



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE, 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
CAMP TAJI, IRAQ APO AE 09378

AFVC-B-CDR

15 March 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 2-82 ABN Historical Command Report

This memorandum provides an overall synopsis of counterinsurgency operations conducted by 2-82 ABN while deployed to Baghdad, Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08.

Deployment and Initial Occupation (JAN 2007) As the security situation continued to deteriorate in Iraq since the Samarra mosque bombing of February 2006, the US political and military leadership determined additional forces would be required to stem the tide of rising sectarian violence. 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne, commanded by [b 3, b 6] was alerted as the first of five "Surge" brigades to increase the combat power on the ground in order to allow more effective counterinsurgency operations.

Receiving official notification for deployment on 28 December 2006, the Brigade quickly mobilized for movement to the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. This included a recall of all personnel that had been released for a holiday block-leave period and a battalion that had just returned from a four-month rotation at Camp Speicher, Iraq in support of Other Coalition Forces- Iraq (OCF-I). 2-82 ABN began movement from Fort Bragg, NC to Kuwait on 01 January 2007 with the majority of personnel closed on Camp Buehring, Kuwait on 07 January 2007 to draw vehicles and equipment from pre-staged stockpiles, train on current theater-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and conduct final pre-combat checks before moving to the Brigade's future area of operations- Northeast Baghdad.


Closing on Camp Taji, Iraq on 18 January 2007, some units of the Brigade were task organized to existing land-owning Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) already in the Multi-National Division- Baghdad (MND-B) battlespace. 1-325 Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR), commanded by [b 3, b 6], remained based on Camp Taji but was task organized under 2-1 ID for operations in the Khadamiyah Security District of Baghdad. 1-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), commanded by [b 3, b 6], would be based at FOB LOYALTY and task organized under 2-2 ID for operations in the Karkh and Karadah areas of eastern Baghdad. Remaining under the command and control of 2-82 ABN was 2-325 AIR, commanded by [b 3, b 6]. 2-319 Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (AFAR), commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6) [b 3, b 6] 2 Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) commanded by [b 3, b 6] and 407th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6). In addition to combat enablers including civil affairs, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and intelligence collection, Task Force 1.4a IN, commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6) was also attached to the Brigade for combat operations.

The Brigade created a unique command relationship for units operating in the FALCON Operational Environment (OE). Due to the unique nature of the mission, there were various units that had no tactical command relationship with the Brigade but were often directly involved in those operations. This relationship was described as a "Cross Functional Team" (CFT) where members did not have a command relationship but rather a mutually supporting working relationship in which all units accomplish their missions in accordance with their high headquarters' guidance while not countering or overlapping another unit's efforts through constant communication and synchronization. This theme was very successful for the BCT especially when working with the Military Police units serving as Police Transition Teams (PTTs) that were responsible for the development of the Iraqi Police.

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2-82 ABN Task Organization at initial occupation of the battlespace



The FALCON OE was composed of the Adhamiyah and Sadr City Security Districts. Adhamiyah is bounded by the Tigris River on the west and the North Canal on the north and east. The southern boundary was defined by ROUTES GRIZZLIES, PLUTO, and AEROS. Predominately a densely packed urban area throughout, high speed mobility corridors were key pieces of terrain. These routes included ROUTES BREWERS, PLUTO, DOVER, and GRIZZLIES. While most neighborhoods are residential there are several agrarian and industrial areas. The Rabi and Tunis Hayys have multiple date palm groves and other fields supporting a small agricultural industry. The Wazariyah Hayy and northern portion of Ur include small industrial districts although there was little activity in these areas during 2-82 ABN's occupation of the battlespace. Sadr City is a dense grid of planned residential neighborhoods with a warehouse district in Thawra 2. These neighborhoods throughout Sadr City are best described as slums.

The population of the FALCON OE is characterized by a sectarian mix of Sunni and Shi'a. The majority of the Shi'a population resides east of the Army canal. The area directly west of the Army canal is mixed with Shi'a and Sunni neighborhoods. The major Sunni neighborhood is Olde Adhamiyah along the Tigris River. Prior to the US invasion of Iraq, the majority of Sunnis in Olde Adhamiyah were professionals and government workers while the Shi'a of Shaab and Sadr City worked mostly, if at all, as unskilled laborers. The mixture of Sunni and Shi'a in the center of the OE sets the conditions for outbreaks of violence on a daily basis. This constant violence provided instability which allowed militia and extremist organizations to influence the local populace. The security these groups claim to provide allowed them safe haven and operational freedom.

