(U) MNF-I FRAGO 05-195 [Operation SAYAID (HUNTER)]

(U) SUBJECT: Operation SAYAID (HUNTER), Full Spectrum Operations in Al Anbar

(U) REFERENCES:
A. (S//REL MOFI) MNF-I Campaign Action Plan for 2005, 22 APR 05
B. (S//REL MOFI) MNF-I FRAMEWORK OPORD, 1 JUN 05
C. (S//REL MOFI) MNF-I Al Anbar Strategic Design Concept Brief (Draft), 7 Jun 05.
D. (U) JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 23 MAR 04

(U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THIS ORDER: Delta

1.A. (S//REL) SITUATION. CF operations are significantly disrupting the Al Qaida in Iraq (AQIZ) Network in the North and Central, but AQIZ still retain internal lines of communications and freedom of maneuver along and north of the Euphrates River. The AQIZ MLCOA is to sustain local facilitation networks; continue to utilize VBIEDs as the primary engagement system; and to expand its network to garner more support and materials. The goal of AQIZ/AIF operations is to undermine legitimacy of ITG and compel the departure of Coalition Forces.

1.B. (S//REL) POPULATION. Tribes maintain an informal but powerful system of local influence and control. The fall of the previous regime brought loss of power and prestige to many in Al Anbar. Many in the population feel politically and socially marginalized as evidenced in the last elections. In short, Al Anbar Province will be a long-term challenge for successive Iraqi governments.

2. (S//REL) MISSION. MNF-I conducts full-spectrum operations in Al Anbar in order to disrupt the AQIZ, restore Iraqi control of the borders, and ensure the successful conduct of the constitutional referendum and elections in Fall/Winter.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

3.A. (U) COMMANDER’S INTENT.

3.A.1. (S//REL) PURPOSE. The purpose of this operation is to set favorable conditions for Iraq’s constitutional referendum and elections, and eventual transition to Provincial and National Iraqi security control.

3.A.2. (S//REL) METHOD. Operation SAYAID is a joint ISF-coalition operation that is a continuation of our efforts to disrupt the Al Qaida network in Iraq by attacking its leaders, facilitators, staging areas and denying it external support from while gaining support of the Iraqi people in order to shape a security environment conducive to the completion and sustainment of the political process and economic development in Iraq.

Keys to success will be:

--aggressive and focused strategic communications campaign to drive a wedge between AQIZ and the Iraqi people; and to disrupt AQIZ recruiting and command and control;

--Iraqi regional and national political interaction by the ITG in support of the operation;
--synchronized integration of border forces and facilities to permit restoration of Iraqi control to the Syrian border by 30 November
SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR

---implementation of supporting emergency laws to complicate terrorist activity in the border region;
---a tribal engagement plan to turn the tribes against the foreign fighters;
---well-coordinated military operations;
---post-operations humanitarian and economic support;
---close integration of the effects of all elements of power to achieve our effects and to enhance the legitimacy of the Interim Government.

3.A.3. (S/REL) ENDSTATE. Our endstate is the elimination of the border and surrounding areas as a support base for the sustainment of AQIZ, and restoration of Iraqi control to the border by 30 November.

3. B. (S/REL) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. For the conduct of this operation, TF 1/4 is the supported force. MNC-I and other MNF-I major subordinate commands (MSCs) will operate in support. Decisive operations include conducting continuous operations against the AQIZ leadership and operational cells throughout Al Anbar and the Euphrates River Valley (ERV); restoring the borders to Iraqi control NLT 30 November; and, conducting full spectrum information operations to separate AQIZ from prospective facilitators and reduce their capacity to influence the perceptions of the general population. Shaping operations include conventional military operations in the ERV and urban areas in Al Anbar to disrupt AQIZ sanctuaries and cross border support. A focused tribal engagement strategy, that leverages informal authority structures in the more remote areas of Al Anbar will be critical to exploiting the increasing divide between Al Anbar’s traditional tribal society and AQIZ associated groups.

3.C. (U) TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS AND STAFF.

3.C.1. (U) TF 1/4

3.C.1.A. (S/REL) Focus continuous operations against AQIZ leadership and operational cells in Al Anbar.

