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(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] b 6  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 11, 2004 10:40 AM  
**To:** Sanchez, Ricardo LTG CJTF7-VCORPS CDR  
**Cc:** Weber, Joseph F. (O-8); Coleman Col John C; Fast, Barbara MG CJTF7-C2; Sargeant, Stephen T. (O-7); [redacted] b 3, b 6; CHOPS; [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6); [redacted] (O-6) CJTF7/C5; [redacted] b 3, b 6; [redacted] b 3), (b)(6); [redacted] 'IMEFDM G3 AC/S'; [redacted] b 3, b 6; (b)(3), (b)(6); [redacted] b 3, b 6; CJTF7-CG XO; [redacted] b 3, b 6; CJTF7-POL-MIL; Miller, Thomas G. MG CJTF-7 C3; [redacted] b 3, b 6; Thomas G. MG CJTF-7 C3; Kimmitt, Mark T. (O-7); [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 101030 APR Fallujah [redacted] b 6 Update (~~SECRET~~)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~  
Caveats: ~~NONE~~

Sir,

I spoke with [redacted] (b)(6) and his team at about 1000 hours:  
The delegation is still planning to depart this morning for Fallujah. The principals are the same; and they do plan to bring, again, some medical doctors to provide assistance.

[redacted] b 6 notes that he has been in touch with their own contacts in Fallujah this morning. Those contacts note that the situation has remained quiet overnight. The contacts understand that we are looking for a period of calm, after the ceasefire begins, before we begin talks about the way forward. They further understand [redacted] b 6 notes - that any withdrawal of Coalition forces will not be immediate, but rather, will take time. And [redacted] b 6 confirms, the contacts understand that the Coalition demands remain in place - see below - regarding information about the perpetrators, etc.

Operationally, the delegation plans to depart from the Governing Council building, "no earlier than 1100 hours"; they have accepted our escort, up to some point on the edge of Fallujah. They are happy to have the assistance getting through CPs but do not want to be seen entering the city in the company of the Coalition. At this writing we are still waiting for confirmation of the travellers, vehicles etc.

As discussed with the Chief, we will want to make sure that the delegation has a good Coalition contact on the ground in Fallujah. This may serve a logistical function, but will also serve as a reality check - are the people on the ground seeing the same things?

CPA is informed about the latest developments.

We do still need to consider more aspects of our approach, should the ceasefire miraculously hold...

VR, [redacted] b 6

[redacted] (b)(6)

4/11/2004

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XO-File  
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-----Original Message-----

From: [b 6]  
Sent: Sunday, April 11, 2004 1:36 AM  
To: Sanchez, Ricardo LTG CJTF7-VCORPS CDR

[Redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: Fallujah [b 6] Update (~~SECRET~~)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: ~~NONE~~

Sir,

As you discussed this evening with the Chief, this evening the IGC delegation led by IIP Deputy [b 6] returned to Baghdad from their day-trip to Fallujah. [b 6] came in to meet with Amb Bremer, and Maj Gen Weber and I joined them.

[b 6] reported that during their stay in Fallujah, they had met with some 12 notable leaders - "but don't ask their names". The delegation had spoken with the leaders about a ceasefire, and, after a period of calm, a withdrawal of troops. They succeeded in convincing the leaders to agree to a ceasefire; those leaders control about 90% of the fighters, and will work on the rest. There is a "very good chance" to work things out.

The problem [b 6] noted, was that during the visit F16s had continued roaring overhead - it was not possible to build confidence in that environment. Further, some 518 civilians had been killed, including some 46 children under the age of five; and the delegation saw a woman killed by a sniper right in front of them. Also [b 6] - like Sheikh Ghazi al Yawer had done earlier in the day by phone - urged the withdrawal of the 36th ICDC BN - they are all "Kurds and Shia", and the people of Fallujah are saying that the "pesh has arrived".

[b 6] also stressed the urgent need for some humanitarian assistance. Amb Bremer referred him to the Ministry of Health, and also to the Red Crescent, who should be able to help.

During the meeting, CPA Governance noted that, separate from the [b 6] effort, current IGC President Barzani had arranged a delegation to travel to Fallujah on 11 April to "solve the problem". Amb Bremer noted that that trip should be turned off, in order to keep the effort in one channel.

Following consultations with you, we confirmed with [b 6] 1) the ceasefire will begin at 1000 hours; and it should last until 1600 hours. 2) If the ceasefire holds, then at 1600 negotiations should begin, on the basis of the points from the previous day (copied below my signature). 3) CJTF7 will provide escort to make sure the delegation gets through all the CPs. [b 6] went up on Al Jazeera around midnight to announce the ceasefire, and to urge compliance. As per your guidance, use of air power will be curtailed. The delegation plans to depart Baghdad around 1130 hours - further coordination to follow.

Way Forward:

4/11/2004

Frankly, the chances that the delegation will succeed in effecting a ceasefire are slim. Nevertheless, it seems that we should be prepared for the "negotiations", should the ceasefire miraculously unfold. The basic premise is that the IGC delegation will raise the "demands", listed below, with the community leaders, who in turn will reach out to the bad guys. The role for CF in the talks has not been specified - the best solution would be direct discussion, but should this unfold, some participants might not be willing to talk directly with CF. All have agreed in principle with the concept that CF would gradually slim down our footprint as competent IRAqi forces of some sort flow in. In practice, it would take time to muster (find) those Iraqi forces. If this goes forward, there might be a role for the Iraqi force that the MOD is discussing creating. In that case, there should be a role in the talks for a national-level Iraqi leader - the Ministerial Committee was eager for negotiations, and this might be their chance...

VR, b 6

(b)(6)

**COALITION DEMANDS:**

1. Identify and hand over the kills of the Blackwater contractors; and if they are not now in Fallujah, provide information about where they are.
2. ID and hand over the desecrators of the bodies of the contractors.
3. ID and apprehend foreign fighters. If foreign fighters are not currently in Fallujah, engage in an intel exchange about foreign fighter locations.
4. Produce the al Jazeera reporter who has been engaging in inflammatory incitement to violence, and let the IGC delegation bring him out of Fallujah
5. Stop all operations against the Coalition and the Iraqi security forces; turn in all weapons.
6. ID those in the IRAqi security forces who fought against us. We will remove them from the ISF; but will parole them to local leaders.

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: ~~NONE~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: ~~NONE~~