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The initial enemy situation for the FALCON Operational Environment is described below in this exert from WARNO 1 to OPORD 07-03 FALCON STRIKE published 21 January 2007.

Insurgents, terrorists, sectarian militias and criminals are the primary dynamic physical threats to political stability in MND-B. Membership and activities in each of these groups are not mutually exclusive; many threat organizations conduct tactical actions which can be considered criminal, terrorist, or insurgent simultaneously. They actively perpetuate instability in order to create the conditions to achieve their diverse endstates. Each group views the Coalition Forces (CF) as "occupiers" and the primary obstacle to achieving their objectives. Distrust of the Iraqi government along with the corruption and infiltration by insurgents within the ISF are key dynamics sustaining the insurgency. A widespread opposition to the presence of CF, coupled with a newly elected government, creates the conditions for support to the insurgency. Although the insurgent groups have diverse and divergent motives, they all share the desire to see CF removed from Iraq. As the GOI assumes a greater share of the security mission, all threat groups will expend correspondingly larger share of the resources in order to destroy, disrupt, intimidate and corrupt the ISF.

Threat Groups

Badr Corps. The Bader Corps- now called the Badr organization and Jaysh al Mahdi are the key militias in the FALCON AO/ AI. The Badr Corps was largely absorbed by the MOI and combined with Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), they control approximately 35 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives.

Jaysh al Mahdi. Jaysh al Mahdi was established by Muqtada al Sadr at the recommendation of Prime Minister Jaffari to counter the influence of the 1.4b Badr Corps. JAM earned credibility by surviving two uprisings against Coalition Forces. JAM maintains credibility within the destitute Shi'a population by providing humanitarian support and claiming credit for CF CERP projects. Sadr controls approximately 32 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. JAM conducts illegal checkpoints, primarily in and near the perimeter of Sadr City, and has shown increased levels of coordination with the Iraqi Army.

Al Qa'ida. Al Qa'ida and associated movements recognized that Baghdad is the key to stability throughout Iraq. They recognized that the period prior to the establishment of a legitimate government is decisive in destabilizing the country and achieving their goal of Multi-National Forces (MNF) withdrawal and establishment of Baghdad as the seat of the new caliphate. Terrorists and foreign fighters will conduct and orchestrate attacks to sustain levels of sectarian violence above the levels that Iraqi Police can control to demonstrate the government's inability to provide a safe and secure environment.

Threat to ISF. The greatest threat to the Iraqi Security Forces is illegitimacy manifested through corruption, poor leadership and the failure to follow the rule of law. The perception that portions of the ISF suffer from pervasive militia influence and lack of professionalism degrades the trust and confidence in elements of the ISF.

Militia Influence. CPA Order 91 authorized integration of the nine existing militias into the ISF. Thousands of Badr Corps members have joined the ISF, primarily the MOI. Most joined the National Police forces, and many senior leaders have either been elected or appointed to civilian ministry positions. This fact reinforces the perception of 1.4b influence held by many Sunni Iraqis. Secret prison scandals and lack of visibility on family members detained by MOI elements also reinforces the perception of corruption 1.4b and militia influence. Many Jaysh al Mahdi elements have also joined the ISF, primarily the Iraqi Police. Estimates vary on the actual numbers of Badr and Jaysh al Mahdi personnel serving in the ISF. It is possible that a strong and charismatic Sunni leader such as Dr. Harith Al Dhari will draw Sunni rejectionists together to form a Sunni militia as

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a counter to JAM and Badr Corps (Iraqi National Police). Recent reporting suggests the desire of Sunni elements to establish a militia in the Abu Ghraib area. Additionally Sunni citizens in the northern portion of the Babil province have approached Coalition leaders to form an IA brigade.

Threat to Civilians. The primary threats to civilians include kidnapping, murder, violence resulting from attacks on iconic religious figures or structures, de-ba'athification, collateral damage from military and AIF operations and increased militia violence associated with eroding faith in the government.

