Iraq: Security Threats over the Next Six Months

The capture of Saddam Husayn will have a sharp temporary effect on anti-Coalition activities. There will be near-term impacts on operations that may force the FRE to become more covert, isolate trans-regional activities, slow current rate of expansion, or force groups to transform into more terrorist-like organizations. Nevertheless, core anti-Coalition elements near-term goals will continue to focus on Coalition failure and ultimate withdrawal from Iraq. The FRE will concentrate on attacks on soft targets: Iraqis and civilians cooperating with the Coalition. The FRE will also continue to tap into Iraqi dissatisfaction of Coalition rebuilding efforts.

(U) Six month assessment

Anti-Coalition elements will possibly lower operational tempo in the near-term in order to assess the situation, ensure key cell leadership is not vulnerable, and then attempt to regain the initiative with spectacular attacks on selected targets. As the impact of the capture of Saddam fades, FRE leadership must consolidate its support base, reassess its influence without Saddam, and tap into Sunni dissatisfaction with the slow rate of rebuilding efforts of the Coalition. They will conduct activities aimed at ensuring failure of an emerging government and Coalition withdrawal. Some Iraqi Sunnis, especially those associated with the Baath Party feel disenfranchised because they perceive they have no representation in the Iraqi Governing Council and no future role in Iraq. FRE goals over the next six months include:

- Spectacular attacks on Coalition forces, potential Coalition members, the Coalition Provisional Authority, international community organizations, non-governmental organizations, emerging Iraqi governmental institutions, police, military, and infrastructure
- Leverage foreigners and terrorist organizations operating in Iraq to conduct high-risk, or suicide attacks on selected targets
- Attack kerosene supply to ensure dissatisfaction with Coalition progress
- Attempt to re-establish a high rate of attacks on Coalition after Saddam capture
- Seek to take advantage of significant increase of Coalition assets on MSR’s / ASR’s associated with move from Kuwait to MSC AOR’s
- Attack aircraft; military and civilian
- Targets selected for maximum IO value – film successful attacks
- Coerce and co-opt tribal elements; leverage CPA mis-steps
- Attack, co-opt and infiltrate Iraqi military, police and security forces; political entities and government agencies.
- Possible kidnappings of civilian and military personnel
- Emergence of ‘anti-Coalition’ political entities
(U) Effective FRE Activities:

(S//REL) The FRE has been effective in its influence operations among the Iraqi people. Their understanding of the mores, culture, language and fault lines have enabled them to tap into the rhetoric, fears, conspiracy theories, and rumors that abound in Iraqi society. They have also created the perception of momentum among the Iraqi people. The capture of Saddam will be a great setback that must be overcome with more successful spectacular attacks directed at the Coalition.

- Target selection - terrorist type attacks on areas that cannot be protected effectively
- Attacks on effective high IO pay-off targets – aircraft, police stations, Coalition, civilian targets

(U) Effective Coalition Activities

(S//REL) Capture of High Value Targets (HVT) including Saddam Husayn. Initial forays into engagement activities with Sunni tribes and leaders seem to be having effects on FRE operations, especially in western Iraq. Prolonged engagement activities with the Shia, combined with long-term relationships with the Kurds have effectively kept FRE activities in the north and south at a minimum. Rebuilding efforts that will improve Iraqi quality of life in the immediate future may have the largest impact on Iraqi citizens now that Saddam is out of Iraqi politics forever.

- CPA is forming the Office of Provisional Outreach that will include tribal engagement and the airing of Sunni grievances against the Coalition
- Military tribal engagement and humanitarian and civil-military operations have had an effect among the populace
- Limited border security operations have disrupted entry by foreign fighters
- Iraqis must perceive that a supreme effort is being undertaken by the Coalition, especially the US, to rebuild Iraq; electricity, water, sewage, medical, economy

(U) Threats to civilian workers

(S//REL) Civilian workers, or anyone assisting the Coalition or emerging government are a threat to the FRE, as they bring stability. The FRE's potential main center of gravity is the acquiescence of the Sunni population to their control, goals, and operations. In order to maintain this, the FRE must be able to assemble a monolithic and anti-Coalition Sunni population by attempting to drive out the Coalition, stall an emerging government, and increase Sunni dissatisfaction with the rebuilding process. Civilian employees contribute to the threat against the FRE in that regard. The FRE must attempt to conduct selected attacks on civilian targets.

