MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

UPDATE TO OPERATIONS ORDER 05 – 02
Synchronizing COIN Operations

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7. (U) US Joint Publication 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning
8. (U) Maps and Charts. US DoD Iraq-Support Study dated Jun 03
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# MNC-I OPERATIONS ORDER 05-02 (U)

(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U) Table of Contents ([ ] denotes base order reference)</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U) BASE OPERATIONS ORDER (JUNE UPDATE)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Updated Phases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Synchronization of Decisive, Shaping, Sustaining Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Concept of Operations (5 Focus Areas)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Updated Priorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Updated ISF Development Timeline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TRA and the Coalition Transition (Condition setting by Coalition Operations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Future Quantification of Police Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Way Ahead - Sep Assessment (decisions to be made)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U) ANNEX A, TASK ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1 – Task Organization Diagram</td>
<td>A-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2 – MNC-I Breakdown (add)</td>
<td>A-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U) ANNEX B, INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>TBP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1 – Intelligence</td>
<td>B-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2 – Key Cities and Providences</td>
<td>B-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4 – PIR</td>
<td>B-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U) ANNEX C, OPERATIONS</td>
<td>TBP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1 - COIN Synch Matrices (add)</td>
<td>C-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2 - Border Operations [add, see Annex C Appendix 1]</td>
<td>C-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab B – BTT Distribution (add)</td>
<td>C-2-B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab C – Fort Distribution (add)</td>
<td>C-2-C-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab D – DBE Force Generation (add)</td>
<td>C-2-D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab E – DBE Information Operations (add)</td>
<td>C-2-E-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab F – Border Capability Strategy (add)</td>
<td>C-2-F-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab G – Border TRA Report (add)</td>
<td>C-2-G-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab H – Border Fort (MTOE) (add)</td>
<td>C-2-H-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab I – Border (METL) (add)</td>
<td>C-2-I-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3 - Infrastructure Security Operations (add)</td>
<td>C-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab A - Effects Synchronization Matrix [see Annex C Appendix 3]</td>
<td>C-3-A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab B - Strategic Infrastructure Battalion TRA (add)</td>
<td>C-3-B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab C – Strategic Infrastructure (add)</td>
<td>C-3-C-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab D – SIB Minimum Equipment Listing (add)</td>
<td>C-3-D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4 - COUNTER-IED / VBIED Operations [see Annex C, Appendix 1]</td>
<td>C-4-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tab A – IED Effects Synch Matrix (add)  
Enclosure 1 – IO IED  (add)       C-4-A-1
Tab B – Counter IED Program [see Annex C, Appendix 1] C-4-B-1
Enclosure 1 – Command and Control (add)  
Enclosure 2 – Chain-of-Command (add)  
Enclosure 3 - IED / UXO Spot Report Format (add)  
Enclosure 4 - Responsibilities and Procedures (add)  
Enclosure 5 – IED Training [see Annex C, Appendix 1] C-4-B-5-1
Enclosure 6 – BDC Training Sched [see Annex C, Appendix 1] C-4-B-6-1
Enclosure 7 – Police Training Sched (add)  
Enclosure 8 – IED Acronyms (add) C-4-B-8-1
Enclosure 9 – IED Targeting ESM (add) C-4-B-9-1

Appendix 5 - Election Plan [see Annex C, Appendix 1] C-5-1
Tab A – Elections Phase I (add) C-5-A-1
Tab B – Elections Phase II, Public Discussion (Frago 163, 13 July 05) C-5-B-1
Tab F – Elections – Security Responsibilities (add) C-5-F-1
Tab G – Elections – TAL Constitutional Timings (add) C-5-G-1
Tab I – Election ESM (add) C-5-I-1

Appendix 6 – Operations to eliminate Seams and Gaps (OPN SHARP SWORD) C-6-1
Tab A – EMS  
Enclosure 1 – IO Support (add) C-6-A-1
Tab B – Operation Sharp Sword (add) C-6-B-1
Tab C – Military Deception (add) C-6-C-1

Appendix 7 - ISF Update [see Annex D, Appendix 1] C-7-1
Tab A – Master Unit List (add) C-7-A-1
Tab C – Iraqi Army Task Organization (add) C-7-C-1
Tab D – MOI Task Organization (add) C-7-D-1
Tab E - ISF Validation Model and TRA (add) C-7-E-1
Enclosure 1 – TRA’s for ISF C-7-E-1-1

Appendix 8 – Force Transition (add) C-8-1

Appendix 9 – Basing Transition Update [see Annex D, Appendix 2] C-9-1
Tab A – Proposed Basing Consolidation (add) C-9-A-1
Tab B – BRAC4IRAQ (add) C-9-B-1

Appendix 10 PSTs and PRDs C-10-1

Appendix 11 Personnel Recovery  
Tab A – Additional Personnel Recovery References C-11-A-1
Tab B – Acronyms C-11-B-1
Tab C – Evasion Plan of Action C-11-C-1
Tab D – PR Training Requirements C-11-D-1
Tab E – ISOPREP Forms C-11-E-1
Tab F – JOC Battle Drill and SMC C-11-F-1
Tab G – Blood Chit Program C-11-G-1
Tab H – Equipment Requirements C-11-H-1
Tab I – Reporting Requirements C-11-I-1
Enclosure 1 – Reporting Requirements Worksheet C-11-I-1-1

Appendix 12 – PSYOP Plan [see Annex C, Appendix 3] C-12-1
Tab A – Task Organization C-12-A-1
Tab B – PSYOP Objectives, 30 Jun 05 C-12-B-1
Table of Contents

Tab C – TAs, 30 June 05                              C-12-C-1
Tab D – Themes and Actions                           C-12-D-1
Tab E – Product Numbering System                    C-12-E-1
Tab F – PSYOP Programs                               C-12-F-1
Tab G – Program and Series Development              C-12-G-1

Appendix 13 – Information Operations [see Annex C, Appendix 3]  C-13-1

Tab A – IO Effects Synchronization Matrix            C-13-A-1
Tab B – JOC IO Battle Drill                         C-13-B-1
Enclosure 1 – ISR Request                           C-13-B-1-1
Tab C – Combat Camera                               C-13-C-1
Tab D – Electronic Warfare [ see Annex C, Appendix 3]  C-13-D-1
Enclosure 1 – Electronic Attack Requests             C-13-D-1-1
Enclosure 2 – Electronic Attack Request Form        C-13-D-1-2
Tab E – Tiers of Influence                          C-13-E-1
Tab F – Task Organization [see Annex C, Appendix 3]  C-13-F-1
Enclosure 1 – Critical Information List              C-13-F-1-1
Enclosure 2 – HODA OPSEC Brief                      C-13-F-2-1
Enclosure 3 – OPSEC Violation Report                 C-13-F-3-1
Enclosure 4 – OPSEC Tri-fold Guide                   C-13-F-4-1
Enclosure 5 – Trash Label                           C-13-F-5-1

(U) ANNEX D, ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS           TBP
  Appendix 1 – Support to ISF                        D-1-1
  Tab Q – Unit Equipment Management Procedures       D-1-Q-1
  Appendix 2 – Theatre Basing Concept                D-2-1
  Tab A – BBCWs                                      D-2-A-1
  Tab B – Base Camp Closure                           D-2-B-1
  Tab C – Base Development and Improvement            D-2-C-1
  Tab D – Property Management                        D-2-D-1
  Tab E – Base Camp Transfer                          D-2-E-1
  Tab F – Real Property Turnover                      D-2-F-1
  Tab G – Base Camp Services                          D-2-G-1
  Tab H – Transfer of US Property                     D-2-H-1
  Tab I – LOGCAP Support (add)                        D-2-I-1
  Appendix 3 – Funding                                D-3-1
  Tab B – Contracting                                 D-3-B-1
  Appendix 5 – Religious Support (add)               D-5-1

