MEMORANDUM

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: L. Paul Bremer III

SUBJECT: Turkish Activities in the North

The CPA Coordinator for Northern Iraq has just reported that the Turks are providing paramilitary and weapons training to 100 Turcomans in the Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) compound in Erbil. As you know, the PMF was established with a document signed by the U.S., UK, Turkey, and the KDP and PUK. Acting for two signatories, the KRG Parliament two months ago called for the removal of the PMF from Northern Iraq. Our coordinator confirms local sources who indicate that the PMF has not been deployed on the PUK-KDP border for over a year, so this activity is a new and unhelpful development.

Turkish paramilitary training of the Turcomans is not only a continuing irritant to the Iraqi Kurds but also may impact the ability of the Turks to serve as credible peacekeepers in Iraq.

I recognize that at the moment we have bigger fish to fry with the Turks. But we need to be ready, again, to address Turkey’s unhelpful activities in Northern Iraq.

Attachment: as stated.
Turkish Military Activity in North

Coordinator was informed by KRG MOI on 23 July that the "Turks had recruited and are training in their PMF compound in Erbil 100 Turcoman recruits from TallAfar". The training is said to include school of the soldier type training with weapons. The source, (b)(5), is trusted and in a position to know the information reported.

Coordinator has been in the North over three months crossing the KDP-PUK border at least two times per week and has never observed the PMF deployed along the old inter party borders. Local sources say they have not been deployed in over one year.

It has now been over two months since the joint declaration of the KRG parliament, one of the signatories to the document establishing the PMF, that essentially asked for the removal of the force from Northern Iraq. The question is: who on the US side is working this issue and the issue of overt TU military Intel presence in Erbil? Do the TU have unlimited authority in the North to recruit and train para-military forces that are supposedly banned?

If TU is to be considered for any future role in peace monitoring in Iraq, there appears to be a need to achieve some understanding of their role in the North. The KRG as you might imagine, does not want their continued presence in the North nor will they tolerate some kind of "logistic tail" through the North to any peace monitoring activity in other parts of Iraq.
CCJ5-PSE POINT PAPER
POLICY ON KADEK (FORMER PKK) IN IRAQ

Background:
JCSJ5 requested USCENTCOM review of the subject OSD draft policy guidance (Tab A).

The PKK/KADEK question has been to the Deputies. It will go to the Principals, who will address the possibility of changing OIF Rules of Engagement (ROE) to declare PKK/KADEK a hostile force, thereby making PKK/KADEK an authorized target set under OIF ROE. If a decision is taken to authorize offensive targeting of PKK/KADEK, the more appropriate action would be to include PKK/KADEK in the list of OIF ROE terrorist organizations authorized for targeting. Available intelligence does not support either action.

The draft Policy Guidance on PKK/Kadek in Iraq (with DASECSTATE Grossman's edits, dated 11 June 2003) focuses on a military course of action. Most importantly, it would deny members of KADEK from Turkey any chance to remain in Iraq, even if they comply with Coalition demands. It goes further to spell out operational details for military planning.

A point paper from CCJ3-PP (Tab B) offers a course of action (COA) that emphasizes a diplomatic, negotiated solution as the principal effort. CCJ5-PSE concurs with the recommendations of CCJ3-PP, as follow:
- In coordination with OCPA, develop a long term solution to the KADEK issue.
- Approach KADEK for a diplomatic solution via negotiations, within the context of the DOD policy and the stated KADEK desires to renounce terrorism and become a political entity.
- Task CJTF 4 to develop a Commander's Estimate regarding the feasibility of action against the KADEK should the diplomatic effort fail.

Discussion:
The singular strength of the subject OSD draft is that it would demonstrate the resolve of the Coalition to use force if KADEK failed to comply with demands to disarm and disband.

However, the current draft OSD policy has three critical weaknesses: 1) it would require the POTUS and SECDEF to declare the PKK/KADEK an authorized targeted (whether as a declared hostile force or a named terrorist organization) when current intelligence indicates they have taken no hostile action against Coalition forces and have committed no terrorist acts since before 1999; 2) it obviates the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to weigh on the disposition of political/militant groups within the borders of Iraq, and; 3) it forces the expulsion of the KADEK into Turkey where their fate is unknown. This last point could give motive to the KADEK to defy the Coalition and go to ground in the highlands of northern Iraq. Offensive military operations by U.S. troops could create the impression that they have become an instrument of Turkish will regarding KADEK.

The KADEK (formerly PKK) leadership have communicated that they wish to use political methods to achieve their aims. The militant arm that found refuge in Iraq has not committed terrorist acts since before 1999 [the year Ocalan declared a truce]. Given the aims of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, it is logical to demand the KADEK renounce terrorism and cooperate in
Apprehending PKK/KADEK individuals who are suspected of crimes and acts of terrorism. Current OIF ROE authorize U.S. forces to react in self-defense should PKK/KADEK individuals take up arms against U.S. forces attempting to negotiate disarmament (i.e., exhibited hostile actions or hostile intent).

Threatening KADEK with forcible expulsion from Iraq without any other peaceable alternative is likely to trigger resistance. KADEK militants live in northern Iraq, scattered among thousands of Kurdish refugees who have fled Turkey. Given that 25,000 Kurds have perished in clashes with Turkish forces, the KADEK fear of death or retribution is reasonable. This fear is unlikely to be mitigated by the promise of an amnesty law from the government of Turkey. Forcing the KADEK into a lose-lose dilemma would leave no appealing alternative to military action.

U.S. policy toward KADEK militants in Iraq should be consistent with the policies adopted by the USG toward other armed groups and combatants in Iraq.

If the KADEK make good on their word and comply with U.S. demands to disarm, disband, and cooperate, then any organized threat they may have posed would be mitigated. This would achieve the aims of OIF in stabilizing Iraq while removing terrorist threats and infrastructure. Offering KADEK Kurds the chance to stay in Iraq would greatly increase the probability of a negotiated solution and avoid expanding military operations to attack an otherwise docile group.

**Recommendations:**
Revise the 11 June 2003 draft of OSD Policy on PKK/KADEK in Iraq to give the CPA and CJTF[4] the latitude to offer compliant members of KADEK, subject to proper screening, the option to remain in Iraq and assimilate into the population.

Specifically, change the final paragraph to read: **Disposition of PKK/Kadek members who are Turkish citizens and are not suspected of specific terrorist acts or war crimes should return to Turkey but may be offered the option to remain in Iraq under such conditions as may be set by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).**

Also, revise the paper to remove specific, operational level planning details and COA reporting requirements from the OSD guidance in order to allow HQ, USCENTCOM and CJTF[14] to develop military estimates of the situation and contingency plans.

Approved by: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Chief, Policy Branch Fwd

Prepared by: (b)(3), (b)(6)
CCJ5-O
23 Jun 03
Resolving the KADEK issue in Northern Iraq

The 101st Division ACE assesses that the bulk of KADEK's activities in Northern Iraq are peaceful and will remain so unless the group becomes convinced it has no political alternatives. Although Turkey attacked KADEK outposts in that country in early June, KADEK has no known plans to retaliate against these attacks and still prefers a diplomatic solution. To that end, KADEK peacefully attempted to initiate dialogue with 101st forces in Mosul immediately following the attacks on KADEK outposts in Turkey. KADEK also established political offices in Sinjar, Mosul and Sulaymaniyah, and at least two of these offices openly profess to be pro-US. In Sinjar, KADEK is joining forces with other ethnic minorities in a likely attempt to press for minority rights in Iraq's new government. As recently as early June 2003, KADEK was providing medical supplies to Kurdish refugees from Turkey and wounded KADEK fighters in the village of Makhmur.

