MND-C OPORD 08-02 (OPERATION BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN)

(U) This OPORD has been approved for release by [b 3, b 6]

References:

a. (U) MNF-I/USM-I Modification to the Joint Campaign Plan 2007, 27 NOV 07
b. (U) MNC-I OPORD 08-02, 10 MAY 08
c. (U) MND-C OPORD 08-01 (Marne Fortitude II), 23 DEC 07

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Charlie.

Task Organization: Refer to Annex A.

1. (U) SITUATION.

1.A. (U) General Situation.

1.A.1. (SH//REL) The security gains of the “surge” have provided windows of opportunity for the Government of Iraq (GOI) to establish itself as the recognized, constituted, legal power within Iraq. Building upon a successful string of operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, and Maysan and Diyala Provinces, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have seized the initiative from Iraq’s enemies and are setting the conditions for successful Provincial elections in the near future. Despite these accomplishments, the enemy has proven resilient and continues to show that terrain won must be held afterwards. Iran’s desire to influence the Shia population centers in southern Iraq and to disrupt the fragile stability in Baghdad is proving to be the major element against lasting security. This is manifest along the border provinces. Insufficient combat power in Maysan Province following its transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) resulted in enemy elements establishing footholds that controlled sections of the City of Amarah and held sway over portions of the government. This situation was remedied with Operation Adirondack Mountain which placed the GOI in firm control of Amarah. The next step, and a major focus of this campaign, will be to extend the reach of governance to Iraq’s borders in the southeast. To this end, Multinational Division-Center (MND-C) will shift its focus away from the Baghdad Belts as it expands its Area of Operations (AO) and begins to set the footprint for long-term, strategic force posturing.

1.A.2. (U) The MND-C Campaign Plan (Operation Blue Ridge Mountain (OBR)) is derived from the Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Joint Campaign Plan 2007 and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) OPORD 08-02 and describes the conduct of operations for MND-C. This Campaign Plan also takes into account the National Security Strategy and the Provincial Development Strategies of the Provinces within the MND-C AO to ensure our efforts are synchronized with the Government of Iraq (GOI).
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

1.A.3. (U) The core purpose of OBR is to assist the GoI in building its capability to secure the Iraqi people, exercise capable governance, and develop a sustainable economy within Iraq. MND-C will conduct COIN operations during all phases of the campaign to exploit the previous successes achieved by the GoI and 3ID (TF 14b) expand on their success by deliberately transferring security responsibility to capable ISF; and by setting security and governance conditions that facilitate the extension of the central government’s authority and influence as the legitimate government of the Iraqi people. CBR provides a broad context for future operations, sets priorities for MND-C, and is designed to maximize flexibility in a dynamic environment. Policies, procedures, and tasks from previous orders remain in effect unless specifically addressed in this order. MND-C continues to issue separate orders for major operations.

1.B. (U) Area of concern.

1.B.1. (U) Area of interest.

1.B.1.A. (S//REL) Operational AI: the airspace, land area, and boundaries of Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait; the Persian Gulf.

1.B.1.B. (S//REL) Strategic AI: Operational AI, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and Coalition Troop Contributing Nations (TCN).

1.B.2. (U) Operational Area.

1.B.2.A. (S//REL) For US military operations, The Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO) is the total airspace, land area, and boundaries of Iraq. MND-C AO includes the provinces of Najaf, Karbala, Babil, Wasit, and portions of southern Baghdad province. MND-C also operates in Temporary Area of Operations (TAO) Dayton within MND-SE’s Area of Operations (AO). The duration of this TAO is indefinite. For the purpose of this Plan, the three provinces in TAO Dayton (Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan) are considered to be permanently part of MND-C’s AO. We will add Qadisiyah province to our AO 1 OCT 08 ICW the 14b end-of-mission. We anticipate realigning our northern boundary in November 08 along provincial lines so that all of Baghdad Province will belong to MND-B.

1.B.2.B. (S//REL) Uninterrupted pursuit of positively identified terrorists across international borders outside the boundaries of Iraq is permitted IAW Reference HH of Appendix 3 of Annex E (ROE).

1.C. (U) Enemy Situation.

1.4b, 1.4d

1.C.4.A. (S//REL) The Coalition, in partnership with the GOI, employs integrated political, security, economic, and diplomatic means to:

- Transition from surge operations
- Maintain security in order to transition from lead to partner to partnership
- Transfer responsibility for population security to the ISF
- Pursue establishment of a long-term strategic partnership based on a reduced and sustainable CF presence
- Continue to support political and economic development

In order to help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009 to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.

1.C.5. (U) MNF-I Commander's Intent.

1.C.5.A. (S//REL) Purpose: To help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009 to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.

1.C.5.B. (S//REL) Method: The Coalition will continue to promote political accommodation between the competing factions of the Iraqi population while simultaneously focusing, with our Iraqi counterparts, on the defeat of the extremist enemies of the GOI. The Coalition will employ an integrated engagement approach, combining persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means to help the GOI move the various key actors toward political accommodation and reconciliation. The Coalition strategy will focus on establishing a baseline of security for the people and create an environment conducive to political and economic progress leading to reconciliation. As GOI capabilities increase and conditions improve, the Coalition will play a decreasing role and security responsibilities will be transitioned to an Iraqi lead. It will be essential to ensure there is
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

no degradation in the security situation during this transition. Authorities for Coalition operations, currently embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), will eventually transition to multi-faceted, long-term strategic partnerships between the GOI and various Coalition nations. The UNSCR for 2008 will be the last under the provisions of Chapter 7, though a subsequent UNSCR not under Chapter 7 is possible.

1.C.5.C. (SH//REL) Endstate: A stable Iraq: sustained by a developing economy; committed to participatory governance under the rule of law and maintaining civil order; denied as a safe haven for extremists; integrated into the regional and international communities; engaged in a long-term strategic partnership with the United States and other Coalition partners.


1.C.6.A. (SH//REL) MNC-I, in partnership with the ISF, secures the population by defeating AQI networks and denying its resurgence, isolates violent extremists (VE) from the population and support bases through simultaneous lethal and non-lethal means, and develops self-sustaining professional security forces to allow civil capacity growth. As conditions permit, CF transfer security responsibilities to ISF and progress from tactical to operational partnership.

1.C.6.B. (SH//REL) MNC-I Commander’s Vision for 2009: Sustainable security is established across most of Iraq and the lives of Iraqis are trending toward normalcy. AQI, VE, militias and the effects of malicious external influences no longer threaten the legitimacy or existence of the GOI. ISF, with increasing police primacy, maintain local security and protect the nation’s borders with increasing effectiveness and less reliance on coalition enablers. Provincial and local government, judicial, and economic systems function with improved delivery of essential services (ESS). CF predominantly in operational partnership moving toward strategic partnership.

1.C.7. (U) MNC-I Commander’s Intent.


1.C.7.B. (SH//REL) Key Tasks:


1.C.7.B.3. (SH//REL) Defeat VE networks and Shia Extremists (ShE)).


1.C.7.B.7. (SH//REL) Improve capability of, and professionalize, ISF.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ


1.C.7.B.10. (S//REL) Improve effectiveness of governance at the local and provincial levels, specifically ESS.

1.C.7.B.11. (S//REL) Set the conditions for safe and fair elections.

1.C.7.B.12. (S//REL) Shape the information environment (IE) to facilitate long term security, governance, and reconciliation.

1.C.7.C. (U) Endstate:

1.C.7.C.1. (S//REL) Enemy: AQI and SuE networks defeated and resurgence denied. Lines of Communication (LOCs) and support zones for external lethal aid networks disrupted.

1.C.7.C.2. (S//REL) Friendly: Sustainable Security (security that can be maintained over time through Iraqi security, civil, and civic institutions) reached; ISF effectively maintain local security with increased police primacy, and less reliant on coalition enablers; CF predominantly in operational partnership.


1.D. (U) Adjacent Units.

1.D.1. (S//REL) MNF-W. 1 MEF (FWD) serves as the HQs for MNF-W. Combat units in MNF-W consist of RCT 1 and RCT 5. MNF-W controls Anbar province, Ramadi, and Fallujah while supporting GOI efforts to secure the border with Syria and Jordan.

1.D.2. (U) (S//REL) MND-N. 1AD serves as the HQs for MND-N. Combat units in MND-N consist of 1/10 MTN, 1/101 AA, 2 SCR, and 3 ACR. MND-N Controls Mosul, Tal Afar, Baqubah, Samarra, Kirkuk, Irbil, Dahuk, Sulaymaniya, Salah ad Din, Diyala and Ninawa and supports the GOIs efforts to secure the northern border with Iran, Turkey, and Syria.

1.D.3. (S//REL) CJSTF-AP. Conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with select ISF units to develop their capability to execute independent COIN operations and conduct Direct Action (DA) to disrupt AQI, JAM SG, and Sunni Resistance Networks. C2: Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).

