

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Security Transition

Opportunities for Reductions and Off Ramps

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Assumptions and Criteria

Assumptions	Requirements	Criteria
■ MNF-I can improve Iraqi military capabilities more rapidly in 2005 ■ Iraqi Army can provide/enable the framework for ISF wide operations ■ Iraqi Army progress in C2 and framework operations will exceed that of the Iraqi police in 2005 ■ Iraqi Army brigade competence will require about 6 months of development after formation ■ ISF will require some Coalition logistics support through 2005 ■ In less challenged areas, Coalition forces can reduce before Iraqi Army brigades fully demonstrate competence ■ In challenged areas, Coalition forces remain in place until Iraqi Army brigades fully demonstrate competence for several months	■ Capable ISF units and headquarters ■ Competent intelligence systems ■ Police forces, and institutions capable of maintaining domestic ■ Reliable border and infrastructure security forces ■ Special striking forces ■ Iraqi leadership and organizations able to conduct independent counter-insurgency operations ■ National Iraqi organizations that can deploy, manage and support Iraq-wide security operations ■ Wartime mentality & service ethos ■ MOI & MOD institutional capabilities	■ Battalions – Manned and Equipped ■ Brigade Headquarters – Manned and Equipped ■ Brigade Capability – formation plus 6 months of development ■ Force levels and Security Situation ■ High threat areas historic troop to population ratio 20/1000 ■ Al Anbar, Ninewah, N Babil ■ Lower threat areas ■ 15/1000 for Salah ad Din ■ 12/1000 for At Tamin, Baghdad ■ 10/1000 for all others ■ Regional Control—local/provincial military, police and civil coordination ■ National Control—local to national coordination, national government and ministerial C2 and direction




Potential Off Ramp Opportunities

J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D																			
	MNB - NW																																									
	MND - NC											 (-)																														
	MND - NC																										 (-)															
	MND - NC									 (-)																																
	MND - NC									 (-)																																
	MNF - W																																									
	MNF - W													 (-)																												
	MNF - W																																									
	MNF - W																									 (-)																
	MND - BAGHDAD 2/3												 (-)																													
	MND - BAGHDAD 4/3																											 (-)														
	MND - BAGHDAD																																									
	MND - BAGHDAD																																									
						MND - BAGHDAD																																				
	OP RES																																									
	SECFOR																																									
	THEATER SEC																																									

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~




ISF Development and Potential Security Handoff MND-North Center



~~SECRET//REL MCFL//X1~~



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MNB-NW/NE



SECTXN-CF RED/OR 2/11/2005


Sharaka wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding

~~SECRET//REL MCFL//X1~~

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~




IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MNF-West



~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~




IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MND-Baghdad



~~SECRET//REL MCFL//X1~~




***IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
MND-South Center***



~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



***IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
MND-South East***



~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~



Assumptions

- Iraqi Transitional Government will remain committed to MNF-I presence and the UNSCR 1546 process
- Insurgency will continue at roughly the present level throughout 2005 in Sunni areas; security situation across the country will not be uniform
- Properly resourced, trained, and supported, Iraqi Security Forces will be capable of conducting successful counterinsurgency operations
- Iraqi Security Force development will progress as programmed; performance will improve with the Assistance Team concept
- Integrated civil-military action will be required longer than coalition combat formations
- Coalition partners will support new concepts and force posture adjustments, but within their current areas of responsibility
- External support to insurgents will continue, but at reduced levels as Iraqi border forces become more capable

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



2005 Security Transition Strategy

Strategy

- Build Iraqi Army capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations
- Progressively transition counterinsurgency responsibility to capable ISF — Conditions-based
- Adjust Coalition force posture and reduce presence
- Continue ISF development
- Improve Iraqi Government capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations
- Transform nature of coalition

Priorities

- Intelligence
- Police
- Borders
- Army Brigade and Division Headquarters
- MOD/MOI Institutional Capacity
- Integrated Iraqi counterinsurgency planning and execution
- Force Protection
- Continuous Force Transition

