Reintegration of Militias 2005-2006

DCS - PME

25 February 2005
Militias and MNF-I Campaign Plan

Against Campaign Plan Lines of Operation

- Security - Continually increasing capability and capacity of Iraqi Security Forces negates need of militias providing local security

- Governance - Continued militia presence threatens Iraqi national unity, Rule of Law, and impedes ITG's main counterinsurgency efforts
Endstate and MNFI-Action Plan

Militia Endstate

"An Iraqi State in which there are no armed forces or militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Government, except as provided by federal law."**

* Transitional Administrative Law of Iraq, Article 27

MNF-I Action Plan

"Militia transition and reintegration – is an important aspect of stability and security. Encourage the Iraqi government to reenergize the process by reorganizing, empowering, and resourcing its capability to transition militia members and reintegrate them into mainstream Iraqi society."**

** MNFI Campaign Plan Action Plan - February 2005
Agenda

- Current Policies and Legal Framework
- Environment/Situation
- Current TR Background and Options
  - Assessment of Current TR Progress
  - Organizational Challenges
- 9 Militias included under CPA Order 91
- 10 Militias not included under CPA Order 91
  - Threat Assessment
- TRIC Report and Recommendations to ITG
- Recommended ITG 2005 TR Actions
- Strategic Framework
- MNFI/COM 2005 Way Ahead on Militias
Current Policies/Legal Framework

- In the Law - (TAL Art 27B) Armed Forces and Militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are prohibited, except as provided under federal law (TAL 54A – Internal KRG security forces)

- In form – CPA Order 91 established the Militia Transition and Reintegration (TR) Program and its implementation committee (TRIC) to oversee execution of that program; However TRIC has made little progress in enabling/encouraging militias to actually reintegrate into Iraqi society

- In practice – Armed Militias continue to exist; most have remained to provide security and support for their leaders, associated political parties, and their aims. IIIG has to date, neither empowered, organized or funded the TRIC to execute its charter, nor effectively encouraged or persuaded the militias to reintegrate into Iraqi society

- Incomplete - Militia policy, under TAL and thru CPA Order 91, provides both a Policy AND a Program way ahead → but only for half or fewer of all Iraqi militias → will not achieve the desired endstate
Environment/Situation

Militias have not transitioned for four principal reasons:

- TRIC not empowered and current TR program has been ineffective
- Continued hazardous security environment – Why give up means to defend oneself, family, tribe and other interests?
- Lack of other economic opportunities - membership provides income as well as prestige/honor (essential in Iraqi culture)
- Presence provides power/leverage to parties or individual leaders to further political aims

Militias are currently still wielding power for their leaders via:

- Issuing threat of violence/use of arms – e.g. Jaysh al-Mahdi (aka Muqtada's Militia; aka Mahdi Militia [MM]) for Ashura
- Deterrent military presence and activity – Kurdish Peshmerga as internal KRG security forces / on limited external security missions
- Primary role, prior to Jan 05 election → protecting leaders and party political positions
Current TR - Background & Options

CPA Order 91 established legal requirements for TR Process

- Established the Transition and Reintegration Implementation Committee (TRIC)

- Only 9 Militias were included – Must have existed prior to May 2003 and fought against Saddam regime (Note: Individual members must meet same qualifications to qualify for program options below)

Options for Eligible Militia Members under TR

- Retire with a military pension based on credited years of militia service

- Transition into the Iraqi Armed Forces or other Iraqi Security Forces as Individuals

