


SECRET//REL MCFI



Samarra Operations



This briefing is classified
SECRET//REL MCFI
Derived from: Multiple sources

4 August 2004

SECRET//REL-MCFI



Assumptions

- Situation in Samarra is of strategic concern and cannot be resolved quickly enough through political means
- Imperative for offensive action outweighs the advantage of waiting for ISF development
- ISF will require coalition support following offensive operations
- MNF-I led attack will encourage local fighters, unite other insurgent factions, and may cause a spike of insurgent activity country wide
- Insurgents will operate from religious and politically sensitive sites – even damaging them to discredit the IIG and MNF-I.
- Limited economic resources and funding flexibility for this operation
- The Iraqi Government will issue a clear statement requesting that US forces conduct an operation to re-establish IIG control in Samarra and liberate the citizens from the insurgents
- The coalition has the necessary top-level political approval

SECRET//REL-MCFI



Iraqi Preconditions – to be developed further and approved by IIG

- 1200 Iraqi police plus 400 ING will be prepared and available for operations in Samarra
- IIG will make political overtures of inclusion and reconciliation to the people of Samarra
- The PM and President will issue a clear statement requesting that US forces conduct an operation to re-establish IIG control in Samarra and liberate the citizens from the insurgents
- Key members of replacement local government will be identified, selected and prepared
- Necessary emergency powers will be passed by the IIG at the appropriate moment

SECRET//REL-MCFI



Why Do This?

- **Why now?**
 - IIG honeymoon period is ending
 - Perception that Baghdad is being encircled
 - Samarra held hostage by insurgents. Rapid action prevents tactical problem from becoming a strategic problem
 - Early action allows time to recover before elections
 - Insurgents grow stronger, more deeply rooted with time
 - ISF will be a part of the action, but waiting for the ISF to be capable of taking the lead imposes unacceptable military and political risk
 - Political outreach alone has not shown progress
- **Why Samarra?**
 - Salah ad Din is heart of Ba'thist / FRE portion of insurgency
 - Insurgent control of the city directly challenges the IG and democratic process
 - Will visibly break the perceived cordon around Baghdad
 - Iraqis believe US was driven out of Samarra—need to reassert our presence
 - Ineffective local government blocks all economic progress—commercial and developmental aid
 - Largely neutral population could be brought into political process if rid of insurgent threat
 - Failure to address this direct challenge will be seen as weakness, with further consequences

SECRET//REL-MCFI



Why Not?

- Failure to win quickly could:
 - Undermine IIG legitimacy and ISF credibility
 - Strengthen the insurgency
 - Result in large refugee flow
- Available economic assets may not meet needs
- Will most likely result in heavy casualties, damage
- Could inflame violence throughout Iraq
- May require long-term presence to stabilize city
- Insufficient intel may result in failure to defeat insurgents

SECRET//REL MCFI



Mission

In support of IIG, on order MNF-I and ISF conduct offensive operations to neutralize insurgents and restore governmental control to the city of Samarra.

Approved for Release

SECRET//REL-MCFI



Concept


MNF-I and ISFs conduct rapid offensive operations in four phases:

- **Phase I — Preparation:** Intel collection, political preparation, detailed planning
- **Phase II — Set Conditions:** Contain insurgents, surgical strikes, stage units and resources, political and information actions
- **Phase III — Attack in Samarra:** Joint combat operations to neutralize insurgents
- **Phase IV — Stability Ops (Decisive):** Establish new government and police, consequence management and economic improvement, turn tactical success to strategic victory

SECRET//REL-MCFI




Overview



SECRET//REL-MCFI



Task Organization



SECRET//REL-MCFI



Possible Endstates



“Fallujah”

- Little or no control inside city—CF cordon
- Some insurgents and criminals still in positions of power
- Long-term containment problem
- Bumpy road to local control
- Country wide unrest
- Discredited IIG
- Legitimate elections very difficult

Long-term CF Commitment

- Build civil government and police capacity
- Requires big information, political, and economic efforts
- Increasing risk as CF presence becomes more unwelcome
- Opportunity costs as troops are “tied down”
- Legitimate elections unlikely

“Najaf”

- Most of city controlled
- Some exclusion zones cordoned off
- Build civil government and police capacity
- Large CMO effort
- Shrink exclusion zones over time (IPS)
- Legitimate elections likely

Full success

- Insurgents neutralized / routed
- Quick Iraqi civil governance and police capacity
- Long-term CMO effort
- Fairly rapid CF withdrawal
- Strengthened IIG
- Legitimate elections highly likely