Based at Camp Taji in northern Baghdad with forward Coalition Outposts (COPs) at OLD MOD and APACHE, Task Force (TF) 1.4a IN previously was the sole coalition force in the new FALCON OE. The immediate focus of the Brigade was to intervene in the sectarian violence that had overtaken Baghdad, particularly in the Sunni enclave of Olde Adhamiyah. The Brigade's initial task was to establish forward COPs in order to reduce movement to and from the area of operations and maintain a constant presence with the local population. The BCT's mission statement as published in OPORD 07-03 FALCON STRIKE on 28 January 2007 read:

2-82 ABN conducts combined, counter-insurgency operations in AO FALCON to reduce the level of sectarian violence, defeat extremist networks, build the effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces and facilitate transition to Iraqi self-reliance.

Forces were initially postured and task organized to interdict the Shi'a militias that were attacking Sunni residents as well as capture and defeat the Sunni extremists that continued to fight the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in an attempt to de-stabilize the fledgling government. 2-319 AFAR, task organized with maneuver forces from two batteries and a light sapper company, assumed responsibility for the most permissive of the areas of the BCT battlespace including Hayys Rabi, Tunis, and Basateen. 2-325 AIR, task organized with maneuver forces of two airborne rifle companies, an airborne Anti-tank company, and an airborne reconnaissance troop, assumed responsibility for the predominantly Shi'a areas of Shaab, Ur, and Beida that were heavily influenced by local militias. 2-325 AIR also assumed responsibility for Sadr City although operations there were limited by the standing rules of engagement that required MNC-I approval for operations there. TF 1.4a IN, task organized with two mechanized infantry companies and one tank company, consolidated their operations into the areas of Adhamiyah, Qahira, Maghrib, and Wairiya. TF 1.4a also controlled an engineer company that provided route clearance support throughout the BCT battlespace.

Map of FALCON Operational Environment at initial occupation

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Defeat the Insurgency (FEB- JUN 2007) The BCT began their initial combat operations with the occupation of COP CALLAHAN by 2-325 on 05 FEB 07. Supported by 3-2 SBCT(-), the BCT conducted a deliberate clearance of neighborhoods throughout Shaab, Ur, and Beida in order to detain known or suspected Anit-Iraqi Forces (AIF). Simultaneously, 2-319 AFAR occupied their sector and established a forward COP site at WAR EAGLE. These clearing operations continued for 5 days until 10 FEB. As units from 3-2 SBCT(-) completed clearing neighborhoods, 2-325 AIR expanded their operations to assume this battlespace.

With units now in full control of their respective battlespace, the attention turned to establishing the infrastructure of forward sites and gaining intelligence on enemy operations. In accordance with the BCT Commander's intent, 2/3 of the combat power was to remain forward in the battlespace in order to reduce travel back and forth from Taji and maintain a significant presence in the area. These forward sites would remain critical to the BCT's operations throughout the remainder of the deployment. With the BCT's combat forces located in their area of operations, they were able to conduct dismounted patrols from these locations, react faster to time sensitive targets, and develop relationships with the neighborhoods they occupied. All of these sites were constructed using local contractors and labor whenever possible in order to provide an economic boom to the local area.

The initial maneuver focus of BCT units was on gaining intelligence of the operational environment through assessment of civil infrastructure, engagement with the local populace and governance, and intelligence collection through 1.4c The BCT's primary efforts focused on reducing the sectarian violence in an area around the Samarra, primarily seen in Extra Judicial Killings (EJK). It was suspected that Shi'a extremists were infiltrating the Sunni enclave and murdering civilians in an intimidation campaign. The Sunnis retaliated with their own attacks and Coalition Forces were perceived as a threat by both groups.

During the late winter and early spring 2007, the Brigade began its development of a long-term campaign plan. With the addition of an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) headed by Mr. Paul Folmsbee (State Department SES), the BCT staff began the development of multiple lines of operation that would encompass all aspects of the counterinsurgency fight.

The expansion of these concepts resulted in the publication of a new Brigade OPORD. This OPORD did not significantly change on-going operations, rather it expanded the scope of the Brigade's operations to better integrate non-lethal operations and establish programs and initiatives to improve governance, economic development, and essential services for the local population. Brigade OPORD 07-04 FALCON Campaign Plan was published on 06 May 2007.