- Increase attacks to expel civilian technocrats, aid workers, or advisors from Iraq
- Continue to attack Iraqi "collaborators": political leaders, security and law enforcement officials, judges, and workers in Coalition compounds

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A Red Cell Special Memorandum

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Iraqi Former Regime Loyalist’s Centers of Gravity

(S//REL TO USA and MCIF) There are seven centers of gravity (COG) for the Former Regime Loyalist (FRL) resistance susceptible to kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, engagement and information operations designed to disrupt, destroy, or co-opt hostile operations against the Coalition: Sunni unity; Funding; Freedom of movement; Recruiting; Weapons availability; Saddam Hussein at large; Popular perceptions of momentum and invincibility.

(S//REL TO USA and MCIF) A sustained campaign that targets these centers of gravity (COG) in varying degrees or by surging on a specific COG with a combination of methods would weaken or destroy former regime loyalist (FRL) group’s ability to continue or expand an insurgency against the Coalition or a follow-on Iraqi government.

(S//REL) COG 1: Iraqi Sunni Unity

(U) Significance:

(S//REL) The FRL must maintain a power base in Sunni-dominated areas to ensure that it can carry out attacks without fear of being identified to Coalition forces and gain tacit and active support; housing, locations for weapons caches, improvised explosive device (IED) construction, freedom of movement, and launch areas for attacks. Sunni unity is dependent on several factors:

- Belief among some Sunnis that Baathist doctrine is the only way to re-establish their dominance and security.
- Funding and patronage to key leaders from the former regime and influential Sunnis.
- Sunni extremists believe that Coalition presence represents an “infidel” occupation and must be expelled.
- The stated goals of the Coalition Provisional Authority appear to marginalize the Sunnis minority – Sunnis have enjoyed almost complete dominance in the power structure of Iraq since its inception. Coalition division among religious fault-lines further intimidates the Sunni population as they represent a small minority in Iraq.
- Coalition presence in Sunni areas presents the view that they are occupation forces there to suppress, while other areas of Iraq have greater autonomy.
(U) Desired Effects:

(S//REL) Isolate the FRL from the Sunni population. Encourage key leadership, groups, and tribes to support the Interim Governing Council and the CPA’s authority, programs, and vision for a new Iraqi government. Tap into other fault-lines within the Sunni community, such as tribal relationships, urban and rural, economic classes, rather than separate the Sunni population as a monolithic religious entity in the Iraqi political landscape. Deny the FRL the ability to use the Sunni populace for recruits, freedom of movement, safe-haven, and resources required to continue the insurgency against the Coalition.

(U) Targetability:

(S//REL) Sunni willingness to embrace Baathism as a means to escape Coalition occupation or Shia dominance must be countered holistically through kinetic and non-kinetic means:

- Well-publicized kinetic attacks against the FRL; captures of key individuals and defeat of FRL cells and criminal activities will indicate to mainstream Sunnis that the Coalition is experiencing success in providing security in Iraq.
- Cooperation of Tribal Shaykhs through a system of patronage and punishment may allow some key leaders with a substantial following to come forward in partnership with the CPA and Coalition forces. Currently, this is being done by Divisional units in local areas, however the CPA has no system in place at the national level in Baghdad. While there may be some success in the field, the tribes look to Baghdad and the central government as the political center of gravity of the country. Under Saddam, one of the most powerful ministries was Tribal Affairs. While CPA has a Ministry of the Interior, it is not yet focused on the complex issue of the tribes. If the CPA directly engaged key tribal leaders, secondary and tertiary effects could be a more secure environment, especially in rural areas under tribal control, and limit resources on which the FRL could draw upon.
- Engagement and personal contact in Sunni-dominated areas with town and city leaders could have a positive effect and allow some Sunni leaders to work directly with the Coalition. The provision of resources, funding, and jobs will present the Coalition in a positive manner to local and regional leaders and possibly allow some of these individuals with a following to break free of the old Baathist status quo.
- Publicize autonomous actions and local governance by Sunni leaders, police, mayors, and others to allay fears of occupation. Ensure Sunnis that Coalition troop presence is finite, but withdrawal is dependent on security and economic improvements.
- After engagement and reward with local and tribal leaders, hold them accountable. If FRL activities continue in these areas, resources can be withheld or intrusive operations conducted to force these leaders to take on a more active role in cooperating with the Coalition.
(S//REL) COG 2: Funding