(U) ANNEX E, ENGINEERS / RECONSTRUCTION              TBP

(U) ANNEX G, CIVIL AFFAIRS                           TBP

(U) ANNEX K, COMMUNICATIONS                         TBP
  Appendix 1-Transition Teams                        K-1-1

(U) ANNEX O, AVIATION                                TBP
  Appendix 1 – ACM Request and ACO Procedures        TBP
  Appendix 2 – AMR Submission Requirements           TBP

iii
SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ and MCFI//20150630
For display only to IRQ
(U) ANNEX P, LEGAL SERVICES

(U) ANNEX Q, MEDICAL SERVICES

(U) ANNEX R, REPORTS

(U) ANNEX U, OPORD DECISION GUIDE
   Appendix 2 Tab A - Effects Assessment Matrix
   Appendix 2 Tab B - Provincial and Key City Assessment Frago 178, 20 July 05
   Appendix 2 Tab C - Effects Assessment Report

(U) ANNEX Z, DISTRIBUTION
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

UPDATE TO OPERATIONS ORDER 05-02

SYNCHRONIZING COIN OPERATIONS

1. *(S//REL) Situation *

   a. *(S//REL) General.* This is the first of a series of Quarterly Updates MNC-I will publish to OPORD 05-02. This 90-day update includes revisions concerning the phases of the operation and timings, a revised threat assessment, and focused guidance on how MNC-I will synchronize security efforts by the MSCs to set conditions for the October Constitutional Referendum and December Election. This update includes changes as a result of the publication of the MNF-I Campaign Action Plan for 2005 and results of the MNF-I June 2005 Assessments.

   b. *(S//REL)* Since OPORD 05-02 was issued on 1 April 2005, the Corps has made significant progress in achieving its objective to develop Iraqi Security Forces that are capable of assuming the lead in the Counterinsurgency Campaign. From establishing a disciplined and prioritized equipment fielding plan, to embedding transition teams within the Iraqi Security Forces, to a unified effort in transitioning battlespace, MNC-I efforts are beginning to shift momentum towards the Iraqi Transitional Government and accomplishing the desired effects of the operational design. The intent of this Update is to build on the current progress and generate irreversible momentum. The focus of this 90-Day Campaign Update is synchronizing COIN Operations across the Corps to ensure the neutralization of the AIF and to set the security conditions that guarantee successful completion of UNSCR 1546.

   c. *(S//REL)* The next 90-Day Update (Published after the MNF-I SEP Assessment) will focus on the next step in refining the Counterinsurgency. Once conditions have been set by developing capable ISF and neutralizing the AIF, the subsequent Update will address in greater detail the plan to establish Rule of Law, the plan to synchronize Economic Reconstruction, the plan to develop an independent logistics system for the Iraqi Army, and the plan to reduce the Coalition footprint by transitioning the Force to strategic overwatch (see figure below, figure 01). The rule of law will focus on court system development, establishment of a judicial body at all levels of government, and through progress made by transitioning the detention system to the Iraqi government.
d. (U) **Area of Concern.** No Change

1. (S//REL) **Area of Responsibility.**

2. (U) **Area of Interest.** For MNC-I, the Area of Interest is principally Iraq and its neighboring countries. The region contains allies and friends that support the mission (such as Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia)...

   moderate Shia majority would pose a major threat to MNC-I objectives...

   insurgents -- in particular to elements and individuals from the former regime -- coupled with a porous border, present the Force with a challenge that will require early resolution in order to neutralize the Former Regime Extremist element of the insurgency. Additionally, MNC-I's area of interest includes the...
Iraqi Government Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior as well as the Ministries of Oil and Energy as they relate to the delivery of basic services and infrastructure security.

DIVISION OF LABOR

CENTCOM
- Looking INTERNATIONALLY
  - Focused REGIONALLY
  - ENgage REGIONal ACTORS
  - IDENTify PERSONNEL, MONEY, AND EQUIPMENT

FORCE
- Looking REGIONALLY
  - Focused GOVT OF IRAQ / INTERAGENCY
  - INTERFACE WITH ITG & EMBASSY
  - COORDINATE INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES
  - INTERDICT PERSONNEL, MONEY, AND EQUIPMENT
  - SHAPE WITH RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

CORPS
- Looking GOI / ISF
  - Focused CROSS BOUNDARY
  - DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN COP
  - BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT
  - PROVIDE ESG FOR CROSS BOUNDARY OPERATIONS
  - FORCE GENERATION
  - DIRECT TRAINING OF ISF & COIN CAMPAIGN
  - SHAPE WITH ISR ASSETS
  - DEVELOP IRAQI ARMED FORCES

DIVISIONS
- Looking CROSS BOUNDARY
  - Focused AO SPECIFIC
  - TRAIN AND ADVISE ISF (MOD & MOI)
  - TRAIN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
  - CONDUCT COIN OPERATIONS

Fig. 2 (S/REL) Diagram

(3) (S/REL) Key Cities and Terrain. In an effort to facilitate prioritization, we will focus our efforts on 21 key cities (see ANNEX B, APPENDIX 2, Key Cities and Province Assessment). If controlled, they will give the ITG a marked advantage towards successfully conducting the elections, while simultaneously neutralizing the insurgents. Perceptions of election validity and legitimacy, and the production of a representative government, both for the Iraqi people and in the UN and wider international community, would be strengthened by the control of these cities.
e. **(U) Enemy Forces.** See Annex B.

f. **(S//REL) Friendly Forces.**

(1) **(S//REL) MNF-I Mission and Intent.**

(a) **(S//REL) Mission.** The MNF-I Mission is changed to reflect the shift in focus of transitioning security responsibility to the ITG and ISF:

In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.

(b) **(S//REL) Objectives for 2005.** The coming year can be decisive in attaining our Campaign end state. As articulated in our Joint Embassy/MNF-I Mission Statement, our two major objectives for 2005 are to complete the UNSCR 1546 political process and to prepare ISF and ITG to assume the counterinsurgency lead. This will require a multifaceted counterinsurgency campaign bringing together all lines of operation and an increased focus on improving the effectiveness of the ISF and ITG to conduct counterinsurgency operations. This comprehensive approach is reflected in the objectives from the Joint Mission Statement.
and indicated additions. These objectives supplement those specified in the MNF-I Campaign Plan:

(i) Complete the UNSCR 1546 political process, with focused effort on achieving a federal, democratic, pluralistic and unified Iraq.

(ii) In conjunction with the ITG, develop a comprehensive long-term approach to Iraq.

(iii) Continue ISF development and transition the counterinsurgency effort to the Iraqis while bringing the insurgency and foreign terrorists to a level that can be contained by ISF.

(iv) Create conditions for continued economic development and reconstruction efforts by encouraging necessary internal economic reforms and enlisting additional economic support from other countries and international financial institutions.

(v) Create the conditions for continued improvement of the Iraqi institutions responsible for overseeing the rule of law. (added)

(vi) Enhance Iraq’s external security through diplomatic efforts focused on deterring interference in Iraqi internal affairs and building win-win relationships with its neighbors.

(vii) Enhance the capacity of Iraqi ministries and improve links between the central government and provinces.

(viii) Reduce the threat posed by militias through integration or other processes by the end of 2005. (added)

(ix) Support the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and the TAL Article 58 process for Kirkuk. (added)

(c) (S/REL) To accomplish this mission, MNF-I will progressively shift our main effort from fighting the counterinsurgency to transitioning responsibility for the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and ISF. We will do this by building Iraqi capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations at the local, provincial and national levels. As ISF are able to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, first with Coalition Transition Teams and enablers, and ultimately independently, Coalition forces will transition to a supporting role with a less visible and reduced presence. All transitions will be based on the readiness of ISF to take the lead in conducting and sustaining counterinsurgency operations. We will accomplish this strategy by partnering Iraqi and Coalition forces at the Army through battalion levels and embedding Transition Teams with Iraqi Defense and Interior ministries’ and military, special police and border police units to improve their confidence and operational effectiveness. Concurrently we will continue to pursue the Campaign Plan aggressively to bring the insurgency to levels that can be contained by increasingly capable Iraqi security forces.