As part of this refined operations plan the Brigade Commander directed a continued focus of combat operations in Olde Adhamiyah to defeat AQI and other Sunni extremist organizations then execution of raids against Shi'a extremists in Sadr City to prevent their export of violence. While the lethal operations remained the BCT's main effort, efforts to improve the governance capability were given greater priority. Focusing on improving the systems by which local leaders develop projects to improve the quality of living, the BCT and members of the ePRT engaged at the local level (Neighborhood and District Advisor Councils- NACs and DACs), city level (Beladiyah and Amanat), and national government (Prime Minister's Office and National Ministers).

As part of the full-spectrum operations of the campaign plan, the BCT developed its relationship with the Iraqi Security Force partners in the area. Organized into Security Districts that are loosely based on existing political boundaries, the BCT was partnered with two ISF Brigades. 2-6 Iraqi Army (IA) Brigade (later reflagged as the 1-11 IA Brigade) was responsible for the Adhamiyah Security District and organized with two IA battalions and one National Police (NP) battalion. 8-2 NP Brigade was responsible for the Sadr City Security District and was organized with two NP battalions. Throughout the deployment, one of the key successes of the BCT was its long-standing relationship with these units and their leaders. Unlike ISF units in other parts of Baghdad these units did not experience a significant amount of turbulence in leadership or battlespace responsibility.

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The continued engagement with leaders in Sadr City resulted in the development of a Joint Security Station (JSS) at the Sadr City District Iraqi Police Station. Part of Multi-National Forces- Iraq's (MNF-I) Fardh Al Qanoon concept, the JSS were intended to serve as the central coordination point for all Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces in each Security District. The JSS was to include three partners- Coalition unit, Iraqi military (NP or IA unit), and Iraqi Police (IP). After the initial success of the BCT's first JSS in 2-319's area of Suleikh, 2-325 occupied the JSS with 8-2 NP on 12 MAR and the site was developed to coordinate not only security missions but also to develop governance, essential services, and economic development.

The additional combat forces in the Adhamiyah and Sadr City areas were successful in deterring violence among civilians but there was an increase in attacks on CF and ISF. In an attempt to place a physical boundary between the sectarian forces, the BCT developed a plan with local and ISF leaders to create a "gated" community. Controlled access to the Sunni enclave, limited to three locations manned by ISF would deter Shi'a militias from entering the area as well as prevent Sunni extremists from exiting with vehicle borne explosives. Although initially met with resistance from locals when started on 07 APR, once completed on 27 MAY, the security measures provide effective as murders dropped from over 100 in December 2006 to 20 in June 2007 and then continued to decrease throughout the remainder of the deployment.

The operations in Sadr City were coordinated at a strategic level. Requiring MNC-I commander approval for operations, the BCT organized a Stryker equipped company assigned to 2-325 AIR to conduct these raids to detain insurgents associated with attacks against GOI, ISF, or Coalition targets. Maximizing the use of Division, Corps, and theater resources, the BCT demonstrated a successful series of operations from June to October focused on defeating the Special Groups networks in Sadr City and Shaab. These operations netted over 100 suspected insurgents.

The Serphid series of operations were SIGINT driven missions that targeted Shi'a extremists in Sadr City and primarily conducted by 2-325 AIR.

Mission: CFT 2-325 conducts raid to clear specified objectives in Sadr City in order to capture known special groups personality and disrupt Shi'a extremist command and control in Sadr City.

Key Tasks: Source PID target location; quickly isolate the objective with mounted and dismounted maneuver elements; conduct deliberate SSE; gain SA on Special Groups activities

End State: Sadr City no longer seen as a sanctuary for Special Groups; extremist militias no longer able to operate and plan freely; coalition forces postured to continue the offensive; local populace minimally affected by kinetic operations

The Salem series of operations were [1.4c] missions targeting Shi'a extremists in Sadr City and were primarily conducted by 2-325 AIR.

Mission: CFT 2-325 conducts precision raids to secure targeted individuals in Sadr City to disrupt JAM command and control elements operating in Sadr City and develop a more clear intelligence picture

Key Tasks: Isolate the OBJ with dismounted maneuver elements; conduct a deliberate SSE on OBJ; engage individuals at each location to develop [1.4c] gain SA on JAM activities

End State: Sadr City no longer seen as a place of refuge for insurgents, JAM operators no longer able to operate freely, and Coalition forces postured to continue operations based on collected intel

The Marlboro series of operations were deliberate clearance operations executed as targets of opportunity by the Stryker company attached to 2-325 AIR.

