MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ

CAMPAIGN PLAN: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

PARTNERSHIP: FROM OCCUPATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS

References:

A. (U) Doctrine - US Joint Publication 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning


C. (U) Directives, Orders, Plans and Guidance -

(1) (U) UNSCR 1511 (03) Dated 16 Oct 03
(2) (U) UNSCR 1546 adopted 8 Jun 04
(3) (U) LETTER, Iraqi PM To DoS Dated 5 Jun 04
(4) (U) LETTER, DoS To Iraqi PM Dated 5 Jun 04
(5) (S/REL USA and MCFI) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1003V Change 1, Dated 28 Mar 03
(6) (S/REL MCFI) US CENTCOM PHASE IV PLANO Dated 241412ZMAR03
(7) (S/REL USA and MCFI) CENTCOM Power Point Brief: The Grand Insurgency draft undated
(8) (S/REL USA and MCFI) CENTCOM OPO 11 Draft
(9) (S/REL USA and MCFI) CENTCOM Brief: Iraq Way Ahead Coordinating Draft Dated 12 Jun 04
(10) (U) CPA Strategic Vision Dated An 03
(11) (S/REL USA and MCFI) CJTF 4 Campaign Plan Dated Jan 04
(12) (S/REL USA and MCFI) CJTF 4 Powerpoint Brief: CJTF 4 Campaign Plan OP Iraqi Freedom V5.3
(13) (U) MCFI FRAGO 023 Transition To Partnership Dated 012229DJUN04
(14) (S/REL USA and MCFI) CJTF 4 Paper: Redefining Iraq’s Security Dated 8 May 04
(15) US DoS Final Coordinating Draft OPLAN Sovereign Iraq 7 May 2004
Ishtirak wa Tafahum - Partnership and Understanding

"Vision without action is a daydream, but action without vision is a nightmare"

1. **Situation**  This Campaign Plan takes the MNF-I, a coalition force of 31 nations, from the end of the period of post-war occupation (June 2003 until June 2004) through to the post-constitutional election period (January 2006). This period will be characterized by an active and positive partnership between the MNF-I and the Iraqi Interim and Transitional Governments to neutralize the insurgency, to build the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to a level whereby they can progressively assume full responsibility for their country’s security, and restore the country. The partnership for the MNF-I will center on the relationship between the Force, the Iraqi authorities, and the US and Coalition Missions. It will also take into account the role and involvement of the UN. The focus of all activities should lead to the assumption of full responsibility and authority for their own affairs by a constitutionally-elected Iraqi government. During the conduct of the campaign, actions in Iraq will be taken within the broader context of regional stability and the GWOT. In short, the MNF-I will act in partnership with the Iraqis to progress Iraq towards internal security and self-reliance, while at the same time contributing to the stability of the region, and alleviating the conditions that foster International Terrorism.

**THE CAMPAIGN**

![Diagram depicting the campaign timeline and partnership.

**Figure 1**

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Approved for Release
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
a. **Context.** The GWOT continues to progress: Al Qaida is fractured, yet dangerous, with the leadership taking temporary sanctuary in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban movement is all but extinguished. There is, however, clear evidence of the migration of AQ elements into Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. AQ and allied elements are drawing on their dispersion, OPSEC, environment and popular support to provide resources and freedom of movement to mount operations globally with no regard for the constraints of international laws, norms or borders. Many of those operations are currently being mounted from within Iraq, and against Iraqis. In Iraq, the Coalition has seen itself step from liberation into occupation and, as that period has drawn to a close, to partnership in support of Iraq’s movement to a representative and constitutionally-elected government. Within the country there remains a complex mosaic of those who would wish to undermine the legitimate government and to destabilize or disrupt Iraq for their own purposes. Within those elements are insurgents and terrorists who would seek to undermine the legitimate government and the work of the MNF-I by the use of armed force. It is these insurgents who must be the focus of the Force’s security activities. The MNF-I will work with a succession of Iraqi Governments (IG), and with the ISF, as the country transitions to a constitutionally-elected representative government in 2006. The UN will have a key role to play in this period of change, both as advisors and as the representatives of international legitimacy. The protection of, and support to, the UN will be essential, especially by helping to expedite free and fair elections.

b. **Partnership.** As the MNF-I addresses the challenges ahead we will interact with US and Coalition missions, the Iraqi authorities, and the UN. As the campaign has progressed, the balance of authority has changed. In order for the triangle of interests (US and Coalition missions, MNF, IG) to remain stable it is important to keep a balance between the three players. The MNF-I must therefore consult, coordinate and cooperate with both the US Mission and the IG; always remembering that the visible legitimacy and success of the IG is the key to mission success. This situation may lead to tensions which will threaten to pull the working relationships apart, and it is therefore vital that these tensions are counter-acted by a strong ‘glue’ of coordination, consultation and partnership between the IG, the MNF-I and the US and Coalition Missions. The diagram below illustrates the positive ‘glue’ required to bind these relationships:
c. **Area of Influence.** Iraq is located in the heart of CENTCOM’s AOR, and also at the heart of its regional plan to wage the GWOT. A stable, democratic Iraq will have a positive regional influence and generate valuable Strategic opportunities. For the MNF-I, the Area of Influence remains principally Iraq and its neighboring countries. In close conjunction with CENTCOM, the Force will reflect on the effects that its internal actions may have on the wider region, and on how the relationships with neighboring states effect the operation within Iraq. The region contains allies and friends who support the mission in a number of ways (such as Kuwait, Turkey and Saudi Arabia). Conversely, present a considerable threat to the conduct of MNF-I operations by suborning and conducting activities within Iraq that serve their own ends.
d. **Area of Responsibility.** CG MNF-I is responsible for the conduct of operations within the national borders of Iraq. An outline map of the AOR and current (July 2004) generic force lay down is as follows:

![Area of Responsibility Map](attachment:area_of_responsibility_map.png)

Figure 3

e. **Authority.** The MNF-I derives its authority from UN Security Council Resolution 1546 dated 8 June 2004 (in conjunction with the “exchange of letters” between the United States and Iraq). CPA Order 17 provides various protections which would normally be contained in a status of forces agreement until such time as a true bilateral agreement can be negotiated. The UNSCR grants the following authorities:

1. A reaffirmation of the authorization for the MNF under unified command, under resolution 1511.

2. Grants the MNF the authority to take all necessary means to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including preventing and deterring terrorism.