(U) Significance:

(S//REL) Many FRL cells and subsequent operations are dependent on funding. Many Iraqis fighting in FRL groups do so for monetary gain. Attacks often occur in cycles of three days to several weeks them to maintain a steady income. Anecdotal evidence indicates that cash is moved from several former regime hubs within Baghdad, Tikrit, Samarah, Baqubah, Ramadi, and elsewhere by couriers who act as paymasters to cell leaders.

(U) Desired Effects:

(S//REL) Interdict the cash couriers from senior members of the FRL to facilitators in key operational areas. Force couriers to carry larger sums of money and assume more risk in movement by increasing the risk to fighters motivated by monetary means. This added risk may eventually drive up the price per attack, make recruiting more difficult, and possibly decrease the number of attacks against the Coalition and others. Exchange traders, bankers, large businesses and others who handle large sums of money should be monitored.

(U) Targetability:

(S//REL) The capture or neutralization of key facilitators providing funds in traditional Baathist strongholds will effect funding. As these individuals are attempting to increase their span of control they will become more reliant on communications and more vulnerable to intelligence collection platforms. If these key facilitators can be targeted, the FRL will be greatly degraded. These effects will be temporary, but will force the FRL to make adjustments, change tactics, and lose resources and momentum.

(S//REL) Emplacement of ad hoc and permanent checkpoints manned by Iraqi Police or Coalition forces including random vehicle searches, finger-printing, and photographing of occupants, along with other restrictions on movement may also slow or hamper movement of funds. This will be unpopular and may cause added friction between citizens and the police and Coalition.

(S//REL) A system that monitors large cash transactions of banks and exchange traders would assist in tracking large cash payments of money already in the banking system, as is the new Iraqi currency.

(S//REL) COG 3: Freedom of Movement

(U) Significance:

(S//REL) Insurgent facilitators require freedom of movement in order to move funds, cell members, weapons, munitions, foreign recruits, and possibly IEDs or materials within
towns, cities, and provinces, to carry-out hostile operations. As the insurgency network grows and former regime leaders attempt to control multiple independent or possibly competing groups and cells, they will have to assume more risk in moving throughout Iraq.

(U) **Desired Effects:**

(S//REL) FRL cells have the ability to attack at a time a place of their choosing. They are reliant on the capability to move individuals, arms, ammunition, ordinance, JEDs, and funds to locations to carry out attacks against the Coalition. This capability to move from town to town or across governates must be interdicted in order minimize attacks as FRL resources in high-OPTEMPO areas dwindle. This will enable the Coalition to focus intelligence collection and narrow the search areas for finding and destroying FRL cells. The ability to move funds is imperative to the FRL. Restriction on freedom of movement will severely degrade the sheer volume of operations, if not the effectiveness.

(U) **Targetability:**

(S//REL) Freedom of movement will be very difficult to impact without producing severe blowback from the civilian population. Some of these restrictive measures could cause civil disobedience, demonstrations, and increased friction. However, there are a few ways that the Coalition and Iraqi Police can add steps into the FRL planning process and thus make their operations more difficult:

- Temporary and permanent checkpoints, especially in chokepoints with random searches of vehicles
- The establishment of a national identification card; in the interim, the oil for food ration card might be used
- Mandatory passes from the resident's local police force prior to being allowed to travel from one governate or major urban area to another

(S//REL) While all of these measure can be defeated with prior planning, they will make it more difficult for the FRL to transport fighters and material from major hubs to operational areas and add planning factors to a currently uncomplicated operation.