1.D.4. (S//REL) MND-B. 4ID serves as the HQs for MND-B. Combat units consist of 2/101 AA, 1/4 ID, 4/10 MTN 3/4 ID, 2/25 ID. MND-B and MND-C will adjust their common boundary as part of the Baghdad Belt realignment NLT NOV 08.

1.D.5. (S//REL) Gulf Region Division (GRD). USACE has established its Gulf Region Division (GRD) Headquarters in Baghdad with three (3) District Offices in the ITO. USACE provides technical expertise, project estimates and contracting, and project management in support of
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

the Provincial Councils and Iraqi Ministries. Gulf Region Central (GRC) is the USACE District with responsibility for all areas within the MND-B OE. Both the GRD and GRC HQs are located in the International Zone. C2: Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I).

1.D.6. (S//REL) Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). Assists the GOI in the development, organization, training, equipping, and sustaining of the ISF and Ministries capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable environment in which representative government, individual freedom, the rule of law, and free market economy can evolve and which, in time, will contribute to Iraq’s external security and to the security of the Gulf Region. C2: Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I).

1.D.7. (S//REL) Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG). Develops Transition Team requirements, plans force flow, oversees force protection measures, and executes RSOI planning, manning, equipping, and battle handover of combat ready Transition Teams to MSC Commanders to support the strategic goal of developing the ISF for the security of their country. C2: Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I).

1.D.8. (S//REL) ISF Partnership. US forces are partnered with IA, DBE, IPS, and NP. This partnership role is conducted in close coordination with MNSTC-I.

1.D.9. (U) Interagency Integration. To realize end states articulated in the Commander’s Intent, effective integration and coordination with United States Government (USG) agency capabilities are essential. The success of this plan hinges on our ability to coordinate all elements of national power down to the sub-national level. To achieve this, we will overcome institutional barriers to information flow, and facilitate communication with the interagency through both formal and informal means. This Campaign Plan outlines the need to identify overlapping goals and synchronize our efforts to achieve US national goals.

1.E. (U) Assumptions.

1.E.1. (U) Baghdad border realignment will occur on 22 NOV 08.

1.E.2. (U) Provincial elections will occur after January 09.

1.E.3. (U) SOI reduction requirements will not change.

1.E.4. (U) The US will have legal authorities to continue operations in Iraq after 31 DEC 08, but under greater constraint

1.E.5. (U) Not all CF will have bilateral agreements with the GoI for post-UNSCR operations.

1.E.6. (U) FOB Echo can be transitioned to HN control by JUN 09.

1.E.7. (U) AQI will not resurge in MND-C beyond the capacity of ISF to control.

1.F. (U) Legal Considerations. Refer to Appendix 5 to Annex I.

1.F.1. (U) International law. US Forces will comply with applicable international law. Commanders should consult the servicing Judge Advocate when there is a question regarding
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

compliance with international law. All operations must comply with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and commanders will have all battalion-level or higher operational plans and preplanned targeting decisions reviewed by the servicing Judge Advocate.

1.F.2. (U) Domestic law. All US Forces in Iraq will comply with applicable US domestic law. Commanders will consult with the servicing Judge Advocate when there is a question regarding compliance with domestic law.

1.F.3. (U) Host-nation and Coalition laws. The ISF are governed by host nation (Iraqi) law. Coalition partners comply with the laws, regulations, and policies of their sending nation. Criminal jurisdiction over non-US coalition personnel remains with the country providing the personnel. Close coordination with the local commander of the forces of the nation concerned should be established when detaining any member of the forces of a coalition partner or ISF.

1.F.4. (U) Rules of Engagement. US forces in MND-C follow US-established Rules of Engagement (ROE) for operations and for self-defense. CF assigned to MND-C may have more stringent ROE as dictated by their national caveats, but will not be more permissive than the ROE established by MND-C HQ. Refer to Annex E (ROE).

1.F.5. (S//REL) PIC Considerations. UNSCR 1790 allows MNF-I to conduct all operations necessary to ensure security and stability in Iraq. Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) MOUs between the various MNDs and Provincial Governors place restrictions on CF operations in PIC provinces. However, each MOU contains an exception that allows MNF-I, and its subordinate units, to conduct all operations necessary to ensure security and stability in Iraq. Whether an operation is necessary to ensure the safety and security of Iraq is a judgment call made by the appropriate level Commander. MOUs are not legally binding; however, they should be followed to the greatest extent possible. PIC MOUs do not replace the ROE.

2. (U) MISSION (CURRENT). TF _____In partnership with ISF, Gol, and USG agencies, conducts COIN operations in MND-C AO to Secure the Iraqi population, Defeat violent extremist networks, Disrupt lethal aid from Iran, Professionalize the ISF, Transfer security responsibilities, and Enable governance and economic development in order to facilitate Gol ability to provide security and essential services to the Iraqi population.

3. (U) EXECUTION.


3.A.1. (U) Commander’s Intent.

3.A.1.A. (U) Purpose: Achieve sustainable security by June 2009 to set conditions for political and economic progress in MND-C OE.

3.A.1.B. (U) Key Tasks:

3.A.1.B.1. (U) Transition security responsibility to capable, credible and professional ISF.

3.A.1.B.2. (U) Partner with ISF maneuver and logistics units and IPS at the District and Station level.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ


3.A.1.B.7. (U) Enable organizations that extend the reach of Gol, enhancing the development of provincial and local government institutions.


3.A.1.B.10. (U) Unified effort among joint, interagency, and multinational partners using a balanced approach, with information engagement, across all lines of operation.

3.A.1.C. (U) Endstate: NLT Summer 2009, Gol has shown incremental progress in providing essential services across the AOR; CF is at a minimum of operational partnership, ISF are the primary guarantors of population security; local populace believes their government as capable of providing economic growth; VE denied resurgence and are incapable of deposing the Gol.


3.A.1.D.1. (G//REL) Campaign Design Theme. The gains of the “surge”, coupled with increasing effective and autonomous Gol-led military actions, have resulted in the lowest levels of violence in Iraq since 2003. More important is the renewed sense of optimism from Iraq’s citizens based upon the belief that their government is capable and willing to protect them so that effective civil life may be conducted. The end we will continue to pursue is the preservation of security of the population. The way we will do this is through the orderly transition of security responsibility to capable and credible ISF. ISF/CF unit-to-unit Partnership is the primary means we will use to accomplish this.

3.A.1.D.2. QBR will follow three Lines of Effort (LOE): ISF Professionalization, Governance and Economic Organization Development, and Population Security. Operations under this plan will apply finite resources into prioritized target units and population centers to reinforce success from 3ID OPORD 08-01 (MARNE FORTITUDE II), and adjust to changes in the operational environment (OE). Information operations (IO) and communications awareness will be infused into each LOE. Every action we perform is, in effect, a form of communication and IO will ensure our words and deeds are synchronized.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

Concept of Operations

Lines of Effort

Professionalize the ISF
Develop Governance and Economic Organizations
Secure the Iraqi population

Objectives

ISF capable of performing independent and joint operations with little or no CF support; self-sustaining

ISAF development governance and economic organizations

Iraqis believe they are secure and protected by their capable security forces, sovereignty enforced

3.A.1.D.2.A. (O//REL) The Professionalize ISF LOE focuses on the development of the Iraqi Army (IA), the Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE), and the Iraqi Police Services (IPS). This is the decisive operation in phases 1 and 2.
3. A. 1. D. 2. B. (S//REL) Governance and Economic Development (Phase 3 decisive operation). Nested with MNC-I’s Build Civil Capacity LOO, MND-C’s initial supporting effort, Building Governmental Capacity and Improving Economic Conditions, builds upon the gains achieved in the overall security situation across the OE by partnering with PRTs and other agencies to build similar capacities in the economic and governmental capacity building. As the supported organizations for all governance and reconstruction activities, MND-C units at all echelons support PRT efforts to improve the linkages among the local, provincial, and central governments, focusing on both inter and intra province lines of communication and their responsibility to better provide essential services, effective government, and improving economic opportunity to their constituents. Essential to these operations is a push to achieve unity of effort with all organizations operating within MND-C, to include military/civilian and governmental/non-governmental organizations. The intent of this focus on unity of effort is to continue to expand and develop planning horizons that transcend unit rotational timelines, emphasize operational and strategic partnering with local and provincial governments, and focus on the overall nesting of short, mid, and long term programs across the OE. This unity of effort throughout the OE takes a number of forms; chief among them are planning documents, provincial boundary alignments, a ‘program vs. projects’ approach, and nesting all programs and spending within unit mid and long term planning priorities. In adopting this ‘program vs. project’ approach to economic development and governmental capacity building, MND-C will continue to emphasize long term, system, and demand-driven programs that enable both immediate impact and secondary effects across the operational environment. Individual BCTs and PRTs will have unique priorities within their areas of operation. Nesting these programs with adjacent units and obtaining assistance from MND-C in overcoming hindrances and delays in these programs is essential.

