APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO MNC-I OPERATIONS ORDER 05-02 (U)

(U) INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

1. (S//REL) **General Situation.** The insurgency in Iraq is principally Sunni Arab, centered on Former Regime Elements (FRE), particularly former Ba’ath Party and Former Regime military and intelligence service members. The insurgents, predominantly under FRE influence, comprise several factions ranging from explicitly religious to Arab nationalists to Saddam loyalists. There is not a monolithic Ba’ath Party/FRE leadership controlling efforts, but a loose system of leadership, with no single, unifying leader. Many of the leading figures and key facilitators are now based outside Iraq, mostly in [1,6,1,4d] Foreign Islamic extremists are a relatively small, yet lethal, problem in Iraq. Meanwhile, [4,6,1,4d] is hoping to win influence over Iraq’s political and electoral process without having to provoke a Shi’a-based insurgency (for which it is preparing nonetheless). The FRE leadership provides broad guidance and facilitation to Sunni Arab Rejectionists (SAR) that fall under their leadership. Relying on Ba’athist institutionalization in society, the insurgents leverage the Muslim Ulema Council, the underground remnants of the Ba’ath Party and the former Iraqi intelligence and security services. The FRE and Islamists extensively use Islamic symbolism to motivate the call to arms and leverage the mosques for C2, logistics and finances to sustain the insurgency. Binding these disparate elements together are the family, tribal, religious and peer group associations. The insurgency is in predominantly Sunni Arab provinces – Al Anbar, Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al Din, Al Tamin, Northern Babil and Baghdad. To date, the majority of attacks against Coalition Forces have consisted of ambushes, direct action, mortar attacks, and Vehicle Borne and Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED/IEDs). These attacks are concentrated along LOCs/MSRs and base camps. Attacks against Iraqi civilians and infrastructure take the form of ambushes, kidnappings, Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs)/Vehicle-Borne Improved Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), intimidation, harassment, and propaganda.

2. (S//REL) **Common Focus.** Although FRE/SAR, Islamic extremists and anti-coalition tribes and criminals may have incompatible ultimate objectives, they share a common focus and intermediate goal of forcing the Coalition to lose its will to fight and cause the ITG to fail. Broad sets of insurgents can be discerned, consisting of those Sunni Arabs in general who reject ‘the occupation’, elements of the Former Regime (mostly, but not exclusively, Sunni), foreign Islamic extremists (such as the Zarqawi network), indigenous Iraqi Islamic extremists (such as Ansar al Sunnah), and Shi’a militants (some of whom are subject to varying degrees of [1,6,1,4d]). Organized and often violent crime complicates this threat environment, with criminal elements that find cause for opposition to the IG/Coalition presence or significantly contribute to public insecurity. These sets are far from mutually exclusive – overlaps of membership occur, both for individuals and the groupings to which they belong.
3. **(S//REL) Threat Model.** The insurgency in Iraq is made up of approximately eight different groups whose motivation stems from the desire for power and/or ideology. The different types of groups are as follows:  
   a) FRE – those individuals who seek to return Iraq to Ba'athist control.  
   b) SAR - those Sunni Arabs that are rejecting their current outlook and future inside Iraq that are attempting to prevent a Shia/Kurd dominated government.  
   c) Shia extremists – those seeking to establish a Shia controlled Islamic Fundamentalist government who are facilitated from Iran.  
   d) Sunni extremists – those that are seeking to establish a Sunni (non-Ba'athist) controlled Islamic Fundamentalist government.  
   e) Terrorists – those that seek to remove all Western influence from the Middle East, support international terrorism, and establish a radical religious government.  
   f) Anti-Coalition Tribes – those tribal networks facilitating the insurgency through recruitment, rhetoric, and smuggling.  
   g) Organized Crime – those establish networks smuggling both arms and people for profit.  
   h) External Influence/Facilitators – etc, funding, arms supplying, and training and recruitment for the insurgency in Iraq for a variety of reasons.  

a. **(S//REL) Leadership.** To date, there is no one centralized person who can be described as the leader of the insurgency within Iraq. The different goals of the groups and their varying ideology prevent any one individual or group from emerging as the head of the insurgency. Currently, no one group has emerged as leader of the insurgency; however,
there has been sporadic collaboration between groups at a tactical level. Additionally, the leadership is decentralized and is described as providing more guidance and facilitation versus command and control, similar to the way the Ba'athist party ruled Iraq.

b. (S//REL) FRE/SAR. The FRE and SAR are composed of former regime hard-liners, especially former Iraqi security and military personnel, who seek to return Iraq to Ba'athist control. A substantial and consistent amount of reporting continues to identify leaders of the FRE/SAR as members of the former regime. The FRE/SAR primarily targets key civilian leaders, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and those who support CF. Their attacks are aimed at intimidation and demobilization of the Iraqi government and remove popular support. The following groups are currently engaged in anti-coalition operations:

(1) (S//REL) Jaysh Mohammad. Jaysh Muhammad (JM) serves as an umbrella structure for SAR and FRE insurgent groups. With approximately 3,000 members, JM cells and supporters extend from Baghdad to Mosul and throughout the Sunni triangle. JM will continue to conduct operations against MNF, the ITG, civilians and the infrastructure while attempting to penetrate and subvert emerging Iraqi political and civic organizations. Their long-term objective remains forcing MNF out of Iraq. In the near-term, JM will sustain adequate levels of attacks to keep a non-permissive environment to discredit the ITG and MNF. They will also try to maintain an IO campaign against the MNF to maintain their popular support and extend it beyond their Sunni Arab controlled areas. JM (also known as Mohammad's Army or the Iraqi Liberation Army), is a Ba'athist party whose goal is to return to power in Iraq. The group has approximately 1000 members who were the mid to higher-level officials under Saddam's regime.

(a) The speculated leader of this group is

(b) The population of Sunni Arab areas and tribal leadership support within the Sunni Arab communities are the JM center of gravity. If the people "believe" that their future lies with the new government and take control of their communities, insurgent support will evaporate forcing the JM to rely on other anti-MNF groups and criminal elements to survive.

c. (S//REL) Hizb al-Awda. Hizb al-Awda (also known, as the 'Return Party') is the largest of the Ba'ath parties. Members, who are primarily Sunni, originate from the former regime and its current strength is approximately 5000. Its leader, is currently detained by Coalition forces. His speculated replacement is The Hizb al-Awda ideology revolves around a desire to restore the Ba'athist Party to its former level of power. Its decentralized leadership provides an operational flexibility to field commanders, ensuring autonomy within their respective spheres. Hizb al-Awda's intent is to destabilize the government, which will in turn reduce popular support for a democratic society. Hizb al-Awda managed to emplace some of its members into the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) structure by controlling a large number of lower-level government positions in the Sunni Triangle and the MND-North Central region. Their objective is to prevent or obstruct reconstruction efforts while consistently
attacking CF and ISF security operations in Sunni controlled areas. The composition of the Hizb al-Awda includes members from the following former regime organizations (but is not limited to):

(1) Former military personnel;
(2) the Fedayeen Saddam;
(3) Fedayeen Saddam;
(4) Saddam's Cubs (an organization that prepared and trained young men for future service). The group is known to conduct both clandestine and overt operations.

d. (S//REL) 11th Revolutionary Avloul Group (RAG). The 11th RAG is an organization comprised of former Iraqi intelligence officers. They utilize well established intelligence operations and relationship networks to plan attacks. This is a group of professionals that work well together and tend to favor quality attacks over quantity. Suicide bombing is unlikely; however, more precise attacks such as assassinations and complex IEDs with extended surveillance are likely. Operations are centered in Baghdad and have extended to Samarra. Group size and recruitment will remain small as this group is more selective in its membership.

e. (S//REL) Sunni Extremists. The Sunni extremists are driven by religious ideology and their resentment over what they perceive as foreign occupation of Islamic soil. They seek to invoke a jihad ("holy war") and force the expulsion of western influence. These groups have a tendency to conduct high-visibility attacks that are aimed at the Iraqi leadership, population, western populations, and the ITG. A majority of the Sunni extremist follow the example of the Wahhabi ideology. The Wahhabi movement is a Sunni puritanical movement that was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd a-Wahhabi in 1700s and a Wahhabi is one who adheres to a puritanical fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. They reject all religious practices adopted after 950 AD. Most Wahhabis are concentrated on the Arabian Peninsula, although they have spread their influence and interpretation of Islam to other Muslim countries through financial support for religious schools (madrassas). Iraqi Wahhabis have been among the most vocal anti-Coalition groups, issuing calls for public opposition and non-cooperation. In addition, some Iraqi Wahhabis have likely cooperated with other extremist groups and former regime loyalist. Saddam Fedayeen forces have trained some Wahhabis to conduct sniper attacks.

