


10 Feb 64

OPERATION STUART



~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR~~

ISR OPERATIONS



1.4C

THT, CJSOTF, OGA, SIS


- 2 x THTs provide F6 and atmospherics of Najaf and Mahdi/Badr activities

MND-CS

- 2 x LATAM Bns continue static check-points and patrols at Sadr residences
- Track Fri movement to Kufa Mosque
- Monitor situation at Imam Ali Shrine

SECRET REL MCFI

OP STUART EXECUTION TIMELINE




Assumptions:

- Sadr's security peaks Thu/Fri and is lowest Sat/Sun/Mon (Ramadan pattern)
- Minimum 14 days of active intelligence gathering before 1st Target Window
- Eid Al-Adha, Ashura, Islamic New Year and Hajj returnees will influence atmospherics and Sadr's patterns

Thurs

Sadr may travel Thu/Fri
Sadr always delivers Fri sermon Kufa mosque
Possible conflict with religious observances

OP STUART EXECUTION TIMELINE



Assumptions:

- Forty days of mourning for Ashura begins 1 MAR and ends 11 APR.
- Sadr's security peaks Thu/Fri and is lowest Sat/Sun/Mon (Ramadan pattern)
- Minimum 14 days of active intelligence gathering before 1st Target Window


Sadr may travel Thu/Fri
Sadr always delivers Fri
sermon Kufa mosque
Possible conflict with
religious observances

BRANCHPLAN A - JOINT CF/IPS Mobile

Phase 1 - Shape/Intel Collection:
Intelligence collection through THT, 716 MP Bn, OGA, LRS teams and National assets.

Phase 2 - Detention: On receipt of actionable intelligence that Sadr is traveling to Karbala or Baghdad, 1AD stage through Al Hillah with Baghdad Police SCU and 18 MP Bde assets TACON. 2x Apprehension sites reconnoitered and occupied. R&S provide early warning and confirm apprehension location. MND-CS and 716 MP Bn provide roadblocks and checkpoints. 1AD provide a cordon to isolate target. IPS front hard arrest force with overt show of force from MP, 1AD and airborne QRF. Detainees flown to Badush prison.

Phase 3 - Consequence Management: Divisions contain civil disorder within boundaries



~~SECRET REL MGR~~

BRANCHPLAN D-1AD OP

FORCES AVAILABLE:

1AD supported HQ
MND-CS supporting HQ
LATAM Bns TACON
716 MP BN/16 MP BDE DS
36 ICDC
IPS SWAT

CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

2BCT

- Attack to detain Sadr in order to support the New Iraqi Government and their establishment of the rule of law

4BDE

- Transport Sadr to designated prison - PZ established vic Camp GOLF


- Transport combat camera to Camp Victory

MND-CS

- Block vehicular movement from Kufah to An Najaf to prevent reinforcement of Mahdi Army

- On order, assume responsibility for captured personnel that will not be transferred to Badush Prison

~~SECRET REL MCFI~~



OPLAN WEASEL II

Tasks:


1.4c	provides early warning
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- Task Org:**


- Fires: 2xHH-60, 2xMH-53, AC-130(night only)

Planning

BIAP, BPT tactical debrief



OP STUART DECISION TREE



~~SECRET REL MCF~~

Sadr Update: 11 Feb 04

- Sadr generally sleeps in his own home unless he feels threatened, then he will sleep at his deceased father's home. There are 3-4 women and 3 children in Sadr's home; all relatives.
- There are guards watching Sadr's residence. Two are in front of his house, armed with AK-47s.
- 15 more guards are across the street in a parking garage. Guards in the garage can be augmented by 35 more guards if needed.
- Sadr normally travels in a white Toyota Corolla. Sadr will use a decoy; decoy usually travels in a green Kia SUV.
- Ya'qubi spends time in Sadr's office near the Imam 'Ali Shrine.
- Telephone number for the Shari'a court: Answered by Judge Ali Al-Kenani.
- Member of Mahdi's Army infiltrated Sistani's security detail.

1.4a, (b)(6)

Intelligence Gaps:

- 1 - Routes taken to and from various locations?
- 2 - Is Sadr on a regular routine?
- 3 - Vehicles used in travel, including make, model, color and plate number?
- 4 - Vehicle Sadr is normally in and where in the convoy is it located?
- 5 - How many Mahdi army with Sadr?
- 6 - How many Mahdi army at Sadr's residence?
- 7 - Where does Sadr spend his nights, is it on a schedule or does it rotate?

