


(b)(3), (b)(6)
From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 8:35 PM
To: CCGG-CAG
Subject: FW: FPS TROUBLES


FPS Update -
Kellogg 4 Jan 04...
Semner Eidelis
(b)(3), (b)(6), USMC
CENTCOM OPCC, Baghdad
(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2004 2:49 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: FPS TROUBLES

Gentlemen:

FYI.

Very respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)
U.S. Central Command Coordination Cell
Policy & Strategy Officer
Coalition Provisional Authority (Baghdad)
A.P.O. AE 09335

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2004 9:43 PM
To: Sattler, MajGen John F
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FPS TROUBLES


Sir,
Attached find an FPS update brief given to CPA COO LTG (Ret.) Kellogg on 04 Jan. Brief does a good job of spelling out the current status of the FPS program and how to make it well again. Bottom-line on current problems:

Why the TOA of FPS is Failing

- CPA Order #27 not implemented (16 of 29 Ministries failed to respond)
 - Ministries not held Accountable
 - Most Ministries did not budget for FPS
 - MOI did not promulgate guidance IAW CPAO #27
- Inexperienced & Small Staff
 - One Contracting officer
- Lack of Equipment

Approved way-ahead: MSCs validate their FPS counts by 15 Jan and have all FPS TOAs complete by 01 Mar. OPCC will continue to monitor FPS TOA progress.

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Facility Protection Service Brief

Purpose:

- Provide update on FPS
- Give Recommendations on how to get Program back on Track

4 January 2004

This brief is going to give you a recommendation on how to get the FPS program back on program

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Background

- Decision to decentralize FPS program
 - Gave ministries responsibilities for their own program
 - Dispersed the power among ministries

The FPS Program was established with CPAO #27. At that time a decentralized process was chosen. CPAO #27 gave specific responsibilities to both MOI and the other Ministries.

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Assumptions

- **Mr. Bremer based his original decision on sound guidance from all areas**
- **Mr. Bremer knew the pain this would cause the Ministries**
- **This would be a Maturing Process for Ministries**

Assumptions we made in reading CPAO #27

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Issues

- Most Ministries are unable to accept the mission
- Many Ministries did not budget for FPS mission
- MOI has not provided policy and guidance to ministries
- FPS program shortfalls
 - Weapons, Uniforms, Training, Vehicles/transportation
 - Communications, Iraqi FPS infrastructure
- FPS lacks parity with other police services
 - No General Officer


What went wrong? CPAO #27 – for whatever reason was ignored by both MOI and the Ministries.

Roughly half of the Ministries did not budget for FPS Guards (19 of 27)

MOI did not publish guidance on the FPS program yet FPS is our first line of defense for fixed facilities

Ministries have not been accountable to CPAO #27

and there are valid reasons the Ministries and MOI can cite for why there are problems but the fact is FPS program is failing. So what do we do? I see two options



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Two Options

- **Stay the Course**
 - Adhere to CPA Order 27
 - Remain Decentralized
 - Pain is on Ministries
- **Course Correction**
 - Centralize
 - Pain on MOI

Here are our two options.

After two weeks of reviewing the pros and cons of centralizing vs. decentralizing and after reading through the orders and frags we have some recommendations. We want to know - next slide - what is the best way to move forward



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Rationale

- **Stay the Course**
 - Makes Ministries grow up
 - 1st time we've given them the guidon
 - Makes FPS a permanent part of their structure vice a budgetary nuisance
 - Must develop sound stewardship
- **Course Correction**
 - Many more Pros than Cons
 - If I owned the company, I would centralize to ease management headaches
 - Equipping, Economy of Scale, Standardization, less expensive

Staying the course forces the Ministries to grow up and holds the Ministries accountable.

Read Slides

After reviewing all of the orders and guidance published on the FPS program we realized the answer was in front of us all along. Both MOI and the Ministries must be held accountable. We already had all the authority and guidance we need. The next few slides are our recommendations-

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Recommendations Road Ahead

- **MOI – Adhere to CPAO NO. 27**
 - Develop Policy for Ministries
 - Training
 - Standards
 - Leadership! Hold Ministries accountable
 - Weekly meetings (starting 7 Jan 04)
 - Standardized reporting process
 - Develop Logistics Plan
 - Initial Issue
 - Compatibility with National Systems
 - Codify FPS into Law
 - Badging System
 - IG System to Validate

MOI needs to take the lead! We can do that. I have a meeting scheduled with all of the Ministry reps on Wednesday. I am going to delineate who is responsible for what based on CPAO #27.

