MNC-I OPLAN
DRAFT COURSES OF ACTION

For Review and Feedback

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

MNC-I C3 PLANS & POLICY

(As of 130230 MAR 05)
Assumptions

- US forces begin Off Ramp with 4 BDE’s in Jan 06 and 4 x BDE’s in June 06.
- AIF will not regain strategic or operational initiative in Coalition AOR.
- AIF influence over Iraqi population will continue to decline.
In partnership with the ITG, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and ISF by developing Iraqi security forces and ITG security ministries while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.
MNC-I MISSION

OPTION 1: In partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), MNC-I neutralizes the AIF and progressively transfers the lead to the ISF for the conduct of COIN Operations by developing capable ISF IOT allowing the Iraqi Government to defeat the insurgency and facilitate the successful completion of UNSCR 1546 process.

OPTION 2: In partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), MNC-I progressively transitions the lead in COIN Operations by developing capable ISF and neutralizing the AIF IOT allowing the Iraqis to defeat the insurgency and facilitate the successful completion of UNSCR 1546 process.

KEY DEFINITIONS:

1. Counter-insurgency operations (COIN): Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

2. Neutralize: To render ineffective or unusable. To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation. (FM 1-02)

3. Defeat: To disrupt or nullify the enemies plan and subdue his will to fight so that he is unwilling to further his adopted course of action. (FM 1-02)
MNC-I COMMANDERS INTENT

Purpose. To transition the MNC-I Main Effort to capable Iraqi Security Forces so they can take the lead in counterinsurgency operations. This will allow the ISF to establish a secure environment and ensure the successful completion of UNSCR 1546 process, enable the establishment of domestic order and the transition to Iraqi Self-reliance.

Key Tasks

- Develop capable Iraqi Security Forces by establishing Partnerships that prepare the ISF for the handover of Counterinsurgency Operations.
- Implement the Transition Team Program throughout the ISF.
- Maintain momentum against the AIF by conducting COIN to deny the enemy the ability to regroup.
- Transition Areas of Responsibility (AOR) to Iraqi Control by synchronizing CF and ISF capabilities and footprint to facilitate security operations when ready.
- Execute IO that exploits opportunities in a timely manner IOT change the public image of the AIF, separate the people from the AIF, and deny the AIF's ability to influence the people of Iraq and promote the legitimacy of the GOI.
- Optimize the ISF intimate knowledge of the operating environment and trust of the population.
- Maintain Framework Operations, ISO the Main Effort (the ISF).
- Assist the ITG and Provincial governments in developing and securing infrastructure at the local level to ensure delivery of basic needs and essential services.
- Support the ITG in safeguarding the political process and the due process of law.
- Demonstrate respect for the Iraqi people.

Endstate. ISF responsible for and leading the effort to create a secure environment in Iraq. ISF capable of conducting independent Counterinsurgency Operations. All sanctuaries denied to AIF. AIF influence neutralized. Infrastructure and territorial integrity protected. Coalition Force visibility reduced and postured to support the ISF in extremis.
Regional Iraqi Control

- Regional Iraqi Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby local and provincial Iraqi security forces are sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain security operations at the brigade/provincial level.
- **Command and control** structures are functioning, and Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions at the local/provincial level.
- Additionally, the capabilities of ISF are increased to a level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of anti-Iraqi forces.
- ISF can maintain **domestic order** in a counterinsurgency environment, assert territorial control through framework operations, and conduct independent counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support only as enabled by Coalition support.
- Coalition forces reduce unilateral operations, increase Combined operations, are postured to deliver regional supporting effects to Iraqi security organizations, and are prepared to defeat external threats and preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. (MNF-I Campaign Plan Update 1, IRAFT)

Transition should be capability and requirements based. Regions might not need a BDE if the police are functioning and capable. This is preferred anyway
DEFINITIONS (2 of 3)

- **National Iraqi Control**
  
  National Iraqi Control is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security forces are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations.
  
  Iraq’s national, provincial, and local government organizations are effectively linked, with ministries that can deploy and support integrated and complementary security operations throughout the country.
  
  A combined Coalition-Iraqi command and control structure is in place to plan and execute national level counterinsurgency operations.
  
  The capabilities of ISF have increased to a level where they no longer depend on CF to deal with the insurgency with Coalition supports only as needed.
  
  ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent framework and counterinsurgency operations, preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity, and deter threats to the national security of Iraq with Coalition support in extremis.
  