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR~~

Sadr Update: 11 Feb 04

- Sadr's patterns have not significantly changed since he learned on 7 February that he was going to be arrested in the very near future allegedly for detention of Iraqis in his An Najaf courts.
- Najaf residents continue to believe Sadr is not supported by the majority of the population.
 - Sadr gives away money and favors to his supporters.
 - Sadr is generally thought to be surrounding himself with thugs.
 - Sadr's popularity is increasing with the younger men because he represents their ideas better than the Najaf theological seminary clerics.

ASSESSMENT: Although tipped to impending arrest, Sadr has not shown evidence of an increased security posture. This is uncharacteristic, and may indicate he is taking less visible security measures, or is planning a new, bolder stance. Indications of his use of a patronage system are reminiscent of Saddam Hussein. Sadr has demonstrated he continues to build his power base around the growing population of Shiite poor, combining the prestige of his family name with the authority of his illegal court and armed supporters. He has already assumed a dominating role over the local authorities in Najaf, and probably intends to continue his quest for power. His long-range vision is likely not well defined, but may be seen in the creation of the Mahdi army in the image of the Lebanese Hizbollah, poised to take advantage of civil unrest and foment revolution in Iraq.

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR~~

SADR INTELLIGENCE GAPS

WHERE IS HE NOW?
WHAT IS HIS SECURITY?

WHEN DOES HE MOVE?
HOW OFTEN?

WHERE DOES HE GO?
HOW DOES HE GET THERE?

An Najaf

Al Kufa



• 24/7 OP's (MP) - IVO POSSIBLE
RESIDENCES - LOOK FOR
SECURITY AND MOVEMENT
1.4c - NAI's, RESIDENCES,
IMMAM ALI AND KUFA MOSQUES
1.4c - INTERCEPT & DF
COMMS
1.4c - TARGET LOCATION

• PREDATOR - FLY RTES ON
SUSPECTED MOVE DAYS (THUR &
FRI) - LOOK FOR MOTORCADES,
SECURITY AND CROWDS
• 24/7 OP's (MP) - AT KEY
LOCATIONS BETWEEN AN NAJAF
& KUFA - LOOK FOR
MOTORCADES
1.4c - DESCRIPTION OF
VEHICLES, ROUTES, PATTERNS,
SECURITY

1.4c KUFA MOSQUE
• 24/7 OP's (MP) - IVO MOSQUE &
ESCAPE RTES - LOOK FOR
MOTORCADES
1.4c - TARGET INTENT

~~SECRET//REL USA AUS GBR CAN//X1~~

231425Z JAN 04

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

PROG: 23 JANUARY 2004
DRAFTED: GOVERNANCE/MOSULLIVAN, RMARTINEZ
AUTHORIZED: PBREMER
CLEARED: SCARPENTER, JLECROY

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

SECSTATE WASHDC

FOR ACTION BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RICE

~~SECRET~~ HQ CPA 0501
E.O.: 12958: 01/23/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ

SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY CPA HQ 0501: PROPOSALS TO CHOOSE THE
TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY

CLASSIFIED BY CPA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JESSICA LECROY FOR REASONS 1.5
(B AND D)

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. THIS CABLE CONTAINS BOTH COMMENTS ON THE
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS PROPOSALS DISCUSSED IN THE JANUARY 21 DEPUTIES
COMMITTEE MEETING AND THOUGHTS ON THE BROADER TACTICAL APPROACH WE
SHOULD ADOPT IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD. IT ARGUES THAT WE SHOULD
REFRAIN FROM IDENTIFYING A SINGLE, PREFERRED USG METHOD FOR
SELECTING THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (TNA) LEST OUR EFFORTS
TO DO SO UNDERMINE THE UN MISSION. WE FIND PROPOSALS TO HOLD
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS DANGEROUS AND UNREALISTIC IN THE TIME PERIOD OF
THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

UN/CAUCUS STRATEGY MOVES

2. ~~(S)~~ WHILE IT IS USEFUL FOR US TO DISCUSS THE VARIOUS OPTIONS
INTERNALLY, IT IS NOT NECESSARY OR EVEN DESIRABLE FOR US TO DECIDE
ON A SINGLE APPROACH FOR CHOOSING THE TNA. THERE ARE SEVERAL
REASONS WHY WE SHOULD NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO SETTLE ON A SINGLE
OPTION AT THIS POINT. FIRST, ADOPTING A PARTICULAR PROPOSAL AS OUR
OWN WILL VIRTUALLY ENSURE THAT IT IS DEAD ON ARRIVAL IN NAJAF.