1. (S//REL) Ansar al-Sunna: In early October 2003, AI experienced an ideological split and approximately 100 Ansar al-Islam (AI) members announced the formation of "Army of Ansar al-Sunna" (aka Ansar al-Sunna or Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna). Ansar al-Sunna is composed primarily of enthusiasts of the Wahhabi philosophy, foreign Mujahidin, and local Iraqi extremists. Their current leader is Ansar al-Sunna has established cells in al-Sulaymaniyyah, Kirkuk, Irbil, Dahuk, and Diyala.

f. (S//REL) Shia Extremists. Similar to the Sunni extremist, the Shia extremist desire the expulsion of the foreign occupiers of an Islamic state and they seek to invoke a jihad. The main difference between the Sunni extremist and Shia extremist is that Shias desire
to use the Iranian example (revolutionary religious government under an Ayatollah) versus the Sunnis who desire a government that is similar to that formed by the Taliban in Afghanistan (extremist tribal ideology forcing their beliefs on the population through force of arms). Shia Extremists groups include the following:

(1) (S//REL) Muqtada Militia. The largest Shia organization and most known of the Shia extremist groups is the Muqtada Militia (also known as the Muqtada Army and Jaysh al-Mahdi). This group once consisted of over 5000 fighters with an estimated 30,000 hard core supporters; however, it is now estimated less than 2500 fighters remain and an unknown number of supporters. The Muqtada Militia includes former military and security service personnel, but the heart of Sadr’s support base is composed of disenchanted young people from the poor sections of Iraqi society. The leader of the group was an influential prominent figure in Shiite society (Muqtada al-Sadr). He was able to rally support for the Shia nationalistic causes. His power comes from his offices (commonly known as Office of the Martyr Sadr), general supporters, and the Muqtada Militia. The high point of the group was the take over of the Inman Ali Mosque in An Najaf and the highly publicized fighting that took place for control of the city in 2004. The attrition of his fighters and the return of Ayatollah Sistani curtailed his bid for power. Sadr lost influence due to Sistani’s ability to control the Shia population as their religious leader. The intended target of the Muqtada Militia remains coalition forces, ISF, and moderate Shia. Sadr’s overall goal is to create a Shiite dominated society that he can control and manipulate to his own advantage. He will continue to use terrorist tactics such as propaganda, kidnappings, direct attacks, and IEDs against anyone who stands in the way of achieving his ideals.

g. (S//REL) Muntada al-Wilaya (MAW). The MAW (Gathering of the Rule), also known as Al Hyaat Al Hussainiya and the Movement of Mujahidin for the Islamic Revolution is a radical Islamic Shiite paramilitary organization that reportedly receives its spiritual guidance and support from [44]. Their goals are to expel Coalition Forces from Iraq and to establish an Islamic state, by force if necessary. The organization is small and estimated to have only about 100 personnel. The leader is [45] who replaced the former leader [46] who is currently detained by Coalition forces. While fundamentalist in nature, its members are also reportedly motivated by money and power. The MAW operates mostly within the southern region, especially within the Basrah and Mayyan provinces. Other MAW activities have been identified in Baghdad, Karbala and An Nasiriyah.

h. (S//REL) Terrorists. Foreign fighters, terrorist organizations, and some Iraqi Sunni extremist groups fall into this category. Many Islamic fighters from around the world are answering the call for jihad and joining the fight against Coalition Forces in Iraq. Foreign extremists operating in Iraq are heavily dependent on external support networks for everything from volunteer fighters to logistic supplies, as well as religious and operational guidance. Support cells are emerging in Iraq's neighboring countries, as well as in Europe and North Africa. These cells, some involving jihadists with experience in moving men and supplies from previous conflicts, provide training, documents, and
guidance as well as separate travel networks to facilitate the movement of foreign fighters into Saudi Arabia or Syria and subsequently across the border into Iraq. Groups falling into this category include:

i. (S//REL) Jama'at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad.

(1) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the leader of this group, which is currently the most dangerous in Iraq. His followers are extremely dedicated to their cause and show a willingness to conduct spectacularly violent acts against Coalition and ITG forces. Zarqawi’s influence over additional groups ((Salafists and Ansar al-Islam (AI)) is primarily fundamentalist and has members from numerous countries. Zarqawi maintains a loose affiliation with Al-Qaeda, but reporting indicates an ideological split. Zarqawi is a Salafi adherent who aggressively pursues the ejection of the Coalition and any western influence from the Middle East. In contrast to Usama bin Ladin (UBL), however, Zarqawi does not stress Muslim unity. A letter from Zarqawi to UBL was intercepted by CF in early 2004 and spelled out Zarqawi’s intent to create tension between Sunni and Shia factions within Iraq to forestall the peaceful transition to Iraqi sovereignty. Zarqawi has claimed several recent attacks in Iraq.

j. (S//REL) Al-Qaida (AQ). In Iraq, AQ’s footprint is likely small but effective. It is currently assessed that logistical support is the primary activity of AQ.

k. (S//REL) Anti-Coalition Tribes. The basic structure of Iraqi society is the tribe. Approximately 75% of Iraqis claim tribal affiliation. Some tribes of Iraq have over one million members. The depth of family and tribal relationships exceed membership to any other group. The dynamic is unlike most western cultures and the tribal goals vary significantly based on the issues. Generally, they aim to maintain influence, increase power, and gain patronage. Tribal support for the national government is crucial for Iraqi success. The majority of the anti-Coalition Iraqi tribes are Sunni and are described as follows.