Mission: B/2-3 IN conducts deliberate clearance of a specified objective in Shaab in order to deny enemy forces the ability to influence coalition and ISF operations in AO WF and develop a more clear intelligence picture of support networks and deny safe haven.

Key Tasks: Isolate the OBJ with dismounted maneuver elements; conduct a deliberate SSE on OBJ; engage individuals at each location to develop [1.4c] gain SA on JAM activities

End State: Shaab no longer seen as a place of refuge for insurgents, JAM operators no longer able to operate freely, and Coalition Forces postured to continue operations based on collected intelligence.

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2-82 ABN Task Organization after the release of TF 1.4a and gain of 3-7 CAV



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FALCON OE after integration of 3-7 CAV, 14 JUL 07

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A critical turning point in the relations with the Sunni population of Adhamiyah was the events at the Al Numan Hospital in late June and early July. The local perception was the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that were predominately Shi'a, were denying access to the hospital with checkpoints established around the hospital. The ISF intended for the checkpoints to prevent injured extremist fighters from receiving medical care. TF 1.4a developed a compromise where local residents were trained for fixed site security by the IA then replaced their checkpoints. This effort by local residents to assume greater responsibility for their own security was demonstrated throughout Iraq, particularly in Sunni communities, where local leaders were taking a stand against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other external influences. Initially called "Awakening Councils" the program was developed as Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs).

Continued support from 3-7 CAV further expanded this concept of local security as additional local residents were hired for fixed site and checkpoint security in Adhamiyah; eventually hiring over 700 military aged males by early November. 2-319 AFAR which led the Brigade in non-lethal project development, was able to replicate similar success by hiring 695 local citizens for security in the Rabi and Tunis areas.

The greatest demonstration of the Adhamiyah populace's rejection of local insurgents came on 05 AUG. In response to the suspected murder of relatives of a local sheikh, more than 80 residents took control of the Abu Hanifa mosque in search of suspected insurgents accused of being involved in the murder. The Abu Hanifa mosque was a significant Sunni mosque and had been suspected of hiding insurgents and caches. Further searches of the area by ISF and Coalition Forces from 3-7 CAV found multiple IEDs, 16 mortars, two hand grenades, a sniper rifle, remote detonation devices, radios, and more than a dozen illegal weapons. Twenty-eight detainees were eventually taken into custody. This direct action by local residents was viewed as a significant turning point in the populace's rejection of the insurgency and desire for peace.

With the security situation significantly improved throughout the area of operations and the expanding capabilities of the ePRT and civil affairs assets, the Brigade's efforts in the non-lethal lines of operation continued to expand.

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Mr. Paul Folmsbee (DoS) and [b 3 b 6] (USN) of the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) were the primary leads with support from the Brigade CA officer, [b(3), b(6)] in engagements with the local Neighborhood and District Advisory Councils (NACs and DACs). Their engagements focused on facilitating local government taking the lead in interaction with the Amanant, Beladiyahs and National Government Ministries to respond to citizen needs. With interaction by the local units, they sought to encourage and support all responsible forms of local governance including NACs and DACs, responsible tribal and traditional governance including Sheiks, Muqtars, moderate Imams and community-based organizations. Always stressing process over projects, in the late summer, success was finally realized when the ePRT was able to arrange a meeting with the entire Adhamiyah DAC, including all Shi'a and Sunni members, in a public forum at their existing DAC hall. This was the first time all members met in a public forum in over a year. Although still hampered by a lack of available funding, the involvement of the Adhamiyah DAC in the development and selection of projects completed through funding by Coalition Forces or forwarded to the city government for consideration, represented a major step towards establishing legitimate government practices.

Improving essential services was a critical component of gaining the support of the population for Coalition Forces as well as the government of Iraq (GOI). In the years since the overthrow of the Saddam regime, significant money and effort had been placed in improving available water sources, sewage removal, trash pickup, electrical service, health care, and fuel distribution; systems which in many cases were outdated or of insufficient capacity. Coalition Force developed and funded most of these projects. While still critical to the improvement of the residents' quality of life, the improvement of local governance allowed the Brigade to increase the Iraqi involvement in the process. Establishing the self-reliance of Iraqis was a difficult undertaking that met with various levels of success.

