


OPERATION STUART: THE WAY AHEAD

(AS OF 30 MAR 04)

DEVELOPING ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE FOLLOWING TARGETS:

- (b)(6)
- (b)(6) (PUBLIC RELATIONS FOR SADR)
- MAHDI ARMY TRAINING FACILITIES
- WEAPONS CACHE (VIC KIRKUK)
- (b)(6) (SUSPECTED ARMS DEALER)
- LTS WITH WARRANTS



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, GBR, AUS~~

~~SECRET\REL TO USA and MCFAX4~~

31 MAR 04 - Present

- 
- Late MAR - Operation Valiant Saber I, Araba'een planning, border security
 - 27 MAR - Decision to close Sadr's 10,000-circulation *Hawza* newspaper
 - 31 MAR - Convoy attacked, contractors killed, burned, dismembered
 - 02 APR - FRAGO 555 - Increase freedom of maneuver in Fallujah
 - 03 APR - FRAGO 566 - (b)(6) arrest, violent protests, 1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d
 - 03 APR - FRAGO 569 - Vigilant Resolve operations in Fallujah
 - 03-04 APR - Large Sadr protests in Baghdad – MEF at Fallujah
 - 05 APR - MM violence in Baghdad, Najaf, Nasariyah began
 - 05 APR - FRAGO 577 – Offensive action against Muqtada and MM
 - 06 APR - FRAGO 581- Declaration of Mahdi Army as a Hostile Force
- MM takes control of CPA in Al Kut
 - 07 APR - IGC member Hakim criticizes Coalition operations, Sistani condemns
 - 07 APR - FRAGO 587 – Operation RESOLUTE SWORD
 - 08 APR - FRAGO 594 – Destroy MM in Al Kut / 2-6 IN enter Al Kut
 - 08-11 APR - Arbae'en occurs without incident
 - 10 APR - Establish JOA STRIKER in An Najaf/ KBR convoy attacked
 - 10-15 APR - 7 bridges attacked south of Baghdad
 - 10-16 APR - Increased kidnappings
 - Early APR - Significant adverse coverage in regional media
 - 11 APR - Minister of Interior Badran resigns; IGC members threaten ...

~~SECRET\REL TO USA and MCFAX4~~

~~SECRET\REL TO USA and MCFIX4~~

31 MAR 04 - Present

- 
- 
- 12 APR - FRAGO 619 - Vigilant Resolve Suspension of Offensive Operations
 - 12 APR - FRAGO 622 - Enhanced MSR Security / MSR closed to civilians
 - 13 APR - First Fallujah negotiation occurs;
 - 14 APR - Brahimi Press Conference on Interim Government and elections
 - 15-30 APR - Multiple Fallujah negotiations; Amb Jones and MG Weber
 - 15-30 APR - Multiple extensions to cessation of Fallujah Offensive Operations
 - Mid APR - National Security Council matrix plan for Fallujah – CPA and CJTF 1.4a
 - Mid APR - Muqtada and MM engagement – Amb Ross and BG Sargeant
 - 18 APR - 1.4b decision to withdraw from Coalition
 - 21 APR - 3 VBIED attacks in Basrah
 - 24 APR - Attacks on Oil Terminals
 - 27 APR - FRAGO 692 Reset of Forces 1.4b BCT Withdrawal
 - Late APR - Iraqi Ministers engaged in developing plan for Muqtada
 - 28 APR - 2nd ACR precision attack on MM
 - 29 APR - MG Dempsey & MG Biniek engage Sheik Husayn & Group of 30 Sheiks
 - 01 MAY - AMB Ross and BG Sargeant engage with Government Coordinators/ Sheiks / civilian personnel in Al Hillah

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CJTF 1.4a FORCE REPOSITIONING
FIRST PHASE (4-17 Apr)

1-14 IN
• REDEPLOYS TO 1ID FROM MNB-N
• DEPLOYS WITH 3BCT, 1ID TO AN NAJAF

5-20 STRYKER BN
• DEPLOYS TO BAQUBAH (OPCON TO 1ID)
• DEPLOYS TO AN NAJAF

CJSOTF-AP

1.4a

GATOR BCT **1 AD**
TF 1.4a 1 2 ACR

• 3 BCT, 1ID DEPLOYS TO AN NAJAF
• CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE OPS




CJTF 1.4a

6X AH-64 4X UH-60

SAUDI ARABIA

~~SECRET//REL MCFI~~

CJTF-14 FORCE RESET SECOND PHASE (17-27 Apr)



SECRET//REL MCFI



MSR MOBILE

MSR MICHIGAN

MSR DOVER

ASR DETROIT**ASR BISMARCK****ASR JACKSON****MSR TAMPA****ASR MIAMI**

Assessment

- 
- No contingency plans in MND-CS
 - Insufficient convoy and MSR security
 - IPB of MSR/Infrastructure
 - Sadr/MM not marginalized
 - No dedicated operational reserve
 - ISF collapse

MNF/C-I Actions required



- CONPLANS developed to compensate for Red Lines
- Enhance MSR board and Crisis Action Team
- Establish flexible Operational reserve
- Reinstate a Red Team to focus operations
- 1.4b, 1.4d
- ID/attack Center of gravity

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ICDC Lessons Learned



- **ICDC is fine until pressure on home town**
- **ICDC reflects demographics of local community– Loyal to his family and tribe.**
- **Will not move – Tribe and Religion – key factor.**
- **Given choice between – local community/ family or fight on behalf of Coalition – will choose the former.**
- **Iraqi Perceptive: ICDC never taken seriously, broken promises, lack of trust**
- **CJTF 1.4a policy not being carried consistently on the ground.**
- **Poor ICDC leadership**
- **Need better, more consistent investment in training, integration with CF.**
- **Those ICDC bns with embedded training teams held together completely.**

ICDC is a Grass Roots Organization – Recruited from a community for that community

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~~SECRET\REL TO USA and MCFIX4~~

Reconstitution of ICDC



Make ICDC Feel important – Develop trust, introduce initiatives that gives Iraqi ownership, invest in ICDC infrastructure and rebuild ICDC BNs on the back of equipment which starts arriving

Leadership – Rebuild ICDC with quality leadership, get rid of weak leaders, replace with experienced and capable Iraqi Army Officers

Recruiting – Look at recruiting demographics. Do not fill from the same area or town. Fill with experienced former Iraqi soldiers

Training – Introduce a program of robust refresher training, PLDC, Leadership and Officer training. Develop ICDC regional academies. Encourage train the trainer programs that allow Iraqi trainers to set the standard

Training Teams – Together with CSTs, greater investment from MSCs required in the provision of training teams to mentor, train and develop ICDC BNs

Partnership Programs – Develop partnership programs to foster good relations, assistance, advice and help ICDC BNs

Theme: Train, Mentor and Build Coalition Forces and ICDC Partnership

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ICDC – Outlook Next 60 days



- FRAGO 689 – Rebuilding ICDC
 - Performance bonus for those that stayed throughout March.
 - ICDC Conference 4 May
 - Equipment arriving – throughout May.
 - Get quality former Iraqi officers and soldiers in ICDC
 - Move of ICDC to MOD
 - Man, Train and Equip Responsibility for ICDC moves to OSC 15 May.
 - Increase Iraqi involvement and ownership in the decision making process.
 - LNOs to be recruited and embedded from bde down to platoon level.
- ICDC Realities:
 - Iraqi's need to make it work .
 - Far greater training investment needed.
 - Action Required:

Clarify Terms of References between MOD, OSC, MNC-I, & MSCs

~~SECRET\REL TO USA and MCFIX4~~

ICDC – Assessment

- 
- **No real surprises at what happened.**
 - **ICDC is not broken: Provided :**
 - **We learn from the lessons,**
 - **get the equipment fielded quickly,**
 - **Invest in training and infrastructure resources,**
 - **Accept increased Iraqi ownership.**
 - **The force should develop and consolidate quickly from here.**