(d) (S/REL) Concept. MNF-I will pursue a phased strategy to transition the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and ISF and create the conditions
for Iraqi Security Self-Reliance. While continuing to aggressively prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign in partnership with the Iraqis, MNF-I will progressively shift its main effort from leading the counterinsurgency effort to building ISF and ITG capability to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations and to maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment. The Security Concept will be executed in four phases described below. Implementation will vary across Iraq based on the security situation and the readiness of Iraqi security forces and ministries.

(e) (S//REL) In Phase I, Implement the Transition Team Concept, MNF-I will establish partnerships between Iraqi and Coalition units and will embed Transition Teams in designated Iraqi Security Force units by 15 June 2005. Coalition units will also work to develop all security forces within their assigned area of operations. Coalition forces embedded with ISF units will remain under Coalition command and Iraqi forces will command Iraqi units. Aggressive counterinsurgency operations will be continued, with increased Iraqi involvement, to deny insurgents and terrorists the opportunity to regain the initiative during this transitional period. Concurrently, MNF-I with IRMO advisors will build the capacity to continue the development of ISF leaders, organizations, supporting institutions and Iraqi security ministries and to assist the transition of the Iraqi Transitional Government. It is imperative that this transition be completed in a manner that preserves the momentum of security force development and of the counterinsurgency campaign.

(f) (S//REL) In Phase II, Transition to Provincial Iraqi Security Control, Coalition forces will pass the lead for conducting counterinsurgency operations to capable ISF as conditions warrant. The conditions for this transfer are detailed in MNC-I OPORD 05-02. As this transition occurs, support to civil-military operations should continue and coalition forces should adapt their mission profile and posture to provide enabling and quick reaction support to ISF and to reduce the visibility of Coalition forces. Our goal is to have all of the provinces of Iraq at this level by 30 November so that the ISF are well-postured to provide security for the elections for the constitutionally-elected government in December. MNF-I will conduct the first of several campaign reviews in June to assess the implementation of the Transition Team and Partnership programs, and to examine possibilities for force posture adjustments. Another assessment will be conducted in September to assess Iraqi security progress and to assess the political and security environment prior to the constitutional referendum and national election period, with attendant requirements for Coalition forces. As Iraqi capacity continues to grow in the security sector, Coalition Forces and Embassy Teams will assist provincial governments in building the capacity to administer their provinces and to provide basic security.
services to their constituencies so that they can support the conduct of counterinsurgency operations by Iraqi Security forces.

(g) (**S//REL**) This will enable **Provincial Iraqi Governance**, which will contribute to **Phase III, Transition to National Iraqi Security Control**. Conditions for these transfers are detailed in MNC-I OPORD 05-02. Coalition presence will continue to evolve as Iraqi ministries and provincial governments begin to oversee the maintenance of domestic order with increasingly capable ISF. Coalition forces will progressively reduce their levels of support and presence. Given the timeline for developing Local Police and Border Police (late summer 2006) and the transition of governments that will take place in early 2006, it is unlikely that this transition will occur before mid-2006. As Iraqi political progress achieves the goals set out in UNSCR 1546 the Multinational Force mandate in Iraq will end and the relationship between the MNF-I and the constitutionally-elected government will be reviewed. As the security situation in this period will likely require some level of Coalition combat operations against insurgents and terrorists, the exact nature of this relationship will require careful and mutual development.

(h) (**S//REL**) As the constitutionally-elected Iraqi government and its forces demonstrate capability to oversee the maintenance of domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terror, the campaign will move to **Phase IV, Iraqi Security Self-Reliance**. Conditions for this transfer are detailed in MNC-I OPORD 05-02. In this phase the security link between the Iraqi government and the Coalition will likely evolve to a more typical security cooperation relationship with Coalition forces postured in strategic overwatch outside of Iraq with training, security cooperation and advisory presence remaining. The exact nature and relationship between the Iraqi government and Coalition forces will be determined in close coordination with the Government of Iraq.

(i) (**S//REL**) **End State.** Our campaign end state remains unchanged: Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
Implementing Security Transition
(MNF-I 2005 Campaign Action Plan)

Fig. 4 (S//REL) Table

(2) (S//REL) Centers of Gravity (COG). No Change.

g. (U) Iraqi Security Forces. See Appendix 7 to ANNEX C

(1) (S//REL) Iraqi security forces continue to develop per expected timelines. Challenges remain in the logistics arena in terms of life support, equipping, personnel, policies and leadership. Most ISF units still lack the capacity to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, ISF unit actions have nearly doubled in the past three months with many units conducting independent operations. The ISF’s positive performance continues to increase as a direct result of integrating Coalition transition teams and the partnership program in most formations. The key elements that require added focus are: leadership; establishing properly manned, trained and capable headquarters; reversing equipment loss rates; and instilling a warrior ethos and commitment to service to the nation and rule of law. The Partnerships between MNF-I and the Joint Headquarters along with MNC-I and the Iraqi Army Headquarters are critical support efforts to sustain capability of the ISF.

(2) (S//REL) The development of police and military intelligence remains a key focus. Efforts are at an early stage to develop capable Iraqi national intelligence organizations to enable COIN Operations. Force generation of other combat enablers are planned throughout the remaining months of 2005.
with the production of Headquarters and Service companies, ISR, Engineer, and Signal units.

h. (S//REL) **Adjacent Supporting Commands and Agencies.**

(1) (S//REL) **Provincial Support Team.**

(a) (S//REL) Mission: The purpose of the Department of State (DoS) led, MNF-I / MNC-I supported, Provincial Support Teams (PST) program is to facilitate development of Iraqi governance capability at the provincial level. The immediate method to achieve this is through development of Iraqi led Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDCs). PRDCs are intended to give Iraqi leaders a greater voice in reconstruction efforts while developing their capability to govern effectively. The endstate is functioning PSTs and PRDCs established in all provinces (Kurdish Regional Government provinces of Irbil, Dahuk, and Sulimaniyah excepted) and contributing to increasing Iraqi governing capability at the provincial level. Priority of MNC-I effort is support to PSTs/PRDCs in the provinces of Baghdad (MND-B), Ninawa (MNF-NW), Al Anbar (MNF-W), Babil (MND-CS), Diyala (MND-NC), Salah Al Din (MND-NC), and An Najaf (MND-W). MNC-I supporting effort is to PSTs and PRDCs in all other provinces except as noted above. See Appendix 10 to Annex C for further details.

(c) (S//REL) C2: Department of State

(2) (S//REL) **Department of State (DoS)/ US Embassy.**

(a) (S//REL) Mission: The mission of the US Embassy is to work side-by-side with the Iraqi people to build a free, democratic, and stable Iraq that does not threaten its people or its neighbors. Our goals are for Iraqis to take full control of their country as soon as possible and to maintain its territorial integrity. We will assist the Iraqi people in their efforts to adopt a new constitution, hold elections, and build a legitimate government based on the consent of the governed and respect for the human rights of all Iraqis. We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, but not one day longer.

(b) C2: Secretary of State

(3) (S//REL) **Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO).**

(a) (S//REL) Mission: The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) directs United States government (USG) assistance to promote stability essential to the people of a free and democratic Iraq. IRMO guides reconstruction projects to modernize Iraq’s infrastructure and foster
conditions favorable to the stable growth of a robust market economy. Toward the goal of a self-sustaining state, and through its cadre of senior consultants in close concert with its coalition partners, IRMO supports the Iraqi government as it pursues social well-being, democratic governance and economic growth.