Here is a partial list of what MOI needs to do and will do.

In addition – I want you to hold MOI and the Ministries accountable. We should report to you on the meeting we hold next Wednesday giving you a SITREP on who is complying and who is not. I need you to look me in the eye and the Ministries and push.

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Recommendations

- **Ministries**
 - Validate current FPS requirement – Baseline is MSC List
 - Supervise
 - Promote
 - Care and Welfare of FPS Force
 - Hire and Fire
 - Leadership!
 - Weekly meetings with MOI (starting 7 Jan 04)
 - Follow standardized reporting process
 - Develop Logistics Plan
 - Equip FPS Guards after Initial Issue
 - Ensure Compatibility with National Systems
 - Work Economy of Scale purchases with MOI

The first step is to validate the current FPS requirement. We will use the MSC list as our baseline.

Ministries must be held accountable and must be weaned from the comfort of the MSC's. We must also recognize that there will always be minor issues that will interfere with the process of transitioning authority but we can't let the small issues and details bog us down from our main effort.

Ministries are going to have to act now. It is in their own best interest to learn how to manage and lead their FPS guards while the MSC's are available to help.




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MINISTRIES PROJECTED FPS REQUIREMENTS


Ministry	FPS			MSC's			
	PROJECTED	PERSONS HANDLED	ACCOMMODATIONS NEEDED	PROJECTED	PERSONS HANDLED	ACCOMMODATIONS NEEDED	
MINISTRY	PROJECTED	PERSONS HANDLED	ACCOMMODATIONS NEEDED	PROJECTED	PERSONS HANDLED	ACCOMMODATIONS NEEDED	REMARKS
ADMINISTRATIVE	1000	200	150	1400	1145	315	
ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRAL	1000	200	200	2000	2000	2000	DATA COMPLETE
COMMUNICATIONS	1140	0	1140	500	1811	18	
CULTURE	364	284	64	198	145	13	
DISPLACEMENT AND RELOCATION	0	0	0				
EDUCATION	10000	11300	1300	2521	2031	290	
ELECTRICITY	1500	1500	0	1000	1831	317	
ENVIRONMENT	200	30	100	4	4	0	
FINANCE	0	0	0	2702	2052	750	DATA NOT REPORT
FOREIGN AFFAIRS	0	0	0	100	100	100	DATA NOT REPORT
HEALTH	4000	2000	1017	1000	2000	200	
HIGHER EDUCATION	134	100	100	770	851	277	
HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION	1182	0	1182	237	228	11	DATA NOT REPORT
HUMAN RIGHTS	0	0	0	14	13	0	DATA NOT REPORT
INDUSTRIES AND MINERALS	4825	2418	842	2000	1611	351	
INTERIOR	4701	2168	1851	2481	1614	877	
JUDICE	8000	100	1000	800	431	172	
LAND AND LOCAL AFFAIRS	0	0	0	400	281	120	DATA NOT REPORT
LABOR	13000	6000	8000	2700	2281	415	
PLANNING & STANDARDS	13	10	1	13	14	1	
PUBLIC WORKS	1000	2000	1000	1200	1100	100	
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS	2100	100	1000	100	1011	10	
SECURITY AFFAIRS	2000	200	2000	275	800	80	
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	1000	100	100	0	0	0	DATA NOT REPORTED BY MSC'S
TRADE	1000	2000	2000	1470	1281	100	
TRANSPORTATION	800	800	0	1000	2071	700	
WATER RESOURCES	2000	1000	1000	200	2211	100	
YOUTH AND SPORTS	1000	1000	100	200	200	100	
TOTALS	81331	80520	30000	30000	20000	20000	

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Issues

- IP Training Academy has reached capacity
 - Not enough classrooms for FPS Training
 - No Firing Range for FPS
 - Need a National Training Academy (\$8M in Budget)
- Shortages of weapons throughout AOR
 - 3,410 currently on hand
 - Goal is 1 to 3 (approximately 20K)
 - CJTF7 shipped 12k (accountability problem)
 - Will Modify Budget to acquire weapons
- Lack of Equipment
 - Uniforms (FPS has increased from 20K to 50K)
 - Vehicles (needed for trainers, staff to visit sites)
- FPS lacks parity with other police services
 - Only service that does not have a General Officer

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MSC FRAGO 444

- **Responsible for:**
 - Recruiting
 - Training
 - Equipping
 - Supervision
- **Four Phase Operation**
- **Final Phase Turn over to Ministries**

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Why TOA of FPS is Failing

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