Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, June 03, 2004 4:23 PM
To: Sanchez, Ricardo S. (O-9)
Cc: McColl, John (LTG, GBR); Metz Thomas F LTG -MNC-I CG; Weber Joseph MajGen MNF-I CHIEF OF STAFF; Fast Barbara G. MG MNF-I C2; Sargeant, Stephen T. (O-7); Kimmitt, Mark (O-7); (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Chief of Staff (Forward), MNF-I; Jones Air Cdre Richard GBR; Graham Andrew J. MG GBR CJTF7 DCG MMC-I; Molan, MAJGEN Jim AUS MNF-I DCS-O (C\M); (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF-I SJS POL-MIL; (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF-I SJS CG XO; (b)(3), (b)(6) CJTF7 SJA MNFI; Davidson, Charles H. (0-7); (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF-I C5; Dempsey, Martin MG (1AD CG); (b)(3), (b)(6); Litt, AMB David C.
Subject: CPA re IIG

Sir,

Below please find CPA's draft cable - not yet signed by Amb Bremer but likely to be approved in close-to-current form.

The cable is not devoid of self-congratulations. Its overall purpose is to depict the IIG as a marked improvement on the IGC, and as generally meeting CPA - and Washington - policy objectives. Indeed, as described, the IIG is more representative and better technically qualified than its nominal predecessor.

Several points of note:

1. The cable notes with satisfaction that the role of Islamist parties has been limited; and that while SCIRI has one Ministry (Dr. Adel at Finance), SCIRI is "not in a position to affect national security". In fact the MOF is a member of the Ministerial Committee on National Security, the security decision-making body for the Iraqi government, so this assertion is not quite true.

2. The cable recognizes that many of the IIG members are "exiles". Indeed, first of all the PM. But two points - 1) Even Brahimi recognized that Saddam was very effective in co-opting, executing or driving out of the country anyone with demonstrated talent; and 2) the absence of some of the key "usual suspect" exiles in the IIG should help.

3. In the cable CPA identifies a possible fault line between a camp including Dr. Allawi and MOI Falah, who support a "Sunni agenda"; and some of the Shia political and religious leadership. I think this is overstated - Gov Falah does bring to the table a demonstrated practice of looking out for "Sunni" interests - not surprisingly, because these were his constituents in Salah ad Din. Dr. Allawi will be very careful not to be labeled - in a derogatory way - a Sunni supporter. Gov Falah will be wise also to take a measured approach. In fact there is actually some hope that the unifying factor among senior security leadership will be the "national" factor, over the sectarian...

VR, (b)(6)

(b)(6)
Political Advisor to the Commanding General
MNFI
Baghdad
DSN (b)(6)
Cell

XXXXXXXXXXXX *(classification to be determined)*
PROG: 06/03/04
AUTHORIZED: (b)(3), (b)(6)
DRAFTED: GOVERNANCE/ (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Other Addressees (CJCS WASHDC and CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL on routine cables)

IRAQ COLLECTIVE

(CAPTION)

(SLUG LINE, i.e. STATE FOR NEA/NGA)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, PINS, PTER, EAID

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT CABINET

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD H.JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

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1. ( ) Summary. On June 1, Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Alawi unveiled the Cabinet of the Iraqi Interim Government. ***This cable provides a brief assessment of the Cabinet, which is notable for its competence and experience, the preponderance of individuals who had not previously served as ministers or members of the Iraqi Governing Council, and its strong national-security team.*** End Summary.

2. ( ) The new Iraqi Cabinet (including PM Allawi and Deputy PM Barham Salih) contains 33 Iraqis. There are 17 Shi'a Arabs, 7 Sunni Arabs, 6 Kurds, 1 Turkoman, 1 Christian, and 1 Yezidi. This composition (with its Shi'a majority) meets Ayatollah Sistani's longstanding criterion that Iraq's government fairly reflect the country population. There is also a much better representation of Sunnis in the Cabinet than in the current government - both because there are more Sunnis and because they are individuals with greater indigenous credibility. Of the six Kurds, three are members of the PUK, two of the KDP, and one is independent.

3. ( ) The Turcoman community continues to be represented by the current Minister of Science and Technology. According to our senior advisers, this minister has done a superb job in office; nonetheless, he is unlikely to be welcomed by the Turkish government, who would have preferred the leader of one of Iraq's Turcoman political groupings. The decision was taken by Amb. Brahimi and Prime Minister Allawi to avoid picking one of the Turcoman political leaders who are, they said, entirely controlled from abroad. The Iraqi Christian community is represented by a leading woman member of the Assyrian Democratic Movement. The Yezidi member of the Cabinet, a last-minute addition, was proposed by the KDP and approved by Prime Minister Allawi.