SECRET//REL MCFI

OIF 04-06

E-LAD

OIF 05-07

AS OF 28 0800Z JAN 05



MNB-NW



MND-NC



MNF-W



MND BAGHDAD



OP RES

SECFOR

THEATER SECURITY BDE

1/25 SBCT
BOG 09 OCT 05



24 AUG 05



172 SBCT

116 BCT
BOG 01 DEC 05



17 OCT 05



3 UA/ 101 AA

278 BCT
BOG 26 NOV 05



11 OCT 05



1 UA/ 101 AA

1 UA/ 3 ID
BOG 15 JAN 06



01 DEC 05



1 BCT/ 1 AD

3 UA/ 3 ID
BOG 22 JAN 06



07 DEC 05



3 UA/ 4 ID

2 BCT/ 2 ID
BOG 15 AUG 05



2 JUL 05



2/28 ID
PENNSYLVANIA

8 RCT
BOG 15 FEB 06



15 FEB 06



7 RCT

2 RCT
BOG 01 MAR 06



15 MAR 06



5 RCT

155 BCT
BOG 15 JAN 06



29 NOV 05



1 UA/ 4 ID

2 BCT/10 MTN
BOG 6 JUL 05



23 MAY 05



48 BCT
GEORGIA

256 BCT
BOG 7 OCT 05



21 AUG 05



1 UA/10 MTN

2 UA/ 3 ID
BOG 27 JAN 06



12 DEC 05



4 UA/ 101 AA

3 BCT/ 1 AD
BOG 07 FEB 06



18 DEC 05



4 UA/ 4 ID

4 UA/ 3 ID
BOG 06 FEB 06



21 DEC 05



2 UA/ 4 ID

3 ACR
BOG 15 MAR 06



29 JAN 06



2 BCT/ 1 AD

29 BCT
BOG 15 FEB 06



21 DEC 05



1 BCT/1 ID

56 BDE /36ID
BOG 3 FEB 06



23 NOV 05



2 UA/ 101 AA

MNB-NW

MND-NC



12 NOV 05

20 JAN 06

MNF-W



TBD

MND BAGHDAD



10 JAN 06

OP RES


SECFOR

THEATER SECURITY BDE

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~




Partnership



~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MNB-NW/ NE




1.4a

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MND-North Center


HQ 5th RA Division	42nd ID
HQ, 3rd Bde IIF	278 RCT
HQ, 4th ING Division	42nd ID
HQ, 30th ING Brigade	1/3 BCT
HQ, 31st ING Brigade	116 BCT
HQ, 32nd ING Brigade	3/3 BCT
HQ, 33rd ING Brigade	116 BCT




~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MNF-West






~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MND-Center South




HQ, 9th IA Bde	US RFF
HQ, 50th ING Brigade	1 BCT (POL)
HQ, 51st ING Brigade	UKR Bde
HQ, 52nd Brigade	TBD
HQ 8 th ING Div	MND-CS

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MND-South East



8 FEB 05
SECTION OF RED/OR 2/11/2005

Sharaka w... um – Partnership and Understanding

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~

~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~




Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Projected Security Transition



~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~




Opportunities

- Near term opportunities (late spring, early summer)
 - Coalition reductions
 - NL, Ukraine, Poland
 - US reductions unlikely, would not impact MAT augmentation
- Mid to far term opportunities (mid summer to fall)
 - Generally promising
 - Continued reductions in need for sustained Coalition presence
 - Opportunity to form IAG from division designated for OIF 05-07
 - Off ramp between 2-7 more brigades

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Potential 2006 Coalition Posture



~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~




Assumptions

- Dahuk and As Sulaymaniayh will not be augmented by CF
- Maysan will only be augmented by British and this is unlikely
- Muthanna will not be augmented by CF, less MND SE units, when Dutch contingent withdraws
- Irbil will not receive additional CF augmentation
- The IPS in Ninewah will take at least 8 months to regain a proper policing capability
- The IPS in Al Anbar will take at least 12 months to regain a proper policing capability
- The IPS will not collapse completely in any other province
- The Polish Bde will not be reformed once the 800 withdraw
- The Ukrainian Bde will not be replaced by any other CF
- The UK and Italian Bdes may draw down but will remain in theatre in the same AOs until at least Dec 05
- DBE will remain at least constant

~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~




ISF and Coalition Force Projections



~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~



MND NW




DD=Draw Down

~~SECRET//REL MCFL//X1~~




MND NC



~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



MNF W




DD=Draw Down

~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~




MND Baghdad



~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



MND SC




DD=Draw Down

~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~



MND SE



DD=Draw Down

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Regional Iraqi Control to Iraqi Self-Reliance

Regional Iraqi Control (Mid 2005)		National Iraqi Control (Early 2006)		Iraqi Self-Reliance (Mid-Late 2006)	
ISF / ITG	Coalition	ISF / IG	Coalition	ISF / IG	Coalition
■ Maintain local & provincial domestic order ■ Assert territorial control through framework ops ■ Conduct independent COIN operations with CF support only as needed ■ Plan, direct, conduct, and sustain brigade/provincial level security operations ■ Local/provincial police, military, and civil authorities cooperate & coordinate actions ■ ISF freedom of action exceeds that of AIF	■ Continue to conduct unilateral and joint COIN operations ■ Enable independent ISF COIN operations ■ Postured to deliver regional supporting effects to ISF ■ Prepared to defeat external threats ■ Partnership and assistance teams train and advise ISF ■ Separate Coalition C2 structure ■ Handover provincial security responsibility to ISF ■ Small reductions in force posture; reduce presence in cities	■ Maintain national domestic order ■ Enforce rule of law ■ Conduct independent COIN operations ■ Preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and deter external threats with CF support <i>in extremis</i> ■ Plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations ■ National, provincial, & local governments effectively linked ■ Ministries direct, support, and sustain assigned ISF ■ ISF no longer depend on CF to deal with insurgency	■ Assist Iraqi COIN operations ■ Postured to deliver supporting effects to ISF when requested ■ Assistance teams train and advise ISF ■ Combined Coalition & Iraqi C2 structure ■ Progressively transition national security responsibility to ISF ■ Significant reductions in force posture	■ Maintain national domestic order ■ Conduct independent national COIN operations ■ Maintain national security without CF assistance ■ Plan, direct, conduct, and sustain independent national security operations ■ National C2 structure ■ Capable, legitimate, & representative IG ■ Civil and economic infrastructures meet basic needs of Iraqis ■ Insurgent / terrorist threat neutralized ■ Partner in GWOT	■ Assume strategic overwatch ■ Handover national security responsibility to ISF & IG ■ Assistance teams train and advise ISF ■ Rotational training with ISF ■ Cooperative security arrangements with ISF & IG ■ Minimal to no combat forces in-country