(1) (S//REL) Tikriti. This is a Sunni tribe and many of its members belong to the Ba’ath party. The Tikriti tribe is located primarily in the Sunni Triangle.

(a) (S//REL) Al Nasr. This is a sub-tribe of the Tikriti tribe. It is the one that Saddam claims his family heritage and is also located in the Sunni Triangle.

(2) (S//REL) Shammer. Elements of this tribe are thought to be more criminal than anti-Coalition in that some of their members provide safe haven to drug and weapons smugglers. The Shammer tribe is located in the Salah Ad Din Governate.

(3) (S//REL) Dulami. A powerful tribe that had many members in the Ba’ath Party. It is located in the Northern, Western and North-Central portion of Iraq. This tribe is anti-Coalition and is also loosely associated with the drug smuggler trade. Many of its sub-tribes and clans are active along the Syrian/Iraqi border providing safe haven and access routes to foreign fighters.
(4) (S//REL) **Al Ajib.** This tribe was associated with the former regime. Its leader, [Redacted], was a former high-level government official. [Redacted] leads a FRE cell that reportedly operates along the Saudi Arabian border.

(5) (S//REL) **Bani Malik.** This tribe is one of the largest Shia confederations. The paramount Sheikh is Sabah Muhsim Imish al Maliki. Maliki enjoyed a close relationship with the former regime and was arrested by Coalition Forces during Operation Juno in Sep 03.

(6) (S//REL) **Al Hadidin.** This is a mainly Sunni confederation. The paramount Sheikh is Shayk Mustafa Ahmad Hasan al Warshanan. Prior to OIF, he enjoyed good relations with Saddam Hussein.

(7) (S//REL) **Al Hamdaniin.** This is a Sunni tribe that supported the former regime and is located in the Mosul area.

(8) (S//REL) **Al Duri.** This Sunni tribe supported the former regime and its most prominent member is [Redacted], the former vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council under Saddam Hussein. [Redacted] is speculated leader of Hizb al Awda.

(9) (S//REL) **Sadun.** This Sunni tribe is connected with violence and attacks against Coalition forces in both Fallujah and Ramadi.

1. (S//REL) **Criminals.** Opportunistic, individual and organized criminal activities have significantly impeded reconstruction efforts. Crime appears to occur predominately around major urban centers, ports, and oil facilities. Types of criminal activities include off shore piracy, kidnapping, murder, oil smuggling, extortion, black market activity, illegal drug traffic, prostitution, liquor distribution and sales, and arms smuggling. Participants in criminal activity come from various backgrounds and tribes. Tribes known to profit from criminal activities include Garamsha Bubkeet, Bakatra, and Al Guamand Tuuma (See Chart Below). These tribes are well supported; well financed; capable of acquiring needed weapons with relative ease; good at reconnaissance and escape and evasion; there is a large pool of tribal recruits due to a high rate of unemployment.
m. **(S//REL) External Support.** Several Middle Eastern states provide indirect or covert support to Iraqi insurgent groups. Improving border security along Iraqi borders will reduce foreign fighter movement into Iraq; force smugglers to take more risks or lose money; and increase Coalition and ISF ability to detect and monitor frequently used smuggling routes and methods. Currently, part of Iraq’s stability is affected by AIF groups receiving external support from the following countries:

1. 

2. 

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n. (S//REL) **Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) Lines of Operation.** There are three main insurgent lines of operations all of which culminate with the withdrawal of US forces. The insurgent’s key line of operation is the intimidation of the Iraqi people, the ITG, and the ISF. They will disrupt the constitutional process, the essential services/economy, assassinate key provincial and government leaders, target the ISF that are attempting to gain control and security, and maintain sanctuary enclaves all in order to intimidate and control the Iraqi people. Another insurgent line of operation is influencing the will of the Coalition. They will continue to target coalition forces and those that support the coalition. They will attempt to isolate the US forces from the rest of the coalition in order to undermine the legitimacy of our efforts. They seek to build a perception that the coalition cannot create a secure environment. The last line of operation for the insurgents is to conduct an IO campaign. They will attempt to reinforce the belief that US is anti-Islamic, seeking to destroy Islam. They will create the perception that the insurgency is a popular revolt against occupation, that the insurgency is winning, the ITG in ineffective and illegitimate, and that the coalition is doomed to failure.