3. A. 1. D. 2. B. 1 (S//REL) Governance. MND-C areas of emphasis within governance center around increasing communication and support between provincial governments and the
Government of Iraq through the numerous DG’s responsible for linking the efforts and funds of both Provincial and national level leaders. Similarly, BCTs, working with PRTs, focus their efforts on increasing the relationships and capacity of governments at the provincial level and below. Areas of emphasis across the MND-C OE will vary, according to the level of existent governmental capacity and the duration of CF presence, among other factors. However, general focus areas for governance include improving provincial capital budgeting and management processes and procedures, and improving the effectiveness of the rule of law for the average Iraqi citizen. Additional specificity may be found in each Provincial appendix in Annex Q (CMO).

3.A.1.D.2.B.2 (S//REL) Economics. Economic activities are focused on reinforcing and accelerating economic success found in key centers of commerce by assisting ISF in the provision of a secure environment, while encouraging GoI, NGO and interagency development and economic programs. Development initiatives will reinforce security operations along key lines of communications to strengthen linkages and enhance commercial interdependence between population centers. PRTs provide development expertise and are the supported organization and are the focal point for the preponderance of the economic programs conducted throughout MND-C. BCT ePRTs support both these efforts and those of each BCT within its OE. All development programs will be synchronized with Provincial Development Strategies via Joint Common Plans.

3.A.1.D.2.B.3 (S//REL) Rule of Law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights standards and norms. Establishing public confidence in the rule of law will be accomplished by providing support and technical expertise to the GoI at the local and provincial levels. MND-C and subordinate units will coordinate and manage initiatives to assist the GoI in building the judiciary to administer fair, efficient and effective justice. BCTs will focus on increasing police and judicial investigative training, increasing security for the judiciary and improving relations between law enforcement personnel and judicial personnel. BCTs will provide a bi-monthly report summarizing recently completed, ongoing and planned Rule of Law initiatives. See Annex U (Rule of Law).

OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

Decisive Points

Secure the Iraqi Population (Part 1)

- Countered Iranian influence
- ShE, SGC defeated
- AQI denied safe-haven in MND-C

ClI
1. Al Shoab FOC
2. Tribes accept increased GOI presence in Shat al Arab
3. DBE FOC
4. DBE, IA perform defense in depth

ShE_SGC
1. Tribes accept increased ISF in South
2. Reduce Iranian influence
3. Reduce irreconcilables and prevent their resurgence

AQI
1. Sunnis embrace election process
2. Controlled SOI transition
3. Power sharing mechanisms emplaced
4. Equitable distribution of essential services

3.A.1.D.2.C.1(S//REL) The first component is combat operations in conjunction with ISF to disrupt the enemy in their support areas within Iraq, interdict lethal aid lines of communication in border regions, and retain freedom of movement along major ground LOCs to prevent the enemy from delegitimizing the GOI. AQI are accessed as severely disrupted. The careful management and transition of SOI programs into long-term GOI and private employment will prevent the resurgence of Sunni extremists. GOI-led operations have disrupted ShE and SGC throughout the southern provinces. The next step to prevent a resurgence and solidification of these elements will be shaping operations along the border in Wasit and Maysan provinces to strengthen the operational reach of the DBE to disrupt malign operations. The decisive operation will be the destruction of the lethal aid networks in the provincial capitals. The standard for lethal operations against enemy forces should be CF in support of ISF nominated operations. Unilateral CF operations against enemy targets will be avoided if at all possible.
3.A.1.D.2.C.2 (S//REL) The second security component is the perception of security. This element targets several audiences, including the Iraqi populace, Gol, the international investment community, and current and potential troop contributing nations. The increasing return of normalcy and the expansion of civil capacity are demonstrated through the accomplishment of specific benchmarks, including PIC status, the transition of CF occupied real estate to the Host Nation, changes in partnership levels, and the accomplishment of goals by the Gol and ISF.

3.A.1.D.3. (S//REL) MND-C IO will attack SGC & VE networks' Financial, Recruiting, Information and Support cells (FRIS) by leveraging all IO Core and Supporting Elements to disrupt their ability to synchronize operations and conduct support functions. We will do this by creating confusion among SGC & VE members by sowing distrust for their supply chains, trainers, leadership and financiers by aggressively disrupting lethal supply chains using ACCM, STO and Counter Intelligence; influencing and disrupting VE leadership using EW, STO and MILDEC; and exploit and disrupt trainers, facilitators and financiers with EW, STO, CNO. This will be executed with in an Information Environment that is shaped by a steady drum beat of Public Affairs and PSYOP messaging, Civil Military Activities and the presence of a Professional Iraqi Security Force that is fully partnered with lethal and non-lethal enablers that is prepared to Coach, Teach, and Mentor their counterparts. These Joint Fires will be applied through an intelligence-driven targeting process that links lethal and non-lethal assets into a network of predictive and responsive resources capable of quickly seeing, understanding and creating effects on High Payoff Targets (HPT) within the Operational Environment (OE). See also Annex P (Information Operations) and Annex R (Public Affairs).

3.A.1.E. (S//REL) Unified execution across all lines of operation interdicts enemy activity through lethal and nonlethal denial of enemy support areas. This denial will prevent the enemy
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

from effectively conducting operations in their operational areas, enabling the consolidation of GoI authority in and between major population centers.

3.3.2. (S//REL) Phasing. This campaign plan will be conducted in three phases. Phase 1: Achieve Operational Partnership, seeks to position and partner CF with IA and DBE NLT 15 OCT 08 to conduct ISF professionalization and execute peaceful provincial elections. Phase 2: Achieve Strategic Partnership, focuses entirely on habitual, unit-to-unit partnerships between CF and ISF to progress the ISF to ORA1. Phase 3: Enduring Strategic Partnership, changes the main effort to the Governance and Economics LOE to set the conditions for long-term development projects and the expansion of civil capacity. ISF partnership continues but shifts focus from maneuver forces to staff and enable professionalization and commander mentorship. CF reduce both their footprint and their total numbers in Iraq.

3.3.3. (S//REL) Phase 1: Achieve Operational Partnership.

3.3.3.1. (S//REL) The purpose of Phase 1 is to build ISF security capability/capacity to capitalize on the security gains from TF 1.4a and recent ISF-led operations.

3.3.3.2. (S//REL) Timing. Phase 1 is already in progress and ends when the partnered ISF unit obtains ORA 2.

3.3.3.3. (S//REL) Phase 1 End State:

3.3.3.3.1. (S//REL) Friendly: All IA and DBE units in the MND-C AO have a positive, enduring partnership with a CF unit. Partnership types will vary depending upon the ORA level of the ISF unit and the threat level within the region. All provinces will be at a minimum of operational partnership, with no regression from previous partnership levels. The al Sheeb POE has established an initial operating capacity (IOC) with 14c operational. 3/101 AA and 2/1 AD have transitioned to MND-B and 2/4 BCT has transitioned into the MND-C AO. Qadisiyah Province is assimilated into MND-C.

3.3.3.3.2. (S//REL) Enemy: Nowhere in MND-C is Insurgent activity capable of preventing provincial elections from occurring. Lethal accelerants to violence are blocked at Zubritiyah and al Sheeb POEs and interdicted IVO DBE border forts. As ISF capability increases, interdiction is conducted in depth. Enemy networks are disrupted throughout the AO.

3.3.3.3.3. (S//REL) Risk: Failure to acknowledge ISF capabilities and change partnership levels creates ISF dependencies on CF. CF must accept that tactical setbacks may occur as the ISF and GoI exercise greater autonomy.

3.3.3.3.4. (S//REL) Execution:

3.3.3.3.4.1. (S//REL) The decisive operation in Phase 1 is ISF professionalization focused on ISF partnership with 10 IA and all DBE in our AO to increase ISF security capability.

3.3.3.3.4.2. (S//REL) Combat operations is a shaping operation focused on disrupting insurgent support areas and border activities to reduce insurgent ability to operate in operational areas. Security efforts also seek to retain freedom of movement throughout the AO and to prevent
establishment of insurgent support areas enabling attacks into our OE. All combat operations in PIC provinces will be by, with, and through the ISF.

3.A.3.E.3. (S//REL) Governance is a shaping operation focused on improving systems of governance and key leader development.

3.A.3.E.4. (S//REL) Development is a shaping operation focused on the expansion of governance. CERP project activity focuses on filling critical gaps which other economic actors are unable to support and/or reinforcing stability until significant economic growth can occur. Development activity in designated insurgent support areas will reinforce long-term sustainment of security by generating local leader and populace support of GoI through relevant quick impact projects facilitating PDSs.