  Coalition forces assist Iraqi operations as needed, remain postured to deliver supporting effects to the ISF when requested, and progressively transition national security responsibilities to the Iraqis. (MNF-I Campaign Plan Update 1, DRAFT)
DEFINITIONS (3 of 3)

**Iraqi Self-Reliance**
- Iraqi Self-Reliance is defined as the conditions whereby the UNSCR 1546 political process is complete.
- Iraqi security forces and institutions are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain independent national security operations.
- ISF function under a national command and control structure that integrates cross-ministry counterinsurgency and national defense activities.
- Iraq's national, provincial, and local government organizations function effectively, and are perceived as legitimate and representative of all Iraqis.
- Iraq's government ministries also effectively manage reconstruction and economic development activities to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people.
- ISF and Iraqi ministerial capabilities have increased to a level where insurgents and terrorists are denied safe-haven in Iraq.
- ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent, full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations, and preserve the national security of Iraq without direct assistance from Coalition forces.
- Coalition forces handover national security responsibilities to the Iraqis, largely disengage from Iraq, and assume a strategic overwatch posture.
- Remaining Coalition forces continue to work with Iraq's government and security forces to establish cooperative security arrangements and support the GWOT. (MNF-I Campaign Plan Update 1, DRAFT)
# Transition Readiness Assessment

**Transition Readiness Assessment is based on the ISF Validation Model:**

- **Green** describes unit capable of assuming AOR and prosecuting COIN OPNS.
- **Amber** describes unit capable of assuming AOR in 90 days.
- **Orange** describes unit capable of assuming AOR in 6 months.
- **Red** describes unit capable of assuming AOR in 9 months.
- **Black** describes combat ineffective unit.

(Note: Does not identify subordinate ISF unit readiness dates that will occur earlier)

## Measurable Variables:

- Deployability
- Sustainment
- Personnel
- Equipment
- METL Proficiency
- Commanders Assessment

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**Current Readiness Assessment**

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<td>6th Div (W)</td>
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**Capable**: Unit ready for transition of COIN fight. Unit takes the lead in COIN operations. CF support is minimal and only insures no failure at battalion level or above.

(As of 130230 MAR 05)
WEIGHTING THE MAIN EFFORT

- Accelerate new formations (Partnership / MiTTs)
  - Training
- Reposition RA formations
- Surge MOI Operational units
- Information Operations
- Prioritize Basing Projects
- Prioritize inbound equipment
- Recruiting emphasis
- MNSTC-I Training Base
- Corps Shaping Ops ISO larger offensive operations
  - Sustainment
  - Inteligence
- Targeted Financial Support
DECISIVE POINT: CAPABLE ISF

MNB-NW: O/O PRIORITY OF EFFORT
T: DEVELOP CAPABLE ISF THROUGH PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS (CAPABLE OF ASSUMING BATTLESPACE)
P: ALLOW ISF TO ASSUME THE LEAD IN COIN IN MNB AOR
T: NEUTRALIZE AIF INFLUENCE IN MOSUL
P: CREATE STABILITY IN AOR UNTIL ISF CAPABLE OF ASSUMING CONTROL

MND-W: SUPPORTING EFFORT
T: DEVELOP CAPABLE ISF THROUGH PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS (CAPABLE OF ASSUMING BATTLESPACE)
P: ALLOW ISF TO ASSUME THE LEAD IN COIN IN THE AOR
T: NEUTRALIZE AIF INFLUENCE IN MNB-W
P: CREATE STABILITY IN AOR UNTIL ISF CAPABLE OF ASSUMING CONTROL
T: DISRUPT AIF NETWORKS ABILITY TO INFLUENCE BAGHDAD
P: ALLOW ME TO ESTABLISH SECURE ENVIRONMENT

ISF: MAIN EFFORT
T: CONDUCT COIN TO NEUTRALIZE THE AIF
P: IOT SET CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI SELF RELIANCE

MND-CS: SUPPORTING EFFORT
T: DEVELOP CAPABLE ISF THROUGH PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS (CAPABLE OF ASSUMING BATTLESPACE)
P: ALLOW ISF TO ASSUME THE LEAD IN COIN IN THE AOR
T: BPT HANDOVER WASIT PROVINCE
P: SUPPORT ISF
P: ENSURE STABILITY UNTIL ISF CAPABLE OF ASSUMING CONTROL

CONCEPT STATEMENT:
DECISIVE POINT OF THIS OPERATION ARE CAPABLE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
THIS COURSE OF ACTION IS THREAT ORIENTED. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION IS TO PRIORITIZE RESOURCES AND ALLOCATE FORCES TO THE AREAS OF GREATEST ENEMY ACTIVITY.
PRIORITY OF EFFORT FOR ISF MITTS, MANNING, EQUIPMENT AND FORCE ALLOCATION IS: MND-B, MND-NW, AND MNB-W.
OTHER LINES OF OPERATION WILL CONTINUE TO SHAPE IN AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY: MND-SE, THE KURDISH REGION, AND OTHER POPULATION CENTERS WITH ADEQUATE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