Under Development

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Enabling Effects for Regional Iraqi Control

- ISF capable of brigade/provincial level operations
 - All units capable of independent operations
- ISF controls territory across province through framework operations
 - Includes: intelligence collection, security presence, defense of bases/stations, and limited offensive action
- ISF capable of conducting independent COIN operations, with CF support as needed
 - Ability to concentrate and coordinate forces for intelligence-led offensive operations (cordon & search and kill/capture)
- CF capable of providing regional supporting effects to ISF and defeating external threats
 - Includes: kinetic/non-kinetic fires, logistics, transport, QRF, intelligence, communications, and liaison
- Local & provincial domestic order maintained
 - IPS conducting operations within local constraints

Assistance teams and partnership with ISF will facilitate achieving effects

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Enabling Effects for National Iraqi Control

- ISF capable of division/national level operations (as appropriate)
- ISF capable of conducting independent COIN operations
 - Includes framework and offensive operations
- ISF capable of deterring external threats and preserving territorial integrity of Iraq, with CF support *in extremis*
 - Includes border security/policing
- CF capable of providing regional supporting effects to ISF when requested
 - Includes: kinetic/non-kinetic fires, intelligence, and liaison
- National domestic order maintained
- Rule of law established and enforced
- ISF no longer depend on CF to deal with the insurgency

Assistance teams and partnership with ISF will facilitate achieving effects

~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~



Regional Iraqi Control Definition

Regional Iraqi Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby local and provincial Iraqi security forces are sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain security operations at the brigade/provincial level. Command and control structures are functioning, and Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions at the local/provincial level. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF are increased to a level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of anti-Iraqi forces.

Under Regional Iraqi Control, ISF can maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment, assert territorial control through framework operations, and conduct independent counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support only as needed. Coalition forces reduce unilateral operations, increase joint operations, are postured to deliver regional supporting effects to Iraqi security organizations, and are prepared to defeat external threats and preserve Iraq's territorial integrity.

~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~



Required Tasks – Necessary Conditions for Regional Iraqi Control

- Organize, train, and equip local & provincial ISF
- ISF plan, direct, conduct, and sustain brigade/provincial level security operations (as appropriate)
 - Requires 6 months of partnership and assistance team support to deliver full brigade-level capability
- Develop local and provincial C2 structure (JCCs and PJCC)
- Local & provincial Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions
 - Formal supported-supporting relationships unlikely to exist
 - Solutions likely to vary by province based on pragmatic development of working relationships
- Increase ISF capabilities to level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of AIF
- Combined ISF capability sufficient for operating area and threat level

~~SECRET//REL MGFI//X1~~



National Iraqi Control Definition

National Iraqi Control is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security forces are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations. Iraq's national, provincial, and local government organizations are effectively linked, with ministries that can deploy and support integrated and complementary security operations throughout the country. A combined Coalition-Iraqi command and control structure is in place to plan and execute national level counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF have increased to a level where they no longer depend on CF to deal with the insurgency.

Under National Iraqi Control, ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, preserve Iraq's territorial integrity, and deter threats to the national security of Iraq with Coalition support *in extremis*. Coalition forces assist Iraqi operations as needed, remain postured to deliver supporting effects to the ISF when requested, and progressively transition national security responsibilities to the Iraqis.

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Required Tasks – Necessary Conditions for National Iraqi Control

- Organize, train, and equip national ISF
 - Development of an Officer Corps within each service of the ISF
- ISF plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations (as appropriate)
 - With minimal CF direct support (logistics, transportation, comms etc.)
- National, provincial, and local government organizations effectively linked
- MOD/MOI direct, support, and sustain assigned ISF throughout Iraq
 - Formal national supported-supporting relationships unlikely to exist
- Develop combined Coalition & Iraqi C2 structure
 - National level counterinsurgency planning and execution capability
 - Able to coordinate MOD, MOI, and Coalition force operations
- ISF and INIS collect, share, and exploit intelligence
- ~~Security ministries supported by essential functions (judiciary, prisons, etc.)~~