- Retrain and re-educate into a civil sector occupations

- (Militias members can join/form Private Security Companies (PSCs) per terms of CPA Memorandum 17 – with security screening by MoI)
### 9 Militias included under CPA Order 91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militia</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peshmerga (PUK) (Kurd)</td>
<td>Northern Iraq</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Internal security forces for KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshmerga (KDP) (Kurd)</td>
<td>Northern Iraq</td>
<td>30→40,000</td>
<td>Internal security forces for KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADR Corps (SCIRI) (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Southern Iraq</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Political advancement +7,000 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb al-Da’wa Al-Islamiyah (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Central &amp; Southern Iraq</td>
<td>&lt; 500</td>
<td>Aim Political advancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Islamic party</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Engaged in TRIC Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Communist party - al-Ansar forces</td>
<td>Countrywide</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Seeking Place in Political System; Engaged w/ TRIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi</strong> (Shi’a)</td>
<td>MND-SE AOR, Baghdad, Diwaniyah</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Legitimate Political Party,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Congress / Liberation Army</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Appears Disbanded</td>
<td>Political party remains; A. Chalabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Assembly / Accord</td>
<td>Countrywide</td>
<td>Appears disbanded</td>
<td>PM Allawi party; Political Party remains</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessment of Current TR Progress

9 Militias or Armed Group were originally deemed qualified

- None have actually undergone the TR process as prescribed
- 2 essentially disbanded already → INC and INA → effect achieved
- 2 have been defacto exempted in practice by the TRIC Chair & whose existence is legalized, albeit in unspecified numbers, by the TAL
  - PUK (25,000) and KDP (30→40,000) Peshmerga
- 2 signed bilateral TR agreements with IIG (thru TRIC)
  - BADR Organization (10,000+) & Iraqi Communist party (6,000)
  - Made no pre-election progress in transition and reintegration
- 3 have been very engaged in Iraqi political process, yet maintain a small armed component; also made no pre-election progress in TR
  - Iraqi Islamic Party (2000), Iraqi 1.4b, 1.4d (1000) and Da’wa (500)
Organizational Challenges

- CPA Order 91 directed terms
  - Minister of Interior is the designated Chair
    ➢ Prior Interior Minister appointed Dr. Sa’ad as TRIC Chair
  - Specified ministries required in TRIC – Interior, Defense, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Labor and Social Affairs, Education and Veterans Agency; Some don’t participate
    ➢ Note: Minister of Interior has no control over other ministries

- Funding
  - TRIC is not authorized a staff and has no Operating budget
  - TR expenses are included in budgets of respective TRIC member ministries; Doesn’t appear as a separate “TRIC” program line item

- Results ➢ TR program not on track; TRIC lacks empowered leadership with authority over ministerial partners, a working budget and an operational staff
TRIC Report and Recommendations to ITG

The TRIC completed an assessment on 20 February 2005 of the Transition and Reintegration Program, established under CPA Order 91.

TRIC plans to submit that report to the Transitional government once it assumes office. Report includes:

- TRIC's Program efforts for 6 months through the January 2005 elections
- TRIC's efforts to inform IIG of its progress and areas needing support
- Lack of IIG support and emphasis on the Militia transition program

TRIC recommends two Options on a Militia Transition Way Ahead to the ITG

- If ITG does not want to continue the current program then replace CPA Order 91 with another law to transition (dissolve) militias
- Sustain the TRIC but adjust it as a temporary Commission attached to the Cabinet and support it execution of duties by:
  - Fund the TRIC budget and staff it to carry out its CPA 91 charter
  - The ITG cabinet, ILO the TRIC, must deal directly with the Peshmerga Groups and their parties/KRG regarding their transition and reintegration
### Militias not Included under CPA Order 91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militia/Group</th>
<th>City/City/Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaysh al Mahdi (Shi’a) (aka Muqtada’s Militia (MM))</td>
<td>Sadr City, Karbala, Najaf</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>Political power for Sadr // Sadr’s control of Lieutenants??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of the Guardians (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Major Southern cities, Baghdad</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Expel CF; Shi’a Islamic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Sha’aban (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Dhi Qar, Basrah, Southern Iraq</td>
<td>500 - 1000</td>
<td>Coalition w/ SCIRI // Possibly CPA 91 Qualified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al-Mahdi (SCLI) (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Najaf, Karbala, Basrah</td>
<td>200 – 500</td>
<td>Political goals in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Action Organization (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Karbala, Najaf, Basrah</td>
<td>&lt; 500</td>
<td>Shi’a Theocratic Govt in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyed al Shohada (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Karbala, Najaf, Basrah</td>
<td>&lt; 250</td>
<td>Iran-like Islamic Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat 1.4b, 1.4d (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Baghdad, Basrah, al-Kut, Nasiriyah</td>
<td>&lt; 100</td>
<td>Align w/SCIRI → gain TNA seats; Shi’a Islamic Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Tajammu al-Islamiyah (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Karbala, Najaf, Basrah, al-Kut</td>
<td>&lt; 300</td>
<td>Import Iranian Revolution in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahidin of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Formerly MAW) (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Al-Amarah, Maysan</td>
<td>100 – 150</td>
<td>Expel CF; Shi’a Islamic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’at al Fadilah (Shi’a)</td>
<td>Baghdad; Basrah</td>
<td>&lt; 500</td>
<td>Shi’a Islamic Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Threat Assessment