Intelligence suggests that KADEK uses its outposts in Northern Iraq to smuggle supplies to KADEK fighters in Turkey for defensive operations, which Turkey currently perceives as a threat. If these outposts are attacked by Turkish or coalition forces, they will result in civilian casualties and could prompt KADEK to join forces with other fundamentalist groups to stage future attacks against its aggressors. We assess that, if KADEK believes it is cornered with no diplomatic options, it will once again become an active terrorist threat to US personnel and ethnic Turks (Turkoms) in Northern Iraq and Turkey and create additional instability in Northern Iraq.

Recent KADEK and Turkish activities

Turkey conducted planned, prepared attacks against KADEK outposts in Southeastern Turkey from 1-4 June 2003. KADEK fighters were able to repel these attacks, which resulted in several Turk casualties and reportedly only one KADEK KIA. Despite Turkish aggression, we have no intelligence indicating that KADEK in Northern Iraq or Turkey intends to conduct retaliatory attacks against the Turks; the organization continues to seek means of initiating dialogue with US forces in Northern Iraq.

By the US State Department definition of terrorist acts, KADEK has not conducted a documented act of terrorism in Turkey or Northern Iraq since 1999 when it changed its name from PKK to KADEK. Although intelligence indicates the group is recruiting and arming, these preparations are probably intended to defend against additional attacks from Turkey rather than initiate offensive operations. At this time, we assess that KADEK intends to gain political rather than military influence in Northern Iraq, and this is one reason the group may be refraining from conducting retaliatory action for the time being. However, the Turks continue to seek excuses to attack KADEK outposts in Northern Iraq and Turkey, which could potentially destabilize certain parts of the region.

KADEK's current leader, Osman Ocalan, openly declared that KADEK has no intention of disarming until the Turks change their approach towards the Kurds living in Turkey and cease
preparations to attack KADEK. Moreover, KADEK’s leaders do not trust the Turks to implement a fair amnesty law, particularly in light of recent hostilities between Turkey and KADEK. We assess that the attacks make it very unlikely KADEK will accept or adhere to any amnesty laws issued by Turkey, and will require assistance from the United States to broker an amicable solution to the problem.

**KADEK Activities in the 101st AOI**

1) (C) KADEK’s activities in Northern Iraq have been and continue to be peaceful. The organization has several outposts along the Iraq-Turkey border, which contain many families of Kurd refugees from Turkey who are protected by KADEK fighters. In addition, KADEK has a refugee and political presence in both Sinjar and Makmur, and may also be developing new organizations to front its political objectives, which include recognition of Kurds as an ethnic minority in Turkey and freedom from additional persecution. KADEK approached US forces twice requesting humanitarian assistance in Makmur and offering to disarm their guerrillas if their security needs are met. In return for assistance, KADEK offered to assist US Forces with locating potential destabilizing operatives from 14b.

   a) (S) Intelligence from mid-April 2003 through the present revealed that KADEK was providing medical relief supplies to Kurdish refugees from Turkey and wounded KADEK fighters in Makmur. Recent reporting suggests that some of the wounded KADEK personnel from the June engagements with the Turks were transferred to the Makmur refugee camp, and KADEK is seeking means to remove them.

   b) (S/NI) and 101st teams revealed that KADEK created the Kurdistan Freedom Congress Party (KAK) to act as a front for KADEK’s political objectives in Northern Iraq, and the organization allegedly established offices in Mosul and Sulaymaniyah. 101st elements that encountered the group in Mosul stated that the group is very pro-US and that its goals are “justice for all Iraqis, democracy, and freedom.” It is unclear from the reporting if this group is sponsored by the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), the international political front for Kurdish (and likely KADEK) issues or if it is an independent attempt by KADEK to change its appearance in Northern Iraq. Regardless, both organizations seek dialogue with the United States to resolve the KADEK dilemma, and neither was responsible for any violence to date.

   c) (S) Multiple sources report that KADEK is seeking to form another movement in the Sinjar region and is currently supporting and working with the Yezidi Movement of Reform and Progress (YMMP) and National Mesopotamian Union (NMU) in Sinjar. Specifically, KADEK is allegedly recruiting from and attempting to gain influence over these groups, whose combined objectives focus on the preservation of minority rights in the new Iraqi and Ninawah governments. The activities of these groups have been peaceful, and only one source claimed the group intended to conduct any anti-coalition activities.

