SECRET

CCJ3 Information Paper
Foreign Fighter and Terrorist Interdiction

Purpose: (S) Provide CDR information for HASC/SASC testimony with regard to preventing foreign fighters and terrorists from entering Iraq.

Background: (S) CDR requests following information: “What are we doing to prevent foreign fighters and terrorists from entering Iraq?”

Discussion: (S) The border is porous, but initiatives to secure Iraqi border land Ports of Entry, control the entry of non-Iraqi males on the Syrian border, coordinate with KSA over border issues, and execute CJTF[1.4a] Operation CHAMBERLAIN will disrupt the flow of foreign fighters and terrorists into Iraq.

1. (S) Along the entire Iraqi border, CJTF[4] has identified four types of border Land Ports of Entry (POE):
   - Class A: Officially designated location for commercial traffic entering the country, fully manned with customs and immigration inspectors on both sides of the national boundary. (16 total)
   - Class B: Personnel crossing points reflecting traditional traffic between neighboring towns on opposite sides of the border, usually with minimal manning. (11 total)
   - Denial Point (DP): A location requiring observation to prevent personnel and vehicle traffic from crossing the border through natural or man-made routes (e.g., old pilgrimage or smuggling routes). Traffic at Denial Points is re-routed to the nearest Class A or Class B POE. (18 total)
   - Blocked Denial Point: A denial point that does not have a convenient Class A or Class B POE. (3 total)

2. (S) The current lay down of Coalition ground forces at border crossing points:
   - 101st AA - There are 16 (six Class A and ten Class B) POEs and one Denial Point in this sector, manned by approximately 1.4a Iraqis (roughly 1.4a border guards and 1.4a police/customs agents). Turkey is providing tight control and the Peshmerga are improving control.
   - 41D - Two Class A POEs and two Denial Points are continuously manned with 1.4a US personnel and 1.4a Iraqi border police and/or customs agents. Iran provides only loose control along the eastern border. Iraqi border control is improving in the northeast.

1.4a
Border Police training - 1.4b trained out of 1.4a required.

Pre-war border enforcement used 1.4a personnel; the post-war proposed requirement is 1.4a. Border Enforcement personnel are on line as of 15 Sep 03. Resources for border personnel are lacking, for example, CJTF[4] is attempting to validate and prioritize requests for 3000 vehicles.

Limited customs and immigration training has been conducted by Coalition forces to date. Expert training will begin in the first weeks of October by international instructors arranged by UK Customs officials. Fully trained customs and immigrations officials should be at all Class A Ports no later than 1 January.
5. (S) Operation CHAMBERLAIN will commence 3 OCT 03 to defeat foreign fighters and terrorists attempting to infiltrate Iraq. Key tasks:

- Identify infiltration routes, C2 assets and logistics support infrastructure that support infiltration.
- Facilitate the establishment of Iraqi manned border points capable of denying infiltration through legitimate Points of Entry (POE).
- Destroy the C2 and logistics support infrastructure that supports the infiltration of foreign fighters and terrorists into Iraq.
- Disrupt the flow of foreign fighters and terrorists into Iraq and engage them in areas of our choice.

6. (S) The CPA Supplemental submitted in September 2003 requests $150M and establishes a goal of 13,600 personnel in three bureaus, with a timeline for completion of 18 months.

- Border Customs and Police – 1.4a personnel
- Border Inspections – 1.4a personnel
- Nationality and Civil Affairs – 1.4a personnel

Recommendation: (S) CDR use these data points to explain Coalition efforts to interdict foreign fighters and terrorists at Iraqi borders.

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