## Equipment Readiness

### Ground

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Readiness Rate (Apr 06)</th>
<th>CY05 Battle Losses</th>
<th>CY06 Battle Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abrams Tanks</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley Fighting Vehicles</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strykers</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up-Armored HMMWVs</td>
<td>11,302</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Aviation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Readiness Rate</th>
<th>CY05 Battle Losses</th>
<th>CY06 Battle Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack/Observation Helos</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Lift Helos</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Lift Helos</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fixed Wing</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Fixed and Rotary Wing</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Fixed and Rotary Wing</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security

Operations Scales of Justice
- Additional Battalions
- 1,100 Joint/Combined Patrols on a daily basis
- Concentrating on 8 Districts
- Accelerated Police Development

Operations in Ramadi
- Insert Iraqi Police - 2157 policemen by July
- Set conditions for provincial governance
- 3 x Iraqi Army Brigade, 2 x Coalition Force Brigade (-)
- Integrated CMO (governance and economic)
- 13 Major CERP Projects ($31 million)

Iraqi Police Services - Police Transition Teams fielded by August 2006
9 +1 Key Cities - Police Transition Teams in 9 Key Cities + Baghdad
Iraqi Army Lead - Currently 2 of 10 Divisions; 14 of 36 Brigades; and 52 of 112 Battalions
National Police - Currently 2 of 9 Brigades; 9 of 27 Battalions at TRA 2
Border Enforcement - 100% force generated
AQIZ CAMPAIGN OF MURDER AND INTIMIDATION

PLANNED OPERATIONS IN RAMADI

- MNF-W (I MEF)
- 3 x Iraqi Army Brigade, 2 x Coalition Force Brigade (-)
- Integrated CMO (governance and economic)

MONTHLY EFFECTIVE ATTACKS IN RAMADI

1 Nov 04 - 21 Apr 06

SET CONDITIONS FOR

- Insert Iraqi Police Presence - 2,157 police by July
- 11 police stations, Development for Iraq Funds used
- Set conditions for provincial governance
- 13 Major CERP Projects ($31 million)
Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Capability

Concept Brief

(1 April 2006)
Purpose

• Information brief on the status of the MNSTC-I and SPA concept development of an Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Task Characteristics

Provide an Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Capability that:

- Is based on appropriate Iraqi policy and legal basis
- Builds on existing capabilities, units, and elements of national power
- Provides Unity of Command/Effort vice currently disparate efforts
- Has National Reach
- Can independently plan, prepare and execute CT missions
- Is responsive in no-notice crisis
- Can be sustained by Iraq post-Coalition
- Is committed to the Iraqi State (not a potential power source for political gain)
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Proposed METL

Strategic Tasks
- Coordinate and synchronize policy among ministries
- Develop appropriate policy and legal authorities
- Develop and approve Counter-Terrorism Charter

Operational & tactical Tasks
- Collect, analyze, fuse, disseminate intelligence
- Refine target sets utilizing organic capabilities
- Maintain, deploy to and operate from ISBs across Iraq
- Conduct low-level / unconventional Direct Action Operations
- Conduct Counter-Terrorism operations against National Level Target Sets
- Conduct Hostage Rescue Operations
- Conduct detailed site exploitation (personnel and materiel)
- Conduct supporting Counter-Terrorism Operations (PSYOPS and CA)
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
The Challenge to Unity of Effort

- Three intelligence components gradually coming together
- Controlled by different Ministers
- Each supported by a high end Iraqi capability
- Each with separate Coalition sponsors
- Unity of effort among ministries required as well

- But all of whom want to serve Iraq
- Each of which works extremely well with their sponsors
- Some Baghdad-centric coordination is being achieved

Requires a National Counter-terrorism Strategy
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Institutional Challenges

- No central direction; authorities
- Limited legal basis for CT capability/operations
- No checks and balances

- Ministerial Responsibility for CT
- Decision authority for employment
- CT Programming and budget
- Manning, equipping, sustaining

- Unity of Effort for CT elements
- JSOC-like enablers
- Title X functions
- Interoperability
- Recruitment and Selection
- Dependence on Coalition
Elevate Anti-Terrorism Advisor to Deputy NSA For Counter Terrorism
National Counter-Terrorism Capability