3. The right to detain and imprison Iraqi nationals based upon the UNSCR granting MNF the ability to engage in the following: “… combat
operations against members of these groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security.”

f. **Risks.** Risk assessment must be a constant feature of this campaign. No campaign is likely to be won without taking acceptable risks, and after a careful and complete risk-to-gain analysis has been conducted. The principal strategic risks for this campaign are as follows:

1. **Break Up Of The Coalition.** Large coalitions always bring with them an element of risk. In particular, the domestic politics of all the nations within the Coalition are capable of affecting the operations of the MNF-I, either through constraints placed upon individual national contingents, or through changes in policy that lead to national withdrawals. The more significant events of this nature provide opportunities for those with unhelpful agendas to undermine the legitimacy of the MNF-I’s mission. One Team – One Mission.

2. **Alienation Of The Iraqi People.** Perceptions matter: not only should all members of the MNF-I be acutely aware of the lessons of Abu Ghuraib, but also every individual needs to understand the effect that they could have in a single conversation at a checkpoint, and remember that any lapses, at any level, from the highest standards of discipline, integrity and conduct risk undermining the wider campaign. Keeping the support of the Iraqi people is everyone’s job. Respect is the key.

3. **Failure To Deliver.** Through our own past information operations, and through the national and international media, an expectation has been generated among the Iraqi people that their standard of living, their security and their well-being will be tangibly improved as a result of the actions of the Coalition. The failure to meet those expectations risks generating a backlash of ill-feeling, which would further undermine the security situation. We must under-promise and over-deliver.

4. **ISF ‘Rush To Failure’.** The positive engagement of the ISF in security operations is one of the keys to campaign success. There is a risk that early commitment of forces to operations that are too demanding, or for which they are not yet ready, will lead to failure. This in turn will lead to erosion of confidence and morale and will undermine, rather than reinforce, the drive towards Local and Regional Control and ultimately self-reliance. Commanders must evaluate the deadlines given to reach Local and Regional Control and provide a timely assessment of whether the deadlines will be met, or whether more resources are required to meet them, or if they are unachievable, in order to allow measured contingency planning. Focus on building quality, not quantity.
(5) **Loss Of UN Support.** The Force’s Legitimacy is reinforced by the mandate, presence and involvement of the UN. If, through an MNF-I failure to provide physical security, the UNAMI withdraws, or the projected elections cannot be held according to the UN timelines through a failure to provide a secure environment, or for other reasons beyond the MNF-I’s control UN support is withdrawn, our mission will be jeopardized. **Support the UN Mission.**

(6) **Rule of Law.** In a counter-insurgency campaign the MoI and police force are the agencies of first choice in the maintenance of order and internal security. The MNF will work closely with the MoI and Iraqi Police and must guard against imposing purely military solutions to problems that may be better dealt with by the use of the police. Our forces must not lose sight of the fact that the rule of law is the centerpiece of governmental legitimacy. **Support reestablishment of the rule of law.**

(7) **IG Capacity.** The ability of the IG to develop the capacity and authority to prioritize and run the counter-insurgency campaign, and to govern, is fundamental to campaign success. Without such capacity they will not achieve the legitimacy that we aim for, and MNF-I will risk being perceived as occupiers rather than supporters. We must focus on building sufficient governance capacity to maintain the momentum of progress through the first elections and then move to generate the capacity for self-reliance. We must also assure the protection of key Iraqi leaders. IG legitimacy is the key to success.

(8) **Strategic Surprise.** All commanders and staff must remain alert for attempts by the insurgents to achieve strategic surprise. Commanders and planners must remain conscious of the constant evolution of events and focus on “what could happen next?” vice “what happened?” **Always Vigilant.**

(9) **Losing Our Offensive Mindset.** Conducting counter-insurgency operations in a country that is working to build its legitimacy can create levels of uncertainty in the minds of our soldiers and leaders that can result in inactions and in ceding the initiative to the insurgents. We are a military force and we win with offensive thinking and offensive action. Our enemy is skilled and ruthless. He will use all means at his disposal to break our will. We must constantly seek innovative ways to exploit his vulnerabilities, to separate him from the people, to disrupt his planning and operations, and to kill or capture those that cannot be influenced. We will do this with the ISF whenever possible, but we will do it every day until we succeed. **Don’t lose your offensive mindset.**

**g. Enemy Forces.** (See Annex B) Within the campaign, the elements and groups that make up the insurgency are wide-ranging, disparate and frequently
changing in nature. However, analysis does show that these groups share sufficient key characteristics as to allow the production of an overarching COG framework from which the vulnerabilities of the separate groups can be drawn. The table below shows this COG framework, and more detailed analysis can be found at Annex B.

### ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CENTER OF GRAVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Center of Gravity</th>
<th>Critical Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Active support from which they draw their critical capabilities and requirements</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Passive support of the Iraqi people that enables their freedom of action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Requirements</td>
<td>Critical Vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public (and tribal) support</td>
<td>• Removal of grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• OPSEC</td>
<td>• Demonstrably improving, or more prosperous, environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information and intelligence gathering for action or targeting</td>
<td>• Morally or ethically unacceptable behavior that could be used to turn passive support against them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Publicity</td>
<td>• Disparate and fractured nature of the insurgency leading to exploitable seams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4