(b) (S//REL) C2: Department of State (DoS) / Chief of Mission (US Ambassador)

(4) (S//REL) **Iraq Project and Contracting Office (PCO).**

(a) (S//REL) The mission of the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) is to serve the people of the United States and Iraq by contracting for and delivering services, supplies, and infrastructure identified within the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), a total $18.4 billion in resources allocated by the U.S. government and taxpaying public for the rebuilding of Iraq.

(b) (S//REL) C2: Department of Defense (DoD); however, PCO is in the process of integrating into IRMO (DoS)

(5) (S//REL) **United States Agency for International Development (USAID).**

(a) (S//REL) MISSION: USAID assists Iraqis in reconstructing their country by working with Iraq's interim government. USAID programs are implemented in coordination with the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Coalition country partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector partners. The USAID Mission in Iraq carries out programs in education, health care, food security, infrastructure reconstruction, airport and seaport management, economic growth, community development, local governance, and transition initiatives.

(b) (S//REL) The USAID Mission in Iraq implements programs in four strategic areas:

(i) Restoring Essential Infrastructure
(ii) Supporting Essential Health and Education
(iii) Expanding Economic Opportunity
(iv) Improving Efficiency and Accountability of Government

(c) C2: Chief of Mission

(6) (S//REL) **United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).**
(a) (S//REL) Mission: In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1546, the mandate of the UNAMI is as follows: “... in implementing, as circumstances permit, their mandate to assist the Iraqi people and government, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the UNAMI, as requested by the Government of Iraq, shall play a leading role to:

(i) Assist in the convening, during the month of July 2004, of a national conference to select a Consultative Council.
(ii) Advise and support the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly, on the process for holding elections.
(iii) Promote national dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq.
(iv) Advise the Government of Iraq in the development of effective civil and social services.
(v) Contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, development, and humanitarian assistance.
(vi) Promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq.
(vii) Advise and assist the Government of Iraq on initial planning for the eventual conduct of a comprehensive census

(b) (S//REL) C2: United Nations.

7 (S//REL) Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I).

(a) (S//REL) Mission: Organize, train, equip, and mentor Iraqi Security Forces, in order to support Iraq's ultimate goal of a unified, stable and democratic Iraq, which provides a representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growing market economy; and is able to defend itself and not pose a threat to the region.

(b) (S//REL) C2: Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I)

2. (S//REL) Mission, NLT 31 DEC 05 MNC-I develops Iraqi Security Forces to allow the progressive transition of Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations to the Government of Iraq and neutralizes the Anti Iraqi Forces (AIF) to establish a secure environment and set conditions for successful completion of UNSCR 1546.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Commander’s Intent. No Change.
(1) **(S//REL) Purpose.** To create a security environment that permits completion of the political process and progressively transitions responsibility for COIN operations to the ISF while enabling the ITG to establish domestic order and transition to Self Reliance.

(2) **(U) Key Tasks.**

(a) **(S//REL)** Develop capable Iraqi Security Forces by establishing Partnerships that capitalize on Iraqi capabilities and prepare the ISF to take the lead in Counterinsurgency Operations.

(b) **(S//REL)** Implement Transition Team Programs throughout the Iraqi Security Forces to increase their capabilities.

(c) **(S//REL)** Maintain momentum against the AIF by continuing shaping operations and conducting COIN to deny the enemy the ability to regroup while transitions teams and partnerships are established.

(d) **(S//REL)** Neutralize the AIF intimidation campaign in Mosul, Baghdad, and Al Anbar.

(e) **(S//REL)** Transition battlespace to Iraqi Control when ready by synchronizing CF and ISF capabilities to facilitate security operations.

(f) **(S//REL)** Execute IO that exploits opportunities in a timely manner IOT change the public image of the AIF, in order to separate the people from the AIF, and deny the AIF’s ability to influence the people of Iraq while promoting the legitimacy of the GOI. Initially priority will focus on the predominantly Sunni Areas of Al Anbar, Baghdad, and Nineveh.

(g) **(S//REL)** Assist the ITG and Provincial governments in developing and securing infrastructure at the local level to ensure delivery of basic needs and essential services.

(h) **(S//REL)** Continue the support and maintenance of JCCs and PJCCs.

(i) **(S//REL)** Coordinate with border security forces and develop their capability.

(j) **(S//REL)** Support the Iraqi Transitional Government in safeguarding the political process and the due process of law.

(k) **(S//REL)** Respect the people of Iraq and their culture.

(3) **(S//REL) Endstate.** ISF assumes responsibility for leading the Counter Insurgency Campaign and is capable of defeating the insurgency. AIF are unable to influence the democratic process and lack credibility with the majority of the population. AIF denied sanctuary. Key infrastructure protected. Territorial integrity of Iraq protected by the ISF. Coalition Forces postured for a conditions-based withdrawal of designated forces. The GOI establishes the rule of law and is recognized as legitimate by the people of Iraq.
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Fig. 5 (S//REL) Diagram

(4) (S//REL) Operational Objectives. In support of the MNF-I Campaign plan and 2005 Action Plan, the Update to OPORD 05-02 takes MNC-I, in partnership with the Government of Iraq (GOI), from the ending stages of Phase I to the beginning stages of Phase III that starts with the constitutional elections in December 2005, and sets conditions for a long-term relationship with respect to the MNF-I desired endstate as described above. Operations will continue on four Lines of Operation (LOO): Security; Governance; Economic Development; and Communicating. These lines of operation are described by their associated objectives. The security line of operation is the critical path to successful MNC-I operations. The other LOOs are supporting efforts to enable the security LOO. The security objectives are:

(a) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: A CAPABLE ISF. Defined as a force that is properly organized, trained, equipped, employed, and respected by the Iraqi people.

(b) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: AIF NEUTRALIZED. Defined as a force that can no longer destroy infrastructure, deny essential services, intimidate the Iraqi people or conduct effective ongoing operations against the interests of Iraq or the Iraqi people. Effect is achieved through intelligence led operations, deterred through Information Operations, dislocated by isolating from popular support, and ultimately defeated through direct action by the ISF.
(S//REL) Developing capable ISF will be the cornerstone of the security LOO. MNC-I support efforts to enhance the governance and judicial system of the Iraqi government will be a key component in the Iraqi government gaining legitimacy. The governance objective is:

(c) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: LEGITIMATE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. Defined as an establishment of a legitimate representative government which enforces rule of law and is capable of providing basic services.

(S//REL) It is also important that MNC-I support the development of the fundamental aspects of the nation’s viability that will lead to improving the prospects and standards of living of the population through economic reconstruction.

(d) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: IRAQI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPING. Defined as development of Iraqi structures and institutions needed to support economic growth.

(S//REL) These second and third LOO will have direct stabilizing effects on the security LOO and will help to isolate the insurgents from the support of the Iraqi people. The fourth line underpins the first three. The need to communicate the successes of the ISF and the IG will generate an irreversible momentum to operations, and will overwhelm the disruptive and negative aspects of our adversaries’ actions. This fourth line of operation, communicating, will strengthen the commitment of the operational COG, while undermining that of the insurgency.

(e) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: IRAQIS SUPPORT THEIR GOVERNMENT. Defined as greater than 50% of each major ethnic group believe that their culture / ethnic / religious / personal interests are satisfactorily represented by the government.

**UPDATE**

b. (U) (S//REL) Concept of Operations.

(1) (S//REL) General.

(a) (S//REL) The Main Effort and decisive point of this operation remains the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and their ability to assume battlespace while leading COIN operations and create a security environment that allows the democratic process to continue.
(b) (S//REL) Coalition Forces support the main effort by establishing the security environment required to allow the ISF to assume the lead in the counterinsurgency. To establish these conditions through the end of the December Election cycle, MNC-I will focus on five types of operations (Border Security, Infrastructure Security, Eliminating Unintended Seams and Sanctuaries, Counter-IED Operations, and Election Support). These operations are intended to gain irreversible momentum in accomplishing the operational objectives and key effects during Phase II and Phase III of the operation.

