Rural Terrain at the edge of the Desert

Rural/Suburban Terrain
POPULATION DENSITY

CITIES IN BCT AO

Ar Ramadi 445,800
Khalidiyah 16,500
Habbiniyah 1,000
Al Taash 5,000

Largest Cities (2002 est.)

Baghdad 5,605,000
Mosul 1,740,000
Al Basrah 1,338,000
Arbil 840,000
Kirkuk 729,000
As Sulaymaniyah 643,000
An Najaf 563,000
Karbala 550,000
An Nasiriyyah 535,000
Al Hillah 525,000
CLIMATOLOGY

- SUMMER MONTHS (MAY - OCTOBER)
  - HOT, DRY, CLOUDLESS
  - TEMPERATURE IN EXCESS OF 100F
  - STRONG WINDS
    • SHARQI, SHAMAL

- WINTER MONTHS (NOVEMBER - APRIL)
  - PRECIPITATION AT HIGHEST LEVELS

- WEATHER IMPACTS
  - PERSONNEL: DEHYDRATION, SUN AND WIND BURNS
  - EQUIPMENT: EXCESSIVE WEAR, OVERHEATING

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<th>JAN</th>
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• Sudden sand storms may reduce visibility to less than 5 meters very quickly
• Not as severe near urban areas
• In the open desert they can force march speeds to a crawl
• The use of ballistic goggles/Wiley-X protective sunglasses, and face scarves will mitigate the effects to personnel
• Environmental contaminants in blowing sand frequently cause minor eye, and respiratory infections
• Daily service is required for systems with air quality standards (rotary wing aircraft, laptops, ECUs, etc.)
Battle Space:
- Rivers define mobility
- Flat/Gentle-Slope Irrigated Farmland
- Elevated Roads and Causeways
- Micro-Compartments: Maze of Berms, Ditches, Hedges, Palm Orchards, & Sprawl between towns
• AO TOPEKA is a very tribal area; four major tribal confederations
  – Dualym (by far the largest and most powerful; most local tribes fall within the Dulaymi)
    – Sub tribes like Fahad, Ghanim, Risha, Faraj, Diab, Chulab, Sulayman, Jasim, Khalifa
  – Shammari (mostly in the southern desert regions of AO TOPEKA)
    – Obaydi
    – Jabburi
• Tribes constitute a feudal shadow government that undermines central government
• Tribes operate like Mafia families: they continually fight within themselves and against one another for power and money; they have only negative power (won’t build a factory, but can incite cause violence)
• Sheikhs will continuously try to enrich themselves at the costs of others; be careful of giving one sheikh too much attention while ignoring the others
• There are two ways to win the “hearts and minds” of sheikhs
  – Money
  – Force (kill, detain, and/or threaten source(s) of income)

RECOMMENDATION: MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH SHEIKHS, WORK WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
• The Dulaymi Tribes of Anbar are split because they have two leaders and two sources of money
  – Sheikh Majed Abdul Razaq Ali Sulayman (and family) aligned with the coalition and head of the Dulaymi Tribal Confederation (Blood Rights) after Mudhir Kharbit fled Iraq for exile in Jordan
  – Sheikh Mudhir Abdul Kareem Thiab Kharbit (and family) aligned with ACF
• Mudhir was leader of the Dulaymi, but fled the country in summer 2003 when the decision was made to detain him; Majed then took control of the confederation
• Most sheikhs are playing both sides and waiting to see who wins; there can be only one tribal leader; it will either be a Kharbit or an Ali Sulayman; the loser will probably end up dead
• All tribes have ACF and criminal elements, some more so than others
• All tribal leaders are overtly pro-coalition at this time; many sheikhs work with ACF however
• “Saddam” sheikhs are more prone to be ACF (false sheikhs appointed by Saddam Hussein)
• Regardless of their current allegiance, most sheikhs do not want Shia dominance of Iraq and many see a constitutional monarchy as a means for them to perpetuate their power
TRIBES IN RAMADI AND SURROUNDING AREA

There are approximately 27 tribes in the Ar Ramadi area. 70% of the sheiks follow the family Al-Bu-Ali Sulayman. The Dulaym Tribe of Al Anbar is comprised of 3.5 – 4 million people. There are many "sub tribes" under the Dulaym Tribe. The leaders of the Dulaym are the Sheiks Amr Abd Al-Jabar Ali Sulayman and Majid Abd Alrazaq Ali Sulayman. Of the many tribes in AO Tappos and Ar Ramadi the two that maintain the most influence are the Khartibes (Khaltlawas) and the Sulaymams (Assaf). They both claim leadership of the Dulaym confederation and compete for coalition contracts as well as putting their own tribal members in key government positions so they can maintain influence of Al Anbar Province. Abu Alwan tribe is the predominate tribe in Ar Ramadi proper.

Tribal Key: (ALL Claim Pro-CF)
Actively Hostile (Kharbit)
Neutral/Hostile Elements
Neutral/Cooperative
Actively Pro-CF
Unknown
Tribal Friction Point
TRIBES IN AO CURRAHEE

Tribal Key: (ALL Claim Pro-CF)
Actively Hostile (Kharbit)
Neutral/Hostile Elements
Neutral/Cooperative
Actively Pro-CF
Unknown

OBAID
(Non-DULAYMI)

BALI

FAHD

KHALIFA

Heterogeneous
Khalifa, Ghortan,
Hazeem, Mohemdi

Heterogeneous
Khalifa, Ghortan,
Hazeem, Mohemdi

MEHEMDI

MAR'AI

FALAHAT
CURRENT SITUATION

Insurgents continue to adapt techniques and tactics (locals are adopting extremist tactics)

- Emergence of AT mines (Khalidiyah/Hit), reemergence of Sniper fire (Ramadi/Tammin), and a shifting of POO sites. Surge in sniper signifies enemy attempt to regain the psychological advantage through terror tactics in response to increase in CF sniper and stay behind operations. IDF POOs are tested and proven over months of use so insurgents can take there pick from multiple sites as they have their firing tables well established.

- After two weeks of ECPs in the city insurgents attacks a VCP with an SVBIED after observing operations at this ECP and identifying a point of attack. This tactic symbolizes the maturity of the insurgency in AO TOPEKA with the ability to patiently observe a target, gather resources/fighters, formulate a plan, and attack.

Internal conflict within the insurgency

- There are members of national level insurgencies, specifically Jaysh Mohammed, Ansar al Islam, and Ansar Al-Sunna conducting meetings in and around Baghdad to redefined the direction of the insurgency in Iraq

- Ideological differences at regional and group leader level trickle down to skirmishes cell level and below

- Most of the contention in the insurgent groups stem from two main topics:
  - The successful results of the elections require a reaction from the insurgents, either participation in the new government (older insurgents) or continued violence (newer radicals).
  - Disagreement between locals insurgents and transitory extremist groups as to whether or not to have Iraqi police should take control of security in Ar Ramadi
    - AMZ put out message calling local insurgent leaders Mohammad Daham Abd and Mahmud Latif “infidels” and traitors to the cause. Possibly because they are backing return of local police.

ASSESSMENT: Post Al-Fajr many of the insurgent groups shifted west towards Ramadi, and attempted to reassert their control of the local population. Although insurgent groups initially formed alligences (locals and external extremists) after the elections were conducted successfully a rift emerged between local and external extremist groups. Locally, another fracture was created between the old and young. Infighting will continue to establish the pecking order post election. Insurgents will again step up their intimidation campaign on the public and new government officials. External extremists will continue high casualty producing attacks on TIG/CF/ISF.
• Sustain IED, SAF and indirect fire attacks against CF to inflict casualties, attack newly elected government officials
• Sustain IO campaign painting CF as “violent occupiers”, portray ECPs as an oppressive unilateral action by CF without support of TIG and portray National Saturday holiday as CF attempt to convert Arabs into Jews and Christians.
• Sustain intimidation campaign (kidnappings/assassinations) of government officials, contractors, and coalition supporters.
• Attack newly deployed and formed ISF/IAF forces to portray their weakness, illegitimacy and inability to secure the local population. By forcing IAF/ISF to retreat and melt away, CF is pushed back to the forefront and easier to target. Insurgents then could target CF with impunity.
• Infiltrate local ISF and government workers for influence and intelligence
• Recon and target municipal buildings Police Stations, Mayors Office, government offices, CF bases and outposts.
• Attempt to regain population support by offering to help with security (local police force) and municipal services.
• Utilize mass casualty producing weapons (SVBIED, suicide bombers) to intimidate population and portray CF illegitimacy.
PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF ANBAR INSURGENCY

International

National/Regional

Local

AQ Bin Ladin

AMZ

QJBR/JTJ
SAJ/HARUN
AI/AS
JM/MA
GB

DAHAM

KRTAN GRP
20th BN
NU’AMAN BN
AL AMIR GRP
Black Flag
Bakr

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Approved for Release
INSURGENT GROUPS IN AR-RAMADI
INSURGENT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES FOR TARGETING ING IN AR RAMADI

SOURCE: DIIR IMEF HET02 0214 05

• INSURGENTS USE THE IRAQI TRAFFIC POLICE, WHO MAINTAIN A CHECKPOINT AT //MGRS: 1.4a TO ALERT INSURGENTS OF THE DEPARTURE OF IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD (ING) PERSONNEL FROM THE 60TH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS. INSURGENTS USE THIS INFORMATION TO KIDNAP AND EXECUTE ING PERSONNEL.

• BEGINNING IN THE TAMIM AREA, INSURGENTS PATROL IN VEHICLES LABELED AS TAXIS. THEY CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE ON THE AREA IN FRONT OF CAMP RAMADI’S OGDEN GATE //MGRS: 1.4a THEN MOVE NORTH ON ROUTE PACER ACROSS THE SOUTH BRIDGE TO SURVEY ROUTE BUCKEYE WHICH LEADS TO THE ENTRY CONTROL POINT (ECP) OF THE ING HEADQUARTERS.