(S//REL) **COG 4: Recruiting**

(U) **Significance:**

(S//REL) The FRL must expand its recruiting efforts in order to increase the current level of attacks on the Coalition. This recruiting base is mostly disenfranchised ex-military in Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and anti-Coalition foreign fighters pent on driving out the Coalition. Many recruits come from the former internal security apparatus, however a growing number of unemployed are being persuaded to carry out attacks for monetary gain.
Regime Loyalists: Thousands of ex-military are available for recruitment into the FRL, especially in Sunni areas. 42-55,000 Baath Party ex-soldiers served in internal security and intelligence forces for the regime. The vast majority of these individuals are disenfranchised and unemployed Sunnis. Many of the areas where these units were last stationed are experiencing the most insurgency activity.

- Special Security Forces (SSO) - Inner circle of regime security and operational control over SRG; most junior SSO officer above senior SRG; led by Qusay Hussein; 7,000 + extremely loyal regime members, including presidential bodyguards; primarily in Baghdad and Tikrit, but had an over-watch element in every SRG, RG and many RA units.
- Saddam Fedayeen - Ruthless paramilitary commando force used for internal security, led by Uday Hussein. Estimated strength was 9,000-30,000 well-connected regime loyalists; stationed primarily in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Irbil.
- Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS); It collected foreign intelligence and monitors Iraqi expatriates; domestically, it monitored dissidents, officials, the armed forces, and foreigners. Official strength unknown, but likely hundreds to thousands, well-connected Sunni loyalists.
- Baath Party Militias - Units organized along party structure: fanatic militias used against Shia for suppression; 10,000-15,000 (up to 60,000) extremely loyal Baathists; stationed throughout Iraq with traditional homes in Sunni-dominated areas; most fanatic fighters during OIF.
- Directorate of General Security (DGS) - Monitored population and conducted security and counter-intelligence operations: 8,000 well-connected, mostly Sunni loyalists; stationed primarily in Baghdad, but stationed throughout Iraq.
- Special Republican Guard (SRG) - 8-10,000 regime loyalists, mostly Sunni. Outer ring for regime protection; stationed at BIAP, Abu Ghurayb, Tikrit, Bayji, and Mosul

Foreign Fighters: Full spectrum from individuals to groups seeking to attack the Coalition to force its withdrawal from Iraq. These foreign fighters can be loosely grouped into two categories:

- Foreign "Jihadists" who are anti-US and willing to enter Iraq for the near-term in order to attack Coalition forces. These individuals and small groups will leave when the Coalition withdraws. They are often untrained and join FRL groups either on their own or increasingly through intermediaries based in Syria and elsewhere who provide money, transportation, possibly training and facilitate link-up with FRL groups. The FRL then uses these foreign fighters for high risk missions or as replacements, dividing them up between cells under Iraqi control.
- Foreign-based terrorists who share common goals with the FRL, namely the expulsion of Coalition forces and the failure of any new Iraqi government, yet intend to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. These terrorists are often facilitated from abroad by groups already present in Iraq, such as Ansar al Islam. Although they are tolerated by the FRL in the near-term, they represent a long-term threat to any ruling power in Iraq as they seek to create instability and ungoverned territory in which to operate from as were Afghanistan and parts of northern Iraq.
(U) Desired Effects:

(S//REL) Reduce the recruiting base by providing alternate means of employment to those fighting for monetary means; increase the risk for those fighting for ideological means, and develop a rapport with those that are on the periphery and are directly or tacitly supporting the FRL by providing services or remaining silent.

(U) Targetability:

(S//REL) Recruiting can be impacted in a variety of ways by use of kinetic and non-kinetic means:

• Tribal engagement – will pressure tribal leadership to exhibit influence among its members through a system of patronage and punishment.
• Improved economy and jobs – will reduce the pool of available FRL.
• Information operations that illustrate the positive effects of the Coalition, the defeat of FRL forces, and negative aspects of Saddam/Baath rule.
• Raising the stakes – more lethal operations or more severe and publicized penalties for detainees and facilitators to increase the risk of operating with the FRL.

