MNF-W 22nd MEU Replacement Request

Information Brief

Problem Statement: Should MNC-I backfill the 22nd MEU in MNF-W and if so, what is the sourcing solution?
Problem Statement and Background

**Problem Statement:** Should MNC-I backfill the 22nd MEU in MNF-W and if so what is the sourcing solution?

**Background:** On 9 Jan MG Johnson formally requested a backfill for the 22nd MEU currently operating in Hit in order to exploit the successes made during OPN SAYAID, specifically the continued partnering and mentorship of IA units (1/2/7 IA) (TRA III, 9 mos).

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**Past Key Dates**

1. 20 Dec 05: 22nd MEU OPCON to MNF-W
2. 27 Dec 05 – o/a 15 Feb: BN TF 2/1 AD designated CENTCOM theater reserve
3. 27 Dec 05: II MARDIV CDR informally requests extension of 22nd MEU to 15 Mar during MNF-W backbrief.
4. 9 Jan 06: MG Johnson formally requests backfill of 22nd MEU in Hit
5. 11 Jan 06: CENTCOM issues AMHS message holding 2/1 AD in Kuwait until 30 Apr then keeps only BN TF and BDE TAC with entire BCT equipment set in Kuwait while BDE (-) redeployed
6. 13 Jan 06: 2nd CMDO BDE begins redeployment to Baghdad (minus 1 CO remaining in Ramadi)

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**Future Key Dates**

7. 18 Jan 06: OP Dahlir VTC with MNC-I
8. 20 Jan – 20 Feb: Planned deployment of 3/7 IA from Force Gen to Syrian Border. 1/1 IIF departs MNF-W for refight/retrain
9. 23 Jan 06 (T): DP to decide to backfill and the source or not
10. 31 Jan 06: II MARDIV assumes MNF-W
11. 5-15 Feb 06: Recommended backfill TOA with 22nd MEU
12. 15 Feb 06: 22nd MEU departs MNF-W
13. 20 Feb 06: RCT 5 TOAs with RCT 2
14. 25 Feb 06: RCT 7 TOAs with RCT 8
15. 28 Feb 06: MNF-W TOA to I MEF
16. 15 Mar 06: Recommendation from MNC-I through MNC-I to CENTCOM on redeployment of 2/1AD.
17. 20 Mar 06: 1/1 IIF returns to Ramadi (7 IA BDE set in MNF-W)
18. 1 May 06: 2/1 (-) begins redeployment
**Threat Assessment for AO Fairbanks and Hit**

**Assessment:**

- Recent MNF-W operations in the WERV and 22nd MEU presence reduced T&FF and IZR influence in Hit.

- Despite MNF presence, T&FF and IZR in Hit continue attacks in the city.

- The populace in HIT is neutral to MNF presence, but distrusts recurring cycle of CF non-presence.

- If 22nd MEU departs Hit and no CF unit backfills, T&FF and IZR would over time return Hit to an insurgent sanctuary.

- Insurgent IO campaign for HIT is increasing; with no CF presence T&FF would attempt to intimidate IA BN

**So What?:** A lack of CF presence in Hit in the short term would result in an increase in T&FF and IZR attacks, but would not create an immediate terrorist sanctuary in Hit. In 60 to 90 days, T&FF and IZR would ultimately exert control over Hit through intimidation of the populace. Security, reconstruction, and basic services provided by the local government are essential for limiting T&FF influence in Hit.
**Analysis**

**Facts**

1. II MEF CG requests long term replacement for 22\(^{nd}\) MEU (6 months)
2. 22\(^{nd}\) MEU will not be extended past 15 Feb in MNF-W
3. 2 CMDO BDE redeploy to Baghdad 13 Jan
4. CENTCOM AMHS message 11 Jan 06: 2/1 AD will remain in Kuwait through 30 April. BDE(-) redeploys leaving BN TF, BDE TAC, and entire BDE set of equipment in Kuwait through 30 Mar 07. PTDO for BDE is 15 days
5. BN TF from AD acts as Theater Reserve until reconstitution of 22\(^{nd}\) MEU o/a 25 Feb 06
6. 1/11IF departs MNF-W (20 Jan to 20 Mar). 3/7 IA BDE from force generation replaces them on border

