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MNF-W 22nd MEU Replacement Request

Information Brief

Problem Statement: Should MNC-I backfill the 22nd MEU in MNF-W and if so what is the sourcing solution?



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Problem Statement and Background

Problem Statement: Should MNC-I backfill the 22nd MEU in MNF-W and if so what is the sourcing solution?


Background: On 9 Jan MG Johnson formally requested a backfill for the 22nd MEU currently operating in Hit in order to exploit the successes made during OPN SAYAID, specifically the continued partnering and mentorship of IA units (1/2/7 IA) (TRA III, 9 mos).

Past Key Dates

- ❖ 20 Dec 05: 22nd MEU OPCON to MNF-W
- ❖ 27 Dec 05 – o/a 15 Feb: BN TF 2/1 AD designated CENTCOM theater reserve
- ❖ 27 Dec 05: II MARDIV CDR informally requests extension of 22nd MEU to 15 Mar during MNF-W backbrief.
- ❖ 9 Jan 06: MG Johnson formally requests backfill of 22nd MEU in Hit
- ❖ 11 Jan 06: CENTCOM Issues AMHS message holding 2/1 AD in Kuwait until 30 Apr then keeps only BN TF and BDE TAC with entire BCT equipment set in Kuwait while BDE (-) redeploys
- ❖ 13 Jan 06: 2nd CMDO BDE begins redeployment to Baghdad (minus 1 CO remaining in Ramadi)

Future Key Dates

- ❖ 18 Jan 06: OP Dahr VTC with MNF-I
- ❖ 20 Jan – 20 Feb: Planned deployment of 3/7IA from Force Gen to Syrian Border. 1/1 IIF departs MNF-W for refit/retrain
- ❖ 23 Jan 06 (T): DP to decide to backfill and the source or not
- ❖ 31 Jan 06: II MARDIV assumes MNF-W
- ❖ 5-15 Feb 06: Recommended backfill TOA with 22nd MEU
- ❖ 15 Feb 06: 22nd MEU departs MNF-W
- ❖ 20 Feb 06: RCT 5 TOAs with RCT 2
- ❖ 25 Feb 06: RCT 7 TOAs with RCT 8
- ❖ 28 Feb 06: MNF-W TOA to I MEF
- ❖ 15 Mar 06: Recommendation from MNC-I through MNF-I to CENTCOM on redeployment of 2/1AD.
- ❖ 20 Mar 06: 1/1 IIF returns to Ramadi (7 IA BDE set in MNF-W)
- ❖ 1 May 06: 2/1 (-) begins redeployment




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Threat Assessment for AO Fairbanks and Hit

Assessment:

- Recent MNF-W operations in the WERV and 22nd MEU presence reduced T&FF and IZR influence in Hit.
- Despite MNF presence, T&FF and IZR in Hit continue attacks in the city.
- The populace in HIT is neutral to MNF presence, but distrusts recurring cycle of CF non-presence.
- If 22nd MEU departs Hit and no CF unit backfills, T&FF and IZR would over time return Hit to an insurgent sanctuary.
- Insurgent IO campaign for HIT is increasing; with no CF presence T&FF would attempt to intimidate IA BN



So What?: A lack of CF presence in Hit in the short term would result in an increase in T&FF and IZR attacks, but would not create an immediate terrorist sanctuary in Hit. In 60 to 90 days, T&FF and IZR would ultimately exert control over Hit through intimidation of the populace. Security, reconstruction, and basic services provided by the local government are essential for limiting T&FF influence in Hit.

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Analysis

Facts

1. II MEF CG requests long term replacement for 22nd MEU (6 months)
2. 22nd MEU will not be extended past 15 Feb in MNF-W
3. 2 CMDO BDE redeploys to Baghdad 13 Jan
4. CENTCOM AMHS message 11 Jan 06: 2/1 AD will remain in Kuwait through 30 April. BDE(-) redeploys leaving BN TF, BDE TAC, and entire BDE set of equipment in Kuwait through 30 Mar 07. PTDO for BDE is 15 days
5. BN TF from 1.4a AD acts as Theater Reserve until reconstitution of 22nd MEU o/a 25 Feb 06
6. 1/1IIF departs MNF-W (20 Jan to 20 Mar). 3/7 IA BDE from force generation replaces them on border

Constraints

1. MNC-I must submit any request for the Call Forward Force through MNF-I to SECDEF
2. Any RIP/TOA with 22nd MEU must be completed NLT 15 Feb 06

Assumptions

1. MNF-W will move 1st LAR from Rutbah to Hit if 22nd MEU is not backfilled

Risks & Issues

1. Risk: Maintaining recent gains in the ERV
 - No backfill uncovers Ruthbah by MNF-W plan
2. Issue: May conflict with CENTCOM intent for CFF
3. Risk: A BN TF from 1.4a AD can be recalled by CENTCOM at any time

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MNF-W Justification

- **Exploit gains made in OPN SAYAID**
- **Continued partnership with 1/2/7 IA BDE in Hit**
- **Stability supports development of district and local Iraqi police**
- **Maintain presence in Rutbah**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MNC-I C3 Plans, DSN

(b)(6)

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Courses Of Action for 22nd MEU Backfill and Way Ahead

- **COA 1: Do not source the backfill – (MNF-W internal realignment)**
- **COA 2: Source the backfill from MND-N or MND-B**
- **COA 3: Source the backfill from 2/1 AD in Kuwait**
- **Way Ahead: Put out to staff and MNDs for formal staffing, continue to develop courses of action and present a decision brief at the 23 Jan SPM**

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Police Partnership Program (P3) for September Assessment

This briefing is classified

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Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1

10 SEP 05

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


P3 Assessment and Way Ahead

Discussion:

- P3 Concept Timeline – training and assessment through the Elections
- P3 Team Update
- Current Assessment and Feedback
- Program Expansion – The Way Ahead in reaching the District and Individual IPS Station Levels (Post Elections)

Planning Timeline:



September Assessment – 10 Sep 05

Itizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

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P3 Team Update

- MNC-I implemented the P3 Program on 06 MAY 05.
- P3-Reconstruction Teams (P3-R) in reconstructed cities of Fallujah, Samarra, Mosul, and S. Baghdad
- P3-Provincial Teams (P3-P) FOC on 01 July 05 (21 Teams; 3 x P3-P Teams in MND-B)

MSC	P3-P STATUS BY PROVINCE	
MND-NW	Dahuk	
MND-NE	Arbil	
MND-NC	As-Sulaymaniyah*	
MND-B		→ (3 x P3-P Teams)
MND-W		
MND-CS		
MND-SE		
KEY	LOCAL CONTROL	


- P3-P Team composition is non-standardized and varies across MSCs.
- IPS in Dahuk, Arbil, and Sulymaniyah Provinces at local control and operating independently; monitored as necessary by P3-P Teams and IPLOs.

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Current Assessment and P3 Manning

(18 Provinces)



Baghdad	12	74	1	28	58	110
Babil			1	0	0	9
Qadisiyah			0	2	0	18
Maysan			0	5	0	3
Dhi Qar			0	6	0	0
Basrah			1	5	0	21
Muthanna			0	5	0	2
Najaf			0	8	0	11
Karbala			0	2	0	7
Kirkuk			0	4	0	18



Based on Sep 05 TRA	
	Effective
2	Effective with Limitations
	Considerable Limitations
	Ineffective

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Current Assessment of P3

- Based on the TRAs and MSC feedback, the P3 Program is having a positive impact on improving Iraqi Police capability and effectiveness.
- Level of Fidelity of IPS TRAs not equal to those of the IA - P3 Team Construct vs MITT
- P3 (MOI) is now established and is demonstrating improving effectiveness at Ministerial Level.
 - The effectiveness of Iraqi Police Services at each level is heavily dependent on MSC/unit commitment to partnership and the amount of IPLO/IPT support to the MSCs - and the protection and mobility of IPLOs/IPTs
- Assessment and Feedback Points:
 - Sustain:
 - Training Programs – key to longer term development of IPS
 - Coaching and Assisting – to develop staff management skills
 - CPATT Ops (P3) – provides administrative and logistical node to P3 Teams
 - Improve:
 - IPS Budget and Equipment– rudimentary processes and poor management; needs command emphasis
 - Force Protection and Facilities Infrastructure – improving, but still inadequate
 - District/City and Station development – to develop leadership and skill sets
 - Limitations:
 - Out-of-Hide team sourcing
 - Transportation and security of Teams –resource constraints
- **Corps Recommendation: Consider expansion of the program. Follow-on P3 Teams to be externally sourced either through NATO/OGA participation or CF partners.**

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Current P3 Capability

What We Can Do:

- Assessment and mentoring at MOI HQ – Ministerial Level
- Coordination with Regional LNOs and MSCs
- Assessment and mentoring at Provincial HQs
- Limited assessments and mentoring at District/City HQs
- Limited station visits and assessments (45% per month)

What We Can Not Do:

- Standardize teams to conduct assessments and effective mentoring of all subordinate District and City HQs
- Standardize teams to conduct assessments and effective training and development at all stations
- Continuous coverage at District and below
- P3 Teams are not self-sustaining – need FP and logistical support
- TRA Fidelity = MITT Concept

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PTT Planning Guidelines and Deployment Criteria (Post Elections)

MOI P3 Team:

- One team for MOI

Regional LNO Teams:

- 2 IPLOs at each Coalition MSC HQ

Provincial P3 Teams:

- One team for every Provincial HQ

District/City PTTs:

- District/City HQ Plan is based on CF priority and security
- One team for every 3 District HQs

Station PTTs:

- Mobile team headquartered with District/City PTT based on CF
- One team for every 5 Stations

Deployment Criteria

- Flexibility based on security situation (focus on 9 Cities and TRA)
- Man all Regional LNO positions and P3-P Teams
- 11 Provinces – not including Kurdistan and MND-SE AORs
- Position Mobile PTTs based upon Corps Priorities

Assumptions:


- Corps already beginning to partner with many MOI Districts/Cities throughout the AOR
- Corps can provide the necessary force protection for teams (where needed)
- Corps can partner at District/City and augment PTT in a formal way (at a minimum, maintain what we have)

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Redistribution of Existing IPLO/IPT Assets

(11 Provinces)



Province	Effective	Effective with Limitations	Considerable Limitations	Ineffective
Baghdad	16	87	2	12
Babil		2	12	16
Qadisiyah			12	8
Maysan			12	2
Dhi Qar			12	2
Basrah		2	12	2
Muthanna			12	2
Najaf			12	8
Karbala			12	8
Kirkuk				12

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Initial Redistribution Plan - PTT Capability

- By prioritizing our efforts and implementing PTTs at District/Major City and Station Levels:

What We Can Do:

- Full time assessments and mentoring at Provincial HQs.
- Significant part-time assessments and mentoring at District/City HQs in priority areas.
- Significant part-time assessments and comprehensive training in stations in priority areas.

What We Can Not Do:

- Continuous coverage at District and below
- P3 Teams are not self-sustaining – need FP and logistical support
- TRA Fidelity = MITT Concept

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The Way Ahead

- P3 Conference (Adnan Palace) on 15-16 SEP 05
- Monitor training and assessment at the Provincial and District Levels (Monthly), as well as Station Level (Quarterly), in order to focus effort.
- Continue to analyze and develop the PTT Concept with the MSCs, CPATT, and MOI.
- Post Elections Expansion – Examine 3 COAs:
 - COA 1 – NATO/OGA
 - COA 2 - Externally- sourced
 - COA 3 – MiTTs (IA – Level 2) re-missioned to P3

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The Cities Lists