   d) (S) On 8 June 2003, KADEK approached the administration team at the 101st CMOC in Mosul ostensibly desiring peace and requested to meet with 101st forces at the CMOC. Sources from the PUK, KDP, and other Kurd parties report that KADEK is also soliciting help.
from the US in other areas of Northern Iraq to get Turkey to accept KADEK disarmament in return for a general amnesty and authorization to form a recognized Kurdish political element in Turkey. The prime ministers of the KDP and PUK both stated that KADEK does not trust Turkey at all and will not accept anything other than complete amnesty, recognition, and a guarantee of security of its people in Turkey before it will disarm.

e) (FOUO) Members of the 101st CMOC Displaced Person’s committee met with representatives of KADEK on 11 June 03. KADEK claims that 9,000 Turkish Kurds live in Northern Iraq; 6,000 live in Makhmur, and 3,000 guerilla fighters live along the Iraqi border. KADEK claimed to be receiving attacks and and also claimed that these forces currently have operatives inside Iraq whose purpose is to destabilize the country. KADEK claims to know the entry points of

Irbil and Dahuk. KADEK offered to assist the US Army with locating these operatives and expressed a desire to coordinate with US forces to remove foreign threats and stabilize Iraq. In return, they asked for assistance against the Turkish Army, which attacked them in Turkey. KADEK also said it will require “security assurances” before they agree to disarm and attack their guerilla force, and they asked for medical aid, food, and water for their families in Makhmur. Their last request was citizenship and equal rights in Iraq.

2) (S/NI) Intelligence suggests that the KADEK fighters in Northern Iraq also smuggle supplies, including weapons, to KADEK outposts in southeastern Turkey. These weapons and materials are ostensibly used to supply the Turkey KADEK fighters defending KADEK camps and families in Turkey from attack. Turkish Special Forces in Northern Iraq are currently attempting to identify the locations of KADEK camps and smuggling routes among other things.

Potential Sources of Tension and Instability

1) (FOUO) Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq expressed concerns about the KADEK issue on multiple occasions. If there is no resolution to the KADEK issue and Turkey continues to attack KADEK outposts, the following may occur:

   a) (FOUO) KADEK families from Turkey will flood into Northern Iraq and Iran creating additional refugee problems in both countries. This is a particularly sensitive issue in Northern Iraq where reverse Arabization is already causing problems and an additional influx of Kurds into refugee areas beyond the former Green Line (like Makhmur and Sinjar) may elevate inter-ethnic tensions there. The Turkoman population will become alarmed, and Turkey will attempt to send additional forces into the region to “protect” the interests of the Turkoman population, which will increase tension between Turkomans and Kurds that could result in violence.

   c) (FOUO) KADEK forces will clash with Turkish Special Forces near the Iraq-Turkey border, which will create a regional, international problem. KADEK will solicit assistance from the KDP and PUK militaries, who may offer some military protection. These actions will distress Turkey, who will reposition their military forces near the border. One violent act perpetrated by either side could ignite violence throughout the border area, which would create
regional instability an area full of tension and inhibit investment, trade, international aid, and growth in the region.

2) (FOUO) At present, KADEK personnel and Kurd refugees from Turkey in Northern Iraq are not contributing members of society since most rely on local and international assistance to survive. As the situation develops in Northern Iraq, area governments will be increasingly reluctant to support this group as they (the governments) struggle to create and sustain economic, political, and social stability in new Iraq. There are many areas and peoples organic to the region who also require assistance, and this group is an additional hindrance to the restoration of normality and stability in the region.