**Assumptions**

1. MNF-W will move 1\(^{st}\) LAR from Rutbah to Hit if 22\(^{nd}\) MEU is not backfilled

**Constraints**

1. MNC-I must submit any request for the Call Forward Force through MNF-I to SECDEF
2. Any RIP/TOA with 22\(^{nd}\) MEU must be completed NLT 15 Feb 06

**Risks & Issues**

1. Risk: Maintaining recent gains in the ERV
   - No backfill uncovers Rutbah by MNF-W plan
2. Issue: May conflict with CENTCOM intent for CFF
3. Risk: A BN TF from AD can be recalled by CENTCOM at any time
MNF-W Justification

- Exploit gains made in OPN SAYAID
- Continued partnership with 1/2/7 IA BDE in Hit
- Stability supports development of district and local Iraqi police
- Maintain presence in Rutbah
Courses Of Action for 22nd MEU Backfill and Way Ahead

- COA 1: Do not source the backfill – (MNF-W internal realignment)
- COA 2: Source the backfill from MND-N or MND-B
- COA 3: Source the backfill from 2/1 AD in Kuwait

Way Ahead: Put out to staff and MNDs for formal staffing, continue to develop courses of action and present a decision brief at the 23 Jan SPM
Police Partnership Program (P3) for September Assessment

10 SEP 05

This briefing is classified Secret
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: X1

Iltizam Mushtarak – United Commitment
P3 Assessment and Way Ahead

Discussion:
- P3 Concept Timeline – training and assessment through the Elections
- P3 Team Update
- Current Assessment and Feedback
- Program Expansion – The Way Ahead in reaching the District and Individual IPS Station Levels (Post Elections)

Planning Timeline:

2005
- JANUARY
- FEBRUARY
- MARCH
- APRIL
- MAY
- JUNE
- JULY
- AUGUST
- SEPTEMBER
- OCTOBER
- NOVEMBER
- DECEMBER
- JANUARY
- FEBRUARY

2006

- MOD 1 TO P3 FRAGO
- Sep 05 Assessment
- Program Expansion

Provincial and District HQs Assessed (P3-P and P3-D)

Provincial Level HQs Assessed (P3-P)

- IPS TRA Assessments
- MNC-I Corps Products
- 100% IPS Stations Assessed

September Assessment – 10 Sep 05

Ilitizam Mushtaraku – United Commitment
P3 Team Update

- MNC-I implemented the P3 Program on 06 MAY 05.
- P3-Reconstruction Teams (P3-R) in reconstructed cities of Fallujah, Samarra, Mosul, and S. Baghdad
- P3-Provincial Teams (P3-P) FOC on 01 July 05 (21 Teams; 3 x P3-P Teams in MND-B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSC</th>
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<td>MND-NC</td>
<td>Anbar, Sulaymaniyah</td>
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<td>MND-B</td>
<td>(3 x P3-P Teams)</td>
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- P3-P Team composition is non-standardized and varies across MSCs.
- IPS in Dahuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah Provinces at local control and operating independently; monitored as necessary by P3-P Teams and IPLOs.
Current Assessment and P3 Manning

(18 Provinces)

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Kirkuk: 0 4 0 18

Based on Sep 05 TRA

Effective
Effective with Limitations
Considerable Limitations
Ineffective

September Assessment – 10 Sep 05

Itizam Mushtarik – United Commitment
Current Assessment of P3

- Based on the TRAs and MSC feedback, the P3 Program is having a positive impact on improving Iraqi Police capability and effectiveness.

