March 2006 Force Structure
Assessment
Decision Brief

Problem Statement: How can we adjust our force structure to best allow us to meet our strategic objectives?

The overall classification of this brief is SECRET//REL TO AUS, CAN, AND GBR//ORCON//20151214

As of: 03 Mar 06
ACTO: (b)(3), (b)(6)
### 1/10 MTN Decision Linkage

#### Decisions

**BTT Realignment (20 Feb MNC --- Mar MNF)**
- Regional BTT and MiTT Remain vic Najaf

**Theater Security Forces allocated to Baghdad**
- Backfills A/C 1-121 IN (329 Soldiers)

**8 IA Assumes (Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, Karbala)**
- 1/8 IA (Apr 06); 2/8 IA (Apr 06)
- DIV, BDE, BN MiTTs
- PRT (Najaf) w/ Reg (BTT)
- Regional PRT in FOB Kalsu

**Curtail 1/10 MTN (TOA 30 Apr 06) (Current Plan)**
- 3/6 IA and 5/6 IA (Mar 06)
- Abu Ghraib not closed

**Close Abu Ghraib / Occupy Camp Cropper (May)**
- Prisoner Release 15 Jun 06

**BOG 1/10 MTN (TOA – 01 Jul 06) (Proposed)**
- Tactical Overwatch Baghdad
- Abu Ghraib definitely closed

#### B/S Realignment Affecting Off-Ramp

**YES =** No need for CF South of City of Najaf

**NO =** Cannot Reduce B/S 2/4 BCT covers twice B/S

Backfill TQ Requirements May 2006

**YES =** MND-B Lead in Baghdad & Babil Only
- Tactical Overwatch in Najaf, Karbala, Wasit, Qadisiyah
- Start Transfer FOB Charlie & Duke move to Babil
- Work Temporary Boundary Change 8 IA S of Kalsu
- June Start rolling up BN MiTTs

**YES =** Same Battlespace; BN (-) to VBC; ABU G BN
- 2/101 AA twice the B/S & 3/6 IA only assumed 1 month
- 2/101 AA possible unit for curtailment (Aug-Sep)

**NO =** No Closure – Bn must remain to guard

**YES =** Frees up BN (+) not required to Backfill

**YES =** Realign Battlespace between 2/101 AA & 3/6 IA
- Reassign Tasks between 2/101 AA and 3/6 IA
Background and Timeline

**Problem Statement:** How can we adjust our force structure to best allow us to meet our strategic objectives?

**Background:**
- CENTCOM Posturing for the Long War plan
- JS approved OIF 06-08 Force Rotation is 13 x BCTs in Iraq + 1 x BCT for Call Forward and 1 x BCT PTDO (No URF Backfill Identified for 1/10 MTN and 2-28 IN)
- CFC FRAGO 09-928 Establishment of CENTCOM Theater Reserve
- OIF 06-08 sourced for 13 + 1 + 1 x BCTs
- Off Ramping Potential based on ISF Capabilities
- Other factors relating to the decision:
  - Threat Environment
  - Battlespace and Partnership Realignment
  - Off Ramp Model (4 IA BDEs = 1 US BDE)
  - Provincial Conditions
  - Risk (Operational / Strategic)
Facts and Assumptions

Facts
1. 2-28 BOG: 26 JUN 06  1/10 BOG: 11 AUG 06
2. TOA occurs 10 days before BOG
3. Decision to return 1-506 IN to MND-B NLT 15 Apr 06
4. 2 BCT, 1 AD (Theater Reserve) provides CDR USCENTCOM with operational flexibility to the shape the AOR and respond to terrorist attacks
5. Corps Decisive Operation – Battlespace Transition
6. Off Ramp Model: 4 IA BDE = 1 CF BDE
7. 1-10 MTN currently 1x BDE & 4x BN MiTTs OOH (Ext fill Apr 06)
8. 2-28 IN currently 2x BN MiTTs OOH
9. MNF-W internal MiTTs provided: 2x BDE and 6x BN MiTTs
10. MNF-W will receive the Theater Security backfill

Assumptions
1. ISF development continues and ISF assumes battlespace as projected (Mar 06 Assessment)
2. Sunni insurgency will not expand; over time, political inclusion will diminish rejectionist component of insurgency so ISF can contain
3. AIF attack trends will continue in the same battlespace
4. 3 non-US MND HQs remain through 2006 (UK, POL, ROK)
5. Mol forces in Key Cities assume counter-insurgency lead by end 2006
6. Provincial elections in mid-July timeframe
7. Camp Cropper will be completed by late May 06.
8. Prisoner transfer from Abu Ghraib to Cropper complete NET 1 JUN
9. Curtailed unit sustain enablers, including TTs, through BOG date
10. External MiTT teams (1 BDE & 4 BN) replacing 1/10 ready for employment NLT Apr 06
11. Most TPS from 1/10 MTN and 2/28 IN remains in theater for redistribution. Excess Property turned in prior to RIP/TOA.
12. All of 8IA assumes battlespace NLT Jul 06
13. Najaf, Sulaymaniyah, & Dahouk relieved of BN / BDE BTTs