MND-NC: SUPPORTING EFFORT
T: DEVELOP CAPABLE ISF THROUGH PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS (CAPABLE OF ASSUMING BATTLESPACE)
P: ALLOW ISF TO ASSUME THE LEAD IN COIN IN MND AOR
T: DISRUPT AIF ACTIVITY AND OPERATIONAL SITES
P: ALLOW ME TO ESTABLISH DOMESTIC ORDER IN MOSUL & BAGHDAD AND ENSURE STABILITY IN AOR
T: CONTAIN AIF IN KEY AREAS
P: PREVENT LARGE SCALE UNREST THAT WOULD DIVERT RESOURCES FROM THE MAIN EFFORT

MND-B: INITIAL POE
T: DEVELOP CAPABLE ISF THROUGH PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS (CAPABLE OF ASSUMING BATTLESPACE)
P: ALLOW ISF TO ASSUME THE LEAD IN COIN IN THE AOR
T: SECURE BAGHDAD
P: ALLOW COMPLETION OF POLITICAL PROCESS AND TRANSITION TO IRAQI CONTROL

MND-SE: SUPPORTING EFFORT
T: DEVELOP CAPABLE ISF THROUGH PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS (CAPABLE OF ASSUMING BATTLESPACE)
P: ALLOW ISF TO ASSUME THE LEAD IN COIN IN THE AOR
T: SUPPORT ISF AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE
P: ENSURE STABILITY UNTIL ISF CAPABLE OF ASSUMING CONTROL
TRANSITION SCHEME

COA 1 – THREAT CENTRIC (BAGHDAD OR MOSUL)

ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES:
+ Focuses ISF against areas with greatest AIF activity
+ Additional security for a majority of Iraqis; continues post-election momentum in population centers
+ Threat reduction prior to elections and transition
- Greater risk of ISF failure(s)
- Initially slower assumption of COIN lead by ISF in MND-NC and MND-CS

PRIORITY OF EFFORT:

[Diagram showing a map of Iraq with various areas labeled as Baghdad Division, Ninewa, Anbar, Salah ad Din, Al Qadisiyah, Karbala, Al Taimim, Wasit, An Najaf, Diyala, and Babil]

TRANSITION ESTIMATE:

CAT A
As Sulaymaniyyah
Dahuk
Arbil
Al Muthanna
Al Basrah
Dhi Qar
Maysan

CAT B
Al Qadisiyah
Karbala
Al Taimim
Wasit
An Najaf
Diyala
Babil

CAT C
Baghdad
Ninawa
Al Anbar
Salah ad Din

(As of 130230 MAR 05)
DECISIVE POINT: CAPABLE ISF

MNB-NW: SUPPORTING EFFORT
- T. Develop capable ISF through partnership operations (capable of assuming battlespace).
- P. Allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN in the AOR.
- T. Disrupt AIF influence in Mosul.
- P. Ensure stability until ISF capable of assuming control.

ISF: MAIN EFFORT
- T. Conduct COIN to neutralizing AIF.
- P. IoT set conditions for Iraqi self-reliance.

MND-NC: INITIAL PRIORITY OF EFFORT
- T. Develop capable ISF through partnership operations (capable of assuming battlespace).
- P. Allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN in MND AOR.
- T. Disrupt AIF activity and operational sites.
- P. Prevent large scale unrest that would divert resources from the main effort.

CONCEPT STATEMENT:
Decisive point of this operation is a capable ISF. This course of action is ISF focused on the objective is to transition the COIN fight as rapidly as possible to the ISF. This course of action prioritizes resources and the allocation of forces to ISF units that will come on line the fastest and then allow commanders maximum flexibility after the transition of battlespace to the ISF. Priority of effort for ISF MitTs, Manning and equipment is: MND-NC, MND-NW, MND-B, MND-CS, and MNB-W. Without disrupting current development in MND-SE. Other lines of operation will continue to shape in areas of opportunity: MND-SE, Kurdish region, and other secure population centers.
TRANSITION SCHEME

COA 2 – FASTEST TRANSITION

ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES:
+ FASTEST COA TO TRANSITION ALL BATTLESPACE
+ PROVIDES MORE IO OPPORTUNITIES
+ PROVIDES COMMANDER MORE COMBAT POWER AND INCREASES CAPABILITY WHEN ENGAGING THE ENEMY IN AREAS OF HIGHER THREAT (CF FROM
- DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY “FLOOD THE ZONE” IN AREAS OF GREATEST ENEMY ACTIVITY
- POTENTIAL FOR INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MND-NW & MNF-W.