- Level of Fidelity of IPS TRAs not equal to those of the IA - P3 Team Construct vs MITT

- P3 (MOI) is now established and is demonstrating improving effectiveness at Ministerial Level.
  - The effectiveness of Iraqi Police Services at each level is heavily dependent on MSC/unit commitment to partnership and the amount of IPLO/IPT support to the MSCs - and the protection and mobility of IPLOs/IPTs

- Assessment and Feedback Points:
  - Sustain:
    - Training Programs – key to longer term development of IPS
    - Coaching and Assisting – to develop staff management skills
    - CPATT Ops (P3) – provides administrative and logistical node to P3 Teams
  - Improve:
    - IPS Budget and Equipment – rudimentary processes and poor management; needs command emphasis
    - Force Protection and Facilities Infrastructure – improving, but still inadequate
    - District/City and Station development – to develop leadership and skill sets
  - Limitations:
    - Out-of-Hide team sourcing
    - Transportation and security of Teams – resource constraints

- Corps Recommendation: Consider expansion of the program. Follow-on P3 Teams to be externally sourced either through NATO/OGA participation or CF partners.
Current P3 Capability

What We Can Do:
- Assessment and mentoring at MOI HQ – Ministerial Level
- Coordination with Regional LNOs and MSCs
- Assessment and mentoring at Provincial HQs
- Limited assessments and mentoring at District/City HQs
- Limited station visits and assessments (45% per month)

What We Can Not Do:
- Standardize teams to conduct assessments and effective mentoring of all subordinate District and City HQs
- Standardize teams to conduct assessments and effective training and development at all stations
- Continuous coverage at District and below
- P3 Teams are not self-sustaining – need FP and logistical support
- TRA Fidelity = MiTT Concept

September Assessment – 10 Sep 05

Ilizam Mushtarak – United Commitment
# PTT Planning Guidelines and Deployment Criteria (Post Elections)

## MOI P3 Team:
- One team for MOI

### Regional LNO Teams:
- 2 IPLOs at each Coalition MSC HQ

### Provincial P3 Teams:
- One team for every Provincial HQ

### District/City PTTs:
- District/City HQ Plan is based on CF priority and security
- One team for every 3 District HQs

### Station PTTs:
- Mobile team headquartered with District/City PTT based on CF
- One team for every 5 Stations

## Deployment Criteria
- Flexibility based on security situation (focus on 9 Cities and TRA)
- Man all Regional LNO positions and P3-P Teams
- 11 Provinces – not including Kurdistan and MND-SE AORs
- Position Mobile PTTs based upon Corps Priorities

## Assumptions:
- Corps already beginning to partner with many MOI Districts/Cities throughout the AOR
- Corps can provide the necessary force protection for teams (where needed)
- Corps can partner at District/City and augment PTT in a formal way (at a minimum, maintain what we have)
Redistribution of Existing IPLO/IPT Assets

(11 Provinces)

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Kirkuk  12  8  35

Based on Sep 05 TRA

Effective
Effective with Limitations
Considerable Limitations
Ineffective

September Assessment - 10 Sep 05
Ilitzam Mushtarak - United Commitment
Initial Redistribution Plan - PTT Capability

By prioritizing our efforts and implementing PTTs at District/Major City and Station Levels:

**What We Can Do:**
- Full time assessments and mentoring at Provincial HQs.
- Significant part-time assessments and mentoring at District/City HQs in priority areas.
- Significant part-time assessments and comprehensive training in stations in priority areas.

**What We Can Not Do:**
- Continuous coverage at District and below
- P3 Teams are not self-sustaining – need FP and logistical support
- TRA Fidelity = MiTT Concept
The Way Ahead

- P3 Conference (Adnan Palace) on 15-16 SEP 05

- Monitor training and assessment at the Provincial and District Levels (Monthly), as well as Station Level (Quarterly), in order to focus effort.

- Continue to analyze and develop the PTT Concept with the MSCs, CPATT, and MOI.

- Post Elections Expansion – Examine 3 COAs:
  - COA 1 – NATO/OGA
  - COA 2 - Externally-sourced
  - COA 3 – MiTTS (IA – Level 2) re-missioned to P3
The Cities Lists

Total Population – 27m
Top Cities – 11.9m – 44%
Kurdish – 5.1m – 19%
All others – 10m – 37%

15 Cities = Election
7 Cities = Baghdad Encirclement
4 Cities = Rat Line

Cities to Control Challenges

Strength of Threat Org, Capability, Activity, Control
Low Med Sig High

Ishtirak wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding