

~~SECRET~~

## CCJ3 INFORMATION PAPER

**SUBJECT:** The future of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corp (ICDC)

**BACKGROUND:** ICDC is a CJTF-4a initiative that is funded by the CPA and is tracked by CENTCOM. CJTF-4a has a plan to train 21 battalions by Feb 04 with a CDRUSCENTCOM proposal to raise an additional 5 battalions for a total of 26 battalions. The responsibility for recruiting, training and organization of the ICDC has been delegated to CJTF-4a by CPA. Primary tasks for the ICDC are: fixed site, area and convoy security, riot and crowd control, disaster response services, search and rescue services, joint patrols with Coalition Forces, support to humanitarian missions, and service as community liaisons and linguists.

### **DISCUSSION:**

#### 1. Near Term:

- A. The ICDC is widely recognized by the Iraqi people and the military as the most effective force we developed. As such, priority of mass for security should be provided in the following order: ICDC, fixed site security, border police, police, New Iraqi Army. All security forces must be developed, but we should capitalize on our success with the ICDC.
- B. Near term we need to draw funding for the equipment, support, training, etc. into CJTF-4a lanes. This will provide an efficient process for getting the most ICDC on the streets the fastest. Capital Equipment Replacement (CERP) funds are currently used by Divisions, but this only represents a short term solution. The CPA essentially holds funding responsibility for the long term.
- C. Furthermore we need to fix the pay disparity between the ICDC and the New Iraqi Army (NIA). ICDC personnel currently make more than NIA personnel. This will hurt NIA recruitment in the long term.
- D. Finally, we must publicize the successes of the ICDC and publicly show respect for them. This will provide a sense of pride for the Iraqis and esteem for the ICDC units.

#### 2. Long Term:

- A. Currently, divisions are working their own uniform sources and design, equipment, and training programs. This must eventually be standardized across CJTF-4a to make the ICDC a national force.
- B. The future disposition of the ICDC will be decided by an internationally recognized, representative government established by the people of Iraq. Once their purpose

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

has been served, there are multiple courses of action this body could take.

Some options include:

- 1) COA 1—Disband the ICDC with no offer of follow on employment in the Iraqi Security Services.
  - a) This COA, at least at first, would be the cheapest way to proceed. However, it has the potential to cost the most in terms of long term prosperity and peace in the country.
  - b) This COA would need to be phased in over a period of time to preclude a mass exodus of individuals that could be quite disgruntled at losing employment. Loss of employment could make them quite susceptible to exploitation by subversive elements in Iraqi society.
  - c) In addition, we would need to develop an approach and methodology that will allow for job placement and training to facilitate a new job.
- 2) COA 2—Disband them with the opportunity to enlist into the New Iraqi Army or other Iraqi Security Service.
  - a) This COA would allow the government of Iraq and the other investors in the re-building of Iraq to see their efforts have not gone to waste after the end of the ICDC.
  - b) Individuals would be afforded the opportunity to continue in their service to Iraq by transitioning to another Iraq service organization.
  - c) Hard numbers would need to be established to prevent the swelling of the ranks in some organizations and not enough in other organizations. We would need to identify where the greatest need is.
- 3) COA 3—Form an Iraqi reserve/guard component force.
  - a) A national guard-type organization would be beneficial to the country in many ways. The organization should be set up along the lines of the US model. The US could and should establish liaisons to these guard units to facilitate the setup and initial training of the units established. It would allow for a ready made force to respond to natural disasters, regional disasters, emergencies and other civil requirements.
  - b) To ensure that the national guard is able to integrate fully with the armed forces if required, they should be equipped with the same weaponry, rifles, pistols, etc. that the active armed forces have in their inventory. This would preclude any compatibility or training problems if they were activated in a time of national emergency.
  - c) A disadvantage is that this COA could allow "Warlord-type" activities to begin if not carefully monitored by a National entity. There would be a strong requirement to ensure that the chain-of-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

command was very well defined and understood by all elements of the national guard.

**RECOMMENDATION:** COA #2. Disband the ICDC with the opportunity to enlist into the New Iraqi Army or other Iraqi Security Service.

- Takes advantage of accomplished training.
- Some opportunity for individuals to stay in their local area.
- Avoids mass unemployment.
- Reduces tendency to form an ethnically polarized, armed militia in any one specific area.

APPROVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ PREPARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_  
J. F. SATTLER  
MajGen, USMC  
Director of Operations  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
Operational Air Plans  
23 Sep 03

Classified by: MajGen J.F. SATTLER, USMC, CCJ3  
Declassify on: 23 SEP 13

~~SECRET~~