

**NORTH BELT AQI:** North Belt leadership is laying low due to heavy CF targeting IVO Tarmiyah—an area that historically was controlled by AQI. Their lines of communication to the west are becoming active as they are pushed from traditional, long held safe areas.

**NORTH KARKH AQI:** The North Karkh network does not have any senior or experienced leaders at this time due to targeting by CF and local security forces. The majority of this network has fled the area, however there are still cells with limited capability. These cells do not have the operational capability to conduct high profile attacks due to the overall lack of experienced leaders and facilitators.

**SOUTH KARKH AQI:** The mid and low level leadership was severely depleted during coalition operations in early August. The network has lost the ability to conduct high profile VBIED attacks in the near term due to the loss of key builders and facilitators. There are indications that remaining elements of the South Karkh network are trying to reorganize with elements of the AQI network in Arab Jabour IOT reconstitute personnel strength and leadership.

In the absence of key leadership and experienced operators, members of the various AQI elements are using VBIEDs to reestablish momentum toward the end of Ramadan, to include a recent increase in low yield VBIED attacks in Rusafa, Rashid, and Adamiyah.


**JAM:** The combination of mainstream JAM's continued adherence to Sadr's order and the desire of JAM SG to remain out of ISF / MNF targeting operations, while avoiding JAM pressure / internal clearing operations, will continue to result in lower than historic attack levels in Shia dominated areas. Attacks will become more effective as JAM SG acquire increased stocks of improved munitions and better trained fighters returning from Iran. We view JAM SG as the most lethal threat to CF due to the greater numbers of CF casualties they have caused in their attacks. We are watching closely to determine if recent IDF attack on VBC is a Shia extremist spike associated exclusively with the Night of Power, or is a leading indicator of crumbling support for (or MAS order to end) the "freeze" on JAM attacks in place since 28 August.

**1. DRAGON TALON II –** Operation Dragon Talon II continues to be the MND-B main effort. 2SCR(-) CONDUCTS FULL SPECTRUM COIN OPERATIONS FOCUSED ON THE DESTRUCTION OF AQIZ IN TOA DRAGON FROM 16 SEP – 15 OCT 07 TO ENABLE 2-2 SCR TO CONTROL THE AO AFTER 15 OCT. 53 CACHES HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED, 273 DETAINEES TO DATE OF WHICH 13 ARE BN/BDE HVTs. We will continue to weight the mulhalla in the southern Doura (M830/32/34/36) and Five Farms / KWWTP with 2 SCR and an additional Stryker Sgdn, as we seek to break AQI organized resistance in East Rashid once and for all over the next month.



2. **RECONCILIATION** - MND-B's Supporting Effort #1 continues to be the Reconciliation and Engagement operations. Iraqi Security Volunteers, currently resourced thru CERP Funding, have been effective in providing local checkpoint and infrastructure security in Abu Ghraib, Taji, Mansour, Adamiyah, and West Rashid. They also have been able to provide invaluable intelligence on AQI and JAM activities in the area. The way ahead includes close management of volunteer participation in the IP expansion process, the transfer of some existing contracts to Iraqi funding, and increased efforts to generate more employment opportunities in civic works projects and other non-security related employment opportunities.
3. **IRON BLITZ** – Supporting Effort #2 is air assaults and clearing operations to disrupt the AQI networks throughout the northern zone of Baghdad. Since the late spring, when the Corps changed our boundary in the north, we have deliberately and incrementally oriented 1/1CD toward the west, tied to activities in MNF-W / MND-N, IOT achieve greater control in what was previously an AQI sanctuary. This operation is making sustained progress, supported by the establishment of new JSSs and patrol bases across the AO, and a growing awakening movement from Falahat to Abu-Ghirab, which has allowed us to augment the CF and ISF in this terrain with newly graduated IPs and additional Iraqi Security Volunteers. The net result is not yet irreversible momentum, but is clearly reason for optimism. Key to continued success will be the full integration of ISF (specifically 9<sup>th</sup> IA units) into leadership of the security effort north of Baghdad, as CF gradually begin the transition toward tactical overwatch. This approach is at some risk, most notably because of the departure of 9<sup>th</sup> IA forces out of this AO and into other areas, which creates challenges for continued partnership and eventual transition.

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Sir, as we looked across the city at our best practices in MND-B, one thing stood out in every AO. As different as each AO's fight is, each of our BCTs are actively shaping the terrain they fight on to facilitate security for the Iraqi populace and for themselves. They have done this with thousands of tons of barrier material, explosives, and an unbelievable amount of good old American ingenuity. Across MND-B, our troopers have managed to build "engagement areas" for this complex, unconventional fight in much the same way we built engagement areas in the seemingly simple fights we used to have in the Central Corridor at the National Training Center.

Sir, starting from the top left, I'd like to talk you through a few of the ways we have managed to shape the terrain here in Baghdad to improve our security situation. As you well know, our Strike Brigade has focused heavily on protecting the markets in Rusafa. After suffering multiple catastrophic VBIED attacks, it became obvious that the Rusafa market and cultural district would never grow unless we made some major adjustments to the terrain there. I know that you have walked the ground there several times in the past few months, and I think you would agree with me that the extensive barrier plan has breathed life back into the 13 markets and other critical infrastructures and routes in the 2/2 BCT AO.

Sir, moving to the top right box and the Doura AO, I want to highlight how the use of barriers by the Dragon Brigade have allowed them to isolate the population from Al Qaeda in what has continued to be one of the most hotly contested pieces of terrain in Iraq. The barriers there have prevented Al Qaeda from freely passing from mulhalla to mulhalla with impunity as they once did. Though they are still fighting for that terrain, it's much more difficult for them to escape, relocate, and resupply themselves because of the barrier plan in East Rashid.

Sir, in the bottom right box, we go back to the Strike AO for another example of our Terrain Shaping Operations. In this case, barriers and concrete have allowed us to create multiple reinforced check points for the Iraqi Security Forces that are charged with protecting this area. Since the first of April, 57 strong points have been created, with another 15 planned to go in this month. These strong points have not only facilitated protection for the Iraqi Security Forces, they have also given vendors confidence that there is a serious, concerted effort being put forth to protect their livelihoods. Between the barriers IVO the markets and the strong points throughout the AO, the Strike Brigade has effectively reshaped this battlefield in their favor.

Finally, moving to the bottom left of the slide, in the Falcon AO the Safe Roadway program was instituted to enhance the Safe Community Program and to create a safe travel way for units and the population to move through. Barriers on both sides of the roads allowed soldiers to better identify IEDs. Furthermore, the barriers created a clean line for Route Sanitization. Engineers were able to use the barriers as stop lines for cleaning roadways, creating a clean, pristine roadway making identification even easier. Messages and Rewards were instituted to inform the local populace of the dangers and benefits from reducing IEDs in their communities and the security that would occur. Finally, CERP programs were incorporated to promote cleanliness and security and it is anticipated that the local community will take on the role of maintaining the roadways making it more difficult and undesirable to install IEDs.

Sir, we continue to evaluate and reevaluate every aspect of the fight in Baghdad, but one thing I can say for sure is without the barriers, demolitions, and out other terrain shaping operations, the security situation in Baghdad would have never decreased to the levels they are at right now.