Deputy NSA For Counter Terrorism

- Elevate from Advisor for Anti-Terrorism to Deputy NSA for Counter Terrorism
  - Advisor position currently not filled
  - Anti is defensive, counter is offensive
  - Ability to direct NSA supporting staff
  - Focused on Counter Terrorism, the other DNSA is day to day guy
  - Extensive security or intel background may not be required if the MoD is lead for "operational" piece, may need more of an interagency perspective

- Serves as a check / balance to the operational CT effort while at the same time enabling the operational effort by:
  - Recommending policy that brings the other elements of power into the fight
  - Recommending policy that provides the required enabling authorities while protecting civil liberties and the rule of law
  - Taking the long strategic view and developing regional partnerships
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Command and Control

- Deputy NSA
  For
  Counter-Terrorism

  • Develops Policy
  • No direct command of capabilities
  • Works through Prime Minister
  • Chairs CT-focused DMCNS

MoD/JHQ

Iraqi Special Operations Command

X

ISOF

MOI

Emergency Response Unit (ERU)

INIS

Special Tactics Unit

SECRET // REL MCFI // X1
National Counter-Terrorism Capability

Counter-Terrorism Fusion Capability

Enablers:
- Air
- MEDEVAC
- Fires
- Other

Intel:
- Joint
- Interagency
- Regional
- Linked to CF

Operations:
- Level I – ICTF, ERU, STU
- Level II – ISOF, NP, SWAT
- Level III – Conventional Forces

JIATF-CT:
- Intel Fusion
- Target Distribution
- Asset Allocation

This capability must be generated for stand-alone Iraqi CT operations to succeed... But When, Where, How and By Whom?
National Counter-Terrorism Capability

ISOC Task Organization

Joint decision between CJSOTFs agreed there is no defined requirement for the MAROPs Company at this time.

1200/1535
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Iraqi Special Operations Force Brigade

- HQ
- Intel Support Battalion
- Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force
- Special Forces Commando Battalion
- Special Warfare Center & School
- Support Battalion

- Recce Troop per region
- Surveillance
- Target Development
- Target Hand-off

- Recruit & Selection
- Doctrine & Training
- Procurement
National Counter-Terrorism Capability

Iraqi Special Operations Force Command
Staff

- Must provide effective C3I for a nation-wide CT capability
- Must increase intelligence capability for:
  - Analysis of critical areas across Iraq
  - Developing and tracking target sets
- Develop planning capability:
  - ISOF superb at execution, relies on Coalition for planning
  - Plan all the way through complex, integrated operations
- Develop effective logistics:
  - Logistics management, planning and coordination skills required
  - Capability to project and sustain force outside Baghdad
- Resource management required to sustain the force over time

This staff could be the nucleus for the Counter-Terrorism Fusion Cell.
But, if so requires a non-traditional organization
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Special Tactics Unit (STU)

- **Mission:** Conduct direct action operations to apprehend/recover targeted individuals and/or materiel of intelligence value and to conduct sensitive site exploitation (SSE) in support of INIS objectives.

- **Strength:** ~ 400 consisting of 2 Assault Squadrons, 1 Support Squadron, Clandestine Collection Unit (CCU), and an air component.

- **Capabilities:**
  - **Ground Ops**
    - Raids
    - CTR, Surveillance
    - Vehicle Interdiction (VI)
  - **CT/HR Ops**
    - Close Quarters Battle (CQB)
    - Advanced marksmanship/target discrimination
    - Basic demolitions
    - Mission planning
  - **Air Ops (In development)**
    - MI-17
    - Twin Otter
National Counter-Terrorism Capability

Iraqi Police Service Emergency Response Unit (ERU)

Mission: The ERU provides a national, high-end, rapid-response law enforcement tactical unit to specialize in high-risk search, arrest, hostage rescue and crisis response operations.