1. **Insurgency Threat Overview** The insurgency is principally Sunni Arab Rejectionist, centered on Former Regime Extremists, particularly former Ba’ath Party and Former Regime military and intelligence service members. The insurgents, predominantly under FRE influence, comprise several factions ranging from explicitly religious to Arab nationalists to Saddam loyalists. There is not a monolithic Ba’ath Party/FRE leadership controlling efforts, but a loose system of leadership, with no single leader. Many of the leading figures and key facilitators are now based outside Iraq, mostly in [14b] Foreign Islamic extremists are a relatively small, yet lethal, problem in Iraq. Meanwhile [14b] is hoping to win influence over Iraq’s political and electoral process without having to provoke a Shi’ite-based insurgency (for which it is preparing nonetheless). The FRE leadership provides broad guidance and facilitation to the SAR that fall under their leadership. Relying on Ba’athist institutionalization in society, the insurgents leverage the Muslim Ulema Council, the underground remnants of the Ba’ath Party and the former Iraqi intelligence and security services. The FRE and Islamists extensively use Islamic symbolism to motivate the call to arms and leverage the mosques.
for C2, logistics and finances to sustain the insurgency. Binding these disparate elements together are the family, tribal, religious and peer group associations. The insurgency is in predominantly Sunni Arab provinces – Al Anbar, Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al Din, Al Tamiim, Northern Babil and Baghdad. Figure 5 is a graphic representation of the insurgency.

THE INSURGENCY

Figure 5

(2) **Common Focus.** Although Sunni Arab/FRE resistance, Iraqi Islamic extremists and foreign Islamic extremists have incompatible ultimate objectives, they share a common focus and intermediate goal of forcing the Coalition to lose its will to fight and to cause failure of the IIG and ITG. Broad sets of insurgents can be discerned, consisting of those Sunni Arabs in general who reject ‘the occupation’, elements of the Former Regime (mostly, but not exclusively, Sunni), foreign Islamic extremists (such as the Zarqawi network), indigenous Iraqi Islamic extremists (such as Ansar al Islam), and Shi’a militants (some of whom are subject to 1.4b, 1.4d). Organized and often violent crime complicates this threat environment, with criminal elements who find cause for opposition to the IG/Coalition presence or significantly contribute to public insecurity. These sets are far from mutually exclusive – overlaps of membership occur, both for individuals and the groupings to which they belong.

(3) **Numbers.** Foreign fighters, measured in the high hundreds, enter the country and link up primarily with Iraqi Islamic extremists, transnational terrorists, and in some cases Shi’a militants. The combined strength of the SAR movement is assessed to be minimally eight to twelve
thousand strong. The ethnic, sectarian and tribal militants fighting for representation, influence, power and self-preservation (for example Jaish al-Mahdi and 15th Sha’aban) have a total combined strength estimated between two and four thousand. Islamic extremists fighting for an Islamic transnational caliphate (for example Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam) have an estimated total combined strength of less than one thousand.

(4) **Annex B.** The attached Annex B describes not only the mechanics and process of Intelligence gathering and dissemination, but also the full spectrum of actors. It examines the Internal Actors: Shi’a, Sunni, Kurds, Turkomen and other ethnic groups, it reviews criminal elements, and it considers both clerical and tribal influences. It also examines the Regional Actors: terrorists and so-called ‘foreign fighters’, and it considers the influences, both positive and negative of the neighboring countries. Having considered the actors, it goes on to summarize the political challenges, the implications on the overall threat to security and stability posed by the state of the economy and the infrastructure and provides a projection across the period of this plan. In order to understand the complexity of the environment and of the threat, and to focus on the insurgents that must be overcome, Annex B should be read in detail. It is also important to understand that this is a multi-faceted and ever-changing kaleidoscope of threat to the MNF-I campaign, and one that cannot be usefully generalized to determine specific courses of action, but instead needs to be examined anew as each situation develops and new threat emerges. Annex B will therefore be updated as the campaign progresses.

h. **Friendly Forces.** This is a campaign that hinges on the inter-operation of the differing groups of Friendly Forces. These forces comprise the US-led multinational forces of the MNF-I and the rapidly reconstituting ISF. Into this force is injected the further elements of the UN, the IG, the US and Coalition Missions, and a range of international governmental and non-governmental agencies.

(1) **Centers of Gravity.** The Centers of Gravity of the Coalition can be divided between the strategic and the operational level. All forces in Iraq need to understand these COG and to understand the effect that their own actions could have on either reinforcing, or undermining them.

(a) **Strategic.** The strategic Center of Gravity is **Coalition Public Opinion** particularly as it concerns the legitimacy of the Coalition’s presence and modus operandi. In the opinion of the public of the Coalition members; of the people and government of Iraq; and of the international community; we must be here legitimately and be seen to act legitimately. The perception of legitimacy, both internally and internationally, is the foundation of
support and the main driver of public opinion within the countries that make up the Coalition. If the public believes that we are here legitimately, then they will give the endeavors of the MNF their support. Without it, the Force would be faced with the prospect of either attempting to complete its mission without the support of its own public, and of the international community or the people or government of Iraq, or alternatively of withdrawing prematurely and being perceived as having failed.

ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Center of Gravity</th>
<th>Critical Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition Public Opinion</strong></td>
<td>UN/IRAQ authority for MNF-I to ‘take all necessary measures’ if required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the opinion of the public of the Coalition members we must be here legitimately, and be seen to act legitimately.</td>
<td>Ability/system to consult &amp; liaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Requirements</strong></td>
<td>A Coalition (vice single nation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition: US and other nations’ domestic political and public support.</td>
<td>To be seen as an occupying force post-28 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi: IIG approval, Iraqi popular support acceptance/tolerance. Full Iraqi participation</td>
<td>Insurgents seek to drive wedges between MNF and IIG, within the coalition and within the IIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN and International</strong>: UNSCR and continued SC approval will foster international acceptance.</td>
<td>UNSC composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong>: Engagement with, and support from, neighboring states.</td>
<td>Western mindset, outlook and attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Illegal actions (ROE, detention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength and cohesion of IO campaign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Diagram showing Center of Gravity analysis](attachment:image.png)

Figure 6

(b) **The Coalition**. The fact that MNF-I is a coalition of nations from across the world demonstrates buy-in and commitment from the International Community. The nature of the Coalition and the support of the people of Coalition nations, backed by international endorsement from the UN in the shape of the UNSCR, and the participation and support of NATO, lends tremendous weight to the legitimacy of the Force’s actions.

