

(b)(3), (b)(6) (USN)
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) (USA)
Sent: Friday, December 19, 2003 2:35 AM
To: CCCG-CAG
Subject: FW: Bremmer's Message (C)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Team,

This is promising if we actually DO something.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

OAACZYUW RUEOMFD0674 3511221-~~CCCC~~-RUCACC.
ZNY ~~CCCC~~ ZUI RUEOMC E0009 3511221

O 171207Z DEC 03
FM HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECTION 1 OF 2
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SUBJ: IRAQ'S SUNNI ARABS AFTER SADDAM: THE VIEW FROM RAMADI
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~////DB

MSGID/GENADMIN/CPA HO/0390//
SUBJ/RAQS SUNNI ARABS AFTER SADDAM THE VIEW FROM RAMADI//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PROG: 16 DECEMBER 2003
DRAFTER:ANBAR/KMINES
AUTHORIZED: RJONES

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CLEARED (b)(6)

FROM: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

Approved for Release

TO: SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO: RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HQ CPA 0390
E.O.: 12958: 12/15/2013
TAGS: PGOV, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S SUNNI ARABS AFTER SADDAM: THE VIEW FROM RAMADI

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JONES FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D)

1. (C)-SUMMARY AND COMMENT. THE CAPTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN BRINGS AN IMPORTANT CHAPTER OF THE IRAQI TRANSITION TO A CLOSE; THE FENCE-SITTERS ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE NEW IRAQ WILL NOT BE PERSONALLY DOMINATED BY SADDAM AND IS LESS LIKELY TO BE DOMINATED

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BY HIS SYMPATHIZERS. THE SUNNIS OF AL ANBAR, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THEY ARE BEING EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATION IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ, AND UNLESS THEY ARE QUICKLY REASSURED, WE WILL SQUANDER THE POTENTIAL BOUNCE FROM SADDAM'S CAPTURE. WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN CITIES LIKE RAMADI AND FALLUJAH, CREATING AN OPENING THAT WILL BRING MANY SUNNI ARABS ON BOARD AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SAFE AND SECURE IRAQ. TO DO SO WE NEED TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN FOUR KEY AREAS.

2. (C)-FIRST, WE NEED A PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION THAT EMPHASIZES IRAQ AS A NATION AND ALLOWS THOSE WITHOUT BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS THAT HAVE BEEN PURGED FROM PUBLIC LIFE TO RETURN. SECOND, WE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO LEVERAGE THE SUPPLEMENTAL TO PROVIDE LARGE NUMBERS OF JOBS AND TRANSITION PROGRAMS TO KEEP DISAFFECTED PLAYERS OFF THE STREET AND "DRAIN THE SWAMP" FOR DEAD-END RECRUITERS. THIRD, WE NEED TO MAKE REAL TO SUNNI ARABS A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT WILL REPRESENT AND PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN THE NEW NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. FINALLY, WE NEED TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE SECURITY FORCES. WE HAVE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY - PERHAPS WEEKS - DURING WHICH ACTION ON THESE FOUR CORE

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ISSUES WOULD CAPTURE THE ATTENTION OF MANY SUNNIS AND CONVINCED THEM THAT IT IS TIME TO GO FORWARD. TO SUCCEED WE MUST DEMONSTRATE TO ANBARIANS THAT THEY WILL PARTICIPATE FULLY AND HAVE THEIR INTERESTS PROTECTED IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

THE CORNERED TIGER

3. (C) FAR FROM THE CELEBRATORY FIRE OF BAGHDAD, THE KURDISH AREAS AND THE SHI'A SOUTH, THE SUNNIS OF AL ANBAR HAVE REACTED TO SADDAM'S CAPTURE WITH A MIXTURE OF INDIFFERENCE AND ANGER. THIS IS NOT TO SAY SADDAM WAS LOVED HERE -- HE HAD POCKETS OF DETRACTORS IN AL ANBAR THAT RIVALED THOSE ANYWHERE -- BUT MOST PEOPLE ARE TOO FOCUSED ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL TO CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH THE FATE OF THEIR FORMER LEADER. THE REAL ISSUE HERE IS LESS THE FUTURE OF SADDAM THAN THE FUTURE OF THE SUNNI ARABS, AND ANBARIANS CONTINUE TO PLAY THE PART OF A CORNERED TIGER, ONE THAT IS BEING PRODDED AND IS LASHING OUT.