3.A.3.E.5. (S//REL) Information is a shaping operations focused on establishing the competency and legitimacy of the GoI and the ISF while protecting CF/GoI/ISF freedom of maneuver in order to increase credibility of ISF in the eyes of population.

3.A.3.E.6. (S//REL) Sustainment and health service support operations to US and coalition forces throughout AO are sustaining operations in Phase 1 in order to enable forces to conduct COIN operations.

3.A.4. (S//REL) Phase 2: Achieve Strategic Partnership:

3.A.4.A. (S//REL) The purpose of Phase 2 is to develop ISF units to ORA1 standards while maintaining previous security gains. This builds upon the security foundation built during Phase 1 as a catalyst for governance and development.

3.A.4.B. (S//REL) Timing. Individual units will move into and through Phase 2 at different times, but it is generally anticipated that this phase will start in December 2008 and end by Summer 2009.

3.A.4.C. (S//REL) Phase 2 End State:

3.A.4.C.1. (S//REL) Friendly: Provincial Development Strategies have been validated following provincial elections and JCPs updated accordingly. ISF secures all provinces in the MND-C AO with CF in strategic partnership. CF continue to reduce and consolidate forces IAW long-term basing and partnership plans. Enablers assist IA brigade and above HQs with primary focus on staff development.

3.A.4.C.2. (S//REL) Enemy: Key nodes for lethal aid networks in Maysan, Wasit, and Babil are disrupted, preventing the movement of lethal aid into population centers. No enemy forces exist in Iraq capable of deposing the GoI.

3.A.4.D. (S//REL) Risk: Post-UNSCR agreements between the GoI and CF will differ by nation and will be more constraining than current authorities. There is a possibility of significant force reductions during this period. These must be deliberately planned and executed to avoid creating seams in security. The tendency to assist the ISF and GoI must be tempered so that they may develop their own sustainable solutions. Tactical setbacks must be accepted so long
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

as they do not result in the loss of key population centers or the destruction of ISF units. No strategic failure is permitted.

3.A.4.E. (S//REL) Execution:

3.A.4.E.1. (S//REL) The decisive operation in Phase 2 is the formation of Strategic Partnership by all ISF in the MND-C AO. Priority of effort will be IA, DBE, and IPS in provincial capitals. As CF units modify partnership levels, it is anticipated that some subordinate units will become unencumbered. Brigades will utilize these units for partnering with lower priority ISF or will notify MND-C HQ of unit availability for possible remissioning or off-ramping. The intent is that units will work towards a predetermined endstate, not that they accept a time-based status quo for the duration of their deployment.

3.A.4.E.2. (S//REL) Development is a shaping operation focused on reinforcing success by enabling other economic actors (NGOs, International Community, and USAID) to assume the lead in economic growth projects and support of PDS. CERP project activity focus on filling critical gaps which other economic actors are unable to support and/or reinforcing stability until significant economic growth can occur. Development activity in designated existing and emerging insurgent support areas will reinforce long-term sustainment of security by gaining local leader and populace support of GoI through relevant quick impact projects which will provide essential government services and emergency infrastructure.

3.A.4.E.3. (S//REL) Combat operations is a shaping operation primarily ISO ISF nominated operations. Under UNSCR, CF retain the right to conduct operations deemed necessary for the maintenance of security in Iraq. It is not yet known how much freedom of maneuver CF will have in post-UNSCR agreements.

3.A.4.E.4. (S//REL) Information is a shaping operation focused on emphasizing increased GoI capability and capacity for subnational governance in order to reinforce GoI governance and development efforts.


3.A.5.A. (S//REL) The purpose of Phase 3 is to transition CF to a strategic force posture IAW negotiated terms between the US and other TCN and GoI.

3.A.5.B. (S//REL) Timing of Phase 3 starts 01 JAN 09 with the implementation of a negotiated post-UNSCR agreement.

3.A.5.C. (S//REL) Phase 3 End State:

3.A.5.C.1. (S//REL) Friendly: ISF secure all provinces in MND-C with CF in strategic partnership. The population sees provincial governance systems and leadership as legitimate. Both the Iraqi people and the international community see the Iraqi elections as legitimate. Provincial councils, supported by PRTs, are now executing PDSs. Long-term basing is developed and forces repositioned as required. Other CF forces redeploy IAW agreed upon timelines.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

3.A.5.C.2. (S//REL) Enemy: Insurgent activity in all provinces remains within the ability of ISF to control. Insurgents are unable to conduct massed or spectacular attacks into Baghdad and other major population centers.

3.A.5.D. (S//REL) Risk: Decreased authorities for CF.


3.A.5.E.1. (S//REL) Governance is the decisive operation focused on development of governance systems and key leaders with two tasks. The first is to improve sub-national administrative systems for governance, with the second to teach, coach, mentor key provincial and district leaders, both in order to enable Iraqi leaders to exercise effective governance, enabling the GoI to be seen as legitimate by the Iraqi people. The exercise of functionally effective governance at sub-national level, building on the gains in governance in Phase 2, will be a critical enabler in communicating GoI authority and legitimacy.

3.A.5.E.2. (S//REL) Development is a supporting operation focused on reinforcing success by enabling other economic actors (NGOs, International Community, and USAID) to take the lead in economic growth projects. CERP project activity focus on filling critical gaps which other economic actors are unable to support and/or reinforcing stability until significant economic growth can occur. Development activity in designated existing and emerging insurgent support areas will reinforce long-term sustainment of security by gaining local leader and populace support of GoI through relevant quick impact projects which will provide essential government services and emergency infrastructure.

3.A.5.E.3. (S//REL) Information is a shaping operation in Phase 3 focused on informing and influencing the population to accept GoI authority in order to enable GoI to effectively govern. All task forces must execute along the line of operation to achieve the campaign end state. Security, development, and governance lines of operations all reinforce the credibility of these influence operations and communicate GoI legitimacy.

3.A.5.E.4. (S//REL) Partnership is a sustaining operation focused on the maintenance of ISF planning and execution capabilities.


3.A.6. (S//REL) Concept of ISF Development. The purpose of ISF development is to build credible, self-reliant, and self-sustaining military and police forces to secure the Iraqi people, strengthen rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism within Iraq. This development program will be accomplished through the coordinated efforts of GoI, MND-C, and MNSTC-I. The GoI ministries provide overall direction to the ISF. MNSTC-I provides assistance to ISF force generation, focused primarily on ISF manning, training, equipping, and sustaining functions. MND-C focuses on combined operations with ISF through partnership relationships, providing technical assistance, access to combat enablers, and in extremis support. Critical to the development of all ISF will be development of their linkages to each other at the Provincial Operations Centers. The priority of development is IA, DBE, and IPS.

OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

under GoI direction to secure the Iraqi people, strengthen rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism within Iraqi borders. MND-C, through linkages at key positions, mentors IA down to the battalion level to build the capacity to plan, execute, command and control operations. As IA units gain experience and knowledge through mentorship, partnering and formal training, CF involvement will become more advisory in nature. As IA units prove themselves capable, they will gradually increase the independence of their actions as CF increasingly focus on an advisory role at the leader level. Partnered units, in conjunction with TTs and IA unit leadership, will determine when units are capable enough to transition to different partnership relationships. MND-C units provide in extremis support, to include logistics, if required. The end state is that selected IA battalions achieve and maintain ORA-1, capable of independent operations with partnered units and TTs present.

3.A.6.B. (S//REL) Concept of DBE Development. The purpose of DBE development in MND-C is to build a professional and competent border security and customs force capable of enforcing security and collection of revenue along the border. TFs, in conjunction with TTs and the interagency, partner with DBE conducting border security and revenue collection operations, providing in extremis support when required. DBE improves its capability to execute support systems to include, but not limited to, recruiting, pay, logistics, supply, maintenance and personnel. The end state is the DBE in MND-C achieving and maintaining ORA-1, capable of enforcing customs and border operations with partnered units and TTs present.

3.A.6.C. (S//REL) Concept of IP Development. The purpose of IP development in MND-C is to build IP capacity to provide for the safety and security of the Iraqi people through the creation of a professional and competent police force capable of enforcing the rule of law within the provinces down to district level and along the Iraq border. IP improves its capability to execute support systems to include, but not limited to, recruiting, pay, logistics, supply, maintenance, personnel, and training (to include sustainment training of personnel). TFs partner with IP conducting internal security and law enforcement operations. The end state is IP in provincial capitals achieve and maintain ORA-1 under CF/ strategic partnership.

3.A.7. (U) Basing and Real Estate Transfer. The planned and orderly transition of CF-occupied basing and real estate is a key component of the ISF Professionalization and Security LOEs. Base transfers and consolidations are a deliberate process based on achieving necessary operational conditions that include not losing previous gains. On a conditions-based timeframe, MND-C will continue to transfer (shrinking and sharing) bases to the GOI.