Updated Effects Based Operational Design
(5TH LINE OF OPERATION (FORCE TRANSFORMATION) ADDED)

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Fig. 7 (S//REL) Diagram

(c) (S//REL) These operations are intended to generally remain consistent with the updated operational design listed above (detailed in OPORD 05-02) and the updated priorities of effort established in OPORD 05-02 listed below:
Weighting The Priority Of Effort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>PHASE I: IMPLEMENT TRANSITION TEAMS</th>
<th>PHASE II: PROVINCIAL SEC. IRAQI CONTROL (DISTRICT OPERATIONS)</th>
<th>PHASE III: NATIONAL IRAQI SEC. CONTROL</th>
<th>PHASE IV: IRAQI SEC. SELF RELIANCE</th>
<th>TRANSITION THE FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSETS AVAILABLE</td>
<td>NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, W, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>W, B, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COALITION FORCES AND EFFECTS</td>
<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
<td>NBW, B, W, NC, SE, NE</td>
<td>W, B, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF RESOURCES* (List will follow 1-37 with other considerations)</td>
<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
<td>NBW, B, W, NC, SE, NE</td>
<td>W, B, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGISTICS AND BASING</td>
<td>NC, CS, B, NW, W, SE, NE</td>
<td>NC, CS, NBW, W, SE, NE</td>
<td>NBW, B, W, NC, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, NW, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMATION OPERATIONS</td>
<td>SE, NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE</td>
<td>NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, W, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, NW, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC RECONST./ESSENTIAL SERVICE DEV.</td>
<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
<td>NC, SE, NW, B, W, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>NBW, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, NW, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 8 (S//REL) Diagram

(d) (S//REL) The four categories of operations that MNC-I will focus on are listed below as interim effects. These interim effects are nested to their enabling effect from the Operational Design and intended to enable the coordination and synchronization of resources in support of these operations.

i) (S//REL) **Enabling Effect 1A2**: ISF capable of BDE level operations.

- **Interim Effect**: Secure Borders defined as DBF, enabled by other ISF and Coalition Forces, disrupts infiltration of foreign fighters, logistics and money, primarily along the Syrian border.

ii) (S//REL) **Enabling Effect 1B1**: AIF freedom of action disrupted.

- **Interim Effect**: Eliminating Unintended Seams and Sanctuaries defined as AIF lines of communication interdicted and enemy denied sanctuary IOT decrease AIF capability to plan, prepare, and stage effective attacks on Coalition Forces, ISF, and the Iraqi populace.
iii) (S//REL) Enabling Effect 2A2: GOI assumes responsibility for delivery of basic services.

- **Interim Effect**: Key Infrastructure Secure defined as MOD/MOI capable of securing key infrastructure in order to minimize disruption of oil and electricity distribution.

iv) (S//REL) Enabling Effect 2A1: Iraqis acknowledge and participate in the election and political/constitutional processes defined as Iraqis are aware of, and free to participate in, the political, election, and constitutional processes at the local, provincial, and national levels - sufficient Iraqis of the three major ethnic/religious groups participate so as to have an inclusive and legitimate process

(e) (S//REL) The concept for each operation is described below:

(i) (S//REL) AL-HADDOOD AL-AMAANY (OPERATION SAFE BORDERS) – The MNC-I comprehensive border security plan. These operations focus on lines of effort that include 1) MSC operations primarily in MNF-NW and MNF-W, 2) DBE Force Generation, and 3) Border Transition Teams integration and their impact on building the capability and leadership of the DBE, and 5) sustainment of these operations. This focus area includes cross boundary operations between MNF-NW, MNF-W, and CJSTIF-AP synchronized by Corps. Operations will focus Corps ISR, LRS, aviation, and other enablers along the borders. These operations will become part of the Corps and MSC playbook to be executed on order after the first iteration and lessons learned. The endstate of these operations is to interdict and disrupt the flow of foreign fighters, supplies and money entering primarily from 14B and prevents AIF plans to interfere with the constitutional referendum and national elections, and restore control of the borders to the Iraqis NLT 31 Dec 05. Operations will be synchronized across the lines of effort including MSC operations, BTT integration, fort construction, DBE force generation, and border sustainment.

(ii) (S//REL) SAYF AL-QA’TYI (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) – The MNC-I priority through 31 August 2005. These operations consist of boundary shifts and cross boundary operations across the Corps battlespace to eliminate unintended seams and sanctuaries. These changes can be temporary for 10-15 days or enduring for extended periods of time. Offensive operations are executed along the old seams by MSCs and sustained by establishing permanent ISF presence. The endstate of this operation is AIF denied areas from which they can indoctrinate, train, plan, and prepare attacks against
Coalition Forces, ISF, and the Iraqi populace. Primary geographic areas targeted include Western Al Anbar, Zaab Triangle, Thar – Thar, and South Baghdad / North Babil.

(iii) (S//REL) AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-ZAHER (OPERATION GLORIOUS FUTURE) – These operations consist of ongoing infrastructure security operation. MNC-I is working toward an Iraqi endstate wherein all infrastructure within Baghdad is secured by Ministry of Interior forces and agencies and infrastructure across the remainder of Iraq is secured by Ministry of Defense forces. Iraqi forces and supported agencies integrate their efforts via a national coordination framework centered on the National Joint Operations Centre (NJOC). MNC-I assumes lead for this operation and progressively transitions responsibility to Iraqi agencies and forces as their individual and collective capability matures. Operational success is dependent upon a high degree of tactical and operational coordination and strategic interaction between the Iraqi Government, its agencies and MNC-I using strategic definition from the Iraqi government. Operations will be synchronized across the lines of effort including physical security, force generation, sustainment, C3 (command, control, and communications), and information operations.

(iv) (S//REL) ISTYAD AL-ADUW (OPERATION HUNTING THE ENEMY) – The Corps priority after 1 September 2005 through the election windows IOT set conditions for the elections. Surge operations in the key cities to neutralize AIF. These operations rely on actionable intelligence and aim to limit disruption to Iraqi populace prior to election windows. These operations focus on known VBIED cells, intended to neutralize as many cells as possible prior to the constitutional referendum. These operations are preceded and followed by political engagement operations. They are primarily MSC focused and require Corps to nest shaping and supporting operations in order to set the conditions for elections. Election operations are synchronized across four lines of effort: security (as described above), logistics support, information operations, and command and control.

(f) (S//REL) These operations will be conducted in four phases, the phases from OPORD 05-02 are updated to reflect the current threat environment and friendly situation:
Fig. 9 (S/REL) Diagram

(g) (S/REL) Phase II: Provincial Iraqi Security Control (PISC)

(i) (S/REL) Local and provincial Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are organized, trained, and equipped to take the lead in planning, directing, conducting, and sustaining counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in their area with coalition support. ISF and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions within the province. Iraqi brigades, functioning under Coalition division tactical control, take the lead in COIN operations in their sectors. AIF activity and freedom of action reduced to the level that the ISF can assert territorial control and maintain domestic order with support from Coalition Transition Teams and enablers, and with assistance from CF reaction forces when Iraqi unit capabilities are exceeded.

(ii) (S/REL) At the conclusion of Phase II conditions will be set for the Force to begin transformation of its presence in Iraq. Based on the threat environment and the capability of the ISF up to two Brigade

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Combat Teams and related enablers will potentially not be backfilled at the beginning of the OIF 05-07.