4. (C) THE SUNNIS OF AL ANBAR ARE MIXED IN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE COALITION PRESENCE. THE MAJORITY VIEW SEEMS TO BE CULTURAL AND

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RELIGIOUS RESISTANCE TO BEING OCCUPIED, MIXED WITH A RESIGNATION THAT SINCE THE FORMER REGIME HAS BEEN DISMANTLED AND SECURITY UNDERCUT, THE COALITION MUST STAY IN PLACE UNTIL NEW IRAQI INSTITUTIONS ARE BUILT. BUT THERE IS A MID-TERM VIEW TO ALL OF THIS IN AL ANBAR: THE COALITION IS NOT JUST AN OCCUPYING POWER, IT IS A POWER WHICH IS SEEN TO BE SUPPORTING THE "DISEMPOWERMENT" OF THE SUNNIS, IMMEDIATELY THROUGH MILITARY OCCUPATION AND ULTIMATELY BY LEAVING THE SUNNIS SUBORDINATED TO THE SHI'A IN THE NEW IRAQ. THE LATTER IS NOT, TO SUNNI ARABS, MERE PARANOIA, BUT HAS BEEN BORNE OUT OF PERCEPTIONS OF COALITION ACTIONS -- INCLUDING THE FORMATION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNING COUNCIL, RECRUITING FOR THE NEW IRAQI ARMY, AND DE-BA'ATHIFICATION. NONE OF THIS HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHOM MOST SUNNIS WERE READY TO LEAVE IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR ENDED. THESE SENTIMENTS ARE FORWARD LOOKING; THEY GO DIRECTLY TO THE QUESTION OF SUNNI ARABS PLACE IN THE NEW IRAQ.

5. (C) IF THE CAPTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL NOT IN ITSELF END THE ATTACKS ON COALITION FORCES IN THE SUNNI HEARTLAND, IT DOES CREATE AN OPENING THAT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE THE POLITICAL AND

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MILITARY DYNAMIC HERE -- IF WE MOVE QUICKLY TO REASSURE SUNNI ARABS IN THE KEY AREAS OF RECONCILIATION, JOBS, POLITICAL PROCESS, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY FORCES. PROGRESS IN THESE FOUR AREAS, COUPLED WITH CONTINUING FOCUSED MILITARY OPERATIONS, COULD START TO SHORE UP THE VERY CHALLENGING POLITICAL CALENDAR WE FACE.

RECONCILIATION

6. (C) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DE-BA'ATHIFICATION POLICY IN IRAQ

HAS UNDERMINED SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION - PARTICULARLY IN SUNNI ARAB AREAS. THE LIFETIME PROHIBITION ON GOVERNMENT WORK (IN A COUNTRY IN WHICH THE PUBLIC SECTOR HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF EMPLOYMENT AND PRESTIGE OVER DECADES) COMBINED WITH THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON EXTENDED FAMILIES HAS CREATED A POOL OF DISENCHANTED AND DESPERATE INDIVIDUALS.

7. (C) THE POLICY PLAYS OUT ON TWO LEVELS. FIRST, THERE ARE NOW THOUSANDS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO NO LONGER HAVE JOBS AND CAN BE RECRUITED - FOR MONEY - TO ATTACK COALITION FORCES. SECOND, BECAUSE THE BA'ATH FAVORED SUNNI ARABS, DE-BA'ATHIFICATION HAS BEEN FINAL SECTION OF 2

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DISPROPORTIONATELY HARD ON THE SAME COMMUNITY AND FEEDS A PARANOIA THAT THE NEW IRAQ WILL FAVOR THE SHI'A AT SUNNI EXPENSE. IRAQ'S SUNNIS, WHO HAVE BEEN FED BA'ATHIST PROPAGANDA FOR YEARS, FEAR THE WORST - AN IMPORT OF 1.4b STYLE RADICALISM AND INCREASING TIES BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN SHI'A AND 1.4b THIS FEAR IS ALSO BEING EXPLOITED BY OUR ENEMIES SPREADING FEAR AMONG THESE COMMUNITIES.)

8. (C) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DE-BA'ATHIFICATION POLICY (WIDELY REGARDED AS SPONTANEOUS, INCONSISTENT, MOTIVATED BY PERSONAL GRUDGES AND WITHOUT MECHANISMS OF DUE PROCESS) NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED QUICKLY.

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AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEED IN IRAQ FOR BOTH THE LANGUAGE AND A PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. CURRENTLY, THERE IS LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE STREET ABOUT THE WAY FORWARD FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN DE-BA'ATHIFIED, LEAVING A VACUUM OUR OPPONENTS HAVE WASTED NO TIME IN FILLING. IRAQIS, OF ALL ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS, NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE CRIMES OF THE PAST WILL BE ADDRESSED. ASSUMING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF SUNNI ARABS WILL REMAIN INELIGIBLE FOR GOVERNMENT JOBS, WE WILL NEED TO REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO GENERATE THE NECESSARY JOBS. [NOTE: CPA OFFICIALS, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR BREMER, CONTINUE TO PRESS THE GOVERNING COUNCIL'S DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COMMITTEE TO IMMEDIATELY ADDRESS INCONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION AND ESTABLISH AND PUBLICIZE A TIMELY APPEALS PROCESS. COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AHMED CHALABI HAS PLEDGED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS QUICKLY. END NOTE]

