Strategy to Secure Baghdad

14 July 2006
Murders – 10 June to 13 July

- Shula / Nur (9.4%)
- Adamiyah (7.5%)
- Shaab / Ur (4.5%)
- Sadri City (6.5%)
- Amerliyah (2.9%)
- Masafee / Zubaida (13.2%)
- Aamel (2.0%)

- 944 Bodies found
- 41% in worst 5 areas
- Most Bodies in Kadamiyah washed up on shore
Can we contain the areas that the attacks come from?

- We cannot simultaneously contain every "hotspot" in Baghdad City and support zones in the outlying Qadas
- Increased combat power improves capacity to contain violence in focus areas
- Eliminating death squads associated with sectarian based militias reduces sectarian violence
- Recommend assigning a combined force dedicated to eliminating death squads
- National Police accountability and improvement of the Iraqi Justice System are essential to eliminating death squads
Can we clearly identify the areas that the attacks are coming from?

- No, however, intelligence indicates majority of bodies are found in vicinity of where they are killed
- Murder cells are distributed throughout Baghdad City not just one central location
- Victims are typically found within known Baghdad "hotspots" (Doura, vicinity Sadr City, Shula, Adhamiyah, and Bayaa)
- Increase surveillance in focus areas to generate actionable intelligence
- Refocus efforts to target death squads with: (1) a dedicated force targeting death squads, (2) more offensive operations, (3) continue the use of combat patrols and checkpoints
Can we go in, clear and resettle specific areas?

- We can and should stabilize focused areas. The number of areas is proportional to the amount of available combat power.
- Military forces create the security conditions in designated areas which enables the Government of Iraq to resettles their displaced citizens.
- The Government of Iraq resettles their displaced citizens.
- GOI will need a media campaign addressing the situation and how they are solving the resettlement issue.
Do we have the troops required to accomplish the mission set?

- No, given the changed condition in sectarian violence. Proposed reallocation of forces allows MND-B to gain greater effects on the focus areas while protecting the local population.

- Additional forces to MND-B may include:
  - 2 x Iraqi Army Brigades
  - 1 x Coalition Army Brigade Headquarters with 2 x Battalions
  - 3 x Military Police Companies (used to increase Iraqi Police Service capability)
Is it possible to increase offensive operations?

- Yes, with more developed intelligence and reallocation of combat power
- More offensive operations are not the complete solution, we must reduce the causes of violence
- Must eliminate the sectarian death squads, increase accountability of the Iraqi Security Forces (National Police, Iraqi Police Service)
- Enforcement of the Rule of Law
What actions have we taken?

■ Shifted targeting and ISR focus to murder cells
■ Moved more capable National Police units into focus areas
■ ISR focus shifted to persistent observation of OMS buildings, Mosques, and schools to develop and defeat the rising murders
■ Increased the number of combined patrols and CF presence at checkpoints
■ Increase CF night patrols throughout Baghdad
Key Deliverables (Security Support)

- Empower ISF to enforce the law against illegal armed groups
- Increase availability, accountability, and professionalism of National Police
- Develop dedicated forces to target leadership of illegal armed groups
- Develop and announce program to counter illegal armed groups
- Increase operations against illegal armed groups and terrorists, particularly in Doura
- Complete bonus payments to ISF
- Engage national political leaders and the Council of Representatives in support of the Baghdad Security Plan