Constraints
1. 15 day RIP/TOA model – No Backfill Model
2. 10 day post TOA Retrograde to meet BOG
3. Base Closure/Transfer Process (100 Day model)
4. BCT Realignment requires Disruption of Partnerships (OOH TTs)
5. PRT, PTT, MiTT security/support requirements

Issues
1. Abu Ghraib Transfer Timeline
2. Realign BTT requirements for Regions 1 & 5 DBE Border units
Transition Readiness Assessment
Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on MAR TRA data)

- 3/7 and 2/9 in force generation 3/9 not formed
- 7 IA DIV HQ assumes battlespace in Jan 07
- 9 IA DIV HQ is still in force generation
## US Offramp Opportunities
(1 FEB TRA Data)

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- **MND-N**: 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12
- **MND-B**: 3, 5, 7, 8, 9
- **MNF-W**: 3, 4

**Offramp Opportunity Model**

- $4 \times \text{IA BDE} = 1 \text{ CF BDE}$
MND-B Conditions (30 April 06)

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in MND-B Sector.
- Increase in Effective Attack trends over past 90 day period.
- No apparent increase in T&FF flow into MND-Baghdad.
- Sectarian violence increase in trend over past 90 days.

Security:
- 5 of 8 (63%) of IA Brigades at TRA Level 2, assumed battlespace (Baghdad)
- 1 Jul 06 – 6 of 8 (75%) of IA Brigades at TRA Level 2, assumed battlespace (Baghdad)
- Iraqi Police at Provincial Level maintaining domestic order – some areas need improvement.
- Formal agreement for MOD and MOI roles/missions (Joint MOU).
- National Police (2 POBs, 1 CMDO, 1 MECH) Operating in Baghdad.

Governance/Economic:
- National Ministerial Capacity needs improvement.
- National government able to improve essential services.
- No Provincial Budget to improve essential services
- No significant increase in employment.
- Abu Ghraib does not fall under Amanat for essential services.
- Still No National Logistical System – Contract Logistics Standard
MND-N Conditions (15 May 06)

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in MND-N
- Infrastructure attacks increased over past 90 days
- Decrease in attack trends in Ninawa over 90 day period
- No apparent increase in T&FF flow across into Ninawa (threat due to WERV operations)
- Sectarian violence increase in trend over past 90 days.
- T&FF will continue to use northern corridor as smuggling route into Iraq

Security:
- May 06 - 0 of 3 (0%) of II) BDEs at TRA Level 2, assume battlespace (Ninawa) but improved by 3 months in March TRA
- Iraqi Police at Provincial, District and Station Level in place and functioning
- PJCC Operational and working with PRDC and PRT (functional) in Mosul
- Border Security Forces tactical integration linked in with 3 IA BDE at Sinjar

Governance/Economic:
- National Ministerial Capacity needs improvement.
- Local Government incapable at providing essential services
- Lack of Electricity hampering economic and employment growth
COA 1 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MiTT Requirements (Based on MAR TRA data)

**Risk:**
- **Threat:** 5.2% of AIF attacks occur in the 1/10 and 1/1 AOs (30 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Ghraib Qada & Western Ninawa
- **TRA:** 15 out of 36 IA Bde Level 2 or better (1/6 & 3/6)
- **Partnership Transitions:** 6

**Transition Teams:**
- No additional external transition teams required.
- 1/10 receives backfill in April.
- 1/1 no internal MiTTs.
- RFF submitted for next three curtail / BOGs. 15 MiTTs + 252 x augmentees required NET Aug 06

**Discussion:**
- Strategic advantages, perception of improved GOI and ISF capability
- Curtail / BOG conditions not met yet
- Provides most time to plan / execute future B/S realignment

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COA 1: Curtail 1/10 (30 Apr 06); Curtail 2-28 (15 May 06)

1/10 MTN Timeline

- 30 Apr 06 TOA with internal realignment
- MND-B Realigns Battlespace (5 BCTs) (2/101 & 1/4 refocus)
- Security tasks for Abu Ghraib remain – must be reassigned
- Partnerships in 1/6 and 3/6 IA realigned
- 6 and 8 IA have not completely assumed battlespace
- 2/1 AD Remains as the Theater Reserve