![AIF Lines of Operation Diagram]

**INTIMIDATE ITG, ISF, AND IRAQI PEOPLE**
- Disrupt/Deny Iraqi Constitutional Process
- Disrupt Essential Services/Economy/Reconstruction
- Assassinate/Discredit/Intimidate ITG, Provincial/Local Leaders, and ISF
- Intimidate Local Populace
- Maintain Sanctuary Enclaves

**INFLUENCE WILL OF COALITION**
- Generate Coalition Casualties
- Undermine US / Coalition Cooperation
- Isolate U.S. from Coalition Partners - Attacks/Kidnappings of NGOs and Coalition
- Undermine the Legitimacy of Coalition
- Build perception that the coalition can’t create a secure environment

**CONDUCT IO CAMPAIGN**
- Reinforce belief that U.S. is seeking to destroy Islam
- Create perception that the insurgency is a Popular Revolt Against Occupation
- Create perception that the insurgency is winning
- Create perception that the ITG is ineffective or illegitimate
- Create the perception that the coalition is doomed to failure

*Fig. 3 (S//REL) Diagram*
o. (S//REL) **Anti-Iraqi Forces Objectives and Endstate.** The AIF groups share a common intermediate objective; to expel the Coalition and destabilize the Iraqi Government. Their success depends on their ability to manipulate the anti-coalition tribes and criminal elements who’s TTPs facilitate the insurgency. However, each group has a different endstate, which makes cooperation difficult and provides a potential wedge for the Coalition to exploit.

**INSURGENTS’ OBJECTIVES / ENDSTATES**

- **FRE/SAR:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF. Seek to return Iraq to Ba’athist control and prevent Shia/Kurdish dominated government from assuming power.

- **Sunni Extremists:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF. Establish a Sunni controlled Islamic Fundamentalist Government.

- **Terrorists:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF. Removal of Western Influence from Iraq; Establish Radical Religious Government.

- **Shia Extremists:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF. Establish a Shia controlled Islamic Fundamentalist Government.

- **Anti-Coalition Tribal Groups:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF. Maintain influence and increase power.

- **Organized Crime:** Profit or revenge // Make money.

- **External Influence / Facilitators:** Undermine US - Coalition (Western) Influence // Influence Political Outcome in Iraq.

*Fig. 4(S//REL) Diagram*

4. (U) **State of the Insurgency by Sector**
a. **Multi-National Brigade-North (MNB-NW).**

(1) **(S//REL)** Multi-National Brigade-Northwest is made up of three key provinces; Ninawa Province, Dahuk Province, and Irbil Province. The Ninawa Province borders with Syria. Foreign Fighters and arms smugglers take advantage of infiltration routes within this province. This province has three cities where insurgents have attacked Coalition Forces; Mosul, Tall 'Afar, and Al Qayyarah. The villages along the Turkey-Iraq border are controlled by the PKK. Within Irbil Province, the city of Irbil remains quiet; however, the Iraq border is porous and poorly guarded by Iraqi Border Police (IBP) allowing Foreign Fighters and smugglers to infiltrate into Iraq almost unopposed.

(2) **(S//REL)** **Threat.**

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(a) (S//REL) **Current Situation.** The number attacks within the region have increased due to Coalition operations in the cities of Tall Afar and Mosul. Additionally, Coalition operations to interdict the Foreign Fighters and smuggling from [1,4b, 1,4b] has increased the reported activity within the region. In Mosul there has been an increase of attacks against civilians, government facilities, and a rise in inter-ethnic violence. The rise in ethnic attacks indicates extremist elements are attempting to create ethnic strife in order to destabilize the government. Currently, the most common type of attacks is indirect fire on MNB-NW bases and direct fire ambushes against the ISF.

(b) (S//REL) **Assessment.** Insurgents will continue attacks on ISF and Coalition Forces, while targeting the ITG and perceived collaborators for assassination. As Tall 'Afar stabilizes, AIF will move back to historical areas in western Mosul and along MSR Tampa south of the city.

b. (U) **Multi-National Division-North Central (MND-NC)**

(1) (S//REL) The North Central section contains portions of the Sunni Triangle (the southern portion of the Sunni Triangle resides in the MND-West sector). The three key cities are Samarra, Kirkuk, and Baqubah.