PRIORITY OF EFFORT:
(OLD NAMES)

5TH DIVISION (NC)
2ND DIVISION (NW)
8TH DIVISION (CS)
3RD DIVISION (NW)
4TH DIVISION (NC)
1ST DIVISION (W)
BAGHDAD DIVISION
1ST MECH DIVISION
6TH DIVISION (W)
10TH DIVISION (SE)

TRANSITION ESTIMATE:

CAT A
As Sulaymaniya
Dahuk
Arbil
Al Muthanna
Al Basrah
Dhi Qar
Maysan

CAT B
An Najaf
Karbala
Wasit
Al Taimim
Al Qadisiyah
Diyala
Babil

CAT C
Ninawa
Salah ad Din
Al Anbar
Baghdad

(As of 130230 MAR 05)
EVALUATION CRITERIA

- NEUTRALIZES AIF
- CAPABLE ISF
- BASING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
- EFFECTS ON POLITICAL PROCESS (SUNNI ENGAGEMENT & CULTURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION)
- IMPOSED OFF RAMP
COURSE OF ACTION FEEDBACK

COA 1
- MND – B
- MND – NE
- MND – NW
- MNF – W
- C2
- C4

COA 2
- MND – CS
- MND – NC
- MND – SE
- CJSOTF – AP
- C7
- C9
- 525 MI

Both COAs supportable: C1, C6, C8, IO
**COA COMPARISON**

**EVALUATION CRITERIA**

- **NEUTRALIZES AIF**
- **CAPABLE ISF**
- **BASING AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
- **EFFECTS ON POLITICAL PROCESS**
  - Sunni Engagement & Cultural Conflict Resolution
- **OFF RAMP**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>COA 2</th>
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**Conclusions:** Course of Action must maintain pressure on enemy throughout the JOA but COA must take long term objectives into account and ensure conditions set to allow transition of COIN and sovereignty.

(As of 130230 MAR 05)
Decision Roll-Up

• COA 1: Threat Centric (Urban Centers)
  – Comments: Greater Momentum Required
  Approved __________ Approved with Modifications __________ Disapproved __________

• COA 2: ISF Transition Centric
  – Comments: Maintain Current Momentum
  Approved __________ Approved with Modifications __________ Disapproved __________
• “We are successful now in kinetic ops. We can stay on course and even with the additional transition and partnering tasks probably be successful over a greater period of time with more risk or we can add additional capability and reinforce success now to ensure a much higher probability of success in both the kinetic and security transition fights in a shorter time in a region vital to the future of Iraq.” – MNB-NW COS

• “The IIF, CDO’s and even TF 1.4a do not help us further that mission along….and may even detract from our ability to execute partnering as they require precious C2, CSS and ISR assets be dedicated to ensure their kinetic fight success.”

- MNB-NW COS
MNB-NW prefers Threat Centric (COA 1)

- Priority of effort based upon “true” threat activity places Mosul as priority effort vs Baghdad.
- MNB-NW statistically has experienced higher number of attacks per population and number of assigned troops.
- Ninewah province has a non functioning police force in Mosul, border infiltration issues, potential ethnic issues.
- MNB-NW, as an economy of force, has largest proportional partnership/MiTT requirement of any MSC which delays transition to ISF control beyond current OPLAN effects timeline
- Failure to provide TFF with any additional capability delays objective of neutralizing AIF.

- Disadvantage of greater risk of ISF failures lies in not dealing with the tougher problems now. Low Hanging Fruit theory creates a perception of success at a strategic level but does not deal with insurgency in a real way. Easy provinces are already at local and provincial control.
- Easiest provinces are primarily Shia and Kurd dominated, which means by not being threat centric we will focus on the ISF in Shia dominated areas under a Shia dominated government at the expense of 40 percent of the populace. There is an inherent risk of destabilizing the country by being too on focused on one ethnic group within the population.
Comments on COA 2

- MNB-NW non-concurs with "ISF Centric" COA 2
  - Transitioning battlespace without addressing significant requirements of Logistic, C2, and Lethal targeting capability in the Iraqi units leaves a CF tether that can not be removed (false assumption that transition occurs faster)
  - Focus on threat reductions in stabilized provinces prior to the elections does not address issues in higher threat provinces and actually creates delays in improving ISF forces in most needed regions, creating greater opportunity for national instability (Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf)
  - Early transition in "Low hanging fruit" provinces creates false perception of strategic success that forces units to "off ramp" out of theater at the expense of needing to re-mission units to achieve tactical and operational success in higher threat regions.
  - Easiest provinces are primarily Shia and Kurd dominated, which means by not being threat centric we will focus on the ISF in Shia dominated areas under a Shia dominated government at the expense of 40 percent of the populace. There is an inherent risk of destabilizing the country by being too on focused on one ethnic group within the population.
MND-NC supports the COA2 (ISF Centric) OPLAN Concept.