The Civil Affairs Teams working at the battalion level assumed the lead in developing these projects with the support of local Iraqis. In Rabi and Tunis, there was great success in the refurbishment of the water distribution system critical to the agriculture of the area and creation of a micro-power co-op that supplied reliable electrical service to 100 homes through neighborhood generators.

As the Adhamiyah DAC sought involvement with Coalition Forces and the GOI, the projects in that area increased and services were improved. The Sadr City DAC continued to be intimidated by Jaysh Al Mahdi and Special Groups from working with Coalition Forces. Although the GOI continued to fund projects in the area, they were often corrupted by bribes and payoffs that resulted in little or no improvement for the general population.


[b 3, b 6] later [b(3), b(6)] from the ePRT, lead the BCT's economic development efforts. Pursuing an integrated strategy for economic growth, vocational training, and sustainable job development, they advocated improvements for bolstering business growth and facilitate business opportunities which will ultimately lead to increased job opportunities especially for militia-aged young males. Specific efforts included the formation of Market Development Councils in Rabi, Adhamiyah, and Shaab. The ePRT brought local business leaders together in these councils and helped them create a framework for free-market enterprise with the improvement of existing markets. USAID supported economic development efforts with small business loans and grants that over the course of 2007 amounted to over \$2,250,000 for Adhamiyah and Sadr City. While still fledgling, the economic development of these areas will offer the long-term stability for the population and reduce the insurgents' support base.

TF [1.4a] IN completed their 15-month combat tour on 01 NOV 07 and redeployed with 2-1 ID to Germany. To compensate for the reduction of combat power in the OE, the Brigade received an additional engineer company to provide assured mobility for the Brigade. 84th EN Company from 2nd SCR initially filled this role and then transitioned route clearance responsibility to 237th EN Company from the 35th EN Group. The Brigade was also task organized with 1-2 SCR from 2nd SCR. This battalion was task organized with 2 companies and assumed responsibility for Sadr City. The third company from this battalion was task organized with 2-319 AFAR as they assumed responsibility for the Qahira area from TF [1.4a] IN.

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FALCON Task Organization on 22 OCT 07



FALCON OE alignment on 22 OCT 07

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Lasting Change (NOV 2007- FEB 2008) As the MND-B leadership prepared to transition from 1st Cavalry Division to 4th Infantry Division on 19 DEC 07, the BCT was faced with the challenge of establishing their existing programs into legacy actions that would provide lasting change for the population. While combat operations were still a significant part of the Brigade's operations, the engagement restrictions in Sadr City continued to prevent CF action. A vast effort was placed on the control of insurgent activity into and out of the area that had become a safe haven.

Expanding on the Safe Roadway program, the Brigade intended to isolate Sadr City by controlling vehicle traffic north into Shaab. Traffic south out of Sadr City and onto ROUTE PLUTO was already limited to three controlled checkpoints at ROUTES GRIZZLIES, DELTA, and AEROS. Although there were existing checkpoints along ROUTE GRIZZLIES (Sadr City's western boundary), they were assessed as ineffective due to multiple avenues and complacency by the ISF that manned them. To counter these ineffective control measures, reinforced checkpoints with CF oversight were emplaced to restrict movement from Sadr City to Shaab. Beginning on 02 DEC access was limited to only three approaches- ROUTES MARYLAND, COPPER WEST, and GOLD- and a barrier along ROUTE TAUPE was emplaced to prevent infiltration. The reinforced checkpoints included additional force protection and traffic control measures and with only three checkpoints CF were able to provide better oversight and reinforcement to the ISF eliminating the complacency seen in the previous checkpoints.

Completed on 10 FEB, the combination of barriers and checkpoints achieved several of its intended goals. Insurgents' freedom of maneuver was restricted. Checkpoints could be closed in order to maneuver on any insurgents that were identified operating in Shaab. The insurgents became afraid to transit the checkpoints which displayed wanted posters with pictures of the Brigade's high value targets.