(iii)(S//REL) Conditions required for PISC

1) (S//REL) * Iraqi brigades, functioning under Coalition division tactical control, take the lead in COIN operations in their sectors.
2) (S//REL) * AIF activity and freedom of action reduced to the level that the ISF can assert territorial control and maintain domestic order with support from coalition enablers.
3) (S//REL) * ISF and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions within the province.
4) (S//REL) Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (PJCC) operational and provide means for coordinating and monitoring operations.
5) (S//REL) Iraqi Division Headquarters forming with command group assigned and capable of limited COIN operations.
6) (S//REL) Intelligence collection takes place at tactical level and mechanisms are in place to share intelligence with other ISF in the province.
7) (S//REL) Iraqi logistics functions begin to support operations with Coalition support.
8) (S//REL) Local Iraqi Police Services (IPS) forming, and coordinate their activities with Iraqi Army and Special Police, including collection of intelligence to assist COIN.
9) (S//REL) Border Police (where applicable) able to disrupt cross-border support to insurgents/ and terrorists and support development of POEs with support from Coalition Force Transition Teams and enablers.
10) (S//REL) ISF basing capable of sustaining brigade-level COIN operations.
11) (S//REL) ISF take the lead in election site security with CF assistance.
12) (S//REL) Rule of law institutions sufficient to support provincial level security operations IAW international norms.
13) (S//REL) CF assessment that local/regional governments are capable of providing basic services.
14) (S//REL) Government at provincial level performs basic functions such as meeting, supervising and paying staff, and participating in oversight and direction of security operations.
15) (S//REL) Government at provincial level coordinates civil construction activities with Coalition and Embassy support.
16) (S//REL) Opportunities exist for economic development. Essential services continue to expand. Domestic order maintained. Economic conditions sufficient to preclude widespread unrest.
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17) (S//REL) CF assessment that economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services.
18) (S//REL) Infrastructure security forces developing. Capability to secure strategic infrastructure in the province exists.

*Essential Conditions*

(h) (S//REL) Phase III: National Iraqi Security Control (NISC)

(i) (S//REL) Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain independent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across Iraq with support from Coalition Forces, when required, and Government structures have the capacity to provide governance and administration at provincial level in support of counterinsurgency operations. National-level command and control structures, intelligence system, detainee system and judiciary, function with Coalition assistance. AIF activity and freedom of action reduced to the level that ISF can assert control throughout Iraq and maintain domestic order with support, only as required, from Coalition reaction forces. Iraqi divisions progressively transition the lead in COIN operations to the Iraqi Police.

(ii) (S//REL) During Phase II conditions will be set for the Force to continue transformation of its presence in Iraq. Based on continued progress up to two Brigade Combat Teams will be curtailed in the Spring of 2005 and an additional two Brigade Combat Teams and related enablers will potentially not be backfilled in the OIF 06-08 force array.

(iii) (S//REL) Conditions required for NISC

1) (S//REL) * Iraqi divisions progressively transition the lead in COIN operations to the Iraqi Police.
2) (S//REL) *AIF activity and freedom of action reduced to the level that ISF can assert control throughout Iraq and maintain domestic order with support, only as required, from Coalition reaction forces.
3) (S//REL) *National-level command and control structures, intelligence system, detainee system and judiciary, function with Coalition assistance.
4) (S//REL) Provinces have sustained Provincial Iraqi Security Control.
5) (S//REL) Iraqi Army Headquarters, tied-in with national ministries and headquarters, established and capable of controlling subordinate Army divisions in multi-province operations with CF Transition Teams and some enabler support. Progressively transition COIN responsibilities to IPS and increasingly focus on external defense.
6) (S//REL) Iraqi Army contains the insurgency in its area with support, as required, from Coalition Force Transition Teams and some enablers when Iraqi unit capabilities are exceeded.

7) (S//REL) Intelligence structures collect and share intelligence at tactical level, national level structures function and provides support to tactical operations with CF assistance.

8) (S//REL) Logistics structures sustain ISF formations with contract support and Transition Team assistance.

9) (S//REL) Special Police conduct direct action in support of counterinsurgency operations nation-wide and coordinate activity with other ISF.

10) (S//REL) Border Forces control borders with support, only as required, from Coalition Force Transition Teams and some enablers.

11) (S//REL) Iraqi Police progressively take the lead in COIN operations from the Iraqi Army.

12) (S//REL) Local Iraqi Police Services (IPS) protect population and support rule of law, maintain domestic order and progressively take the lead in COIN operations from the Iraqi Army.

13) (S//REL) Area BSU(s) and Regional BSU(s) developed sufficiently to support tactical Division Operations.

14) (S//REL) Provincial level detention capability continues to operate under Iraqi control IAW international norms.

15) (S//REL) Rule of Law functioning nationwide with CF and Embassy assistance.

16) (S//REL) Temporary Detainee Operations under Iraqi control at all levels with CF Transition Team assistance. Detainee Screening Operations conducted at division level.

17) (S//REL) Essential bureaucratic structure and procedures capable of handling national down to local administration in place.

18) (S//REL) Functioning relationship between local through national agencies.

19) (S//REL) Begin establishment of national financial system.

20) (S//REL) Economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services.

21) (S//REL) Infrastructure security forces secure strategic infrastructure assets nationwide and coordinate activity with other ISF.

22) (S//REL) Basic needs met and economic development continues.

23) (S//REL) Iraqi people perceive ISF as providing national security.

24) (S//REL) Iraqi people perceive basic services and needs are being met by local, provincial, and/or national government.

* Essential Conditions

(2) (S//REL) Scheme of Operations.
(a) Tasks to Subordinate Units:

(i) MNF – NW
1) S//REL Secure borders IAW Appendix 2 to ANNEX C in order to prevent infiltration of Foreign Fighters, supplies, and money and disrupt the support that enables the insurgency.
2) S//REL Disrupt AIF IED and VBIED employment IAW Appendix 4 to ANNEX C by interdicting the operational cycles of these weapon systems in order to secure population and defeat the IED threat.
3) S//REL Secure potential seams IAW Appendix 6 to ANNEX C in order to eliminate unintended sanctuaries.
4) S//REL Secure key infrastructure IAW Appendix 3 to ANNEX C in order to minimize the disruption of oil and electricity distribution.
5) S//REL Support the ITG and ISF in the preparation for and execution of the National Referendum and Constitutional Elections IAW Appendix 5 to ANNEX C in order to enable the completion of UNSCR 1546.
6) S//REL Develop capable Iraqi Army forces (total of 2 Divisions and 6 Brigades) through partnership and transition team implementation IAW the June 2005 TRA IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish rule of law and set conditions for Iraqi Security Self Reliance and allow for transition of the Force. Second Division Brigades 2-4 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in FEB 06, JUN 06, and DEC 05 respectively. Third Division Brigades 1-3 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in NOV 05, MAY 06, and FEB 06 respectively.

(ii) MND – B
1) S//REL Disrupt AIF IED and VBIED employment IAW Appendix 4 to ANNEX C by interdicting the operational cycles of these weapon systems in order to secure the population and defeat the IED threat.
2) S//REL Secure potential seams IAW Appendix 6 to ANNEX C in order to eliminate unintended sanctuaries.
3) S//REL Secure key infrastructure IAW Appendix 3 to ANNEX C in order to minimize the disruption of oil and electricity distribution.
4) S//REL Support the ITG and ISF in the preparation for and execution of the National Referendum and Constitutional Elections IAW Appendix 5 to ANNEX C in order to enable the completion of UNSCR 1546.
5) S//REL Develop capable Iraqi Army forces (total of 2 Divisions and 9 Brigades) through partnership and transition team implementation
implementation IAW the June 2005 TRA IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish rule of law and set conditions for Iraqi Security Self Reliance and allow for transition of the Force. Sixth Division Brigades 1-5 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in DEC 05, SEP 05, SEP 06, JAN 06, and OCT 05 respectively (Does not include 5 unformed battalions. Completion of these Battalions is SEP 06). Ninth Division Brigades 1-3 and the 1st IIF Brigade (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in SEP 06, and JUN 05 respectively.