- COA 1 Diminish MND-NC’s ability to maintain the momentum in the building and transition of COIN to ISF. Resources would likely be diverted from MND-NC to Baghdad or Ramadi prolonging the turn over of battlespace and gain regional/provincial control.
- Reinforces the IO theme that shows progress of our turning over battlespace to the Iraqi Army.
- COA 2 undermines the AIF recruiting tool that portrays the United States as occupiers. Finally, ISF Centric keeps in line with the “ISF in the Lead” concept most aggressively.
MND-NE

- CG MND-NE supports COA 1
  - Secures initiative
  - Maintains momentum since Post election
  - Deprives enemy of opportunity to reorganize
CG II MEF (Fwd) supports COA 1
- COAs similar; COA 1 seems favorable to MNF-W
- Flow of ISF must be balanced; must not overwhelm ability to host / train
- Must maintain focus on properly training ISF

PRO
- Demonstrates Coalition commitment to Sunni Inclusion
- Positions MNF-W to provide better protection for Sunni areas
- Facilitates focus in MNF-W Decisive Area
- Directly addresses safe haven & seam—Al Anbar; accelerates achieving endstate: so goes Anbar, so goes Iraq
- Gives priority of Security LOO resource allocation (e.g. ISF formations) to provinces that have active insurgency.
- Properly resources (not only ISF formations, but funding to facilitate required life-support & construction) aggressive approach to “neutralizing” insurgency
- Provides MNF-W necessary flexibility (Ramadi, turning CAT B provinces in near term, and Troop-Task)

CON
- Potential for differing prioritization along other LOOs
  - Monies, I/O focus, specialized Coalition resources (CA)
- Potential for delay in ‘turning’ Karbala & Najaf to Iraqi Provincial Control
MND – B Supports COA 1: has a greater chance of defeating the insurgency by undermining the insurgency in key cities and bolstering US public opinion. In order for this approach to succeed, Iraqi forces must assume battlespace within Baghdad and other key cities.

**COA 1**
- Promotes government legitimacy (critical in national capital during elections).
- Allows CF to quickly have an ISF presence within the key cities.
- Potentially undermines the legitimacy of the insurgency by presence of ISF (strips population away from insurgency).
- Potentially reduces the number of CF casualties seen on television (positive domestic political/IO effort).
- Attacks the insurgency in the primary urban areas which the insurgents need in order to continue operations effectively – particularly the capital city of Baghdad.
- Greater opportunity for any ISF failure to become a media event, but also greater opportunity for any ISF success to become a media event.
- Media presence greatest in Baghdad (most benefit from using ISF)
- Experience w/ 40th BDE extremely positive:
  - Haifa street essentially neutralized (according to detainee comments)
  - Very successful targeting (knowledge of population and culture)

**COA 2**
- Allows CF to quickly handover battlespace to the ISF, even if it’s not important battlespace.
- Potentially reduces the perception of CF as an occupying power by allowing us to state that XX% of the country has been handed over to the Iraqi’s. However, this message will be countered by continued high numbers of US casualties and ISF presence only in “safe” areas.
- Allows CF to remission units to more contentious areas and/or redeploy some units, however CF will are not the solution to the problems in contentious areas. ISF forces are the solution.
- Repositioning CF from other AOs is not likely to have the desired effect and potentially will enflame the insurgency.
- In addition, the international media, which are based in the major metropolitan areas, will continue to show footage of CF providing security as well as CF casualties.
Comments:
- 8th Div will be capable of assuming battle space in 8 months however, the following prerequisites need to be achieved:
  - Armament/wepon, vehicles and other equipment delivered;
  - Barracks renovated/constructed
- MND CS TCNs are going to change the nature of the contribution and provide more training and assistance focused troops instead of maneuver units.
- Taking into consideration the first MND CS task - Develop capable isf through partnership operations – execution of this will not be possible beyond Jul 2005 due to potential reduction of CF / MND-CS troops and change in their character.

COA 1
- In this COA ISF in MND CS AOR will not be able to achieve readiness to take over COIN operations.
- The consequence of this COA could be increase of threat in MND CS AOR.
- Due to possible reduction of CF in MND CS AOR and changes in composition of forces deployed additional troops responsible for ensuring stability until ISF capable of assuming control will be required.