3.A.7.A. (S//REL) The transfer (shrinking or sharing) or closure of CF bases is conditions based within each BCT’s AO. As the ISF become more capable and assume more battle space, and as surge forces redeploy and boundaries realign, MND-C will conduct planning for the transfer / closure and consolidation of bases to facilitate an appropriate level of partnership and CF presence.

3.A.7.B. (S//REL) The Shrink and Share basing concept is a combination of reducing the perimeter or fence-line of a given base or operating location (thus reducing the logistical, force protection, and other associated requirements) and co-locating on a base with the ISF and GoI. Shrinking may involve reduction of personnel and infrastructure on a base. Sharing may be done in conjunction with shrinking/reducing and the GoI may provide some base life support functions.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

3.A.7.C. (S//REL) ISF that can or will operate in the same battle space with CF are the primary focus for ISF and CF base sharing. Conditions based (Lead, Partner, Overwatch) coordination of ISF and CF from the operations channels is followed up by basing management and support channels to identify, plan, and execute base sharing transitions that supports the local ISF and CF commanders.

3.A.7.D. (S//REL) Engineer Priority of Support (troop labor). The following is the division
construction priority list by unit. Any projects in addition to this project list will be evaluated
based upon the need and inserted into the priority of support accordingly. Engineers work
multiple units concurrently versus providing support to only one unit at a time (for example,
enGINEERS are currently working 4/1 CAV and TF4-4 projects in parallel, which are in addition
to normal emergency and base camp maintenance EWRs).

- (S//REL) 4/1 CAV (COP GO, COP Condor, Amarah IP academy, Majr Al Kharbir,
  Amarah stadium, Al Gharrar, E. Barracks, Kumayt)
- (S//REL) TF4-4 (TF to 1.4a) CAB HQs to Adder, AVN BN to Adder
- (S//REL) 2/4 BCT (3xJSSs)
- (S//REL) Zurbitya POE - TF 1.4a (generator pad, and rewiring of system)
- (S//REL) 4/3 BCT (Mahawil, Hamiyah, Jabella, Hillah)
- (S//REL) 172nd BCT (TBD)

3.A.7.E. (S//REL) Engineer projects (contracted). Through various contractors the following
projects are tracked and worked by DIVENG, but being executed via contract: Al Sheeb POE, Al
Sheeb LSA, Shalamsha POE, Shalamsha LSA, COP GO Well Drilling, Spray Foaming of tents,
Zerbitya POE generator pad.

3.B. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units (All Phases).

3.B.1. (S//REL) 4/3 BCT.

3.B.1.A. (S//REL) Task: Partner with the ISF; defeat violent extremist networks; conduct KLE in
AO.

3.B.1.B. (S//REL) Purpose: Enhance ISF capabilities; sustain security gains; build civil capacity.


3.B.1.D. (S//REL) Partners: 8th IA BDEs, 5th DBE, IPS.

3.B.2. (S//REL) 3/101 AA.

3.B.2.A. (S//REL) Task: Partner with the ISF; defeat violent extremist networks; conduct KLE in
AO.

3.B.2.B. (S//REL) Purpose: Enhance ISF capabilities; sustain security gains; build civil capacity.

OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

3.B.2.D. (S//REL) Partners: 8th IA and 17th IA.

3.B.3. (S//REL) 2/1 AD.

3.B.3.A. (S//REL) Task: Partner with the ISF; defeat violent extremist networks; conduct KLE in AO.

3.B.3.B. (S//REL) Purpose: Enhance ISF capabilities; sustain security gains; build civil capacity.


3.B.3.D. (S//REL) Partners: 9th IA BDEs, 3/1 NP BDE.

3.B.4. (S//REL) 4/1 CAV.

3.B.4.A. (S//REL) Task: Partner with ISF, defeat violent extremist networks; conduct KLE in AO.

3.B.4.B. (S//REL) Purpose: Enhance ISF capabilities; sustain security gains; build civil capacity.


3.B.4.E. (U) T Provide AWT/ lift capabilities across MND-C IOT enable the execution of all ground tactical plans.

3.B.5. (U) 41 FiB.

3.B.5.A. (S//REL) Task: Partner with ISF; defeat violent extremist networks; conduct KLE in AO

3.B.5.B. (S//REL) Purpose: Enhance ISF capabilities; sustain security gains; build civil capacity

3.B.5.C. (S//REL) Overwatch: Wasit

3.B.5.D. (S//REL) Partners: 8th IA, 3rd DBE, and IPS units to increase ISF professionalism.

3.B.6. (S//REL) 3 REGION BTT.


3.B.6.C. (S//REL) Assist the 3rd Region DBE units in developing intelligence IAW MND-C priorities on the Iranian border in order to develop actionable intelligence on smuggling networks.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

3.B.6.D. (S//REL) Be prepared to relocate from Wasit Province to extend to Al Sheeb POE in Maysan Province.


3.B.7. (S//REL) 54 EN BN.

3.B.7.A. (U) Perform targeted route clearance, assured mobility, operational construction, and QA/QC of programs and projects to build civil capacity to provide MND-C with freedom of maneuver in Area of Operations, fixed site security, and oversight of key programs and projects that increase the civil capacity of the GoI.

3.B.7.B. (U) Partner with the 8th IA and 10th IA Divisional Engineers to develop and increase the ability of IA Engineer Companies assigned to support ISF.

3.B.8. (S//REL) 793 MP BN. Train, Advise, and Assess the Iraqi Police on the development and execution of police competencies and operating systems IOT facilitate the transition of the IP to a professional force capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent law enforcement operations; ensuring security and the legitimate application of the Rule of Law.

3.B.9. (U) 445 CA BN.

3.B.9.A. (U) Provide civil-military assistance to provincial governments in order to increase local capability/capacity to provide effective governance.

3.B.9.B. (U) Identify and enable economic conditions for increasing economic opportunities and enterprises.

3.B.9.C. (U) Receive and procure humanitarian assistance for the division’s units.

3.B.9.D. (U) Provide Civil Information Management in order to create a civil COP for the Division Commander and staff.

3.B.9.E. (U) Advise and interface with all USG agencies, International Organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations to further the Division’s civil-military efforts.


3.C. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

3.C.1. (U) This Order is effective for planning upon receipt.

3.C.2. (U) OBR becomes effective 01 SEP 08.

3.C.3. (U) All units will conduct operations with and through the ISF to the greatest extent possible; avoid unilateral CF operations if possible.

3.C.4. (U) Seek Iraqi solutions to all Iraqi problems. Solutions must be sustainable by the GoI.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

3.C.5. (U) Land-owning BCT’s submit shrink and share plans NLT 01 SEP 08. Refer to Shrink and Share (Annex C, Appendix 2, Tab G) for procedures and guidelines.

3.C.6. (S//REL) Identify and suggest replacement leaders associated with negative influencers in order to limit the negative impact of poor leaders on popular perception of GoI.

3.C.7. (S//REL) Coordinate and conduct training for ISF and government officials within AO with emphasis on leadership in order to increase professionalism and capability of ISF and GoI.

3.C.8. (S//REL) TF commanders BPT describe their operational disposition, friction points and recommendations for future operations at TOA + 60 days.


3.C.9.A. (U) Security. Security is achieved when the population is able to conduct routine civil life without undue threat of violence, coercion from VE, criminal groups and the majority of the population is not receptive to extremist ideology.

3.C.9.B. (U) Partnering. The partnering definitions below are current IAW Reference A. MNC-I is staffing possible modifications to these definitions and will distribute changes via future FRAGOs.

3.C.9.B.1. (S//REL) Tactical Partnership: Tactical Partnership is characterized by largely independent Iraqi operations, enabled by substantial CF support. CF provide enablers through partnership and transition teams- but only as required. Likewise, the high level of interaction typical of habitual relationships in earlier stages is scaled back to some extent. A reduction in direct CF participation in local security missions accompanies the transition to Tactical Partnership, but CF maintain a QRF to ensure Iraqi success at the tactical level. Even with the shift to independent Iraqi operations, CF continue to conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations. Conditions required for transition from Tactical Partnership to Operational Partnership include:

3.C.9.B.1.A. (S//REL) ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with specific, tailored Coalition enabler support only.

3.C.9.B.1.B. (S//REL) ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable) - relative to the threat and anticipated threat.

3.C.9.B.1.C. (S//REL) Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability.


3.C.9.B.2. (S//REL) Operational Partnership is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, enabled by CF support that is more specific in nature and tailored to critical, planned operations.
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

CF maintain partnership and transition team coverage, but habitual relationships involve less-frequent interaction. Direct CF participation with local security missions continues to decrease, but CF provide response forces that constitute an operational reserve, capable of intervening to maintain or restore order in the event of an operational crisis. CF continue to conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations. Conditions required for CF transition from Operational Partnership to Strategic Partnership include:

3.C.9.B.2.A. (S//REL) ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with limited Coalition enabler support (generally by exception only).