(iii) MNF – W

1) (S//REL) Secure borders IAW Appendix 2 to ANNEX C in order to prevent infiltration of Foreign Fighters, supplies, and money and disrupt the support that enables the insurgency.

2) (S//REL) Disrupt AIF IED and VBIED employment IAW Appendix 4 to ANNEX C by interdicting the operational cycles of these weapon systems in order to secure population and defeat the IED threat.

3) (S//REL) Secure potential seams IAW Appendix 6 to ANNEX C in order to eliminate unintended sanctuaries.

4) (S//REL) Secure key infrastructure IAW Appendix 3 to ANNEX C in order to minimize the disruption of oil and electricity distribution.

5) (S//REL) Support the ITG and ISF in the preparation for and execution of the National Referendum and Constitutional Elections IAW Appendix 5 to ANNEX C in order to enable the completion of UNSCR 1546.

6) (S//REL) Develop capable Iraqi Army forces (total of 2 Divisions and 6 Brigades) through partnership and transition team implementation IAW the June 2005 TRA IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish rule of law and set conditions for Iraqi Security Self Reliance and allow for transition of the Force. First Division Brigades 1-3 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in MAR 06, JUN 05, and DEC 05 respectively. Seventh Division Brigades 1-3 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in SEP 06.

(iv) MND – NC

1) (S//REL) Secure borders IAW Appendix 2 to ANNEX C in order to prevent infiltration of Foreign Fighters, supplies, and money and disrupt the support that enables the insurgency.

2) (S//REL) Disrupt AIF IED and VBIED employment IAW Appendix 4 to ANNEX C by interdicting the operational cycles of these weapon systems in order to secure population and defeat the IED threat.
3) (S//REL) Secure potential seams IAW Appendix 6 to ANNEX C in order to eliminate unintended sanctuaries.
4) (S//REL) Secure key infrastructure IAW Appendix 3 to ANNEX C in order to minimize the disruption of oil and electricity distribution.
5) (S//REL) Support the ITG and ISF in the preparation for and execution of the National Referendum and Constitutional Elections IAW Appendix 5 to ANNEX C in order to enable the completion of UNSCR 1546.
6) (S//REL) Develop capable Iraqi Army forces (total of 2 Divisions and 5 Brigades) through partnership and transition team implementation IAW the June 2005 TRA IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish rule of law and set conditions for Iraqi Security Self Reliance and allow for transition of the Force. Fourth Division Brigades 1-3 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in DEC 05, FEB 06, and DEC 05 respectively. Fifth Division Brigades 1-2 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in NOV 05, and MAR 06 respectively.

(v) MND – CS
1) (S//REL) Secure borders IAW Appendix 2 to ANNEX C in order to prevent infiltration of Foreign Fighters, supplies, and money and disrupt the support that enables the insurgency.
2) (S//REL) Disrupt AIF IED and VBIED employment IAW Appendix 4 to ANNEX C by interdicting the operational cycles of these weapon systems in order to secure population and defeat the IED threat.
3) (S//REL) Secure potential seams IAW Appendix 6 to ANNEX C in order to eliminate unintended sanctuaries.
4) (S//REL) Secure key infrastructure IAW Appendix 3 to ANNEX C in order to minimize the disruption of oil and electricity distribution.
5) (S//REL) Support the ITG and ISF in the preparation for and execution of the National Referendum and Constitutional Elections IAW Appendix 5 to ANNEX C in order to enable the completion of UNSCR 1546.
6) (S//REL) Develop capable Iraqi Army forces (total of 1 Divisions and 4 Brigades) through partnership and transition team implementation IAW the June 2005 TRA IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish rule of law and set conditions for Iraqi Security Self Reliance and allow for transition of the Force. Eighth Division Brigades 1-3 and 3rd Brigade, 5th Division (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in DEC 05 (Does not include the unformed battalion in 1st Brigade. Completion of this Battalion is SEP 06).
(vi) MND – SE
1) (S//REL) Secure borders IAW Appendix 2 to ANNEX C in order to prevent infiltration of Foreign Fighters, supplies, and money and disrupt the support that enables the insurgency.
2) (S//REL) Disrupt AIF IED and VBIED employment IAW Appendix 4 to ANNEX C by interdicting the operational cycles of these weapon systems in order to secure population and defeat the IED threat.
3) (S//REL) Secure potential seams IAW Appendix 6 to ANNEX C in order to eliminate unintended sanctuaries.
4) (S//REL) Secure key infrastructure IAW Appendix 3 to ANNEX C in order to minimize the disruption of oil and electricity distribution.
5) (S//REL) Support the ITG and ISF in the preparation for and execution of the National Referendum and Constitutional Elections IAW Appendix 5 to ANNEX C in order to enable the completion of UNSCR 1546.
6) (S//REL) Develop capable Iraqi Army forces (total of 1 Divisions and 4 Brigades) through partnership and transition team implementation IAW the June 2005 TRA IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish rule of law and set conditions for Iraqi Security Self Reliance and allow for transition of the Force. Tenth Division Brigades 1-4 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in MAR 06, MAR 06, DEC 05, and FEB 06 respectively. Third Division Brigades 1-3 (incl. all subordinate Battalions) are to be capable of assuming battlespace in NOV 05, MAY 06, and FEB 06 respectively. (Does not include the unformed battalions. Completion of these Battalion is SEP 06).

(vii) MND – NE
1) (S//REL) Disrupt AIF IED and VBIED employment IAW Appendix 4 to ANNEX C by interdicting the operational cycles of these weapon systems in order to secure population and defeat the IED threat.
2) (S//REL) Secure potential seams IAW Appendix 6 to ANNEX C in order to eliminate unintended sanctuaries.
3) (S//REL) Secure key infrastructure IAW Appendix 3 to ANNEX C in order to minimize the disruption of oil and electricity distribution.
4) (S//REL) Support the ITG and ISF in the preparation for and execution of the National Referendum and Constitutional Elections IAW Appendix 5 to ANNEX C in order to enable the completion of UNSCR 1546.
5) (S//REL) Develop capable Iraqi Army forces (total of 1 Brigade) through partnership and transition team implementation IAW the
June 2005 TRA IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish rule of law and set conditions for Iraqi Security Self Reliance and allow for transition of the Force. Second Division 1st Brigades (incl. all subordinate Battalions) is to be capable of assuming battlespace in APR 06.

(viii) CJSOTF-AP
1) (S//REL) CJSOTF units remain TACON to MNC-I and provide mutual support to MSCs.
2) (S//REL) Assist Coalition Force Commanders with the development of ISF. Specifically, CJSOTF provides recommendations for “best practices” to assist with Coalition Force and MiTT training for use with ISF.
3) (S//REL) Establish and maintain PSDs on the ITG (+) until relieved (NLT 15 AUG 05) IOT prevent disruption of the political process.
4) (S//REL) Priority of training during all phases of this operation: ISOF, ISF in critical locations (21 cities), and coalition MiTT FID training.
5) (S//REL) BPT support Taji training academy ISO CF Transition Teams.
6) (S//REL) Establish mutual support with MSCs in assigned AOR in order to facilitate MNC-I MiTTS Implementation Strategy.
7) (S//REL) Continue to conduct targeting operations ICW MSCs.
8) (S//REL) Build tactical ISF targeting capability and Scout Platoons IOT allow the ISF to use their cultural and social capability to the maximum extent.
9) (S//REL) Support Combined / Joint Operations as required.
10) (S//REL) BPT provide sniper support to MSCs ISO ongoing operations.

(b) (S//REL) Tasks to Staff.

(i) (S//REL) Effects

1) (S//REL) Synchronize asset allocation and effects for all named operations IAW the Synchronization matrix

(3) (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) (S//REL) CCIR. No Change

(b) (S//REL) Requests for assistance in support of operations by MNC-I:

(i) (S//REL) Required from MNF-I:
1) (S//REL) Encourage establishment of Iraqi Inter-Ministry Working Group (IIMWG), focused on the MOD / MOI / MOJ IOT identify roles and responsibilities of Ministries and facilitate better cooperation and efficiency.