COA 2
- MND CS troops will be mainly focused on development of ISF.
- Once Regional Control achieved in selected provinces (all MND CS). MNC-I could shift the main focus onto the most dangerous areas.
- Reduction of CF troops without operational threat.
- MNC-I could focus on other provinces.
- Proper condition for development of industry.
- MND-CS would not require additional troops.
COMMENTS

Regional Control. MND(SE) has raised questions about this phrase before. There is absolutely no problem with WHAT it describes, which is an interim Endstate with Iraqi self-reliance at the provincial and brigade level. It is the term ‘Regional’ which causes the problem. There is simply no such thing as a ‘Regional’ level in Iraq. Everything, certainly in MND(SE) is done at Provincial level. There are no credible ‘Regional’ military, police or government structures or parallels. Hence, to avoid confusion, references to ‘Regional Control’ should be substituted by ‘Provincial Control’.

Timelines. The timelines for the achievement of the levels of control given are, frankly, not realistic. The earliest date at which the CG has predicted we can transition some of the provinces in the AO to Iraqi control is Oct 05. The most optimistic timeline for any uniform Iraqi provincial control across all provinces has been set at the end of Dec 05. In the ‘Transition Readiness Assessment’ slide the 10 Div elements are expected to be capable of assuming the battle space in 90 days (Jun-Jul 05?). This is totally unrealistic. In the ‘MNC-I OPLAN Phasing’ slide 10 (IA) Div is capable of carrying out Div level ops by end of Jan 06 at the latest. This timeline is better, but is still highly optimistic.

Priorities of Effort. ‘Priority of Effort’ refers to the concentration of forces and means by the Commander in a particular area to bring about a decision. Clearly both COAs have the same outcome MND(SE), being the bottom priority in both. We can expect no help from Corps assets. This is fine, and understandable in many ways. However, we assume that this gives MND(SE) degree independence in carrying out the Corps Intent in the AOR.

Constraints. What must be clearly understood by Corps planners is that current strategic guidelines for all the TCNs represented in MND(SE) have very strict caveats on cross-boundary operations, increases in troop numbers or increases the size of the AOR. In short, if we are to support a priority effort, then it must be done within the MND(SE) AOR, and from existing assets.

SUMMARY

During its own Estimate process MND(SE) has come to the deduction that any progression to transition and an eventual ‘off ramp’ strategy must be conditions based, not time driven. This has therefore led us to conclude that our strategy must be highly flexible, both in terms of timelines, and in the prioritization of resources and activity. Milestones must be goals, rather than all-or-nothing deadlines. We must be ready to rapidly switch resources to reinforce success or prevent failure.
CJSOTF-AP

- COA 2 most effectively employs SOF assets to transition the fight to COIN and then reallocate forces to areas of greatest enemy activity
- CJSOTF can support both COAs
  - COA 1: Is not the most effective use of currently engaged SOF forces. Insufficient amount of ISF units in MNF-West does not support reallocation of SOF assets.
  - COA 2: Closest to the current SOF FID posture. Best option to complete FID operations with currently engaged ISF units that are in areas of greatest enemy activity.
COA 2 preferred, most feasible now
- Develops current ISF capabilities to disengage from ISF units that are capable of conducting independent COIN operations.
- Transition the PSD mission will enable CJSOTF to reallocate SOF to ISF in areas of greatest threat
- Affords the opportunity to establishment additional ISF units in the threat centric regions (particularly MNF-W) to partner reallocated SOF assets

COA 1 preferred as a sequel to COA 2
- Insufficient number of ISF in MNF-W AO. Currently CJSOTF assets are conducting FID with identified ISF units. Reallocation of additional SOF assets is not additive to existing operations to develop an ISF independent COIN capability.
- SOF FID in MNF-West requires the establishment of additional ISF and relief from PSD
- Identified as the sequel to COA 2

Comments / Recommendations
- Ensure capable ISF (currently engaged) so that they can sustain COIN fight after SOF shifts to other areas
- Don't forfeit current gains and momentum with ISF.
C2:
COA 1 states the intent is to allocate forces against the greatest concentration of enemy activity. This appears to be inconsistent with making MND-B the POE, should be MND-NW. With half the population Mosul is equaling or exceeding the Baghdad totals for insurgent activity. Mosul is also the gateway for the outside support to the insurgency – shut it off hard and you really hurt their ability to continue to sustain things like suicide bomb attacks. As a final consideration, if you buy the “squirter” theory, combat ops in Mosul will only push the insurgents 2 primary directions – south or west. Similar ops in Baghdad will push them at least north, south, and west (possibly east) making our follow-on ops more difficult.