JOBS

9. (C) IN AL ANBAR OUR CAMPAIGN OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WILL NEVER OVERCOME THE DISCONTENT UNTIL WE DO MORE TO MEET BASIC NEEDS. THE

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MOST SIGNIFICANT GROUPS OF PEOPLE ARE THOSE WHO WERE WORKING BEFORE THE COALITION CAME AND HAVE NOT WORKED SINCE, AND THOSE WHO CAN BE HIRED FOR ANTI-COALITION ATTACKS. THE FIRST IS A SYMBOLIC ISSUE, AS PEOPLE QUESTION WHETHER THEIR LIVES ARE IN FACT BETTER IN THE NEW IRAQ, AND THE SECOND IS A PRACTICAL ONE, OF TAKING OFF THE STREETS THOSE WHO CAN DO THE COALITION HARM. THE SUPPLEMENTAL IS AN IMPORTANT TOOL IN THIS EFFORT, BUT IT WILL NOT MATERIALIZE SOON ENOUGH; WE NEED TO CREATE JOBS IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM TO GET PEOPLE BACK TO WORK. [NOTE: CPA HAS RECENTLY RELEASED ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO REGIONAL AND GOVERNORATE COORDINATORS TARGETED TO QUICK-HITTING PROJECTS TO GENERATE EMPLOYMENT, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SUNNI AREAS. END NOTE]

POLITICAL PROCESS

10. (C) THE SUNNIS SEE THEMSELVES AS TRIPLE LOSERS IN THE NEW IRAQ: THEIR PRIVILEGED POSITION WAS ELIMINATED, THEY HAVE BEEN THE HARDEST HIT BY COALITION MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND THE NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE WILL CREATE A GOVERNMENT THAT IS UNFRIENDLY TO THEM. [COMMENT: THEY MAY BE RIGHT ON THE FIRST TWO POINTS AND IT MAY BE

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WELL DESERVED, BUT WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE ENOUGH CONFIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS TO BELIEVE THAT THE FUTURE DOES NOT HOLD RETRIBUTION FROM THEIR COUNTRYMEN. END COMMENT.]

11. (C) THERE APPEARS TO BE A SLIGHT BOUNCE FROM THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ACCELERATED POLITICAL TIMETABLE, BUT THERE IS LITTLE BUY-IN TO THE UPCOMING POLITICAL PROCESS IN AL ANBAR. MANY PEOPLE SIMPLY CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEX POLITICAL CALENDAR LAID OUT IN THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT. MANY OTHERS SEE A CONSPIRACY (BY THE GOVERNING COUNCIL, CPA OR BOTH) IN THE PROCESS' COMPLEXITY TO ENSURE CONTINUED CONTROL OVER THE SUNNIS. IF THIS PERCEPTION IS NOT CHANGED, IT WILL CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH - AT BEST - WE WILL MUDDLE THROUGH THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, BUT WE WILL NOT ESTABLISH LASTING, STABLE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN AL ANBAR. SUNNI ARABS MUST BE BROUGHT FULLY ON BOARD IF WE ARE TO HAVE A FUNCTIONAL, UNIFIED STATE AT THE END OF THIS.

SECURITY FORCES

12. (C) THE SLOW DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY FORCES HINDERS POLITICAL

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STABILITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO SURGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE, ICDC AND THE NEW IRAQI ARMY OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, TO PROVIDE MORE AND BETTER EQUIPMENT, LEADERSHIP AND

TRAINING IN AN ORGANIZED AND INTEGRATED FASHION.

MOVING FORWARD

13. (C) IN MEETINGS DECEMBER 15 WITH SHEIKH OF SHEIKHS MAJID, CPA AL ANBAR WAS TOLD THAT THE CAPTURE OF SADDAM HAS CREATED AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE FORWARD AND TAKE TANGIBLE STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH WITH THE SUNNI ARABS WHILE ANBARIANS WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH ARE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE MEANING OF SADDAM'S DEMISE, THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO SEE THAT WE WILL USE THE EVENT TO GAIN TRACTION ON THEIR KEY ISSUES.

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V/R

CENTCOM J-5 Engagement Division
Iraq, Yemen Desk Officer

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 2:25 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) (USA)
Subject: Bremmer's Message (6)
Importance: High

Classification: **CONFIDENTIAL**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Send me the electrons of the Bremmer message you left on my desk (171207ZDEC03, Iraqs Sunni Arabs after Saddam: The view from Ramadi). Thanks! This message will save my bacon with the nay sayers! :- (b)(3), (b)(6)

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~~DECLASSIFY ON: Source marked OADR~~
DATE OF SOURCE: 30 NOV 2003

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