Samarra Operations

4 August 2004

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SECRET//REL-MCFI
Derived from: Multiple sources

Ishtirak wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding

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Assumptions

- Situation in Samarra is of strategic concern and cannot be resolved quickly enough through political means.
- Imperative for offensive action outweighs the advantage of waiting for ISF development.
- ISF will require coalition support following offensive operations.
- MNF-I led attack will encourage local fighters, unite other insurgent factions, and may cause a spike of insurgent activity country wide.
- Insurgents will operate from religious and politically sensitive sites – even damaging them to discredit the IIG and MNF-I.
- Limited economic resources and funding flexibility for this operation.
- The Iraqi Government will issue a clear statement requesting that US forces conduct an operation to re-establish IIG control in Samarra and liberate the citizens from the insurgents.
- The coalition has the necessary top-level political approval.
Iraqi Preconditions – to be developed further and approved by IIG

- 1200 Iraqi police plus 400 ING will be prepared and available for operations in Samarra

- IIG will make political overtures of inclusion and reconciliation to the people of Samarra

- The PM and President will issue a clear statement requesting that US forces conduct an operation to re-establish IIG control in Samarra and liberate the citizens from the insurgents

- Key members of replacement local government will be identified, selected and prepared

- Necessary emergency powers will be passed by the IIG at the appropriate moment
Why Do This?

Why now?
- IIG honeymoon period is ending
- Perception that Baghdad is being encircled
- Samarra held hostage by insurgents. Rapid action prevents tactical problem from becoming a strategic problem
- Early action allows time to recover before elections
- Insurgents grow stronger, more deeply rooted with time
- ISF will be a part of the action, but waiting for the ISF to be capable of taking the lead imposes unacceptable military and political risk
- Political outreach alone has not shown progress

Why Samarra?
- Salah ad Din is heart of Ba’thist / FRE portion of insurgency
- Insurgent control of the city directly challenges the IG and democratic process
- Will visibly break the perceived cordon around Baghdad
- Iraqis believe US was driven out of Samarra—need to reassert our presence
- Ineffective local government blocks all economic progress—commercial and developmental aid
- Largely neutral population could be brought into political process if rid of insurgent threat
- Failure to address this direct challenge will be seen as weakness, with further consequences
Why Not?

• Failure to win quickly could:
  • Undermine IIG legitimacy and ISF credibility
  • Strengthen the insurgency
  • Result in large refugee flow

• Available economic assets may not meet needs

• Will most likely result in heavy casualties, damage

• Could inflame violence throughout Iraq

• May require long-term presence to stabilize city

• Insufficient intel may result in failure to defeat insurgents
Mission

In support of IIG, on order MNF-I and ISF conduct offensive operations to neutralize insurgents and restore governmental control to the city of Samarra.

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MNF-I and ISFs conduct rapid offensive operations in four phases:

- **Phase I — Preparation:** Intel collection, political preparation, detailed planning

- **Phase II — Set Conditions:** Contain insurgents, surgical strikes, stage units and resources, political and information actions

- **Phase III — Attack in Samarra:** Joint combat operations to neutralize insurgents

- **Phase IV — Stability Ops (Decisive):** Establish new government and police, consequence management and economic improvement, turn tactical success to strategic victory
Overview

Phase I – Preparation
14-17 Days

Phase II – Set Conditions
14 Days

Phase III – Attack in Samarra
2-4 Days

Phase IV – Stability Ops (Decisive)
14-30 Days

President / PM’s Approval
Collect Intelligence

Contain
Collect Intelligence

Precision Strikes
Forces Staged
Phase IV Ops Set

Joint attacks to neutralize insurgents
Begin establishing civil control

Complete establishing Civil Control
Interlocutor → Mayor
Police Chief
Police Build Capacity → Withdraw CF
Limited Strike Ops

CMO

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## Possible Endstates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Fallujah”</th>
<th>Long-term CF Commitment</th>
<th>“Najaf”</th>
<th>Full success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little or no control inside city—CF cordon</td>
<td>Build civil government and police capacity</td>
<td>Most of city controlled</td>
<td>Insurgents neutralized / routed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some insurgents and criminals still in positions of power</td>
<td>Requires big information, political, and economic efforts</td>
<td>Some exclusion zones cordoned off</td>
<td>Quick Iraqi civil governance and police capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term containment problem</td>
<td>Increasing risk as CF presence becomes more unwelcome</td>
<td>Build civil government and police capacity</td>
<td>Long-term CMO effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumpy road to local control</td>
<td>Opportunity costs as troops are “tied down”</td>
<td>Large CMO effort</td>
<td>Fairly rapid CF withdrawal</td>
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<td>Country wide unrest</td>
<td>Legitimate elections unlikely</td>
<td>Shrink exclusion zones over time (IPS)</td>
<td>Strengthened IIG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discredited IIG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate elections likely</td>
<td>Legitimate elections highly likely</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimate elections very difficult</td>
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Samarra

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