SISTANI AND HIS SUPPORTERS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY LOOK ON ANY COMPROMISE SUGGESTED BY THE COALITION WITH GREAT SUSPICION; EVEN THE PERFECT PROPOSAL WILL BE TAINTED TO THE POINT OF IRRELEVANCY IF IT IS SEEN AS OUR PREFERENCE. SECOND, PRESENTING THE UN WITH OUR PREFERRED COMPROMISE WILL REINFORCE THE SUSPICIONS OF SOME OF SECRETARY ANNAN'S ADVISORS THAT WE ARE JUST LOOKING TO THE UN TO RUBBER STAMP OUR OPTIONS. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DETRIMENTAL TO OUR OVERALL PLAN TO BRING IN THE UN IF IT WERE TO OCCUR BEFORE ANNAN MADE A FIRM AND PUBLIC DECISION TO SEND A UN TEAM TO IRAQ. MOREOVER, WE WILL SEND THE UN EXTREMELY MIXED SIGNALS IF NOW, HAVING LOBBIED FOR WEEKS FOR ANNAN TO RULE OUT DIRECT ELECTIONS, WE APPROACH IT WITH A PROPOSAL FOR HOLDING SUCH ELECTIONS BY JUNE. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ANY NEW PROPOSAL MADE BY THE USG TO THE UN WILL IMMEDIATELY BE CONVEYED TO IRAQI POLITICIANS - AND TO NAJAF - BY ANNAN'S STAFF.

3. (S) RATHER THAN SETTLING NOW ON A NEW OPTION THAT MAY (OR MAY NOT) PLEASE SISTANI, OUR STRATEGY SHOULD BE TO DEVELOP A RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD SATISFY OUR KEY OBJECTIVES. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE CAUCUS SYSTEM SET FORTH IN THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT, PERHAPS WITH ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS OR UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME SUCH AS PARTIAL ELECTIONS, PROVIDES THE BEST HOPE FOR OBTAINING A REPRESENTATIVE AND LEGITIMATE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. *ONLY IF SISTANI'S OPPOSITION TO THIS PLAN CONTINUES SHOULD WE BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER NEW UN PROPOSALS* -- OR FLOAT OUR OWN -- CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS. AT THIS POINT, WE GAIN NOTHING BY ABANDONING THE PROCESS SPECIFIED IN THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT. WE SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH OURSELVES. IT IS FAR BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL WE CAN GAUGE SISTANI'S REACTION TO A UN TEAM, ITS VIEWS ON THE INADVISABILITY OF EARLY ELECTIONS, AND ITS PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF THE CAUCUS PROCEDURE.

4. (S) WE SHOULD LET THE UN PLAY THE ROLE THAT WE HAVE DEFINED FOR IT: EXPLORING OPTIONS AND BUILDING CONSENSUS FOR A COMPROMISE TO CHOOSE THE TNA. WE SHOULD PLAN ON FEEDING OUR IDEAS TO THE UN THROUGH CPA IN BAGHDAD AS PART OF THE BROAD-RANGING CONSULTATIONS THAT THE UN WILL UNDERTAKE. ANY OTHER APPROACH - PARTICULARLY IF IT INVOLVES THE USG FEEDING IDEAS TO THE UN BEFORE IT DEPLOYS TO IRAQ - WILL ONLY WEAKEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN MISSION AND BY TAINTING IT THREATEN ITS ABILITY TO PLAY THE BROKERING ROLE WE NEED IT TO PLAY.

5. (S) WE MUST ALSO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ANY TALK OF EXTENDING THE TIMELINE. THE JUNE 30 DATE FOR THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY GIVES US SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE OVER THOSE WHO ARE PUSHING FOR ELECTIONS, GIVEN THAT MOST PARTIES ACCEPT THAT CREDIBLE ELECTIONS CANNOT FEASIBLY BE ORGANIZED IN THIS TIME PERIOD. HOWEVER, IF IRAQIS OR THE UN GET THE SENSE THAT WE ARE WILLING TO RETHINK THE TIMELINE, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO HOLD THE LINE ON NO ELECTIONS.