(S//REL) COG 5: Weapons Availability

(U) Significance:

(S//REL) Caches of weapons were scattered throughout Iraq. Hundreds of these were left unattended for months after the Coalition’s destruction of the Iraqi military. These caches have been pilfered by FRL and others and ordinance and material has been moved in abundance to other hide sites and used in anti-Coalition activities. There has been no indication of significant arms smuggling into Iraq or of a shortage of weapons and ammunition for the FRL. These caches can sustain the current level of insurgency for possibly months or years. More advanced weaponry such as anti-armor missiles or more modern MANPADs may be sought in order to increase lethality, but all weapons used against the Coalition thus far were here during Saddam’s regime. If access to this available supply of ordinance were reduced or cut off, through confiscation, destruction, or interdiction of freedom of movement, the FRL would face great difficulty in supplying cells in high OPTEMPO areas without foreign assistance or smuggling through neighboring countries.

(U) Desired Effects:

(S//REL) Capture, destroy, and control all known and covert arms caches, munitions or ordinance that can be used against the Coalition. Initiate and maintain a holistic program that ranges from reward to punishment in order to gain information on caches from the populace.
(U) **Targetability:**

(S//REL) Intrusive operations based on targetable intelligence coupled with engagement with a system of penalty and reward can assist in locating caches of weapons. Other known locations must be secured, moved or destroyed to prevent use by FRL.

- Operations that target reported caches along with intrusive operations that allow a sustained presence of Coalition forces will allow some of these caches to be discovered and possibly intimidate those that know where others are. This will allow some to come forward for fear of being implicated if caches are discovered; on or nearby personal property, places of business.
- Others may turn in weapons and ordinance if an atmosphere of security is maintained and monetary rewards are offered.

(S//REL) **COG 6: Saddam Hussein at Large**

(U) **Significance:**

(S//REL) Saddam serves as a rallying point for former Baathists and the disenfranchised Sunni population. The specter of Saddam's return gives hardcore FRL a figure to rally around and gives hope to a restored Sunni dominance, while intimidating those who would seek other options in a future Iraq. It also allows the nucleus of the at-large chief members of the Baath Party to gain funding for the growing insurgency.

(U) **Desired Effects:**

(S//REL) Saddam's elimination could temporarily dishearten fringe and tacit supporters of the insurgency, interdict funding, and drive a wedge between Sunni groups, possibly allowing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to gain influence.

- Could possibly lead many of the non-violent Sunnis to accept the Governing Council and the CPA in the near-term
- Possibly slow funding to insurgent facilitators, cells, and foreigners
- Force current FRL leaders to maintain a low profile for a period of time for fear of additional HVT targeting or lack of support among the populace
- Allow a window of opportunity for the Coalition to gain the initiative
- Could force FRL to prop up another well-known Baathist leader, possibly not as well-known or effective as Saddam

(U) **Targetability:**

(S//REL) Kinetic targeting of Saddam is possible. Intelligence reporting on Saddam's whereabouts and health are available. It is a matter of time before these reports lead to Saddam.
SECRET/REL TO USA and MCFl/X1

- Discrediting Saddam’s brutal rule on Iraqi communications mediums will assist in whittling away his prestige among the Sunni population in Iraq. Depictions of his brutality, greed, wealth, and his inner circle in prison can only assist in that effort.
- When Saddam is captured or killed, the event should be highly publicized to allay any Coalition “conspiracy” theories.

(S/REL) COG 7: Popular Perceptions of Momentum and Invincibility

(U) Significance:

(S/REL) The FRL must foster and maintain the perception among the general Iraqi population that it is able to defeat the Coalition and has the operational momentum to stay inside the decision curve of Coalition counterinsurgency planners in order to carry out that defeat.

- Belief among the general population that the FRL will eventually drive out the Coalition.
- Maintenance of a high level of fear and coercion among the population to deter cooperation with the Coalition.

(U) Desired Effects:

(S/REL) Deny the FRL the propaganda initiative stemming from its high profile attacks. Highlight for the general population the inherent small size and military weakness of the resistance which forces it to adopt indiscriminate killing of innocent Iraqis.

(U) Targetability:

(S/REL) FRL efforts to portray invincibility are susceptible to information operations designed to dispel the aura of FRL capability.

- Well-publicized kinetic attacks against the FRL; captures of key individuals and defeat of FRL cells and criminal activities will indicate to mainstream population that the Coalition is experiencing success in defeating the FRL.
- Public trials of captured FRL for crimes against humanity will highlight the terrorist nature and military weakness of the FRL for information operations designed to isolate them from the Iraqi population.

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