• INSURGENTS ALSO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE AT THE BAGHDAD GARAGE //MGRS: 1.4a WHICH IS THE MAIN TRANSIT CENTER IN AR RAMADI. INSURGENTS HAVE PEOPLE STAGED IN VEHICLES IN THIS AREA LOOKING FOR MILITARY AGED MALES. ONCE SPOTTED, INSURGENTS DON THEIR MASKS, APPROACHED THE YOUNG MALES, THEN SEARCH THEM FOR ING IDENTIFICATION AND QUESTION THEM AS TO THEIR REASON FOR BEING IN AR RAMADI.

Assessment: AIF are continuing to target ING personnel in order to terrorize the populace and destabilize the Iraqi government in order to discouraging local nationals from cooperating with CF.
AO TOPEKA MONTHLY ACTIVITY 01SEP04 TO 08MAR05

ASSESSMENT:

IEDs and SAF have remained the insurgents main focus of attacks. The last 4 months IEDs have taken precedence over SAF attacks. IEDs and SAF have shown to be concentrated along MSRs and ASRs. IDF has been slowly decreasing the last 5 months, which could be due to the high volume of cache finds. The high volume of VBIEDs during the months of October and November was due to the increased efforts of insurgents during Ramadan.

TOTALS

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AVERAGES:

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<td>SAF:</td>
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<tr>
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3rd LAR’s CACHE 38S LC 70687 09294
CACHE DISCOVERED AT THE AL HAQ MOSQUE IN RAMADI
CACHE DISCOVERED AT THE AL HAQ MOSQUE IN RAMADI

Declassified on: 201506
## INSURGENT NETWORK UPDATE

### C2
- **Impacts:** Friction between AMZ against Daham and MML, resulting in fighting between the groups.
  - Meeting between Sheiks, IIPs, and QJBR members show a rift among the insurgency.
  - ECPs constrain movement and ability to meet in Ramadi in person.
- **Upgrades:** Establishing new C2 in Ramadi through promotions (Nasser is new OPO for Harun).
- **Movements:** Insurgent leaders are coming through ECPs unarmed for meetings.

### SUSTAINMENT
- **Impacts:** Constrained movement in the city forced insurgents to establish new caches or reuse old ones outside the city limits in Jazirah, Sophia, and Tammin and use boats as primary mode of trans.
- **Upgrades:** RPGs are being brought into AO Topeka from Baghdad.
- **Movements:** Complications with bringing weapons and explosives into Ramadi.

### SAFE HAVEN
- **Impacts:** Ramadi has been taken away as a convenient safe haven with ECPs.
- **Upgrades:** Insurgents are acquiring land and houses outside of Ramadi.
- **Movements:** With control access of city fighters may move outside of the city to have better freedom of movement, Jazirah, Sophia, Zangora, Tammin, and Tash.

### MANPOWER
- **Impacts:** Fighting between groups resulting in loss of manpower for AIF groups.
  - General split between young radical Islamists and older peers on insurgent activities.
- **Upgrades:** Amir has 5 Syrians, active aggressive recruiting campaign by insurgents, unemployment contributing to manpower pool.
- **Movements:** Recruiting has moved to outlying areas focused on Mosques.

### Population
- **Impacts:** Civilians are starting to take a more proactive stance against AIF.
  - Civilians firing on AIF in order to keep them from conducting IDF from their homes.
- **Upgrades:** QJBR threatening to behead anyone who works with the IP, ING, or CF.
  - AIF are continuing to intimidate the populous by increasing execution style killings.
- **Movements:** NONE

### Status Indicators
- **AIF INEFFECTIVE**
- **AIF EFFECTIVE**
- **CF INEFFECTIVE**
INTEL SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION

2/5
HET 2
3 X DRAGON EYE
1 X ASAS
MRS
RVT

PROPHET HAMMER
506th INF
THT 171(+)
6 X RAVENS
1 X ASAS
RVT

BDE HQ
PROPHET HAMMER
TROJAN D- LITE
DRT
1 X SAVAGE
UAV FWD
THT 170 / 172
REMBASS
CGS/GCS/RVT/MRS
6 X ASAS
1-9 INF BN
6 X RAVENS
1 X ASAS
THT 632
44th ENG
6 X RAVENS
1 X ASAS

503rd INF
HET 6 (2 pax)
THT 631
6 X RAVENS
2 X ASAS
RVT
1 X SAVAGE

UAV LAR SITE
2 X Shadow 200s
1 X GCS and L&R S

* Shipped to US for repair
INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES

• **Interpreters**
• **Communications**
  – Dissemination of UAV feed, imagery Access
  – Communication real time with remote sensitive collectors
• **Data Mining search capability**
• **National or regional identity database for citizens of the province and the nation**