Strength: End Strength ~ 400 Pax

Capabilities:
- Respond to terrorist incidents
- Kidnappings
- Hostage Negotiations
- Explosive Ordnance
- High Risk Searches
- WMD Response
- Emergency Medical Procedures
- CT Task Force Coordination
- Other National Law Enforcement Emergencies

Red = Potential focused high-end capabilities
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Way Ahead

- Obtain Coalition/Iraqi support for a National CT Capability
  - Field Counter-Terrorism AST (O-7/O-6 led)

- Establish Deputy National Security Advisor for Counter-Terrorism
  - Eliminate Minister of State for National Security Affairs

- Establish JHQ Counter-Terrorism Directorate
  - Staff Ministry for Counter-Terrorism Tasks (J33 SOD-like)
  - AST for Ministry (~2 Personnel added to JHQ/MoD AST)

- Determine Objective Organization and Basing

- Program and Budget for 2007

- Generate Enablers (Intel, Operations, Support) and Fusion Cells
  - Requires AST (and embeds initially)

- Coordinate Integration of MoD CT operations with MoI ERU and STU

- Embed Coalition-to-Iraq Transition Plan throughout

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interoperability</th>
<th>Interdependence</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Support Plus ASTs</td>
<td>Embedded AST</td>
<td>Theater Engagement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National Counter-Terrorism Capability
Some Things to Think Through

- Begin with Unity of effort and evolve to unity of command OR establish unit of command soonest
- Capability for both deliberate and time sensitive operations
- Communications backbone required for distributed operations
- Centralized vs decentralized intelligence analysis
- Connectivity between elements
- Developing exploitation capability (personnel and materiel)
- Interaction with conventional forces
- Potential for combined Coalition – Iraqi fused targeting element
- Action plan for the concept to include how we engage the Iraqis
Guidance
CC
BACKUP
Trends in Adhamiya and Rusafa

• Key findings
  – AQI was establishing a base in the Adhamiya district near the Abu Hanifa Mosque to facilitate attacks against Shi'a targets
  – JAM death squads are likely responsible for the increase in violence in eastern Adhamiya
  – AQI's plans for the area were disrupted by JAM's intrusion into Adhamiya and will likely lead to an increase sectarian violence over the long term
JAM Trends in Adhamiya and Rusafa

- The increase in violent activity is likely due to JAM death squads intruding into Sunni neighborhoods searching for terrorists
  - Hassan Salim raid in Adhamiya resisted by Sunni

- Reporting indicates JAM uses ISF (MoI) uniforms and vehicles to enter Sunni neighborhoods and kidnap suspected terrorists
  - [1.4c] indicates Abu Fatima coordinated with BG Abbas to kidnap Sunnis
  - Strongholds in Ur and Sha‘ab; used as execution site for Sunni and Shi’á

- Low activity in Hay Ur and Sha‘ab indication of JAM security presence
  - Extensive use of checkpoints and patrols

- Majority of violence concentrated in Adhamiya neighborhood near Abu Hanifa mosque and Sunni majority neighborhoods
  - Activity in Rusafa also an indication of JAM influence in the district; mixed neighborhood still prone to violence
    - 14 Sunnis kidnapped at MoI checkpoint

Assessment: JAM is likely responsible for the increase in violence in both districts because of their involvement in both kidnappings and executions. JAM is intruding into Sunni majority neighborhoods searching for terrorists. JAM’s activities are creating instability in Rusafa and Adhamiya and exacerbating sectarian tensions amongst the districts.
Recent Terrorist Activity in Adhamiya and Rusafa

- AQI's attempt to exert authority in Adhamiya was disrupted by April 17th gun battle against JAM
  - AQI was attempting to establish a base in an area from which AQI could conduct attacks against Shi'a targets
  - Terrorists from outside cities are moving into Adhamiya to establish a safe haven
  - AQI/AS intimidates local populace
- Rusafa has less terrorist activity than Adhamiya, but attacks may increase if the violence in Adhamiya spreads

**Attacks in Adhamiya 19 Mar - 19 May 06**

**Attacks in Rusafa 19 Mar - 19 May 06**

Assessment: Terrorist attacks in Adhamiya are a reflection of heightened sectarian tensions. Recent violence has altered AQI's procedures in Adhamiya. Clashes between AQI and Shi'a elements may increase as both attempt to assert their dominance.
Assessment: The recent decrease in violent activity is likely short-lived. JAM is actively pursuing Sunni terrorists and is likely in the planning stage of another incursion into western Adhamiya district. AQI's presence in the area is unlikely to diminish and confrontations are likely to increase. Western Adhamiya will continue to destabilize over the short term as the two groups continue to confront each other.