ENGINEERS (C7):
COA 2: More supportable because the main effort occurs in permissive areas and we can leverage both contracted construction and Coalition engineer effort simultaneously.

1. The following construction critical tasks must be executed to support either COA:
   a) Coalition base construction and closure
   b) MOD and MOI base construction
   c) Reconstruction
2. The Coalition engineer force is not large enough to execute these critical tasks IAW the timeline in the OPLAN. Logically, we need to leverage other capability, in this case contracted construction. Contracted construction only operates in permissive areas.
3. Bottom line: In COA 1 we cannot use contracted construction to weight the main effort, which means we will have to use Coalition engineer units. We will have to rely heavily on contracted construction for support to everyone else. A lot of risk there.
C8:
BLUF: C8 can support either COA. Resources—either presently in our possession or expected in the Supplemental or FY06 budget request—are available to do so.

1. Will position—or possibly reposition—resources within/between sectors to best effect.
2. We establish a strategic reserve at the MNC level in our most critical operations-impacting funds (e.g. Rewards and CERP), so that we can use money as a non-lethal weapon system to provide effects either in support of the primary or supporting effort.
3. Will provide useful instruction to MSCs through the OPLAN that specifies where and how to access critical resources.

525 MI:
COA 2: Insurgency will continue for years to come, COA 2 allows early success that will provide momentum for other areas of Iraq and potentially free up Coalition Forces for those areas sooner and enable us to refocus combat power.
OPLAN COA Recommendation

**Facts**
- Concept of Support needs to be flexible enough to adjust mid-course
- MNC-I MSCs are to provide limited logistic support to ISF

**Assumptions**
- COA 1 Requires troop movement
- Limited logistics capability to weight the ME
- Contractors capabilities are questionable to support all types of operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>COA 1 – Threat Centric</th>
<th>COA 2 – Status Quo/ISF Centric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contracting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
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**Concept of Support**
- Concurrently establish Ad-hoc 1st Line capability in Cat C Div AOs (where green suit logistics is of greater importance) and start the institutional development of Iraqi Army Logistics Units and BSUs in lower threat regions
- May be possible to seed some Log capability to manoeuvre commanders to support operational requirements (transportation equipment to Cat C Divs) – Iraqi Units execute self-delivery under guidance and mentoring of MSCs partnered with Cat C Iraqi Units
- Develop Logistics structure in low threat areas to establish foundation and promote success within the Iraqi Logistics community – the time line on this is really undeterminable as there are too many factors which cannot be controlled (MOD, ITG etc)
- Assist MNSTC-I with the establishment of institutional Logistics capability and partner ISF Log units out of training with like echeloned units (MSCs) for development
- MSCs/DISCOMs partner with 1st Line/2nd Line Iraqi Log Units
- 1st COSCOM partners with 3rd/4th Line units (MTRs) and organizations (Regional BSUs)
- Corps Partners with the Iraqi Army
- MNSTC-I partners with the Iraqi Wholesale Logistics System

**RECOMMENDED COA - #2**
CMO COA Analysis

- Both COAs are feasible, acceptable, and supportable
- Recommendation: COA 2

COA 1 (Hardest to Easiest)
+ CMO leveraged to target greatest threats
+ Allows economy of force in the easiest provinces
- Slower development of GOI legitimacy
- Reinforces Sunni perceptions of occupation
- Expected to be lowest return on investment of economic resources
- Increased risk of GOI rush to failure
- Does not reinforce success in Kurdish and Shia areas (possible backlash)

COA 2 (Easiest to Hardest)
+ Faster development of GOI legitimacy
+ Expected to be highest return on investment of economic resources
+ Reduced risk of GOI rush to failure
+ Mitigates Sunni perception of occupation
+ Reinforces success in Shia and Kurdish areas
- Highest threat areas treated as economy of force mission
  - CMO not leveraged to target greatest threats
INFORMATION OPERATIONS

COA 1:
- Exploiting the development of the ISF is very supportive in this COA. In many instances it is no different from the current IO efforts. IO can best support this by developing COMCAM and PA data gathering abilities within the ISF. This will enable imagery, of Iraqis, caught with an Iraqi eye, to be collected and passed through channels to the GCD. The risk with this COA is the use of ISF units in the most hostile areas. If too great an amount of pressure is placed upon them and they suffer a major set back it will offer the AIF an exploitation opportunity. An appropriate risk reduction control measure is to not allow large scale Iraqi units to become decisively engaged without the appropriate CF back up.