(c) **Operational**. The operational Center of Gravity is the acceptance of the **Legitimacy of the Transitional Iraqi Governments**. In the eyes of the people of Iraq the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government and their responsibility for the present and the future of Iraq must be accepted, and be seen to be accepted.
There must also be a clear perception that the IG has the requisite capacity to govern effectively. Not only must those holding authority in the country be perceived as holding that authority legitimately, but there must be acceptance, both internally and internationally, that it is the Iraqi people, and on their behalf their legitimately appointed government and cascading governance systems, that are responsible for the future of the country, with the other players, including the MNF-I, acting in support of their aims and aspirations.

**ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY OPERATIONAL CENTER OF GRAVITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Center of Gravity</th>
<th>Critical Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Governmental Legitimacy and Responsibility</td>
<td>Capable ISF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the eyes of the people of Iraq, Iraqi Government legitimacy and responsibility must be accepted</td>
<td>Functioning governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functioning legal/judicial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International support and acknowledgement</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Requirements</th>
<th>Critical Vulnerabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tribal involvement</td>
<td>Popular acceptance of ‘imposed’ government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF ability to provide security and rule of law</td>
<td>Opposing or undermining IO/STRATCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue man, train &amp; equip</td>
<td>Lack of unity on vision of the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance by all that MNF-I are in support</td>
<td>Ethnic (Sunni/Shia/Kurd/Arab/Persian/Tr/ial etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widespread Iraqi popular consent (tolerance)</td>
<td>Single state/federal/dismembered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive engagement &amp; agreed C2</td>
<td>Iraqis vision/other Coalition Members’ vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined up Iraqi IO/STRATCOM</td>
<td>Over-confidence and pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly convey genuine sovereignty</td>
<td>Desire for single strong leader vice democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly articulated exit strategy; condition based, agreed with Iraqis</td>
<td>War legacy: Infrastructure/Economy/Ess Sves</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Figure 7**

(2) **Multinational Forces.** The diversity of the Coalition, currently of 31 nations, offers strength to the MNF, not just in terms of legitimacy as described above, but also in terms of: equipment and manpower; MSC leadership; and political and diplomatic advice and economic resources through their respective embassies and missions. It is important, therefore, for commanders and staff at all levels, to retain in mind that, while the US is the lead nation in the campaign, all of the other contributing nations in the Coalition have a key role to play. The forces brought to the campaign by the diverse Coalition members provide a range of resources, skills and experience that will be essential to Coalition success.
(3) **Supporting Agencies.** In addition to the combined and joint military units in support of Civil Military Operations, there are many other key players and stake-holders in the campaign. Efforts by the MNF-I to assist these organizations and agencies alleviate the requirements levied against the military and help to enable the immediate period of transition and to provide longer term support to Iraq. The coordination of these agencies, in order to achieve timely effect in support of military operations will be a vital component of the campaign.

(a) **Reconstruction And Development.** US Government Agencies such as the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and Program and Contracting Office (PCO) set the reconstruction priorities in concert with the requirements of the MNF, the Coalition missions and embassies and the Iraqi people, and develop the overall program of reconstruction throughout the country. USAID and other Coalition embassy aid organizations, such as the UK’s DFID, and UN organizations, such as the UN Development Program, have similar charters to provide development assistance across the spectrum of civil-military operations. Additionally, many Private Security Companies (PSC) have been engaged to carry out all the required security for both the reconstruction and infrastructure security. International Donors and Organizations as well as Non-Governmental Organizations have already contributed direct funds, equipment and services that must be efficiently linked to the appropriate needs at the national, regional and local levels. These assets are pulled together in a two-pronged strategy of long-term infrastructure building, underpinned by short term bridging mechanisms (such as the Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program and CERP) to demonstrate immediate results and assist the country with employment. These assets are key tools in meeting the expectations of the Iraqi people and should form major messages for the “drumbeat”.

(b) **Effective Co-ordination.** To achieve the maximum effect from these organizations and agencies, a coordinated engagement and communications effort is required by the Force across the theater. Commanders at all levels should ensure that they engage fully with the representatives of all reconstruction agencies that operate within their AOR and with the Regional Project and Contracting Officer. This effort will set conditions for the future success of these agencies and organizations, and enable new relationships to be established between these organizations and Iraq. In the long run, an active engagement strategy with these organizations and agencies will greatly assist the goal of reaching a state of Iraqi self-reliance.
i. **Assumptions.** The direction within this campaign plan is based upon the following assumptions:

1. That the Coalition will continue to commit to the future of Iraq, and that sufficient Coalition force levels will be maintained to complete the mission.

2. That funding will be available for reconstruction.

3. That the Coalition will remain extant throughout this operation.

4. That the existing UN-imposed timelines for elections will be met or not significantly changed.

5. That the existing agreements that allow basing and access to the Theater and to Iraq will remain extant.

6. That the authorities contained in UNSCR 1546 will remain extant.

7. That the UN will remain engaged in progressing Iraq towards a constitutionally-elected representative government and will wish to see its own UNSCR through to completion.

8. That, while neighboring nations are likely to continue to try to influence Iraq’s development, they are unlikely to take direct overt military action to achieve their aims, at least for the duration of the time that MNF-I forces are deployed on Iraqi soil.

9. That international, non-governmental and contractor organizations will continue to provide assistance.

10. That, providing a reasonably secure environment is maintained, increased private investment will follow.

2. **Mission.** In partnership with the Iraqi Government, MNF-I conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists, and organizes, trains and equips Iraqi security forces in order to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process on schedule.