Discussion of Proposals for the Solution of the KADEK issue

1) (FOUO) Kurd and minority leaders alike agree that if Turkey offers KADEK full and complete amnesty and recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic minority in southern Turkey in an agreement brokered by the United States, KADEK will agree to disarm and the bulk of the Kurd refugees in Northern Iraq will return to Turkey. Naturally, the refugees will require financial assistance to reintegrate into society, and there will be some disputes over the treatment of recognized KADEK terrorists. If the latter are afforded a fair and legal process for their crimes, the complete surrender of KADEK militants is more likely. Prior to the Turk attacks on KADEK outposts in Southeastern Turkey, it might have been possible for the Turks to make this agreement with KADEK without assistance from the United States. However, Turk aggression now makes US or other international intervention a requirement for a peaceful resolution to the problem.

2) (G) KADEK will be reluctant to capitulate to US forces outright because they observed what happened to the Mujahedin E Khalq (MEK) when that organization capitulated. The US did not provide security for the MEK forces following their surrender, and the organization was attacked by its arch-enemy, the Badr Corps. KADEK would probably fear that Turkey would attack its outposts if it disarmed and would require a guarantee of US protection prior to capitulation. US protection would involve the allocation of additional military resources for an undetermined amount of time in the region. It is possible that KADEK would accept protection from the Peshmerga, but increased Peshmerga presence in either the border or disputed regions could heighten tensions between the Peshmerga and Turkish military and between the Arabs and Kurds in those areas respectively.

3) (G) Outright attacks by the United States against KADEK outposts in Northern Iraq could create civilian casualties and would leave KADEK with few alternatives other than violence. Although some elements might surrender, the more extreme elements would fight to the death and, once again, KADEK might even attempt to align with fundamentalist groups in Iran and Iraq and, over time, become an active threat to US and Turkish forces and civilians in Northern Iraq and Turkey. Since the organization's activities in Iraq have been peaceful, many civilians in Iraq and worldwide would view the attacks as unprecedented and condemn them. Moreover, attacks would create distrust of the United States in the international Kurdish community, which could provide reinforcements to the Kurds through supporters in [14b] thereby creating additional instability in Northern Iraq. Though the PUK and KDP would likely attempt
to distance themselves from the problem, many Iraqi Kurds would be outraged and might also doubt whether the United States will assist them in achieving their goals of Kurdish regional autonomy in the new Iraqi state.

The "Ball" is in our Court

(S) It is apparent that the ideal solution to the KADEK problem for all parties is a full amnesty and recognition agreement between Turkey and KADEK negotiated by the United States or another independent country. KADEK’s behavior presently and over the past four years has been peaceful, making the designation as a terrorist organization questionable for the time being. In addition, Turkey now recognizes that it made an enormous mistake by refusing to allow US forces to exercise the northern option in OIF, and is reportedly doing some political "soul-searching." This mistake and recent unprovoked Turkish aggression against KADEK gives the United States diplomatic leverage with regard to this issue, and Turkey may be willing to be more generous to KADEK with a little prompting from the US. Other alternatives, including forced capitulation and outright attacks, will generate more problems than they hope to solve, and, in the long run, foster distrust and instability in Northern Iraq.
SECRET/REL-GBR-AUS

CCJ3-PP POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: KADEK WAY AHEAD

1. (U) PURPOSE. To provide information and a recommended course of action regarding the treatment of the KADEK in Iraq in consideration of the KADEK policy from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

2. (S/Rel USA-GBR-AUS) BACKGROUND.

   a. In November 1978, Abdullah Öcalan, an Ankara University dropout, founded the PKK. He began building an organization dedicated to establishing and securing an independent Kurdistan encompassing southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northeast Syria and northwestern Iran. The group's goals, strategy, and structure were based on Marxist-Leninist ideology.

   b. The PKK began its guerrilla war against Turkey in 1984. In 1998 the majority of the PKK relocated to northern Iraq, where it conducted insurgent operations into Turkey. Since that time, roughly 37,000 have been killed; approximately 5,500 Turkish civilians, 6,500 Turkish military and 25,000 civilian and militant PKK and KADEK Kurds.

   c. In April 2002 the PKK changed their name to KADEK and have expressed a desire to move from their previous violent/criminal methods into the political arena and instead of fighting for a Kurdish state, work with the Coalition for improved Kurdish rights.