2-28 IN / 1/1 AD(-)

- 15 May TOA w/ 1/1 AD (-)
- MND-N sends 1/1 AD (-) to Ramadi
- 2-37 AR remains in Tal Afar, 1-36 in Hit Feb 06
- 172 SBCT increases battlespace to Sinjar (Attach 2-37 AR)
- W - SWCT increases battlespace to Sinjar (Attach 2-37 AR)
- Provincial Reconstruction Team Operational in Ninawa
- 2/1 AD Remains as the Theater Reserve
COA 2 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MiTT Requirements (Based on MAR TRA data)

**Risk:**
- **Threat:** 5.2% of AIF attacks occur in the 1/10 and 1/1 AOIs (30 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Ghraib Qada & Western Ninawa
- **TRA:** 27 out of 36 IA Bde Level 2 or better (All 6 & 8 IA except 4/6 in Aug); All 3 IA Bdes TRA Level 3
- **Partnership Transitions:** 6
- **Transition Teams:** No additional external transition teams required.
  - 1/10 will receive backfill in April. 1/1 provides no internal MiTTs.
  - RFF submitted for next three curtail / BOGs. 15 MiTTs + 252 x augmentees required NET Aug 06

**Discussion:**
- Strategic advantages, perception of improved GOI and ISF capability
- Curtail / BOG conditions are met (Abu Ghraib transfer)
- Curtail / BOG occurs prior to potential election window
- Provides more time to plan / execute future B/S realignment

- **3/7 and 2/9 in force generation 3/9 not formed**
- **7 IA DIV HQ assumes battlespace in Jan 07**
- **9 IA DIV HQ is still in force generation**

**15 + 1 x BCT Set**

**Projected 13 + 1 x BCT Set**

**Total BCTs: 2**
- Personnel: 7472

**Total TTs: 15**
- Personnel: 421

**Currently Owns Battlespace**

**JAN06**  **FEB**  **MAR**  **APR**  **MAY**  **JUN**  **JUL**  **AUG**  **SEP**  **OCT**  **NOV**  **DEC06**

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Approved for Release
COA 2: BOG 2-28 IN (26 Jun 06); Curtail 1/10 MTN (1 Jul 06)

1/10 MTN
- 1 JUL 06 internal TOA
- Abu Ghraib transfer complete
- All of 6 & 8 IA assumed under their DIV HQs
- Battlespace below N. Babil under overwatch
- Provincial Reconstruction Team – Baghdad Operational
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve

2-28 IN / 1/1 AD(-)
- 16 Jun TOA w/ 1/1 AD (-)
- MND-N sends 1/1 AD (-) to Ramadi
- 2-37 AR remains in Tal Afar, 1-36 in Hit Feb 06
- 172 SBCT increases battlespace to Sinjar
- West- SW Ninawa – 2 & 3 IA partnered with 172 SBCT
- Provincial Reconstruction Team Operational in Ninawa
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve

2/28 IN Timeline
1/10 MTN Timeline
Provincial Election Window
15 day RIP/TOA
10 day Retro

RIP
TOA
BOG

11/28 ID
1/10 MTN

BOG Jun 06
Curtail Jul 06

RIP
TOA
BOG

11/28 ID
1/10 MTN

This document is approved for release.
## COA 3 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MiTT Requirements (Based on MAR TRA data)

**Risk:**
- **Threat:** 5.2% of AIF attacks occur in the 1/10 and 1/1 AOs (30 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Ghrabi Qada & Western Ninawa
- **TRA:** 31 out of 36 IA Bde Level 2 or better (All 6 & 8 IA); All 3 IA Bdes TRA Level 3
- **Partnership Transitions:** 6

**Transition Teams:**
- No additional external transition teams required.
- 1/10 will receive backfill in April.
- 1/1 provides no internal MiTTs. RFF submitted for next three curtail / BOGs. 15 MiTTs + 252 x augmentees required NET Aug 06

**Discussion:**
- Strategic advantages, perception of improved GOI and ISF capability
- Curtail / BOG conditions are met (Abu Ghrabi transfer)
- Curtail / BOG occurs during to potential election window
- Less time to set conditions for future curtailment / BOGs
- More time to consolidate and reorganize battlespace

### Currently Owns Battlespace

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- 3/7 and 2/9 in force generation 3/9 not formed
- 7 IA DIV HQ assumes battlespace in Jan 07
- 9 IA DIV HQ is still in force generation
Recommendation: COA 2