3. **Execution.** (See Annex C)

   a. **Commander’s Assessment and Intent.** The campaign has already seen two phases (Liberation and Occupation); this campaign plan will take the MNF-I from occupation to the constitutional elections.
(1) The period covered by this plan, from July 2004 to January 2006, will see the transformation of the Iraqi Government from an appointed body to a representative and constitutionally-elected government. This will include two elections (one in December 2004 or January 2005, and one in December 2005). During this period of political change the MNF-I will work in close consultation with Coalition missions and embassies to support the Iraqi Interim and Transitional Governments, and in particular the Ministries of the Interior and Defense, in order to enhance their legitimacy and their capacity to govern effectively.

(2) The threat to security and stability in Iraq is from a complex mosaic of insurgents and discontents, following a range of agendas from across the ethnic and tribal groups and is variously supported by neighboring countries and international terrorists. The pre-eminent threat, however, is presented by the insurgency that is comprised of Sunni Arab Rejectionists and Former Regime Extremists supported by international terrorists, that centers in the Sunni Triangle, and receives support from FRE leaders living in Syria in terms of resources, safe haven and a route of supply across the border. The Main Effort of the MNF-I will be neutralizing this SAR/FRE insurgency.

(3) The MNF-I will neutralize the insurgency by driving a wedge between the insurgents and the people of Iraq, separating them from their supporters and potential supporters. The Force, with the Iraqi Security Forces, will conduct full spectrum counter-insurgency operations, synchronized with the activities and resources of the Coalition missions and embassies, to improve the lives and conditions of the moderate population, to encourage reconciliation and inclusion of the fringe population, to deny assistance to the insurgents from neighboring countries, and to engage the insurgents with precision offensive operations. These activities will be informed by an improved and coordinated Intelligence effort, working in concert with Iraqi intelligence resources. In parallel to this the Force will help to build the capacity and capability of the Iraqi Security Forces, working in partnership with them to progressively increase their ability to manage their own security affairs.

(4) The momentum and tempo of the campaign will be driven forward by a “drumbeat” of positive activity, underpinned by a Strategic Communications effort publicizing the positive activities of the IG to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Government, while highlighting the negative aspects of the actions and activities of those who seek to undermine the better interests of the Iraqi people. This message will be reinforced by the responsible conduct of all members of the Force, demonstrating respect for the people of Iraq and changing the image of the Coalition from occupying force to supporter and protector, with common interests and shared goals for the future of Iraq.
b. In partnership with the Interim and Transitional Iraqi Governments the Force will conduct full spectrum counter-insurgency operations that:

(1) Enhance the legitimacy of the IG, isolate insurgents from internal and external support, and change the Iraqis’ perceptions of Coalition Forces.

(2) Create and sustain irreversible momentum toward a freely-elected Iraqi government in January 2005 and a constitutionally-elected government in 2006.

(3) Leverage Iraqi political, police, military and intelligence capacity and Coalition precision effects.

(4) Apply Coalition military power to reduce the insurgency to levels that can be contained by ISF, and that progressively allow Iraqis to take charge of their own security.

(5) Build the capacity of the ISF to permit Local Control country-wide by 31 December 2004 and Regional Control by 31 July 2005.

(6) Permit the conduct of elections in January 2005 and December 2005.

(7) Guard against strategic surprise.

(8) Build teamwork between embassies, MNF-I and the IG and sustain the multi-national Coalition.

c. End State. Iraq at peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven to terrorists.

d. Local Control. Local Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security organizations maintain internal security with limited Coalition support, and can plan, direct and conduct security operations at platoon/station level. Local Coalition reaction forces are established to assist ISF in contingency situations. [Local Control is further defined in Appendix 4 to Annex C.]

e. Regional Control. Regional Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security organizations maintain internal security with Coalition support in extremis. ISF plan, direct and conduct security operations, and assume responsibility for training, sustaining and conducting personnel administration functions, at battalion/provincial level.
Coalition forces are postured for regional reinforcement of Iraqi security organizations, as well as being prepared to defeat external threats. Concurrently the Iraqi Armed Forces begin to develop the capability to plan nationally, and to direct and execute defensive operations against external threats. [Regional Control is further defined in Appendix 4 to Annex C.]

f. **Strategy**. The MNF will conduct full spectrum counter-insurgency operations in a post-war collapsed state. This contains complexities not normally present in a classic counter-insurgency campaign. The MNF is no longer a force of occupation. The country and security forces are being rebuilt. For the face of security operations to change it is vital to have a capable and operating ISF. The Force will therefore use the full spectrum of military and civil tools to separate the insurgents and the activists from the Iraqi people, and to rebuild capable ISF.

Different techniques will be required to address the differing faces of this problem. For example, those who can be influenced must be separated from the insurgents by engagement, reconciliation, and inclusion and by the removal of their grievances by the application of the full range of political and economic tools. Those who cannot be influenced, the hard core of the insurgency and the foreign terrorists, will be isolated from their supporters and potential supporters, and be the focus of the military effort, which will see them captured or killed. The diagram below illustrates and summarizes the strategies that will be required:

**Figure 8**

(1) **Lines of Operation**. This campaign plan takes the Force, in partnership with the IG, from occupation to the constitutional elections in January 2006. The purpose of the Partnership phase is to support the Iraqis in building a legitimate constitutionally-elected government. The campaign will seek to neutralize the current insurgency while building a
capable ISF and will operate on four Lines of Operation (LOO): Security; Governance; Economic Development; and Communicating. With this in mind, the generation of effective ISF will be a cornerstone of the security LOO. It will be equally important that the MNF-I supports efforts to enhance the governance of the country and supports the development of the fundamental aspects of the nation’s viability that will lead to improving the prospects and standards of living of the population. These second and third LOO will have direct stabilizing effects on the security LOO and will help to isolate the insurgents from the support of the Iraqi people. The final fourth line underpins the other three. The need to communicate the successes of the IG widely, as a steady drumbeat of positive events, will generate an irreversible momentum to the campaign, and will balance the disruptive, destructive and negative aspects of our adversaries’ actions. This fourth line will strengthen our COG, while undermining that of the insurgency. The MNF-I will conduct full spectrum security operations as necessary in support of the IG, to neutralize the insurgents and terrorists. The campaign will therefore run on four LOO, with the Security line concentrating in equal measure on counter-insurgency and neutralizing AIF and on developing the ISF to progressively assume this responsibility, inextricably supported by the other lines, allowing, in the final phase, the Iraqis to assume full responsibility for their security.

