION OF KEY LEADERS. THE SHIA APPARATUS IS BROADLY PUSHING PASSIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS BUT SOME ELEMENTS ARE PURSUING THE USE OF VIOLENCE.

1.F. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **METHODOLOGIES.** THE PAST TWO MONTHS HAS BEEN CHARACTERISED BY AN INCREASED USE OF IED/VBIED, PARTICULARLY ALONG KEY MSR/ASR AND AN INCREASE IN DELIBERATE EFFORTS TO TARGET THE IPS. INSURGENT IO EFFORTS ARE CURRENTLY ASSESSED AS EFFECTIVE WITHIN MUJAHIDEEN CIRCLES, SUSTAINING RECRUITMENT PROGRAMS AND MAINTAINING THE PERCEPTION OF GROWING SUCCESSES AGAINST MNF/ISF. AN INCREASING EMPHASIS IS LIKELY TO BE PLACED ON INTIMIDATION OF THE POPULATION AND DELIBERATE ATTACKS AGAINST POLITICAL ENTITIES. EXISTING METHODS AND RESOURCES ARE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY.

1.G. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **COLLABORATION.** SENSITIVE REPORTING INDICATES SOME INSURGENT ELEMENTS HAVE INCREASED COOPERATION WITH OTHER GROUPS, CROSSING TRADITIONAL SHIA/SUNNI AND TRIBAL BOUNDARIES. INSURGENT LEADERS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN COLLABORATING BETWEEN AL ANBAR PROVINCE, NORTH BABIL, BAGHDAD, AND DIYALA PROVINCE. WHILST THIS MAY BE AN INDICATOR OF INCREASING RELIANCE ON SHARED RESOURCES, IT IS MORE LIKELY AN EXTENSION OF THE 'RELATIONSHIPS OF CONVENIENCE' CONSTRUCT AS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES INCREASE IN IMPORTANCE. EXPLOITATION OF TRIBAL LINKAGES, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN FALLUJAH AND THE NORTH BABIL AREA, WILL CONTINUE, AS WILL THE USE OF CRIMINAL NETWORKS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

2. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **WEATHER.** WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR THE AO AND THE LIKELY IMPACT ON OPERATIONS CAN BE FOUND AT THE MNC-I JOINT METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE SIPRNET SITE:

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3. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **THREAT COA.**

3.A. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **ENEMY MOST LIKELY COA.** INSURGENT MAIN EFFORT WILL SHIFT TOWARDS THE DENIAL OR DISRUPTION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. IN PARTICULAR, ATTACKS WILL BE AIMED AT ELECTION AND SECURITY CENTRIC TARGETS, INTENDED TO SET THE CONDITIONS WHEREBY THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF IRAQ (IECI) AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DEEM THE ENVIRONMENT NOT CONDUCIVE TO HOLDING ELECTIONS AS SCHEDULED. KEY ELECTIONS TARGET SETS INCLUDE IECI INFRASTRUCTURE (VOTER REGISTRATION SITES, IECI OFFICES AND PERSONNEL ETC), POLITICAL ENTITIES (PARTY OFFICES AND KEY OFFICIALS) AND THE ISF. EFFORTS WILL CONVERGE ON THE KEY POPULATION CENTRES OF GREATER BAGHDAD AND MOSUL IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE IMPACT WITH CONTINUED ATTACKS IN OTHER AREAS TO DISRUPT MNF/IIG EFFORTS AT RECONSTRUCTION AND ESTABLISHING CONTROL. INSURGENTS WILL CONTINUE OPPORTUNITY TARGETING OF INFRASTRUCTURE, PARTICULARLY STRATEGIC FACILITIES THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT BAGHDAD AND IIG REVENUE GENERATION. OPERATIONAL LEVEL INSURGENT LEADERSHIP WILL REGROUP AND PROVIDE DIRECTION AND RESOURCES TO SUBORDINATE OR AFFILIATED GROUPS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR WIDER INTENT.


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INSURGENT LOC AND ATTACKS WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT SEAMS AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING SURVIVABILITY.

3.B. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **ENEMY MOST DANGEROUS COA.** THE MOST DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION WOULD INVOLVE THE CONDUCT OF A SPECTACULAR ATTACK AIMED AT INTIMIDATION OF THE POPULATION TO AN EXTENT WHERE THE MAJORITY REFUSE TO VOTE, BASED ON FEAR OF FURTHER ATTACKS. THE EXECUTION OF A MASS CASUALTY ATTACK OR MASS HOSTAGE SCENARIO AGAINST CIVILIANS WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY METHOD OF ACHIEVING THE LEVEL OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION REQUIRED. DEMANDS MAY BE ISSUED FOR THE IIG AND IECI TO FORMALLY DECLARE THE ELECTIONS CANCELLED BEFORE SUCH AN ATTACK OCCURS. BAGHDAD IS ASSESSED AS THE MOST LIKELY LOCATION FOR SUCH AN EVENT. INSURGENTS WOULD CAPITALIZE ON THE INCREASED MEDIA PRESENCE IN IRAQ DURING THE BUILD UP TO THE 30 JAN 05 POLLING DAY.

3.C. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ SUPPORTING EFFORTS MAY INCLUDE A BROAD ESCALATION IN ATTACKS ACROSS IRAQ AIMED AT DIVERTING MNF RESOURCES TO AREAS AWAY FROM BAGHDAD. AGITATION OF THE SUNNI/SHIA DIVIDE MAY BE UNDERTAKEN TO INCITE EITHER LOCALIZED SECURITY DETERIORATION OR A BROAD UPRISING BY SECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY. THE ASSASSINATION OF SISTANI OR AN ATTACK AGAINST A LARGE GROUP OF SHIA COULD PRODUCE THE DESIRED ESCALATION IN TENSIONS. BOTH INSURGENT LEADERSHIP AND SUNNI POLITICAL ENTITIES MAY USE RECENT MNF OPERATIONS, DOMINANTLY AGAINST SUNNI AREAS, AS THE CATALYST FOR ABANDONMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. PROVOCATION OF THE KURD POPULATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE DISPUTED AREA OF KIRKUK, WOULD ALSO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED EFFECTS OF MNF/ISF DIVERTING SECURITY BASED RESOURCES AWAY FROM BAGHDAD AND PREVENTING PORTIONS OF THE POPULATION FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE ELECTIONS.

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ **PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT.** THE FOLLOWING PIR ARE ISSUED IN SUPPORT OF THE DEVELOPING OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PICTURE:



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Approved for Release

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