3.C.9.B.2.B. (S//REL) ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable) - relative to the threat and anticipated threat.

3.C.9.B.2.C. (S//REL) Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability.


3.C.9.B.3. (S//REL) Strategic Partnership is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, supported with limited CF enablers provided generally by exception. CF continue to develop ISF capability through combined exercises and maneuvers that enhance collective training at battalion level. CF provide response forces capable of intervening in a timely manner throughout Iraq in the event of a strategic crisis. Beyond this, CF perform only a limited set of missions, including strike operations in coordination with the GoI. At this stage, CF activity takes place within the parameters of a long-term security arrangement.


3.C.10.A.1. (S//REL) SOI: Where are the areas that SOI disenfranchisement will be to the point that they return to violence against CF, ISF, or the GoI in MND-C?

3.C.10.A.2. (S//REL) ISF: Which key insurgent groups (JAM, SEG, AQI) are attacking the ISF/ISIs in MND-C?

3.C.10.A.3. (S//REL) Civil: What are the key reconstruction/development projects and infrastructure that support and legitimate GoI efforts in MND-C?

3.C.10.A.4. (S//REL) Elections: Which are the greatest threats to the provincial elections in MND-C?

3.C.10.A.5. (S//REL) Accelerants: Which are the critical accelerant networks (IEDs, EFP) and key leaders that are attacking CF, ISF, SOI, and the GoI in MND-C?
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

3.C.10.A.6. (S//REL) Governance/Economics: What are the greatest threats to good governance and stability in MND-C?


3.C.10.B.1. (S//REL) Status change of any the following: regional and local security and stability (including massing of militia in platoon sized or larger elements); key infrastructure (oil, electricity, dams, bridges, LOCs).

3.C.10.B.2. (S//REL) Any US/CF Soldier/ US Civ/ Tier 1,2,3 GoI Officials/ key tribal or religious leaders and media supporting MND-C, known MIA, DUSTWUN, kidnapped or released.

3.C.10.B.3. (S//REL) Any attempt by enemy forces to isolate, capture, or exploit CF personnel such as transition teams, small units or detachments, TCPs, and other isolated positions.

3.C.10.B.4. (S//REL) All confirmed or credible CF or ISF misconduct (Law of Armed Conflict violations (LOAC)) resulting in serious detainee injury or death.

3.C.10.B.5. (S//REL) Any border (or proximity of the border) incident involving MND-C force engagement.

3.C.10.B.6. (S//REL) Reported use, attempted use, or discovery of weapons of mass destruction within MND-C’s AO.

3.C.10.B.7. (S//REL) Any operation that requires pre-approval from the MND-C, MNC-I, or MNF-I Commander (mosque entry, operations targeting “no touch” individuals or locations.

4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT (See Annex I for additional sustainment information).

4.A. (S//REL) CONCEPT OF SUPPORT. OBR, the MND-C Campaign Plan, takes effect 01 September 2008. OBR focuses on: professionalization of the ISF, partnering with the ISF, securing the populace, disruption of lethal aid across the Iraq-Iran border, defeat of AQI and criminal networks, and promoting organizational and economic growth in support of the GOI. In addition, OBR calls for an expansion of the MND-C AO into southern Iraqi provinces. Both this expansion and the increased efforts to interdict lethal aid along the border present several logistics challenges. These include: equipping units deploying into the MND-C AO, longer lines of communications, professionalizing the logistics corps of Iraqi Army divisions through the employment of Logistics Training and Advisory Teams (LTATs), and the shrinking and sharing of CF basing as the MND-C force array shifts to the south over the next 12 months. With the focus on moving toward strategic partnership during the next 12-18 months, MND-C moves to consolidate forces at two enduring bases: Forward Operating Base (FOB) Delta and Contingency Operating Base (COB) Adder. MND-C G4 supports and enables BCT tactical sustainment operations in the expanded OE by providing reach-back sustainment to support tactical logistics operations, providing oversight to facilitate unit transitions, enabling units with redundant resupply platforms, synchronizing and monitoring the shrinking and sharing of CF basing, and initiating division-level Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) to support the development of division-level Iraqi logisticians, their staffs, and Iraqi Army (IA) operations. These SAVs will be nested with Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) and/or BCT-provided Military Training Teams (MITTs) as well as BCT LTAT efforts at the Motorized Training Regiment (MTR) level and below.

24
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

4.A.1. (S//REL) Phase I: Achieve Operational Partnership (1 September-NLT 15 October 2008). During this phase, TF positions CF units to partner with IA and DBE NLT 15 October 08 to professionalize the ISF and establish partnership for November 08 provincial elections. During this phase, the G4 will support:

4.A.1.A. (S//REL) 2-4 BCT RSOI. Throughout September, 2-4 BCT will deploy from Fort Carson to Kuwait and into the MND-C AO. In coordination with MNC-I, ARCENT, 1st TSC, 3rd ESC, and AMC, MND-C G4 supports 2-4 BCT’s RSOI. Key to 2-4 BCTs RSOI will be the fielding of an IBCT (-) unit equipment set, M1151 Up-Armored HMMWVs (UHs), MRAPs, and establishing the communication infrastructure to support the interface between EPLRS and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) systems. MND-C G4 DTO coordinates transportation platforms to echelon 2-4 BCT equipment and personnel into the MND-C AO.

4.A.1.B. (S//REL) ISF Logistics Partnership. MND-C G4 conducts bi-weekly SAVs with 8th IA. Initial goals are to support IA improvement in the areas of maintenance management, Class VII replacement procedures, and closing the resourcing gap between unit set fielding and units operating in the field. To support the professionalization of 10th IA logisticians, MND-C G4 synchronizes an LTAT consisting of soldiers from 4-1 CAV, 7th Sustainment Brigade (SB), and the MND-C G4 staff. BCT’s conduct logistics partnership in their respective OEs by resourcing multi-functional LTATs. BCT LTATs focus on partnership with division MTRs and Headquarters Support Companies (HSCs). Further guidance will be published in Annex I ISF Logistics Partnership NLT 10 August 2008.

4.A.1.C. (S//REL) MND-CS Assumption. The Multi-National Division will depart NLT 1 October 08. Operations in Qadisiyah province will be assumed by MND-C. The Division G4 will posture the Multi-National Division for redeployment by coordinating transportation assets through the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) and overseeing the disposition of Theater Provided Equipment (TPE).

4.A.1.D. (S//REL) Basing Transfers to the ISF. As MND-C repositions units to partner with IA and DBE, units will identify requirements for CF basing and the need to adjust the basing footprint within their respective AOs. BCTs, already partnering with ISF units in their OEs, will first attempt to coordinate transfer of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Combat Outposts (COPs), and Patrol Bases (PBs) to the ISF. Units will operate IAW MND-C Basing Shrink and Share Annex (TPB NLT 10 August 08) to facilitate transfer of both property and equipment to the ISF.

4.A.2. (S//REL) Phase II: Achieving Strategic Partnership (O/A 15 October 08-summer 2009). During this phase, TF develops ISF units to ORA 1 standards while maintaining previous security gains. Individual units will move into and through Phase II at varying times depending on the professionalization and progress of their ISF counterparts. By the end of this phase, ISF secures all provinces in the MND-C AOE with CF in strategic partnership. MND-C continues to reduce and consolidate forces IAW long-term basing and partnership plans. During this phase, MND-C G4 will support:

4.A.2.A. (S//REL) Potential Move of MND-C HQs. In this phase, MND-C HQs may echelon south to Basra while providing uninterrupted C2 of the expanded MND-C OE. MND-C G4 coordinates for air and surface intra-theater transportation assets to support the HQs during this
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

deliberate move. During RSOI at the southern HQs location, MND-C G4 provides contracting and continued transportation support to facilitate the HQs transition.

4.A.2.B. (S/REL) Operational ISF Logistics Partnership. During this phase, MND-C G4 conducts SAVs to 8th IA HQs bi-weekly. MND-C G4 provides focused staff assistance to the IA in the area of maintenance management, Class VII replacement, force generation, and logistics planning. The MND-C G4 LTAT, comprised of soldiers from 7SB, 4-1 CAV, and MND-C G4, provides training and assistance to 10th IA logisticians. BCTs continue to conduct logistics partnership in their respective OEs by employing multi-functional LTATs.


4.A.2.D. (S/REL) 3-101 Redeployment. MND-C G4 coordinates transportation and provides oversight of property accountability and lateral transfers in support of 3-101's redeployment from Southern Baghdad through Kuwait to Fort Campbell, KY. MND-C G4 provides oversight over 3-101's shrink and share basing plan ICW the CF forces and 17th IA conducting RIP/TOA of 3-101's battlespace with 2/1 AD.