THE LINES OF OPERATION

![Diagram of the Lines of Operation]

- **Security**: Insurgents and terrorists neutralized
  - Capable ISF
- **Governance**: A legitimate Iraqi Government
- **Economic Development**: Basic needs met
  - A wedge driven between the insurgents and the population of Iraq
- **Communicating**: Changed Images

**End-State:**
- Iraq at peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven to terrorists

Figure 9

(a) **Security**: Military operations, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, ISF development, rule of law (IPS), border security, national defense, intelligence.
(b) **Governance**: Engagement and relations with the IG, the UN, rule of law (judiciary), tribal issues, provincial and local governance, reconciliation process and property claims resolution efforts.

(c) **Economic Development**: Economy, trade, employment, essential services, education, agriculture, electoral process.

(d) **Communicating**: The “drumbeat” that delivers positive momentum to all aspects of the campaign with a steady beat of positive IO and STRATCOM messages that highlight the successes of the IG.

(2) **The Concept Of Operations**. The first steps of this phase of the campaign will revolve around the isolation and neutralization of the FRE and Rejectionist insurgency (the Main Effort). Baghdad will be secured, the borders controlled, with an early emphasis on the border with Syria, and the Shia and Kurd populations sustained to retain their involvement and support of the political process. The insurgents will be beaten by isolating them from their support, by neutralizing them with military operations, by leveraging the self-knowledge that is brought to the campaign by the IG and ISF and by altering the circumstances in which they operate and in which their supporters live.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Figure 10
(4) **The Key Cities.** In an effort to facilitate prioritization, we will focus our efforts to ensure we achieve Local Control in key cities before 31 Dec 04. These cities, if controlled, will give the IIG a marked advantage towards successfully conducting the elections, while simultaneously neutralizing the insurgents. Perceptions of election validity and legitimacy, and the production of a representative government, both for the Iraqi people and in the UN and wider international community, would be strengthened by the control of these cities. We will publish this list separately.

g. **Rebuilding And Deploying The ISF.** (See separate MNSTC-I Campaign Plan) The MNF-I, through the MNSTC-I, will support operations by building capable ISF (recruiting, training, equipping, organizing and deploying). Building a trained and ready police force will be MNSTC-I’s Main Effort. Initially those elements of the ISF who are most closely involved with internal security, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations will need particular attention, particularly the special mission police and Army units. As the security situation stabilizes and the capability of the ISF increases the MNF-I local commanders at MSC level should aim to cede Local Control to the ISF. As the situation further improves Regional Control will be ceded. At various stages this will result in a patchwork of security situations with some provinces or towns under regional control, some under local control and some still relying on the MNF-I. Passing control will need careful liaison and cooperation between the MNF-I and the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defense. UNSCR 1546 provides overarching guidance and legitimacy to this partnership between the ISF and the MNF-I and Appendix 1 to Annex C on engagement provides the detailed structures that will foster close cooperation at all levels from government to the lowest tactical and local levels. Throughout the area of operations the security forces should attempt to minimize the profile of the MNF-I, and maximize the profile, activities and responsibilities of the ISF wherever possible. Where MNF-I activity is essential, forces should be accompanied by the appropriate members of the ISF wherever possible.

h. **Targeting of Supporting Effects.** In this campaign the accurate and flexible targeting of economic and project resources will be as crucial as the application of military force. A Targeting Board, working in close conjunction with C3 Operations and Effects, will draw together the available and appropriate assets, allowing a steady flow of routine projects to continue, but retain the capability to surge to achieve specific effects for critical operations. This can be likened to an artillery fire plan, with assets selected and targeted for desired effects as an integral part of individual operations, as opposed to a random fire of ammunition types at targets as they become available. For example, an operation to clear insurgents from a particular town or village should be followed immediately by a program of funded, short-term projects that ensure that the operation not only provides security by removing a threat or a negative influence from the local population, but also immediately and tangibly improves their wider wellbeing and standard of living. At the same time the larger capital projects will be executed in close liaison with local commanders to ensure that they generate
the maximum effect on the population. This system will require financial flexibility and delegation, and will include the use of local labor (to have effect both in terms of project benefit and employment). This will require a formal staff structure, a C2 structure, new financial and project arrangements and delegations, and a close link to the STRATCOM ‘drumbeat’.

i. **Wider Capacity-Building.** In conjunction with the above measures, the MNF-I will assist other agencies involved in wider Iraqi capacity-building. In particular, advice and assistance to develop the bureaucracy that will support governance from national to local level will be critical in ensuring that the governance structure attains the capacity to govern. While this aspect of the campaign may not be the immediate responsibility of military commanders, the support to capacity-building will foster a lasting effect.

j. **Key Effects.** The Key effects that the Force should seek to achieve by their actions are as follows:

1. **A Legitimate Iraqi Government.** Desired Effect: The Government of Iraq, and the cascading governance to Provincial and local levels, is perceived as legitimate and representative of the people of Iraq. It is perceived as having the required capacity to function effectively, and has confidence in itself and in a vision for the Nation’s future. It is moving toward a functioning and durable bureaucracy that will facilitate the execution of government policy and allow continuity of process and structures as officials and governments change.

2. **Insurgents And Terrorists Neutralized.** Insurgents seeking to overthrow or otherwise disrupt the legitimate governance and functioning of the country are isolated and neutralized, and at the same time the security situation is such that International Terrorists are unable either to operate in concert with the insurgents to undermine Iraq, or to use Iraq as a secure base from which to launch terrorist attacks; leading to a safe and secure environment in which the other effects may more rapidly come to fruition.

3. **Capable ISF.** The ISF, both military and civil, have been trained, equipped and organized, and subsequently committed to operations in such a manner as to prove their effective capability; leading to the firm establishment of their ability to manage the security of Iraq without the direct support of the military forces of another nation.