- Intelligence threat assessment indicates that most of the 10 (Shi‘a*) Militias, not included in CPA 91 process, have been deemed minimal threat for military action with possible exception of the below three:

- JAM (or MM), and their leaders (Sadr) have been erratic in their reaction before (An Najaf - Aug 2004), recently threatened to use violence during Ashura, but continue to engage politically → poses highest threat for instability in Southern and Central Iraq, dependent on political power outcomes for SADR through seating of TNA / cabinet appointments

- Army of the Guardians, led by (b)(6) → No political aspirations; Remains highly anti MNF-I → Poses threat to fellow Shi‘a who are supportive of MNF-I efforts to promote electoral / constitutional process → also a threat to Shi‘a unity in Southern regions

- Ansar al-Mandi (SCLI), carrying out covert preparation for military activities; is influenced by 1.4b, 1.4d; has an anti-MNF-I bent → more of a wild card but relatively small numbers mitigates threat

* "Shi‘a (UIA) controlled government will likely address any threat directly and forcibly." EMB POL-MIL
Militia Transition Way Forward

- ITG Actions
- MNF-I and U.S. Mission Supporting Actions
Recommended ITG 2005 TR Actions

- Reorganize the TRIC under a centralized, empowered ITG official (a DPM)
- Staff and fund the TR office
- Develop economic development /Job Creation programs (MoTrade) and complementary job training programs (MoLSA)
- Re-energize current Transition and Reintegration program agreements - adjust to realistic timelines; reconfirm bilateral commitments w/ militias
- TRIC completes bilateral agreements and TR plans and timelines with any additional militias deemed qualified under CPA order 91
- TRIC monitors compliance by current CPA Order 91 groups and regularly reports progress to the MCNS
- Develop reintegration policy/program for militias not covered by CPA order 91
- Assess utility of transitioning militia units and/or members to meet regional infrastructure security force requirements
Strategic Framework
MNFI/COM 2005 Militia TR Way Ahead

- MNF-I DCS PME, through Embassy Staff, encourage/engage ITG to:
  - Buy into & re-energize Iraqi Militia TR program; engagement of militia leaders
  - Reorganize/resource TRIC under (a) DPM; send regular reports to MCNS
  - Enact/enable an economic development plan / job training programs

- MNF-I Supporting Actions
  - DCS INTEL - provide ongoing assessment of militias ICW INIS
  - DCS SPA – facilitates program planning thru DMCNS and JFG process
  - DCS STRATOPS – issue FRAGO to MNF-I; track militia-related incidents
  - DCS STRATCOM – facilitate ITG STRATCOM I/O plan for TR program
  - MNC-I and MSCs – o/o analyze and maintain assessments of militias in AOR
  - MNSTC-I – provide ongoing assessment of militia accessions into ISF

- IRMO – assist/monitor ITG ministries’ execution of TR program(s); designate advisors
  - TRIC – engage other CPA 91 qualified/unqualified militias in agreements/plans
  - MoD/Mol – facilitate member transition into IAF; other ISF; or Retirement (VA)
  - MoE – provides Literacy and other educational programs for members
  - Planning – plans budgets for TRIC “O&M” and TR activities by each ministry
  - MoLSA – provide re-training to Civil sector and links to job opportunities