Recommendation: Continue with Current Off-Ramp Schedule if Following Are Set:
- BOG 2-28 IN, TOA 16 Jun 06 – No backfill
- Curtail 1/10 MTN 1 Jul 06 (curtail = TOA) - No backfill

Conditions:
- 1/10 MTN (July 2006):
  - Abu Ghraib prisoners transferred to Camp Cropper
  - 1 JUL 06: All 6 & 8 IA BDEs have assumed battlespace under their DIV HQs (except 4/6: Aug)
  - Victory Base Security Plan resolved to consolidate Security Missions
  - No Increase in “Effective Attacks” throughout MND-Baghdad
  - Improvement in essential services, continuity of civil projects in Abu Ghraib
- 2/28 IN (1/1 AD) (June 2006):
  - 01 Jun 06: 2/2, 3/2, 1/3, 2/3, 3/3 IA only units still Level 3 in MND-N
  - BOG of 26 Jun 06 provides MND-N more time to consolidate and reorganize battlespace
  - No increase in “Effective Attacks” in MND-N
  - Improvement in essential services, continuity of civil projects in Tal Afar
Off Ramp Courses of Action

COA 1 --- 1/10 Curtail (30 Apr); 2-28 Curtail (15 May)

Rationale: Risk Mitigation for off-ramps and provides operational flexibility given threat and elections

COA 2 --- 2-28 BOG (26 Jun); 1/10 Curtail (1 Jul)

COA 3 --- 2-28 BOG (26 Jun); 1/10 BOG (11 Aug)

* Curtailing Affects Sourcing of Internal MiTTs, PRT Security, Partnerships, and Multiple RIPs

Legend:
- 90 day review
- DP for 1/10 & 2/28

Potential PTDO Candidates

* 2/1 AD available until Nov 06
COA 3: BOG 2-28 IN (26 Jun 06); BOG 1/10 MTN (11 Aug 06)

1/10 MTN Timeline
- 1 Aug TOA with internal backfill
- RIP/TOA during potential election window
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve
- Provincial Reconstruction Team – Baghdad Operational
- Abu Gharib Transfer Complete; 6 IA positioned to secure Abu G

2-28 IN / 1/1 AD(-)
- 16 Jun TOA w/ 1/1 AD (-)
- MND-N sends 1/1 AD (-) to Ramadi (AR, CAV, FA)
- 2-37 AR remains in Tal Afar, 1-36 in Hit
- 172 SBCT increases battlespace to Sinjar
- West- SW Ninawa – 2 & 3 IA partnered with 172 SBCT
- Provincial Reconstruction Team Operational in Ninawa
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve
### Strategic Risk

**Curtail / BOG BCTs / Theater Reserve remains in Kuwait**

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<th>Risk Mitigation</th>
<th>Residual Risk</th>
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| **International media question premature US withdrawal, and GOI ill-prepared** | - Insurgents increase effort for Info Ops win  
- Coalition nations seek to accelerate own withdrawal | Coalition off-ramp plans impact US ability to off-ramp BCTs and/or enablers | - Coordinated US and theater message  
- Maintain Theater Reserve in place at TF (+) level  
- Enhanced Coalition engagement | Low - Medium |
| **Loss of Operational Flexibility with Curtailments** | - MNC-I loses some ability to assume risk greater than medium level  
- IO - AQAM claims victory | • MAS moves to gain more power as CF leaves  
• Directs large Shia moves to force reaction from GOI and possibly CF | • IO Campaign predicting power grab but urging support to GOI  
• Link redeployment and curtailments to conditions achieved  
• BCT/JA PTDO Status | Medium |
| **IA unit suffers defeat after curtailment / BOG of BCT** | - Insurgents (especially T&FF) continue to exploit seam/gap to break Coalition will  
- Insurgents gain IO win that sustains their will to continue the fight  
- MND must rush forces to affected area – degrades legitimate government | • Iraqis feel they may be abandoned and decrease assistance / cooperation with CF  
• Perception that CF are leaving before ISF are ready | • IO campaign explaining ISF ready to assume missions under GOI control  
• Increase MiTT coverage and partnership contact immediately following offramp  
• Designate IA OPRES  
• IP Development | Low - Medium |
| **Not curtailing forces creates perception that the Coalition is failing – opens door for AQAM to take initiative** | - Continued degradation of Coalition will to sustain fight  
- Increased political stress on Coalition nations to seek early exit | • Concerted effort both IO and kinetic to cause casualties to CF and ISF to demonstrate losing effort | • Concerted PAO Campaign to describe CF planned turnover of mission to a new ally – Iraq  
• Establish Adaptable Theater Reserve construct for rapid reinforcement | Low |