3.C.1.B. (S/REL) Continue operational pressure on leadership and cells in Mosul and Baghdad.

3.C.1.C. (S/REL) Conduct operations to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters, financing, and leadership.

3.C.2. (U) TF 1/4

3.C.2.A. (S/REL) ICW MNC-I, facilitate the expeditious processing of detainees.


3.C.3. (U) MNC-I


3.C.3.C. (S/REL) Expand ISR operations in Al Anbar w/ focus on AQIZ leadership and cells.


3.C.3.F. (S/REL) Conduct shaping operations in Mosul and Baghdad to sustain previous successes and maintain pressure on AQIZ.

3.C.3.H. (S//REL) Function as overall proponent for information operations for this operation and accomplish the following IO related tasks:

3.C.3.H.1. (S//REL) Establish an Information Operations Task Force-AQIZ (IOTF-AQIZ) IAW paragraph 3.D Coordinating Instructions. FOC of the IOTF is NLT 31 JUL. Expected duration of IOTF is 120 days. All IOTF personnel will require indoctrination training at Balad prior to beginning operations.


3.C.3.H.3. (S//REL) Conduct supporting information operations to ensure operational success and capture opportunities to influence the enemy, IZ populace, and world wide audience.


3.C.4. (U) MNSTC-I.

3.C.4.A. (S//REL) Assist MOI in providing DBE forces and in establishing facilities that allow for the restoration of Iraqi control of the borders NLT 30 November.

3.C.4.B. (S//REL) Assist MOI in the synchronized integration of border forces and facilities ICW MNC-I and STRATOPS.


3.C.5. (U) DCS INTEL.

3.C.5.A. (S//REL) Assist in expanding ISR operations in Al Anbar w/ focus on AQIZ leadership and cells.

3.C.5.B. (S//REL) Provide personnel to the Operations and Intelligence Fusion Cell (O/I Cell) in accordance with paragraph 3.D. Coordinating Instructions.

3.C.6. (S//REL) DCS STRATOPS.


3.C.6.C. (S//REL) ICW MNC-I develop a post operations humanitarian and economic support plan (CMO).

3.C.6.D. (S//REL) Ensure close integration of the effects of all elements of power to achieve our efforts and to enhance the legitimacy of the ITG (Effects cell).


3.C.7. (U) DCS STRATCOM.

3.C.7.A. (S//REL) Develop an aggressive and focused strategic communications campaign to drive a wedge between AQIZ and the Iraqi people and to disrupt AQIZ recruiting and command and control.
3.C.7.B. (S/REL) ICW the IOTF, assist in conducting full spectrum information operations to reduce AQIZ capability to influence perceptions.

3.C.7.C. (S/REL) ICW the IOTF, assist in conducting supporting information operations to ensure operational success and capture opportunities to influence the enemy, IZ populace, and worldwide audience.


3.C.7.E.  (S/REL) Assist the Iraqis to leverage the National Iraqi strategic communications capability to:
3.C.7.E.1. (S/REL) Manage popular expectations on provision of basic services and reconstruction and promote tribal, religious, and municipal and provincial political leadership in resolving local problems.
3.C.7.E.2. (S/REL) Promote the value of an active civil society and political participation; encourage local opinion makers to endorse political participation and engagement.
3.C.7.E.4. (S/REL) Highlight insurgent threat to the Iraqi self determination and their responsibility for innocent deaths, interruptions of basic services, and reductions in quality of life.
3.C.7.E.5. (S/REL) Publicize significant successes against AIF in Al Anbar to portray a weakened enemy put increasingly on the defensive by mounting setbacks.
3.C.7.F. (S/REL) Assist to Iraqis to develop a provincial and municipal strategic communications capability.

3.C.8. (U) DCS PME.


3.C.8.B. (S/REL) ICW the US COM-led PSTs, assist the ITG in expanding its tribal and religious engagement strategy in Al Anbar to strengthen relationships and increase/enhance their support of the ITG and Coalition efforts.

3.C.8.C. (S/REL) ICW USCENTCOM and US COM, assist in the development of a national effort which

3.C.8.D. (S/REL) Facilitate regional and national ITG political integration in support of this operation.