4. **Basic Needs Met.** The basic needs of the Iraqi people are met, through the progressive improvement of essential services, infrastructure and the economy.

5. **A wedge driven between the insurgents and the population of Iraq.** The Tribal leaders and the people of Iraq have sufficient confidence...
in the security and viability of their country, combined with the fact that the level of essential services, human rights and standards of living are improved; driving a wedge between the insurgent and terrorist groups and the Iraqi people, and leading to the vast majority being prepared to play a role in supporting and contributing to the country’s future.

(6) **Changed Images.** The people of Iraq’s perceptions are changed, such that the images of the MNF-I and Coalition missions and embassies are positive, while the FRE and foreign terrorists are seen as reactionary, criminal, and acting against the common interests of the Iraqi people.

(7) **Iraqi Self-Reliance.** Ultimately, the combination of the above effects is such that the security and viability of Iraq is assured and that Iraq is capable of conducting its own affairs, both internal and external, without the need for external military support.

k. **Synchronizing The Effects.** The effects described above will need to be synchronized for maximum impact. In the planning and management of operations this will be achieved by an effects synchronization board that pulls all the assets together. The board will examine problems as they arise and participate in planning groups in order to ensure that all the levers available to the Coalition are applied to a problem in a coordinated and synchronized manner, whether they be military force, political influence, or reconstruction and essential services projects. The application of these assets and the positive results and events that flow from their use, will form an important part of the “drumbeat”. This synchronization is illustrated below:

**Synchronizing Pol, Mil and Economic Effects**

![Diagram of Synchronizing Pol, Mil and Economic Effects]

Figure 11

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l. **Delivering Results - The CASB Process.** (See Annex U.) The Commander’s Assessment and Synchronization Board (CASB) is an assessment of effect and effectiveness, a synchronization of efforts and a forum to issue campaign-critical direction and tasks. It is the key command tool to retain an overview of the campaign, to measure progress and to manage the accomplishment of the strategy. The changing nature of any campaign means that the campaign plan is not a complete and final document. This plan lays the foundation, but the CASB Process will keep the plan alive, will measure success and will concentrate the Command Group on the making of timely decisions in order to influence the outcome of events at decisive points. The detail of this process is contained in Annex U, but, in brief, the plan lays out a series of decisive points and decision points that influence the outcome of the wider campaign. The Command Group will meet monthly and an assessment of campaign performance and effects will be presented – this will not be merely a statistical report, but a genuine, Principal Staff-level assessment of effect and effectiveness. This will be followed by an explanation of the strategic decisions that need to be made at that time, and an explanation of the possible effects of those decisions. Likely outcomes will be examined against the agreed decisive points and against the ideal and alternative campaign end-states. Note that:

1. This is the key staff tool for campaign management, and should become the focus of the strategic-level staff.

2. The CG will use it as his primary strategic direction and campaign management forum.

m. **Tasks.**

1. **Key Strategic Tasks**

   (a) Protection of key Iraqi leaders, UN mission, infrastructure and freedom of movement.

   (b) Protection of the political process, both Iraqi and UN, including support to the elections.

   (c) Create and maintain a secure environment by neutralizing the insurgency.

   (d) Man, train, equip and assist the organization and the development of the ISF.

   (e) Facilitate the establishment of functional governance structures (MoI, MoD).
Support humanitarian and economic reconstruction projects that create jobs and raise the standard of living.

Integrate Ops, Intel, IO and STRATCOM to create a drumbeat of positive tempo and inevitable momentum across all lines of operation.

n. **Tasks To Subordinate Organizations.**

(1) **MNC-I.**

(a) Neutralize the insurgency in the Sunni Triangle.

(b) Secure Baghdad.

(e) Assist in building of ISF, primarily ING and Border Guards.

(f) Assist the ISF in planning and execution of operations to allow the assumption of Local and Regional Control.

(g) Achieve Local Control by 31 December 2004, focusing on priority cities.

(h) Achieve Regional Control by 31 July 2005.

(i) Sustain in the primarily Shia and Kurdish areas, reinforce the perception of ISG success and legitimacy, and to recast the image of the Force as supporters and protectors of Iraq.

(j) Support the election process.

(k) Support key economic reconstruction projects.

(l) Conduct Army Title 10 functions and requirements.

(2) **MNSTC-I.**

(a) Man, train and equip the ISF.
(b) Organize and train the ISF as cohesive police and fighting units.

(c) Lead in MoI and MoD governance support.

(3) **UN Security Brigade.**

(a) Secure elements of the UN as requested.

(b) Assist the Iraqi Government and UN to secure the electoral process.

(c) Be prepared to support UNAMI efforts to convene a national conference in Jul 04 to select a consultative council.

(4) **ISG.**

(a) Transition to CT/COIN in support of MNF.

o. **MNF-I Staff Branches.**

(1) Structure and balance the staff to ensure the most efficient relationship between the development of strategy and the execution of operations (Chief of Staff).

(2) Establish and coordinate a forward-looking, intelligence-led strategic decision-making and strategic planning process that sees the Iraqis playing a progressively leading role (DCG, DCS Ops).

(3) Establish a functioning partnership engagement system that permeates all levels, from government down to and including local tribal level, supported by integral STRATCOM (DCG, DCS Strat, Pol, Mil).

(4) Develop contingency plans to guard against strategic surprise. (DCS Ops).

(5) Establish mechanisms with US COM, coalition partners, IG, NGOs, local governance and ISF at all levels to synchronize effects and achieve unity of purpose and execution (DCG PM, DCS Strat, Pol, Mil).

(6) Conduct planning to support and protect the UN (DCS Ops).

(7) Conduct planning to support the electoral process (DCS Ops CM).

(8) Support the effort to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people (DCS Ops CM).
(9) Conduct and coordinate the STRATCOM “drumbeat” (DCS Ops)

(10) Assist IG in formulating a national security policy (DCS Strat, Pol, Mil).