6. (S) FINALLY, IN EVALUATING THE OPTIONS, WE MUST BE COGNIZANT

THAT ACCOMMODATING SISTANI WILL HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL COSTS. JUST TODAY, MASOUD BARZANI AND JALAL TALABANI AGAIN EXPRESSED THEIR UNEASE TO US REGARDING SISTANI'S GROWING POLITICAL POWER. OTHERS ARE ALSO UNCOMFORTABLE WITH POLITICAL DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY A RELIGIOUS FIGURE WHO, AS FRUSTRATED AND SUSPICIOUS SUNNIS POINT OUT, IS NOT AN IRAQI BUT AN IRANIAN. ADOPTING ELECTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE TIME FRAME OF THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT, WILL FURTHER EMPOWER SISTANI AND WEAKEN THE CONFIDENCE OF KURDS AND SUNNIS IN THE VIABILITY OF A SECULAR, DEMOCRATIC IRAQI STATE.

SPECIFIC REACTIONS TO PROVINCIAL ELECTION PROPOSALS

7. (S) ACCORDING TO OUR ELECTIONS EXPERTS THERE ARE MYRIAD TECHNICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH HOLDING STAGGERED PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS BY SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE. PRESUMING THAT SUCH ELECTIONS COULD BE ORGANIZED THE ASSESSMENT OF THE TEAM IS THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD LIKELY BE AN UNSTABLE TNA BASED EITHER ON INDIVIDUALS WITH LITTLE BASIS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES - IN THE BEST CASE SCENARIO - OR RADICALIZED SECTARIAN GROUPS REPRESENTING THE BEST ORGANIZED PARTIES.

8. (S) USING SINGLE NON TRANSFERABLE VOTE (SNTV) IN SUCH ELECTIONS, MEANING THAT THE TOP VOTE GETTERS ARE SENT TO THE TNA, WOULD ENSURE THAT THE BEST ORGANIZED PARTIES WOULD SWEEP THE ELECTIONS. BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF PROPORTIONALITY, THIS SYSTEM SERIOUSLY DISADVANTAGES MODERATES AND MINORITIES.

9. (S) WEEK-LONG ELECTIONS ARE ESPECIALLY PROBLEMATIC. RARELY IN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE TWO-DAY ELECTIONS ARE THE RESULTS NOT CHALLENGED OVER QUESTIONS OF BALLOT CUSTODY OVERNIGHT. THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE MULTIPLIED EXPONENTIALLY FOR EVERY DAY THE ELECTION PERIOD IS EXTENDED. MOREOVER, BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF POLLING SITES ENVISIONED IN EACH PROVINCE (FOOD DISTRIBUTION SITES, PRESUMABLY) THE ELECTION WOULD BE LARGELY UNOBSERVABLE MAXIMIZING THE POSSIBILITY FOR MANIPULATION AND FRAUD. ALSO, THERE IS NO KNOWN INDELIBLE INK THAT WILL LAST A WEEK IF A PERSON IS INTENT ON REMOVING IT. IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY, MOREOVER, FOR INDIVIDUALS TO VOTE EARLY IF INDELIBLE INK WERE USED SINCE THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO OPEN THEMSELVES UP FOR INTIMIDATION (OR REPRISAL). ADDITIONALLY, IF IN THESE ELECTIONS ANY ID CARD IS SUFFICIENT FOR PROOF OF IDENTIFICATION TO VOTE THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT AN INDIVIDUAL COULD USE A SERIES OF ID'S TO VOTE ON DIFFERENT DAYS.

10. (S) STAGGERING PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS WOULD CREATE UNPREDICTABLE DYNAMICS AND LIKELY ENFLAME ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN TENSIONS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE ELECTION WOULD NOT BE PROPORTIONAL AND THERE WOULD BE NO POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATORY SEATS. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS WOULD ALSO COME INTO PLAY. ELECTIONS IN ONE PROVINCE COULD LEAD TO BOYCOTTS IN ANOTHER DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS IN THE FIRST. FOR EXAMPLE, IF IN BASRA, SUNNIS OR KURDS FAILED TO BE REPRESENTED ADEQUATELY, THESE COMMUNITIES MIGHT LOOK TO EXCLUDE SHIA

MINORITIES IN THEIR PROVINCES, PROMPTING INTIMIDATION OR WORSE. THIS IS A PARTICULAR CONCERN OF THE KURDS WHO WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT PROVINCE-BASED ELECTIONS FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS.