3.C.8.E. (S/REL) Assist Iraqis in the implementation of supporting emergency laws to complicate terrorist activity in the border region.


3.C.9. (U) DCS R & S.

3.C.9.A. (S/REL) Assist the JHQ and MoD with setting up life support contracts for the Iraqi forces that are being deployed into the Al Anbar and monitor their progress.


3. D. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

3.D.1. (S//REL) The Operations and Intelligence Fusion Cell (O/I Cell) is a CG directed liaison to TF OC located in Balad. DCS STRATOPS is the executive agent for the establishment of the O/I Cell. The purpose of this cell is to ensure unity of effort in the collection and management of intelligence, and in the planning and execution of subsequent operations. The cell will be established and is expected to remain in operation for 120 days. Total manning requirement is 8 personnel as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank/Specialty</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fusion Cell Leader</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>STRATOPS</td>
<td>Balad,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops Officer</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ USMC</td>
<td>MNCI</td>
<td>Balad,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops Officer</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ USA AR/CAV</td>
<td>MNSTCI</td>
<td>Emba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR Intel Analyst</td>
<td>MAJ/MAJ GS 13/14</td>
<td>DCS INTEL</td>
<td>Balad,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Collection Mgr</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ USMC Intel</td>
<td>MNCI (MNF-W)</td>
<td>Balad,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Officer</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ Intel</td>
<td>MNCI (MNF-NW)</td>
<td>Balad,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans Officer</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ USA AR/CAV</td>
<td>MNCI (MNF-W)</td>
<td>Balad,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans Officer</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ USA AR/CAV</td>
<td>MNCI (MNF-NW)</td>
<td>Balad,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention LNO</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Balad</td>
</tr>
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3.D.2. (S//REL) The Information Operations Task Force-AQIZ (IOTF-AQIZ) is a CG directed element capable of planning, implementing, and assessing full spectrum IO and public affairs ISO Operation SAYAID (HUNTER). MNCI is the executive agent for the establishment of the IOTF. The IOTF will establish and attain full operating capability (FOC) NLT 31 JUL. Total requested MNF-sourced manning requirements are 5 personnel. TF will provide an additional 3 personnel. Total breakdown of manning is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank/Specialty</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOTF Leader</td>
<td>LTC/COL Info Ops</td>
<td>MNCI</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA LNO</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Expert</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>In-staffing</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Ops Plans Officer</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ Info Ops</td>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Ops Plans Officer</td>
<td>LTC/MAJ Info Ops</td>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strat IO Warrant</td>
<td>CW3/4 325J</td>
<td>MNCI</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF IO Plans Officer</td>
<td>MAJ/LTC USMC</td>
<td>MNCI</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWAC Analyst</td>
<td>MAJ/LTC/MAJ</td>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Victory, MNCI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.D.3. (U) Personnel tasked to support the O/I Cell and the IOTF will have at least 120 days remaining in theater, possess a TS/SCI clearance, and have no physical limitations.

3.D.4. (S//REL) All IO efforts in support of this operation will be developed ICW and vetted through TF and interagency partners.

3.D.5. (S//REL) Planning and Coordination Timeline.

- NLT 14 JUL: FOC of Ops Intel Fusion Cell
- NLT 15 JUL: MNC-I back-brief to MNF-I
- NLT 31 JUL: FOC of IOTF
- NLT 15 SEP: Assess results to date; review manning and supported/supporting relationships.

3.D.6. (U) DIRLAUTH authorized amongst MSCs.

3.D.7. (U) DCS STRATOPS is the overall MNFI staff proponent for this operation.

3.D.8. (U) The POC for this FRAGO is

3.D.9. (U) This FRAGO is enduring.
4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT. No Change.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

5.A. (S//REL) Supported Command. TF [143] is designated the supported command for this operation. The supported command receives assistance from another command's forces or capabilities, and is responsible for ensuring that the supporting command understands the assistance required (JP 3-31).

5.B. (S//REL) Supporting Command. MNFI is the supporting command for this operation. The supporting command aids, protects, complements, or sustains the supported command; and, is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported command (JP 3-31).

ACKNOWLEDGE:

CASEY
GEN

OFFICIAL:

MG BARGEWELL
DCS STRATOPS