(2) (S//REL) **Threat**

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<th>Estimated Strength</th>
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<td>Crime [1,4b]</td>
<td>International</td>
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(a) (S//REL) **Current Situation.** MND-NC has a high concentration of FRE operating in the AO. The violence within MND-NC is primarily directed against Coalition forces, the ITG and ISF. The enemy’s preferred method of attack is the use of ambushes, direct attacks and VBIED/IEDs along Lines of Communications (LOC) and Military Supply Routes (MSRs). Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) base camps are frequently attacked with mortars and other indirect weapons. The city of Kirkuk is an ethnically mixed city in the sector. Its economy is based on the oil fields. Insurgent activity is directed against Coalition Forces, city infrastructure, and the ITG. Baqubah is dominantly Sunni, but the citizens in the city are working with the ITG. Generally, they desire peace and stability in the region. Within Samarra, the fighting is primarily focused against Coalition Forces and limited to harassment attacks and IED attacks conducted by hard-line insurgents.

(b) (S//REL) **Assessment.** AIF will continue to attack as opportunities present themselves. AIF groups are feeling pressured by the Iraqi Government and will...
find few safe havens within Iraq. AIF groups will attempt to discredit the Interim Iraqi Government in the form of collaborative spectacular attacks. Expect a steady rate of activity with periodic surges. The Zarqawi Network is intent on maintaining an operations tempo (OPTEMPO) which provides daily media attention to successful attacks and will continue to target the ITG and ISF.

c. (U) **Multi-National National Force-West (MNF-W).**

(1) (S//REL) Much of the violence in Iraq is within this region. The eastern portion of the CF-W has a significant portions of the Sunni Triangle located within it. Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces are the primary targets for attacks; however, inter-tribal fighting also takes place as the tribes vie for power within the region. As the Iraqi Security Forces continue to improve and become an effective force, they will be increasingly targeted by the AIF groups.

(2) (S//REL) **Threat.**

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<tr>
<td>Criminals/Support</td>
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(a) (S//REL) **Current Situation.** Ar Ramadi and Al Qaim are the current targets for MEF continuing operations along the Euphrates river. Most of the tribes within the eastern section are Pro-Former Regime; their Anti-Coalition stance is such that they provide assistance to the extremist and any other group that opposes Coalition Forces. The MSRs on the western portion of the MND-W are subject to frequent ambushes and IEDs; however, these attacks appear to be mainly directed towards Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally, the attacks against the Iraqi Security Forces are frequently criminal in nature or smugglers who are caught/stopped at roadblocks or checkpoints versus deliberate attacks to destabilize the government.

(b) (S//REL) **Assessment.** Anti-Iraqi Forces will focus their attacks on Interim Security Forces personnel and facilities, provincial government officials, as well as critical infrastructure facilities. Insurgents will generally avoid direct engagements with the CF and ISF, preferring hit-and-run tactics and standoff attacks that offer greater survivability. AIF will continue to base themselves in rural areas and “commute” to the city to conduct attacks. Additionally, VBIED/IED attacks against convoys will continue to be the method of harassment along MSRs and ASRs.

d. (U) **Multi-National Division-Baghdad.**
 Baghdad has the highest concentration of daily activity due to the various types of insurgent elements operating within city. The city provides sanctuary, safe-houses, weapons caches, and other logistical support for each of the groups operating there. Additionally, the urban terrain gives the insurgents the ability to move through the city while avoiding Coalition patrols. Baghdad provides ample targets for the insurgents.

(2) (S//REL) Threat.

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<th>Estimated Strength</th>
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<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>Crime/Support</td>
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<td>International</td>
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</table>

(a) (S//REL) Current Situation. Baghdad will remain the focus of AIF activity due to the number and density of high impact targets. AIF will continue attacks against civilian, ISF, ITG and infrastructures. There are various districts in Baghdad that are assessed to be strongholds for AIF. These areas hold the headquarters of groups such as the 1920 Revolutionary Group, Mohammed's Army, Saraya Jihad, as well as the Muslim Ulema Council (MUC). Anti-Iraqi Forces roam freely and recruit freely in these areas. Mosques are still currently being used as safe-houses, weapons caches, and communications hubs for AIF. The Al Nina, Al Hanifa, Um al Tarbul, and the Mother of all Battles Mosques are being used as insurgent HQ and safe havens. Terrorist groups (e.g., Jamat al-Tawid wa Al-Jihad, directed by Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi) are largely responsible for VBIED employments in Iraq, especially suicide VBIEDs and attacks against Iraqi civilians.

(b) (S//REL) Assessment. Anti-Iraqi Forces will attempt to discredit the ability of the ITG to provide a safe and secure environment by targeting the ISF and prominent government members. AIF will target Coalition Forces with indirect fires against FOBs and VBIED/IEDs on MSRs, and they will target ITG and ISF with VBIED and assassinations against key political brokers. AIF will continue to threaten and attack electrical, oil, and water infrastructure to promote instability.

c. (U) Multi-National Division-Central South.