Although combat operations in Sadr City had been minimized, engagement with local leaders continued. The Brigade developed and acted on an engagement strategy that focused on four groups- OMS leadership, Sadr City District Council, tribal sheikhs, and religious imams. None of these groups were willing to meet with Coalition representatives publicly or in Sadr City. Meetings were initially arranged by Brigade ISF counter-parts, primarily the 8-2 NP commander BG Ali, at the Al Rasheed Hotel in the International Zone.

[b 3, b 6] were the primary representatives at these discussions. Slowly building on each previous meeting, the Brigade was able to progressively increase the significance of those local Iraqi leaders that attended the meetings. Tribal sheikhs and imams were the most responsive to these discussions. Although claiming ties to OMS, there was never a significant representative. Those that did attend with ties to OMS often cited a requirement to report back to leadership in Najaf before agreeing to any further discussion. The most significant of these meetings occurred on 03 DEC. [b 3, b 6] [b 6] represented the BCT as they met with Sadr City leaders including representatives of the local tribal councils, senior imams, and DAC members. Although producing no specified agreements, the meeting represented a huge step in open dialogue between Coalition Forces and Iraqi local leaders. During the Haji in late December, negotiations ceased for the religious holiday and never fully regained momentum.

One of the final efforts of the BCT was to establish a final JSS in Hayy Ur that would be capable of countering the intimidation of Special Groups from Sadr City. Strategically located along RTE MARYLAND, JSS Ur would allow a constant Coalition and ISF presence along one of the primary access routes between Shaab and Sadr City. This location also positioned forces closer to Sadr City in order to execute timely raids based on actionable intelligence. The emplacement of an AEROSTAT system allowed 24-hour ISR coverage of the northern third of Sadr City. This final forward position located in the battlespace raised the total to five JSS and five COPs where the Brigade had forces forward positioned.

The redeployment of 2-82 ABN represented the end of the "surge". Although no unit was identified as a specific backfill for 2-28 ABN, the transition of the International Zone to a Joint Area Support Group made 3-4 ID available for the assumption of the Brigade's mission. Commanded by [b 3, b 6] 3-4 ID was task organized with one maneuver battalion, 1-68 Combined Arms Battalion (CAB), a support battalion,

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68th BSB, and their habitual Brigade Special Troops Battalion. Because of their arrival in theater in mid-December, the brigades were able to execute an extended relief in place process.

3-4 ID initially assumed battlespace north of 2-82 ABN in the Istiqlal Qada on 15 JAN. They then assumed responsibility for the southern half of Adhamiyah and 2-319 AFAR and 3-7 CAV on 22 JAN. This extended RIP benefited the incoming unit by providing them greater situational awareness of the terrain, population, and enemy prior to their own operations.

The final transition of battlespace occurred on 15 MAR 08 when 1-68 CAB from 3-4 ID conducted a relief in place of 2-325 AIR and 3-7 CAV relieved 2-319 AFAR. These final transitions left 3-4 ID as the sole headquarters for Adhamiyah and Sadr City Security District with 3-7 CAV, 1-2 SCR, and 1-68 CAB controlling the battlespace.

Historical documents supporting this report are available via the internet through the unit file on AKO-S.

- Login to AKO-S at the following link: (b)(6)
- Select the "FILES" icon next to Email icon on top of page,
- Click on PLUS sign under "US ARMY ORGANIZATION" in the navigation tree to the left of the page,
- Select "FORSCOM",
- Select "2BCT 82d ABN - Falcon Files"

The point of contact for this memorandum is the Brigade S3, (b)(3), (b)(6) at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Commanding

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2-82 ABN Key Personnel

BCT Commander	(b)(3), (b)(6)	JUN 06 SEP 07	APR 07 Present
BCT Command Sergeant Major		APR 07	SEP 07
BCT Deputy Commander		JUN 06	Present
BCT Executive Officer		APR 07	Present
BCT Adjutant		NOV 06	Present
BCT Chaplain		JAN 07	JUL 07
BCT Intelligence Officer		JUL 07	Present
BCT Operations Officer		JUN 06	Present
BCT Effects Coordinator		JUL 06	NOV 07
BCT Logistics Officer		NOV 07	Present
BCT Signal Officer		JUN 07	Present
BCT Civil Military Ops Officer		JUN 06	JUL 07
		JUL 07	Present
		MAY 06	AUG 07

	AUG 07	Present
	MAY 06	Present
	AUG 06	Present

~~SECRET//REL TO US, MCFI~~