4.A.2.E. (S/REL) 4-3 Redeployment/RSOI 172 IN BDE. During December 08-January 09, 4-3 BCT conducts RIP/TOA with the 172 IN BDE in the Vanguard OE. MND-C G4 synchronizes transportation support to facilitate the movement of 4-3 out of sector while concurrently moving 172 IN BDE into the MND-C AO. MND-C G4 provides guidance and partnership to support the transfer of property between 4-3 and 172. MND-C G4 provides guidance and partnership of 4-3's shrink and share basing plan ICW redeployment.

4.A.2.F. (S/REL) Transition with 34th ID G4 and Redeployment of TF 14a TF 14a conducts RIP/TOA with 34th Infantry Division HQs beginning in April 2009; TOA date in May 2009. MND-C G4 maintains lines of communication with 34th ID G4 sharing products, lessons learned, and starting battle handover of the MND-C mission. MND-C G4 conducts RIP/TOA with 34th ID G4. MND-C G4 coordinates transportation in support of 34th ID's deployment and the redeployment of TF 14a. MND-C G4 executes deliberate property transfer between TF 14a and 34th ID.

4.A.3. Phase III: Enduring Strategic Partnership (June-December 2009). Phase III begins when all units within a province obtain ORA 1 status. It is anticipated that all provinces will be at strategic partnership by Summer 2009. This phase may start for different units at varying times. By the end of this phase, ISF secures all provinces in the MND-C OE with CF in strategic partnership. Iraqi elections and provincial governance systems are viewed as legitimate by both the Iraqi people and the international community. During this phase MND-C supports:

4.A.3.A. (S/REL) Strategic Partnership Realignment. During this phase, MND-C completes its move to enduring FOBs/COBs. Depending on both the political and tactical situation in Iraq, MND-C force structure is reduced to between two and three BCTs operating out of FOB Delta and COB Adder. MND-C G4, ICW MNC-I, provides input to Corps plans to consolidate bases, potentially off-ramp forces, re-postures logistics assets, and reduces the CF footprint, as
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

required. MND-C G4 provides partnership of basing transfers and closures ensuring detailed accountability and disposition of property throughout the MND-C AO.

4.A.3.B. (S//REL) Strategic ISF Logistics Partnering. MND-C G4 coordinates support throughout the MND-C AO operating out of enduring logistics hubs at COB Adder and FOB Delta. MND-C G4 continues to partner with 8th, 10th, and potentially by summer 2009, the 14th IA HQs, providing focused SAVs concentrating on logistics planning, request and distribution flow, maintenance fleet management, Class VII replacement, and force generation.

4.B. (S//REL) CONCEPT OF SUPPORT AND SUSTAINMENT TO OBR LINES OF EFFORT (LOE): ISF Professionalization, Governance and Economic Organization Development, and Population Security. The descriptions that follow provide examples in which the Sustainment War Fighting Function (WFF) performs as a combat multiplier throughout MND-C.

4.B.1. Concept of Support: ISF Professionalization. TF 1.4a units partner with ISF units across the MND-C OE to improve logistics partnership and facilitate the CS movement toward strategic partnership. The TF 1.4a SF Professionalization Plan, NCW MNC-I, is based on the LTAT. LTATs at the BCT-level partner with ISF logistics units to provide relevant and viable sustainment training packages. These training support packages work in accordance with IAG-sourced MITT, National Police Training Team (NPTT), Police Training Team (PTT), and Border Training Teams (BTTs) to improve maintenance, supply, and other readiness aspects of IA, DBE, and IP units. These LTATs will promote professionalism and sustain self-reliance. Concurrently, the MND-C G4 will conduct SAVs to 8th, 10th, and potentially by summer 2009, the 14th IA HQs focusing efforts on logistics planning, request and distribution flow, maintenance fleet management, Class VII replacement, and force generation.

4.B.1A. ISF Logistics Priorities: IA, DBE, NP, IP

4.B.2. Concept of Support: Governance and Economic Organization. The TF 1.4a Sustainment WFF enables the Governance and Economic LOE, by enabling the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in support of their efforts with the Iraqi people. MND-C G4 will coordinate sustainment operations across the MND-C AO in support of projected Iraqi provincial elections that begin Q1 November 2008. While provincial elections are the responsibility of the GOI and support provided through IHEC, BCTs can expect to receive short-notice emergency missions within their OEs to support the IA and GOI by conducting barrier emplacement and providing exigent Class IV. Use of non-standard transportation assets and MHE (e.g. use of M88s to position barrier material) can also be expected.

4.B.3. Concept of Support: Population Security. TF 1.4a Sustainment WFF enables the Population Security LOE by coordinating and synchronizing BCT support requirements with Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) support enablers that facilitate the maximum operational reach for MND-C forces. These efforts will ensure that support throughout the non-contiguous MND-C OE remains transparent to the soldiers and units requiring sustainment, regardless of where they operate. Additionally, as resourcing requirements in support of force protection emerge (example: emergency support to provincial elections) across the Division OE, the G4 will work closely with the 7th SB and 3rd ESC to obtain and emplace those assets IAW the operational plan.
4.C. (S//REL) SUSTAINMENT EXECUTION. MND-C CF units receive sustainment from the 7th SB located at COB Adder, Tallil. The 7th SB provides Direct Support (DS) to MND-C and coordinates for support on an area basis in the northern portion of the Division AO (3-101 and 2-1 AD); support of 3-101 and 2-1 AD is provided by the 1st SB in Taji. Multi-class Combat Service Support (CSS) will be provided by several methods, including: unit distribution, supply point distribution and contracted delivery to BCTs, Brigade Support Battalions (BSBs) and Forward Support Companies (FSCs) at FOBs, COPs, and PBs across the MND-C AO. As required, BSBs provide area support to units assigned/attached to MND-C, or located/operating in or around their BCT AO. This includes MiTTs, NPTTs, PTTs, and BTTs.

4.C.1. (S//REL) Realignment of support during OBR. During OBR, MND-C units and boundaries will shift south in support of the expanded MND-C OE that includes Babil, Wasit, Qadisiyah, Karbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan provinces. Current support relationships between BCTs and Combat Service Support Battalions (CSSBs) of the 7th and 1st SBs do not change with publication of this order. However, as the task organization of MND-C shifts south, or new units are assigned to MND-C for operations, and/or as unit boundaries change that affect the MND-C task organization, the BCTs will receive DS from 7th SB. BCTs must also BPT to reconfigure SAMS-2(E) IOT to transmit any new units data to 7th SB, as appropriate. RIC GEO management functions for all MND-C units continue to be provided by 7th SB. In December 2008, 7th SB will conduct RIP/TOA with 287th SB in Tallil without interruption of sustainment within the MND-C AO.

4.C.2. (S//REL) Support during realignment. With the realignment of the MND-C force array, focus on ISF partnering, and move to strategic partnership, MND-C units will need to anticipate support to units operating in austere conditions during ISF partnering, especially ICW DBE operations along the Iraq-Iran border. A significant implied task during these operations is the need to provide anticipatory logistics, especially for CL I, Water, CL III(B), CL IV barrier and force protection materials, and CL V. Units must maintain accountability of TPE and maintain serviceability of tents, cots, generators, and ECUs resourced through contracts or MND-C. These items will prove vital to unit sustainment as BCTs project combat power and conduct partnering efforts across extended LOCs.


4.C.5. (U) Priority of Support: TBP by operation and IAW BCT requirements.


4.C.7. (U) Transportation. See Annex I, Appendix 2 (Transportation) for more information on routes, movement control, TMRs, and Combat Logistics Patrol (CLP) movement procedures, etc.


5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL.

OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ


5.A.2. (S//REL) Succession to Command. DCG-O, DCG-S, Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff- G3.

5.B. (U//FOUO) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems. The G6 maintains a robust C4 architecture throughout the AO and leverages C4ISR information technology and innovative concepts to execute command and control, and provide reliable and redundant connectivity between partner entities. Utilizing a combination of Joint Network Transport Capability Systems (JNTCS), Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) equipment, and theater provided equipment, G6 will provide an integrated, redundant, and interoperable C4 architecture that is protected, secured, and facilitates collaborative information sharing throughout the AO. Refer to Annex H.