(1) (S//REL) Multi-National Division-Central South sector remains mostly quiet. The majority of the sector is Shiite and supportive of the ITG. Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s support of the new government has quieted a vast majority of the Shia. Only in the northern portions of the sector along the MSRs and in the Sunni dominated areas are there significant amount of activity. In MND-CS, key city is Al Kut.
(2) (S//REL) Threat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estimated Strength</th>
<th>Affiliated</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRE / SAR</td>
<td>500-600</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karbala, Al Hilah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia Extremists</td>
<td>450-580</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Karbala, Al Hilah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/Support</td>
<td>630-800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) (S//REL) Current Situation. The Former Regime Elements are operating in areas that are IVO the urban population centers and along the MSRs. The Sunni region ends north of Al Hillah and the Shia influence begins. In the southern portion of the Multi-National Division – Central South sector, the significant activity is primarily sniping and ambushes of Coalition forces along the Military Supply Routes (MSRs).

(b) (S//REL) Assessment. IEDs and VBIEDs combined with small-arms fire remain the greatest threat to CF operating in the area. Mortar and RPG fire remain a viable option for attacks against bases. Sabotage of oil facilities, power plants and water installations should be anticipated.

f. (U) Multi-National Division-South East.

(1) (S//REL) The Multi-National Division-South East sector is dominated by the Shia and most of the Shiite leaders are supportive of the Coalition efforts in Iraq. Key cities in this province include Umm Qasr and Basrah. Incidents are predominately concentrated in the cities where there is a significant Sunni population. In this area the Muntada Al Walaya is influential. This group operates along the border in the larger cities. They are not conducting operations against Coalition forces; rather their efforts are to increase among the Shiite population.

(2) (S//REL) Threat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estimated Strength</th>
<th>Affiliated</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRE / SAR</td>
<td>200-300</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ba’athist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia Extremists</td>
<td>950-1200</td>
<td></td>
<td>Basrah, Nasiriyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/Support</td>
<td>600-800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) (S//REL) Current Situation. A majority of the sector’s significant activity is criminal related or isolated anti-Coalition events. In the larger cities Umm Qasr and Basrah attacks are directed against Coalition or the Iraqi Government. Control exerted over the Shia by the tribal and religious leaders limits the number of attacks. Attacks are mainly small-scale using small arms and occasionally mortars.
5. (U) MLOCA/MDCOA.

a. (S//REL) MLOCA. The FRE, elements of the SAR and AMZ, the Main Effort, conduct IED/GBIED, IDF, and suicide attacks against Coalition Forces, the ISF, and the Iraqi people in order to influence the Constitutional Process, disrupt the reconstruction effort, limit ISF and Coalition control, and intimidate the Iraqi people. In addition, enemy forces will target critical infrastructure to deny revenue generation and basic needs and to discredit the government. Tribal leaders, criminal elements, and external actors, the Supporting Effort, will provide necessary logistical requirements to sustain the insurgency. Other supporting efforts include: high profile attacks and intimidation efforts along the periphery to divert MNC-I resources away from the greater Baghdad area and increase freedom of maneuver for the Main Effort. Kidnapping and crime are also likely to rise as the MNF continues to capture key financiers of the insurgency.

b. (S//REL) MDCOA. A more unified insurgent front conducts a coordinated and sustained IED/GBIED/IDF/Suicide campaign from Mosul in the North to Al Qaim in the West as well as the greater Baghdad area in order to overextend/attribution Coalition Forces and take advantage of an underdeveloped ISF. In addition, enemy forces conduct strategic attacks on infrastructure, assassinate key government leadership, and attempt to influence regional support, Coalition Will to fight and World Opinion. Tribal leaders, criminal elements, and external actors, the Supporting Effort, will provide necessary logistical requirements to sustain the insurgency.

6. (U) Potential for Strategic Surprise.

a. (S//REL) AIF focus shifts to strategic attacks. Who: All insurgent groups. When: during constitutional development process. Why: Insurgent intelligence capabilities, infiltration of ISF increases, insurgents recognize that attacking critical nodes has a greater impact on new government, coalition efforts, and public opinion. 2nd and 3rd Order Effects: Improved targeting of Coalition forces, critical electrical grids, key oil production facilities and fuel distribution centers, increased assassination attempts on government officials, coalition security/force protection requirements increase, and the ITG unable to meet Iraqi’s basic needs.
The threat to military and commercial flights at BIAP, the international zone, and Coalition force protection requirements increase.

c. **(S//REL) Sistani assassination.** Who: Zarqawi network, FRE/SAR. When: Following anti-Coalition or ITG rhetoric during the constitutional development process. Why: To create confusion and civil unrest, because the Shia have too much influence (killed by FRE/SAR), or Sistani fails to gain enough influence (killed by Shia). 2nd and 3rd Order Effects: Change in the direction of the Shia community, new goals, increase influence and leverage in Shia community, the Coalition has less influence and leverage in Shia community, requires Coalition forces to shift focus.