3. (S/Rel USA-GBR-AUS) DISCUSSION.

   a. The OSD KADEK policy purpose statement requires "the elimination of KADEK as a terrorist threat in Iraq to achieve the Coalition commitment to rid Iraq of terrorist infrastructure, preserve stability, and eliminate any cause for a Turkish incursion," Tab A. This provides sufficient latitude for the development of a flexible approach which will account for the current situation and allow for long-term stability in the region.

   b. It is assessed that given the KADEK statements regarding disavowing terrorism, Tabs B and C, KADEK would meet the DOD KADEK Policy intent to eliminate terrorist organizations. It would also meet one of the criteria to be removed from the DOS terrorism list. Procedures for being removed from this list include; 1) renouncing terrorism, or 2) cease to exist, and/or
3) be inactive (presumably with regard to terrorism) for two years, Tab D. Therefore, it may be in our best interest to support and facilitate their move into the political realm. This also complies with the desire of the DOS, Tab E.

c. The overriding concern in dealing with the KADEK is ridding Iraq of terrorists. This can best be achieved via diplomatic efforts utilizing several means. A peaceful transition would set a positive precedent for other groups throughout the world considering laying down their arms. Disarmament is a key element in the OSD policy but should be addressed in the context of a society which is and always has been armed. KADEK concerns will include their security in an environment where the Turkish military has a presence in Northern Iraq with a goal of their eradication. Consideration should be given to allowing small arms retention with the focus of disarmament being on the larger caliber weapons.

d. Intelligence assessments indicate the current plan for Repentance Laws and surrendering weapons is unacceptable to KADEK as a matter of honor. KADEK would be more likely to comply with capitulation demands if allowed to disarm and go free rather than be extradited to Turkey. Further, KADEK doesn't trust Turkish efforts, Tab G.

e. The key to our success in implementing the OSD policy is stability in Northern Iraq. The most effective way to achieve long lasting stability is to achieve "buy in" regarding Coalition policies from the region's inhabitants. The Turks have searched for years in an effort to find and destroy the KADEK, with no success, resulting in an on-going low intensity struggle with no end in sight. Without complete support from the PUK and KDP, Coalition efforts would likely have the same result. Even with that support, it is likely that the Coalition would face a situation similar to that found in Afghanistan; characterized by vendettas, score settling, bad information and individuals who had been co-opted by outside influences. In either case, any military effort in the near term to eliminate KADEK will drain resources and divert attention from the primary focus of stabilizing Iraq.

f. While some comparison can be drawn between the KADEK and MEK, they are more different than similar. These differences will make military action against the KADEK more difficult than action against the MEK. The MEK had military formations and heavy weapons that were capable of being targeted. Not so with the KADEK. With approximately 4500 fighters spread throughout
the KAZ in Northern Iraq (NIZ), they do not present a target that can readily be kinetically addressed, Tab B.

g. Eliminating causes for Turkish incursions. CENTCOM assessments indicate the most likely reason for Turkish presence in Northern Iraq is the Turkish fear of the declaration of a Kurdish state, seizure of the Northern Oil Fields to support such a state and support of Turkmen in NIZ. Destruction of the KADEK, either by the coalition or the Turks would not, in itself, result in a Turkish withdrawal and would not greatly contribute to stability in the region.

4. (S/Rel USA GBR AUS) RECOMMENDATION. In coordination with OCPA, develop a long term solution to the KADEK issue.

   a. Approach KADEK for a diplomatic solution via negotiations, within the context of the DOD policy and the stated KADEK desires to renounce terrorism and become a political entity.

   b. Task CJTF[14] to develop a Commander's Estimate regarding the feasibility of action against the KADEK should the diplomatic effort fail.
Pages 13 through 20 redacted for the following reasons:

Defer to CIA