(11) Develop a long term basing strategy (DCS Ops).

p. Political Tasks. The above tasks coincide with the political tasks that the US Chief of Mission and Commanding General set out in their joint Mission Statement, which are as follows:

(1) Ensure that the December/January election takes place as planned.

(2) Support national reconciliation and peaceful alternatives to violence.

(3) Assist the IIG in job creation and the provision of essential services.

(4) Help the IIG end external support for the insurgency.

(5) Encourage the international community to further the restoration of stability and security in Iraq.

q. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Dates/Timings. Timings will be dictated by the UN recognized election process which for now is:

   (a) During Aug 04 - select a Consultative Council.
   (b) By 31 Dec 04, in any case no later than 31 Jan 05 - Direct Democratic Elections.
   (c) By 31 Dec 04 - achieve hand over of Local Control, particularly in key cities.
   (d) By 31 Jul 05 - achieve hand over of Regional Control
   (e) By 31 Dec 05 - Constitutionally Elected Government.

(2) Boundaries. Wherever it is reasonably practicable local commanders should, where the security situation permits, align MNF-I subordinate boundaries to coincide with security boundaries set by the Iraqi National Security Policy, likely to be based on police local and regional boundaries.

(3) Definitions. The key definitions are contained in Annex U.
(4) **Engagement Policy.** The engagement strategy across MNF-I must be carried out consistently, re-enforcing all the Communicating Line of Operation Decisive Points (see Annex U), in accordance with the policy at Appendix 1 to Annex C.

4. **Administration And Logistics.**
   
a. **Concept of Support.** MNF-I DCSLOG will serve as the central agent responsible for the integration of logistic support within Iraq. The DCSLOG will synchronize logistics operations based on the priorities established by the Commander, MNF-I. Logistics operations in Iraq will focus on supporting the COM efforts to provide for a secure and stable Iraq and the timely rotation of Coalition Forces. This will be accomplished by providing CSS for ongoing combat operations, providing for stability and support operations, and equipping the ISF. MNF-I, with the agreement of the IG, will continue to draw-down and/or develop air and sea ports within Iraq, for use as APOD/SPOD and APOE/SPOE to receive, sustain, rotate and eventually redeploy Coalition Forces. MNF-I will continue to sustain and improve the quality of life in base-camps and increase the use of contracted services, lessening the need for military CSS assets in Iraq.

b. **US Mission.** MNF-I will provide services and supply support to the US Mission in Iraq, COM Regional Teams, and other DOS personnel stationed throughout Iraq in accordance with the MOA between DOS and DOD for Support Services in Iraq.

c. **Tactical Level Logistics.** Tactical level logistics will continue to be a service and national responsibility. Service component commands exercise Title 10 authority for their respective forces. MNF-I may provide life support to Coalition Forces on a reimbursable basis via an Acquisition Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA). This support may be in the form of a Coalition LOGCAP Task Order, a US LOGCAP Task Order, or direct support from US supply system. Equipment request by Coalition forces will be validated by MNF-I DCSLOG and forwarded to CENTCOM for approval.

5. **Command And Control.**
   
a. **Command.** The Commanding General of MNF-I is the commander of all Coalition Forces in Iraq. The MNF-I reports to US CENTCOM. The Force acts in support of the IG, US COM and of the other Coalition embassies. Coalition contributing nations will continue to place their forces in Iraq OPCON to MNF-I. The Force will coordinate all operations with the ISF chain of command and will operate a parallel chain of command to the ISF, although ISF units may come under the control of MNF-I formations for specific operations. ROEs will remain a matter for individual nations within the Coalition. (Refer to Annex J.)

b. **Command Posts.** MNF-I will be commanded by the CG from HQ MNF-I based at Camp Victory. This will be the main HQ, and will have liaison.
presence from the ISF. Because of the need for close liaison, consultation and coordination with the Iraqi Government and coalition embassies, he will establish a forward HQ, HQ MNF-I (Fwd), at the Presidential Palace. At HQ MNF-I (Fwd), he will establish a Commander’s Situation Room from which he can issue direction through his Force Operations Center at HQ MNF-I to his subordinate commands. The Commander’s Situation Room may be co-located with the National Civil Military Operations Center and US Mission Operations Center. MNC-I is to establish its HQ at Camp Victory. MNSTC-I is to establish its HQ in consultation with the Iraqi government at a place where it can best discharge its mission. (Refer to Annex J.)

c. **Succession.** DCG UK, CG MNC-I, CG MNSTC.

d. **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.** HQ MNF-I, as it is in partnership with the Iraqi government and in support of Iraqi Security Forces, will conduct its routine business and execute command through CENTRIX, with all material being releasable on a need-to-know basis to MCFI, deemed to include Iraqi Security Forces as required. Iraqi Security Forces will in time establish their own command, control, communications and computer systems. MNF-I will assist the ISF with command, control, communications and computer systems support as an interim measure. (Refer to Annex K.)

Respect - Resilience - The Will To Win

/// SIGNED ///

GEORGE W CASEY, Jr
General, US Army
Commander, Multi-National Force - Iraq

“Ishtirak wa Tafahum - Partnership and Understanding”
Annexes:

Annex A – Task Organization – to follow
Annex B – Intelligence
Annex C – Appendix 1 – Engagement Strategy
Annex C – Appendix 2 – CMO
Annex C – Appendix 3 – Insurgency Operations
Annex C – Appendix 4 – Engineer
Annex D – Logistics
Annex E – Personnel
Annex F – STRATCOM
[Annex G – Civil Affairs – Not Issued]
[Annex H – Meteorology and Oceanographic – Not issued]
Annex J – Command Relationships – to follow
Annex K – CIS
[Annex L – Environmental Considerations – Not issued]
[Annex M – Geospatial Information and Services – Not issued]
[Annex N – Space Operations – Not issued]
Annex P – Legal
Annex Q – Medical Services
Annex R – Reports – to follow
[Annex T – Consequence Management – Not issued]
Annex U – Campaign Plan Decision Guide
Annex V – Interagency Coordination – to follow