An FRE-led Insurgency Strategy to Defeat the Iraqi Transitional Government
(A Red Cell Assessment)
Insurgent Targets of Opportunity – 2005

- The next 10 months will present many opportunities to disrupt Iraq’s move toward institutionalizing majority rule

- TNA Convening in February
- Provincial Governments seating in March / April
- ITG Standup in March / April

- Seating of the Federal Supreme Court in March / April
- Constitution development process – April - August
- Constitutional Referendum – October
- National Elections – December
- Coalition Forces / ISF / Collaborators -- Always
Insurgent Intentions

- Attack to disrupt, delay, or deny seating of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA)
  - Deny momentum to new Assembly

- Intimidate, coerce, or assassinate TNA members to prevent formation of ITG
  - Focus on TNA leadership—Presidency Council, Sunni leadership, and Constitution committee

- Attack ITG as it is forming; take advantage of inexperienced ministries and security forces
  - Provoke incoming ITG to employ exclusionary, oppressive measures against Sunni Arabs
  - Attack infrastructure to affect population's quality of life
  - Work IO campaign emphasizing that TNA is unrepresentative and ineffective, and supported by the occupiers
Targeting the TNA

Announcement of Winners (Pre-TNA)

- Target winners and families at their homes
  - Strike before proper security measures can be put in place
  - Intimidate representatives into not participating; kidnap or kill those who ignore warnings

- Attack Convention Center with mortars and rockets ahead of assembly day
  - Make it unsafe to meet there; force TNA to meet at less secure location

- Draw headlines away from election results and TNA
  - Emphasize government ineffectiveness through series of attacks against infrastructure and security forces
Targeting the TNA

Opening of Assembly

- **Target arriving TNA members**
  - Close IZ entrances with SVBIEDs, RPG fire, SAF; disrupt / delay opening ceremonies
  - Attack convention center with mortars and rockets; make it unsafe to attend
  - Explode smuggled-in IED near convention center entrance
  - Stage violent demonstrations outside of Int'l Zone; play to international media that TNA does not represent all Iraqis
  - Call in bomb threats / increase threat reporting of attacks

- **Turn the lights off in Baghdad**
  - Even if Convention Center has power, citizens of Baghdad will be cold and in the dark

- **Conduct attacks away from Int'l Zone; emphasize that elections did nothing to improve security**
  - Attacks against Shia crowds at religious sites in Najaf or Karbala during Arbaeen
  - Attacks along ethnic fault lines; provoke sectarian violence (Kirkuk / Mosul) and force harsh government response
  - Attacks against Coalition FOBs conducting RIP/TOA—look for breakdown in security

Create fear and insecurity in opening sessions to emphasize that while the government is controlled by Shia and Kurd collaborators, Sunni Arab insurgents can dictate security
Targeting the Provincial Governments

- Attack to disrupt, delay, or deny seating of Provincial Governments

- Work to gain de facto control of three or more provinces
  - Disrupt attempts at effective governance; intimidate or attack potential leaders unfriendly to the insurgency
    - Governors, mayors, police chiefs, and council members
  - Influence and intimidate population into voting against any constitution unfavorable to insurgent goals

- Focus on ‘Swing’ Provinces—Nineewa and Kirkurk, where attacks and intimidation could have greatest affect on orientation and makeup of provincial governments
  - Place insurgents into key power positions and influence policy and security
  - Provincial governments in Al Anbar and, to a lesser extent, Salah ad Din may be more easily influenced by insurgents—given high concentration of Sunni Arabs
Defeating the ITG

- Defeat government attempts at inclusiveness and reconciliation
  - Target Sunni 'collaborators' who participate in new government
  - Inflame fears of Iranian control of Iraqi government
  - Portray De-Ba'athification program as Shia witch hunt against loyal Sunnis
  - Portray Shia-Kurd government policies as "Us vs Them"—anti-Sunni bias
  - Insert collaborators into key ministries—MOI, MOD, and INIS

- Exploit divisions within the Shia / Kurd government
  - Highlight differences between Shia Islamist agenda and Kurdish federalist requirements—attempt to drive a wedge between leading factions
  - Play on fears that any institution of a Shia version of Sharia law is a move toward Iranian-style theocracy

- Disrupt Establishment of Rule of Law
  - Assassinate, intimidate, or kidnap officers of the court
  - Attack and disrupt regime crimes trials
  - Attack Abu Ghraib after Coalition transitions to Buca detention facility

- Increase sectarian violence, capitalize on divisions in Iraqi populace
  - Increase attacks along ethnic fault lines—Kirkurk, Mosul, Basrah, and N. Babil
  - Assassinate moderating influences—political and religious leaders
  - Incite harsh responses by Kurdish and Shia militias
  - Force Shia-led government to enact draconian security measures
Defeating the ITG

- Remove unifying and moderating influence of Ayatollah Sistani
  - Continue efforts to assassinate Sistani; provoke Shia response and force government and Coalition reactions
  - Exploit divisions between ruling Shia coalition (secular vs Islamist)
  - Exploit Muqtada al Sadr; manipulate his suspicions of Coalition intentions

- Reduce the effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces
  - Continue attacks against ISF; focus on effective leaders
  - Attack IP stations, isolated bases, and border posts; make them too costly to maintain
  - Strike ISF where Coalition is not present; demoralize rank-and-file
  - Conduct carefully-chosen ambushes against joint Police Assistance Teams / joint Military Assistance Teams; make it too costly for Coalition to maintain

- Defeat attempts at economic recovery
  - Turn the lights off in Baghdad
  - Continue attacks against oil / power infrastructure
  - Attack central banking infrastructure; destabilize banking system with attacks or robberies of banks
  - Deny economic recovery to Sunni population; blame the ITG for lack of results
Insurgent Nightmares

- Formation of a representative, inclusive, and conciliatory national government that provides effective governance for all Iraqis
- Emergence of a popular, charismatic Sunni leader working with the ITG to create an inclusive and conciliatory Iraqi government
- High-level FRE defections remove leadership and funding; huge psychological impact on insurgent rank-and-file
- Syrian crackdown on FRE; loss of safe haven and freedom of movement puts leadership at great risk
- Effective Iraqi intelligence services penetrate insurgent cells
- Effective Iraqi security forces maintain momentum of Election Day successes
- Motivated populace, building on the momentum of Election Day, gets 'off the fence' and supports ITG and ISF
- Secure environment leads to economic growth, modernized infrastructure, and improved quality of life
- Return of many former mid- to low-level Ba'athists into political and social arena
- ITG provides tribal sheikhs with money, power, and other incentives to peel away popular support for insurgency
Insurgent Assessment

- Insurgents will seek to regain momentum of pre-election attacks and intimidation while denying the new government the opportunity to establish itself.

- Insurgents will continue attempts to increase the size of the insurgency by capitalizing on Sunni feelings of disenfranchisement flowing out of election results and policies of TNA and ITG.

- Insurgents will pursue a dual-track strategy and increase attempts to use political means to infiltrate and influence new government; look for opportunities to penetrate insurgent loyalists into key military and security positions.

- Insurgents are in the fight for the long-term, and will continue a campaign of terror and intimidation to force departure of the Coalition and the compliance of a weakened ITG.
Questions