4. ( ) Overall, the Cabinet includes six women members. These women will lead the important ministries of Agriculture, Labor & Social Affairs, Municipalities & Public Works, Environment, and Displacement & Migration.

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There will also be a new post, the Minister of State for Women's Affairs, which will work to promote issues important to Iraqi women both domestically and internationally. The women in the Cabinet are of varied backgrounds, and include human rights activists, politicians, an economist, a sitting deputy minister, and a former peshmerga fighter against the previous regime. The Cabinet's women are significant improvements on the female representation in the former Governing Council, in terms of both numbers and quality.

5. ( ) The Cabinet is professionally, geographically, and politically diverse. It includes doctors, lawyers, economists, businessmen, engineers, scientists, oil technocrats, international economists, intellectuals, academics, university presidents, and human-rights activists. Nearly two-thirds of the new cabinet have doctorates. The Cabinet also contains a handful of prominent local leaders who have demonstrated talent and leadership at the provincial level. The current governors of Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Salah ad-Din, and Basra are included in the Cabinet, as is the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Suleymaniyah. Geographically, the new Cabinet does a better job than the Governing Council in representing the demographics of the country, particularly in the Sunni areas. Finally, the Cabinet includes representatives from at least 12 different political associations, including several of Iraq's small, but growing, liberal-democratic parties.

6. ( ) The new Cabinet includes nine ministers who have been in office since last fall, and two former members of the Governing Council; it also includes three individuals who served as the principal deputies to individual IGC members. It also includes a large number of individuals new to the national political scene in Iraq. Of the 33 ministers, 22 were neither members of the IGC nor ministers. Overall, the Cabinet strikes the right balance between ensuring that the main political forces in the country are well-represented while also bringing into power many new individuals from constituencies and groupings that to date have not been adequately represented.

7. ( ) In addition to its diversity and general competence, the Cabinet achieves two other leading USG objectives. First, ***it significantly reduces the political influence of Islamist forces in the Iraqi government.*** The Da'wa Party is not represented in the IIG Cabinet. ***SCIRI controls the Ministries of Finance and Youth & Sports, but is not in a position to affect critical decisions concerning national security.*** Both the Ministers of Finance and of Youth & Sports have had extensive dealings with the CPA over the past year, and are well-regarded by Coalition officials. [Comment: The dearth of Islamists in the Cabinet has not gone without notice; it was the chief complaint of several Islamist Governing Council members at June 1 final meeting of the IGC. End Comment.]

8. ( ) The Cabinet also includes a ***talented national security team.*** Prime Minister Alawi is notably strong on security issues, and has worked closely with the Coalition on these matters since last spring. The new Ministers of Interior and Defense, Governor Falah al-Nakib of Salah ad-Din and Governor Hazem Sha'alan of Qadissiayah, have risen to prominence largely because of their strong stands against the insurgency and Muqtada al-Sadr, respectively. Rounding out the national security leadership are Deputy Prime Minister for National Security Affairs Barham Salih and Foreign

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Minister Hoshyar Zebari, both of whom have long histories working closely with the Coalition and supporting a tough stance against the enemies of democracy in Iraq.

9. ( ) ***The Cabinet's greatest weakness is its large number of former exiles.*** Of the 33 members, between one-third and one-half of its members have lived outside of Iraq for some period of time. That said, many of these former exiles were nominated by political parties (namely SCIRI, PUK, KDP, and Iraqi Islamic Party) that have domestic roots and credibility in Iraq that are impossible to ignore.

10. ( ) Comment. Overall, the new Iraqi Cabinet provides a solid foundation for Iraq to take the next step on the path to democracy once it assumes sovereign authority on June 30. We believe the Cabinet is sufficiently competent and credible to earn the support of the Iraqi people in the coming months. ***The main possible fault line within the Cabinet lie between Alawi and his Minister of Interior, both of whom have shown enthusiasm for pursuing what is generally considered a "Sunni" agenda on items such as de-Ba'athification and the recall of the former Iraqi army, and the Shi'a political and religious leadership.*** If pursued aggressively, these measures could potentially spark confrontation between Alawi and prominent Shi'a leaders. In the past few days, however, Alawi has demonstrated a great deal of political savvy, and he appears fully aware of the importance of maintaining the support of Shi'a political and religious leaders. We are therefore confident that he will be able to navigate the potential minefields ahead with skill. End Comment.

BREMER

Tracking:

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