COA 2:
- Exploiting the Development of the ISF is likewise supportive in this COA. It is essentially identical to current efforts, the difference in this COA is prioritizing the ISF units that are closest to being mission capable. It is also best supported by developing a COMCAM and limited PA capability within the ISF. The IO risk in this COA is the possibility that the Iraqi people view the ISF as not providing security in the most hostile areas. This risk can be mitigated by the Risk Reduction Control Measures (RRCM) of publicizing ISF activities and deliberately not publicizing CF operations. Then, as units come up, ISF forces will operate in the more hostile areas which will remove this residual risk.
- The IO risk associated with both COAs is two fold.
  - First, as a general rule, the more CFs are in contact with the Iraqi people the greater the chance of incidents that will turn neutral Iraqis against us (through accidental hostile events and the continued perception of CF as occupiers). We perpetrate these types of incidents every day. The only way to lessen them is through soldier education and by reducing/removing CF FOBs and operations, away from major population centers.
  - Second risk is in dictating force placement to the Iraqi Army. They should be in on all force placement discussions at some level. By telling them where to place forces we run the risk of reinforcing the AIF propaganda that we are here as occupiers and the GDI is a puppet. The more they are seen to be independent the better, even if it means that MNC-I loses a public discussion every now and then.
- The IO cell has no preference for either proposed COA, as long as the appropriate risk reduction control measures are taken and increased utilization of imagery collection from ISF and MiTT/PPP sources in cultivated. However, the IO cell supports a merging of the two COAs, supportable through the use of different available resources – supporting the handoff of stable areas through the increased use of C7 and C9, while preparing non-permissive areas with shaping and maneuver operations, backfilling with CMO.
Assumptions

- All MiTTs will be fielded by 1 APR to units already in existence and by 30 JUN for units being formed.
- By 1 SEPT 05 44 Army Battalions with MiTTs will be capable of tactical COIN Operations if current progress is maintained.
- Properly resourced, trained, and supported ISF will be capable of conducting successful counterinsurgency operations but performance will remain mixed.
- The coalition will remain intact and partners will support adjusted concept of operation.
- Emerging capability in Iraqi MOD and MOI will shape operations in the AOR.
- The Iraqi National Intelligence Service achieves limited effectiveness in the foreseeable future.
- Coalition forces remain responsible for external security and some internal security operations after Regional Iraqi Control established.
- Security situation across country will not be uniform.
- ISF Divisions are not required for Regional Control.
- ISF Battalions are capable of owning limited battlespace in a Coalition AOR.
GROWING IRAQI CAPABILITY

COA 1
WATER HOSE

COA 2
SPRINKLER

CF ISF

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
CENTER OF GRAVITY

- SPEED
- DECISIVENESS
- SUSTAINABLE

COA 1

CAPABLE ISF

REDUCED POPULAR SUPPORT
- IO CAMPAIGN
- INTERDICT RESOURCES
- ILLEGIT. METHODS

COA 2

ELIMINATE SANCTUARIES
- INTERDICT RESOURCES
- REDUCE FREEDOM OF ACTION

POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURN

Center of Gravity

Capable AIF
(Defined as: A force that can destroy the infrastructure, deny essential services, and intimidate the Iraqi people.)

Critical Capabilities
- Freedom of Action
- Recruit
- Logistical/Monetary Support
- Conduct Effective IO
  (Influence Popular Opinion)
- Local C2

Critical Requirements
- Moral Authority
- Sanctuary
- Leadership
- Manpower
- Weak ISF
- Intel Structure / Support
- Popular Indifference / Sympathy / Support
- Money/Weapons/Ammunition
- Media Coverage

Critical Vulnerabilities
- Eliminate Sanctuary
- Effective ISF
- Interdict Resources
- Counter IO
- Economic Improvement
- Reduce Popular Support
- Illegitimate cause
- Illegitimate methods

(As of 130230 MAR 05)
DIVISIONS RANK ORDERED

1. 1st IIF, DIV (-) (MND-W)
2. 10th DIV (MND-SE)
3. BAGHDAD DIV (MND-B)
4. 5th DIV (MND-NC)
5. 4th DIV (MND-NC)
6. 8th DIV (MND-CS)
7. 2nd DIV (MND-NW/NE)
8. 3rd DIV (MND-NW/NE)
9. 6th DIV (MND-W)

GREATER IRAQI ARMY

LEGEND
- GREEN: OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE
- YELLOW: EFFECTIVE WITH LIMITATIONS
- ORANGE: CONSIDERABLE LIMITATIONS
- RED: NOT EFFECTIVE

(As of 130230 MAR 05)