d. **(S//REL) Political process becomes main effort and insurgency becomes supporting effort.** Who: FRE/SAR, AMZ. When: Spring. Why: Preservation of insurgent forces and waits for Coalition Forces to withdraw. How: Insurgent's main effort shifts to political means, begins to utilize the political process to gain access and influence in new government. Infiltration of upper levels of government agencies and military/security forces. Support AMZ freedom of action in order to sustain insurgency while conducting low level attacks to maintain constant pressure on Coalition forces and the ITG. Develop intelligence networks while supporting new government stability and architecture. Assist in the acceleration of the withdrawal of Coalition Forces in order to provide an environment for a Coup to control Iraq.

7. (U) **Conclusions.**

a. **(S//REL) The successful elections provided the Iraqi Government and Coalition Forces a significant boost of forward momentum; however, the fight is far from over.** In the post election period, there has been a drop in overall attacks and a shift in TTPs. Attacks during November were directed against the Iraqi people in an attempt to intimidate the population. The attacks of December through March have been about 70% against Coalition, 15% against Civilians and 15% against the ISF. Attacks against infrastructure have been on the rise in an attempt to affect the perception of the Coalition and ISF to provide for the essential needs of the Iraqi people. According to this has caused a divide: those that realize the AIF are stopping the progress of a better life in Iraq and are beginning to turn in the AIF to Coalition and those that place their anger against the Coalition for not protecting their livelihood and join or support the insurgency.

b. **(S//REL) Generally, the insurgency is spread across Iraq along the two main rivers; along the Euphrates from Baghdad to Al Qaim in the West and along the Tigris from Baghdad to Mosul in the North. Specifically, the insurgency is making its stand in the two largest population centers: Baghdad and Mosul.** The large urban environment provides them with the ability to blend into the population, a greater number of targets, media attention for their IO campaign, and a larger pool of unemployed, disillusioned youth for recruitment.
(S/REL) The present threat level in 12 of the 18 provinces is low to medium, mainly in the South East and North Eastern Kurdish controlled area. A significant level of threat in 3 and a mid to high level of threat in 3 provinces. In the past 12 months, the MNF and IG have won significant battles in Najaf and Fallujah. However, there is little evidence that we are moving towards a complete victory. Iraq faces two more political events during 2005; the constitutional referendum should occur by Mid-October, and full national elections are scheduled before the end of the year. Insurgents will have every incentive to create as much political turmoil as possible, as well as continue their attacks on the Iraqi government, economy, security forces, and the Coalition.

d. (S/REL) Overall, the insurgency has clearly not been neutralized. Levels of violence and insecurity are higher than when the Campaign Plan was implemented. But progress has been made. ITG control has been re-established to varying degrees in Najaf, Samarra, Thawra, North Babil and Fallujah, albeit with continuing resistance and re-infiltration in some areas. Insurgent safe havens have been eliminated. The Shi'a insurgency, highly active throughout August 2004, is currently dormant, although its capabilities remain intact. Poverty, mischief-making, Moqtada Sadr’s dysfunctional personality and the radicalism inherent in Shi’a Islam all suggest that the Shi’a insurgency is unlikely to disappear completely. But the Shi’a leadership stands to gain most from successful elections, and can be expected to call for restraint, at least in the short term.

e. (S/REL) Targeting and intimidation are ever more sophisticated. There is increasing evidence of tactical co-operation between groups, although not yet of a fully-integrated structure. Nor is this yet a popular Sunni insurgency, though political alienation could make it into one. It remains centered on a number of FRE leaders, determined to regain power at any price. It remains the most serious threat to the ITG, and to the MNF/MNC-I end-state.

f. (S/REL) The AMZ network continues to operate, and has claimed responsibility for many of the most serious attacks in recent months. Although relatively few in number, foreign fighters have had a disproportionate strategic impact. The possible merger between the AMZ and Al Qaeda organizations also expands the operational reach of the AMZ network and makes it potentially more dangerous. Reporting indicates that a major goal of the merger is to develop Iraq into a training ground for a generation of global jihadists.

g. (S/REL) The most serious threat to overall success is the FRE intimidation campaign. It touches all sections of the community and all walks of life. Having so far failed in its plan to “decapitate” the ITG, the insurgency appears to be concentrating on “hollowing it out”. To combat this, development of ISF capabilities is the Corps number one priority.

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TABS
A  OPLAN IPB

B-1-19
SECRET/REL TO USA, IRQ, and MCFI/20150401
For display only to IRQ