ACKNOWLEDGE

OATES
MG

OFFICIAL:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Annexes
- Annex A – Task Organization
  - Appendix 1 – TO Slides
- Annex B – Intelligence
- Annex C - Operations
  - Appendix 1 - Force Protection
  - Appendix 2 - ISF Professionalization
    - Tab A – IA Development
      - Enclosure 1 – IA re-numbering
    - Tab B – IP Development
      - Enclosure 1 - IPA
    - Tab C – NP Development
    - Tab D – DBE Development
      - Enclosure 1 – DBE naming convention
    - Tab E – Partnership Methodology (TBP)
    - Tab F – Operational Readiness Assessment
    - Tab G – Base Transition to Host Nation
      - Enclosure 1 – Property Closure Notification
      - Enclosure 2 – FEPP Inventory
      - Enclosure 3 – Real Property Inventory
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

- Enclosure 4 – DD Form 200 FLIPL for Donations
- Enclosure 5 – Tactical Base Closure or Transfer Checklist
- Enclosure 6 – Record of Return
- Enclosure 7 – FEPP Memorandum for Record
- Enclosure 8 – Tactical Base Closure or Transfer Worksheet
- Enclosure 9 – ESCS
- Enclosure 10 – Barrier Reporting
  - Tab H – ISF Logistics Partnering
  - Appendix 3 - Governance and Economics Development
  - Appendix 4 – SOI Strategy
  - Appendixes 5-9 – NOT USED
  - Appendix 10 (Aviation Operations)
    - Tab A – Mission Priorities
    - Tab B – Air Mission Request Procedures
    - Tab C – Attack Mission Requests
    - Tab D – Air Assault Operations
    - Tab E – Foreign National Waiver Requests
    - Tab F – Aviation Seats-out Operations
- Annex D - Fire Support
  - Appendix 1 – Target Block Assignments
  - Appendix 2 – CDE
    - Tab A – CDE Tables
  - Appendix 3 – Target Approval Packet
  - Appendix 4 – Radar Net Structure Diagram
  - Appendix 5 – FSCM Naming Convention
  - Appendix 6 – JTAR
  - Appendix 7 – Air Support Plan
  - Appendix 8 – EARF
  - Appendix 9 – Targeting Objectives
  - Appendix 10 – CIDNE Target Linkls
- Annex E - Rules of Engagement
  - Appendix 1 – ROE General Policy Provisions
  - Appendix 2 – ROE Definitions
  - Appendix 3 – References
  - Appendix 4 – Mosque Operations
  - Appendix 6 – Kinetic Targeting
  - Appendix 7 – ROE Cards
  - Appendix 8 – MITT / NPIIT Cards
- Annex F - Engineer
  - Appendix 1 – Engineer Construction Timeline
- Annex G - Air and Missile Defense
  - Appendix 1 – Unit/ Sentinel Radar Locations
  - Appendix 2 – Data Linkage Diagram
- Annex H - Command, Control, Communication, and Computer
  - Appendix 1 - Info Sys
    - Tab A – Helpdesk WO
    - Tab B – Baseline Checklist
    - Tab C – SAAR
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

- Tab D – Bulk User
- Tab E – Group Acct Request
- Tab F – IMO Memo
- Tab G – AISH Standard
- Appendix 2 - BCT and NETOPS
  - Tab A – Network Integration
- Appendix 3 – Single Channel
  - Tab A – Convoy Reporting Net
  - Tab B - LMRs
- Appendix 4 – IA
- Appendix 5 - COMSEC
- Appendix 6 - Spectrum
  - Tab A – Frequency Request Procedures
  - Tab B – Frequency Request Template
  - Tab C – Call Word Request
  - Tab D – JRFL Format
  - Tab E – JISR Checklists
  - Tab F – JISR Template
- Appendix 7 - Reports
  - Tab A – Master Phone List
  - Tab B – COMMSTAT
  - Tab C – Radio Density Report
  - Tab D – TORC Report
  - Tab E – Asset Validation
  - Tab F – IAVA Report
- Appendix 8 - Validation Report
  - Tab A – Example Docs
  - Tab B – Flow Chart
  - Tab C – Time Table
- Appendix 9 - Iraqi Security Force Communications
- Appendix 10 - Telephone Control
  - Tab A – MNC-I Cell Phone Policy
  - Tab B – Iridium Matrix
- Appendix 11 - CPOF
- Appendix 12 - SPAWAR
- Annex I - Service Support
  - Appendix 1 - Supply and Services
    - Tab A – Mortuary Affairs
    - Tab B – Class VII Accountability
    - Tab C – Ammunition
    - Tab D – Retrograde Operations
    - Tab E – Prime Vendor
    - Tab F – FLIPL Process
  - Appendix 2 - Transportation
    - Tab A – Cross Boundary Request
      - Enclosure 1 - Cross Boundary Request Form
    - Tab B – Transportation movement Requests
      - Enclosure 1 - TMR Instructions
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

- Enclosure 2 – Blank TMR
  - Tab C – Container Management
  - Tab D – Consolidated Vehicle Movement and Convoy SOP
  - Tab E – Corps and Divisional Routes
  - Enclosure 1 – Route Status Classification Process
  - Enclosure 2 – Route Classification Status Chart
  - Enclosure 3 – Highway Reg Plan ASR-MSR Grid
  - Enclosure 4 – Route Descriptions
  - Tab F – Division Movement Program
  - Tab G – Pallet Management
- Appendix 3 – Maintenance
- Appendix 4 – Personnel
- Appendix 5 - Legal
- Appendix 6 - Medical Services
  - Tab A – Patient Administration
  - Tab B – Patient Movement and Evacuation
  - Tab C – Rotary Wing Medical Evacuation
  - Tab D – Force Health Protection
  - Tab E – Medical Logistics
  - Tab F – Joint Blood Program
  - Tab G – Dental Services
  - Tab H – Veterinary Services
  - Tab I – Combat Stress Control
  - Tab J – Medical Intelligence
  - Tab K – Medical Civil Military Operations
  - Tab L – ISF Medical Training
  - Tab M – Medical Care for Detainee Operations
- Appendix 7 - LOGCAP
- Appendix 8 - Religious Support
- Appendix 9 - Financial Management
- Annex J – CBRN
- Annex K - Provost Marshall
  - Appendix 1 – MWD
  - Appendix 2 – Detainee Operations
    - Tab A – DHA-A Overview
    - Tab B – MNFRC Board Overview
    - Tab C – Daily Detainee Report
    - Tab D – Weekly ISF Detainee Report
    - Tab E – Monthly ISF Facility Assessment
    - Tab F – OE Assessment for Detainee Release
- Annex M - Rear Area and Base Security (TBP)
- Annex N - Space Operations
- Annex O - A2C2
  - Appendix 1 - Blue Rain Procedures
- Annex P - Information Operations
  - Appendix 1 – OPSEC
    - Tab A – CIL
    - Tab B – POC Roster
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

- Tab C – Website Checklist
- Appendix 2 – PSYOP
  - Tab A – TO
  - Tab B – PO and SPO
  - Tab C – Themes
  - Tab D – TAL
  - Tab E – MOE
  - Tab F – IOTF
  - Tab G – TRWI and IIA
- Appendix 3 – MILDEC
  - Tab A – MILDEC Assessment Guidance
  - Tab B – Joint MILDEC Review List
- Appendix 6 – DSPD-KLE
- Appendix 7 – IE Concept Matrix
- Appendix 8 – IE ISO CIED
- Appendix 9 – IPE
- Appendix 10 – LOO
- Appendix 11 – COMCAM
  - Tab A – MND-C COMCAM Mission Report
- Annex Q – Civil Military Operations
  - Appendix 1 – Civil Affairs Task Organization
  - Appendix 2 – Provincial Reconstruction Teams
  - Appendix 3 – Babil Province
  - Appendix 4 – Wasit Province
  - Appendix 5 – Karbala Province
  - Appendix 6 – Najaf Province
  - Appendix 7 – Maysan Province
  - Appendix 8 – Muthanna Province
  - Appendix 9 – Qadisiyyah Province
  - Appendix 10 – Dhi Qar Province
  - Appendix 11 – Funding Methodologies
  - Appendix 12 – Humanitarian Assistance Operations
  - Appendix 13 – Civil Information Management
  - Appendix 14 – Veterinary Services
- Annex R – Public Affairs
- Annex S – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
  - Appendix 1 – TF[1.4a] Command Relationship and Org
  - Appendix 2 – OE Assessment
  - Appendix 3 – Post Blast and Forensic Exploitation
  - Appendix 5 – EOCA
  - Appendix 6 – ERW
  - Appendix 7 – Route Clearance
  - Appendix 8 – EOD Support
  - Appendix 9 – CREW Procedures
  - Appendix 10 – SSE
  - Appendix 11 – Reports
  - Appendix 12 – Training
  - Appendix 13 – BIOMETRICS
OPORD 08-02 (BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAIN), MND-C, CAMP VICTORY SOUTH, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

- Annex T – IJSTO
  - Appendix 1 – IJSTO Synch Matrix
  - Appendix 2 – IJSTO Support to IO
  - Appendix 3 – IJSTO Support to Detainee Ops
  - Appendix 4 – IJSTO Support to Counter-Communications Activities
  - Appendix 5 – ACCM Easy Farmer
  - Appendix 6 – ACCM Easy Actor
  - Appendix 7 – ACCM Triced Block
  - Appendix 8 – Fortunate Son

- Annex U - Rule of Law
  - Appendix 1 – RoL Report
  - Appendix 2 – RoL Court Statistics
  - Appendix 3 – RoL Court Assessment