2) (S//REL) Establish Joint Inter-Agency (US) Working Group with the Embassy to coordinate improved cooperation among Departments with the intent to improve economic reconstruction operations. The JIAWG should establish the prioritization of reconstruction and engagement effort IOT allow resource allocation.

3) (S//REL) Increase new Coalition member support for Police Partnership Program (P3) IOT allow current Coalition Forces to remain focused on COIN operations. Transition the P3 program to Coalition Lead as a successor to the program.

4) (S//REL) MNC-I requests assistance reestablishing the rule of law through the development of a judicial system that is effective and accountable to the needs of the people. Need interim guidance on local/provincial courts, detention facilities and any assessments that have been completed.

(c) (S//REL) Requests for assistance in support of operations through MNF-I to ITG Ministries:

(i) (S//REL) In support of Election Operations:
   1) (S//REL) MOT decision regarding curfews ISO the election preparation.
   2) (S//REL) MOE decision to allow the use of schools as polling sites, School holiday during elections.
   3) (S//REL) MOI decision on policy for soldiers voting in country and out of country.
   4) (S//REL) MOI(DBE) decision on when borders close ISO election windows.
   5) (S//REL) MOI Policy of Emergency Restrictions ISO election windows.
   6) (S//REL) All Ministries (MOD/MOT/EOE/DOO/) need designated Election Rep to attend IECI/NOI Election Working Group Meetings.
   7) (S//REL) MOI CONOPS on Physical Security of Polling Sites.
   8) (S//REL) IECI CONOPS on Elections and policy on MNC-I request for assistance.
   9) (S//REL) MOJ clarify authorities for decision making on Emergency measures.
   10) (S//REL) MOO/MOT decision on what commercial / legal traffic is allowed to cross borders during elections.
   11) (S//REL) IECI Policy on Ramadan for elections.
12) (S//REL) Determine scope and prioritize force protection requirements expected from us (physical security, i.e. #T walls/barriers required at polling stations).

(ii) (S//REL) In support of Border Security Operations:
1) (S//REL) MOD should support PJCCs as command and control mechanism that facilitates a comprehensive defense in depth strategy to find, fix, and finish potential insurgents. Must embed LNOs in the PJCC to facilitate coordination.
2) (S//REL) Reinforce the need for Syria to patrol its border IOT prevent flow into / out of Iraq.
3) (S//REL) Request the Council of Ministers publish a formal memo affirming the MOI commander’s lead role and responsibilities at the POEs.
4) (S//REL) Recommend MOI lift the hiring freeze in order to fill the DBEs requirements. In the short term, allow 900 Border Guards to be assigned to the Al Anbar region and fill an emergency requirement.
5) (S//REL) Recommend MOI commit resources required to reduce the length of time to clear POEs in order to encourage their use.
6) (S//REL) Define the roles (disposition, composition, capabilities, mission) of the newly formed Border Commando Units and Provisional SWAT Units.
7) (S//REL) MOD/MOI assign LNOs to support the following: JHQ/JOC, MNC-I JOC, and POLICE NCC.
8) (S//REL) MOD must allocate slots for MOI personnel in newly formed schools that instruct intelligence and logistics.
9) (S//REL) MOI must accredit the DBE academies.
10) (S//REL) Determine plan to implement permanent presence in Al Anbar of MOD forces north of the Euphrates River near the Syrian Border IOT support and secure the MOD in this area.
11) (S//REL) FEMA must send mobile training teams to instruct and train the PJCCs.

(iii) (S//REL) In support of Counter IED / VBIED Operations:
1) (S//REL) Develop solid waste management program to clean up roadside trash and manage waste at the Provincial level.
   a) (S//REL) Maximize manual labor force to employ as many Iraqis as possible.
   b) (S//REL) Focus hiring in areas with high unemployment, high Sunni Arab density, and former Iraqi combat engineers.
   c) (S//REL) Include contracts for hauling away piles of trash beyond scope above (Iraqi government run).
   d) (S//REL) Develop capacity to manage basic services regionally and locally and spread program throughout country.
2) (S//REL) Develop national IO/PAO with Iraqis in lead.
a) (S//REL) Villainize foreign fighters coming into Iraq and contributing to IED/VBIED attacks.
b) (S//REL) Show progress and successes of ITG, ISF, and Iraqi people.
c) (S//REL) Continue education campaign on dangers of UXO.

3) (S//REL) Develop regional IO/PAO with Iraqis in lead.
   a) (S//REL) State our collective will to solve the IED problem in specific areas and secure population IAW MNCI priorities.
   b) (S//REL) Publicize jobs programs.
   c) (S//REL) Show cooperation between CF, ITG, ISF, Iraqi people, and regional/local governments.

4) (S//REL) Develop plan to transition route clearance requirements / capability to Iraqi Army.
   a) (S//REL) ID and purchase equipment: Buffalos, RG-31s.
   b) (S//REL) Prioritize EOD training in Army and police (locations TBD IAW MNCI counter IED focus).
   c) (S//REL) Reprioritize former Iraqi combat engineer training to employ them sooner.

5) (S//REL) Develop forensics capability and training to help ID bomb makers.

6) (S//REL) Establish proponency for Counter IED Operations in JHQ and coordinate with MNCI.

7) (S//REL) Develop plan to transition route clearance requirements / capability to Iraqi Army.

8) (S//REL) Establish proponency for Counter IED Operations in JHQ and coordinate with MNCI.

7) (S//REL) National highway construction plan to mitigate risks on MSR / ASR.

8) (S//REL) Initiate traffic control plan to deconflict civilian and military traffic and reduce collateral damage.

(iv)(S//REL) In support of Infrastructure Security Operations:

1) (S//REL) Identify key national infrastructure sites to be secured and proposed force allocation.
2) (S//REL) Identify near and long-term end state, by key site for: (Maintenance of current capability, Reconstruction, Development).
3) (S//REL) Consider centralizing Infrastructure Security for short-term (e.g., DHS) (Requires CPA 27 to be overturned).
4) (S//REL) Codify relationship between MoD, SIB and FPS organizations.
5) (S//REL) Consider transferring responsibility for Infrastructure Security deliberate planning to Iraqi Land Command.
6) (S//REL) Enforce existing laws to limit easy access to key sites (reinforce Rule of Law).
7) (S//REL) Establish national identification processes (e.g., weapons cards, uniforms, work permits, access rights, etc...)
8) (S//REL) Create critical infrastructure security oversight office that manages across all ministries (similar to our DHS or within JHQ). Must have decision making authority.
9) (S//REL) Establish Iraqi-led information operations.

34
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a) (S//REL) Educate populace on harm done to Iraq and local communities with each attack.
b) (S//REL) Role of insurgency and subsequent losses to Iraqi populace.
c) (S//REL) Impact of criminal activity (monetary, ecological, maintainability) on Iraqi economic future.
d) (S//REL) Future plans for Iraqi economy (oil-based income, projects, jobs, works programs, reconstruction development, and quality of life).

10) (S//REL) Decide on strategy for tribal engagement.
11) (S//REL) Establish MoO and MoE presence in PJCC/JCC.
12) (S//REL) Identify command, control, and communication means and channels (MoD, SIB, MoO, MoE, MoI).
13) (S//REL) Identify method for ensuring pay, life support and other CSS for SIB.
14) (S//REL) Diminish pay/service condition inequities (IAF vs. SIB).
15) (S//REL) Expand Parsons Security Complex via Al Fatah Crossing to include both sides of the crossing.
16) (S//REL) Establish a national supply system for National Infrastructure. Must include critical components that are common fail parts IOT reduce down time of key infrastructure.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics, No Change.

5. (U) Command and Control, No Change.

Acknowledge:

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