11. ~~(S)~~ LOGISTICS FOR PROVINCE-BASED ELECTIONS WOULD BE LARGELY SIMILAR TO THOSE FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS. IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF POLLING STATIONS - LIKELY SOME 10,000 NATIONWIDE - WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED BY SOME SORT OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION THAT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO COUNT AND VERIFY RESULTS. BALLOTS WITH CANDIDATES NAMES WOULD HAVE TO BE PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED IN ADEQUATE NUMBERS TO EACH OF THESE POLLING PLACES, AS WOULD BALLOT BOXES AND SCREENS. VOTERS LISTS, IF CREATED, WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE. TRAINING FOR CARRYING OUT THE ELECTION - FOR 50,000 OR MORE POLL WORKERS - WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED. A PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGN WOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT. ALL OF THESE REQUIRE TIME - EVEN EXCLUDING A REGISTRATION PROCESS OF SOME SORT - WHICH WOULD LIKELY CAUSE A DELAY IN THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY ON JUNE 30.

12. ~~(S)~~ *IN SUM, PROVINCE-BASED ELECTIONS ARE MORE COMPLICATED AND MORE DANGEROUS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT THAN EARLY NATIONAL ELECTIONS.* THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS PROPOSED TO CUT DOWN ON TIME - NO VOTER S LIST, FOR INSTANCE, WILL SAVE SOME TIME BUT NOT MUCH. MOREOVER, THE MORE LIKE AN ELECTION THE PROCESS LOOKS THE MORE LIKELY IT WILL BE CRITICIZED FOR NOT BEING THE REAL THING. IFES HAS INFORMED CPA, FOR INSTANCE, THAT IT WOULD NOT LIKELY HELP ORGANIZE SUCH ELECTIONS OUT OF CONCERN FOR THEIR LIKELY CATASTROPHIC FAILURE.

BREMER

~~SECRET//REL MCF//X1~~



Badr Corps Update

Sanchez
Bryant
to
Noizaid

This briefing is classified

~~SECRET~~

~~REL MCF~~

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1

11 Jan 04

~~SECRET//REL MCF//X1~~

~~SECRET//REL MCF//X1~~

TASK / PURPOSE



TASK: Provide alternatives for engaging Badr Corps to prevent unsanctioned use of force by paramilitary units

PURPOSE: Support development of a unified and stable Iraq through a broad engagement strategy focused on reducing destabilizing acts of violence by Shi'a paramilitary organizations

This briefing is classified

~~SECRET~~

~~REL MCF~~

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1

11 Jan 04

~~SECRET//REL MCF//X1~~

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Background



- Shi'a elements have killed numerous former Ba'athist party members
- Shi'a-on-Ba'athi violence is increasing
- The rate of retribution murders has gone up substantially since the murder of Muhammed Bakr Al-Hakim
- 1.4b
- Majority of Shi'a-led violence occurring in Shi'a dominated areas

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~

SCIRI/Badr Perceptions



- Mechanisms for arrest and prosecution of perpetrators of violence against Shi'a are limited
 - No one has been brought to justice for the killing of Mohammed Bakr Al-Hakim
 - Moqtada Sadr continues to freely incite against the coalition
 - Numerous former regime officials are employed in the Iraqi Police and NIA
 - When Shi'a-originated intelligence is provided to the coalition it is not acted upon in a timely manner
- Way ahead: engage Shi'a leaders, address issues, focus near-term efforts to curtail violence

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~

Engagement Concept



- Sunni Engagement Strategy has been crafted and developed and is currently being implemented
 - Leverage lessons learned
 - Tailor approach to use parallel engagement strategy to address Shi'a concerns
 - Modify to reflect Shi'a concerns
 - Conduct supporting Information Operations
- Identify near and mid term actions

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~

Engagement Concept



- **Near-term actions under consideration to reduce violence:**

- Actions speak louder than words (arrest and try FRL and Sadr)
- Confront Shi'a political leadership with evidence of vigilantism
- Engage with key leaders of the Shi'a organizations at senior levels outside of Baghdad
- Speed up the implementation of the intelligence fusion cell with the parties
- Engage with Sistani to continue his discouraging extra judicial activities
- Create truth and reconciliation process (eg: evidentiary collection center to document FRL crimes)
- Cut off sources of income that fund militia activities

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
Engagement Concept



- Mid-term actions under consideration to address root causes:
 - Disarmament, demobilization & reintegration (DD&R) of militias
 - Prosecute vigilantes
 - Targeted economic programs
 - Target set: 15 to 35 year old males
 - Job creation
 - Job training to allow advancement
 - Adult education

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~

Issues



- Coordinated CENTCOM/CPA/CJTF-^{1.4a} key leader engagement
- Identification of resources for targeted economic and jobs programs
- Impacts of accelerated sovereignty
 - Reconciliation and de-Baathification
 - Transitional administrative law
 - Security agreement