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MSC OPORD FEEDBACK & MNC-I RESPONSES

(b)(3), (b)(6)

29 MAR 05

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
MNC-I C3 PLANS & POLICY
As of 291700 MAR 05


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MNC-I OPLAN

- **Discussion:** OPLAN COA decision 17 March 2005.

- **Planning Timeline:**



- **Way Ahead:**

- ☒ Draft released of staffing 21 March 2005
- ☒ Feedback due NLT 27 March 2005
- ☒ Responses to MSC Feedback by COB 29 April 2005
- ☐ Final publication due 1 April 2005
- ☐ Administrative Supplement NLT 15 April 2005



Feedback Summary

- Phasing: Timeline vs. Conditions
- Clarity on Prioritization of Efforts
- Coalition caveat restrictions prevent accomplishment of objectives.



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MNB-NW

- Degradations in already logistically challenged enablers will reverse the progress we have made standing up the 3rd and 2nd Div IA, Mosul police, and other key emergency responders.

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MNB-NW

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
Authority to detain for "important information" is omitted from this ROE.	(re para 3g2: MNC-Is FEB ROE (and all ROE since the beginning of OIF) provided: "3.e(2) Detaining civilians. Individuals encountered in Iraq who are believed to possess important information... may be temporarily detained". The draft version does not contain the authority to detain civilians who may have "important information". This change may reflect a concern that the guidance in FRAGO 1173 (or UNSCR 1546) conflicts with the current ROE. However, "important information" as a detention basis as provided in the ROE currently in effect, enables temporary detention of persons (and the media for that matter according to current guidance) to gain information on the threat, to protect the detained individual from dangerous areas, or to detain those who interfere with mission accomplishment. The five bases for detention provided in 1173 do not provide "important information" as a basis for detention, but the nature of detention contemplated by 1173 (potential long term hold based on the belief the individual has committed an offense against CF or poses an imperative threat to MNF) differs from that provided by the ROE (immediate and temporary detention to gain information as to what is happening, or to protect the detainee). Is the omission intentional?	DETENTIONS FOR "IMPERATIVE REASONS OF SECURITY" INCLUDES "IMPORTANT INFORMATION AS A BASIS FOR INFORMATION. ISSUE RESOLVED BETWEEN SJA OFFICES. NO ACTIONS REQUIRED.

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OPORD 05-02 has not specified the nuances of the different priorities of effort throughout the phasing of the OPORD.	For instance in Phase I MNB-NW has POE coalition forces while tertiary POE for ISF and quaternary POE for basing. MNB-NW is already an economy of force mission. Any degradations in already logistically challenged enablers will reverse the progress we have made standing up the 3rd and 2nd Div IA, Mosul police, and other key emergency responders.	OPORD needs to address minimum baselines that MSCs will maintain. 1. Rewards and CEPR 2. Engineer assets 3. MNB-NW must become the IA logistics unit standup #1 or #2 priority. CONCERN NOTED. NO ACTION TAKEN
Echelon 1 for ISF logistics establishment.	The formation of battalion level organizational logistics is the priority mission for standing up ISF logistics, yet no mention is given to method or design of that formation.	Our current method of forming the HSC and conducting a logistics MTT may meet commander's intent, but some fidelity of tasks need to be directed. Organizational parameters in the form of MTOEs need to be provided along with any guidance MOD or JHQ want to provide before we move out. C4 COMMENT – STANDARD MTOE WILL BE PROVIDED TO UNITS AS ATTACHMENT TO ORDER. MNSTC-I HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO EQUIP, BUT UNITS WILL HAVE TO DISTRIBUTE EQUIPMENT IAW MTOE. MTOE WILL BE FILLED BASED ON EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY AND C3 PRIORITIES.
Regional control	Consolidation of bases and turn-over of provinces to regional control must be predicated on specific conditions being met. Among the most important is a synchronized system of command and control.	Specific conditions need to be identified and command and control issues necessary for provincial control identified in advance of the turn-over. MSCs WILL IDENTIFY OWN CONDITIONS PER UNIQUE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS. COORD. INSTR. REQUIRE MSCs TO BACK BRIEF OPERATIONAL SET PRIOR TO TRANSITION. TRANSITIONS WILL REMAIN CONDITIONS BASED.

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Priority of engineer effort along the security line of effort is survivability/force protection of coalition forces, assured mobility, coalition base construction and closure, mod base construction then MOI base construction. OPORD and ANNEX E (ENG) does not address reconstruction operations cell (ROC), police partnership program (P3), or government transition team (GTT).	These priorities don't take into account force protection measures at police stations and governmental buildings. P3, GTT, MiTT are driving forces for the ENG effort in MNB-NW. Force protection measures are largely in place. They can always be improved, but not the priority effort at this time. P3, GTT, and ROC are critical to enable ISF and turning over a self sufficient government and economy to the Iraqi citizens and sets the conditions for coalition drawdown.	Survivability / Force Protection measures in support of key ISF and government facilities, assured mobility, survivability/force protection of coalition forces, coalition base construction and closure, MOD base construction then MOI base construction. THE PRIORITIES A GIVEN MSC MIGHT BE ADJUSTED SLIGHTLY FROM THE OVERALL PRIORITIES BASED UPON MISSION. MNB-NW IS MORE FOCUSED ON POLICE IN MOSUL THAN OTHER MSCs. Expand OPORD to encompass all effort in support of the four MNC-I LOOs: P3, GTT, and Reconstruction effort P3 AND GTT CONCEPTS UNDERDEVELOPMENT AT MNF-I. WILL ADD INPUT TO THE OPORD THAT ADDRESSES THE MIGRATION OF RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS CELL DUTIES BACK TO THE PROJECT CONTRACTING OFFICE.
1st IIF BDE as a contingency element	The IIF BDEs, are hardened fighters with solid experience, lengthy deployments far from home stations and absences following the deployments	The concept of an ISF reinforcement element of highly trained soldiers needs to have a financial perk to work and deployments must be kept very short. MECHANISM ALREADY EXISTS. NOTED.

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Frequency management	IA frequencies are not presently being managed, effective C2 in later phases requires proper management of C2 architecture.	Specify chain of command for management. Develop an MTT to assist with the training of this skill and a centralized architecture. SEE BELOW:
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SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT DOES NOT EXIST IN THE IRAQI MILITARY AND IS IN THE INFANT STAGE AT THE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS. MND/Bs WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ISF WITH FREQUENCIES UNTIL THE TIME THE ISF CAN TRAIN, DEVELOP A FREQUENCY SPECTRUM, AND MANAGE THEIR FREQUENCIES. (ANNEX K, APPENDIX 1 PARA 3.C.1.F)

PLANS FOR THE STAND-UP OF THE IRAQI SIGNAL SCHOOL THIS FALL INCLUDES THE IDENTIFICATION AND TRAINING OF IRAQI SPECTRUM MANAGERS. ONCE GRADUATED (EST NOV 05), THEY WILL ASSUME DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ISF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, UNTIL THEN, CF WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.

PAO Capabilities	ISF and the IP has no formal MPAD. Our MPAD only has three teams it can push out. To cross train and equip ISF with it's own MPAD capability, we would need additional MPAD support.	Deploy additional PAO capabilities to MSCs and employ them to help develop some PAO capabilities within the ISF. REQUEST MNB-NW DRAFT A PRECISE LIST OF REQUIRED PERSONNEL AND FORWARD THROUGH CHANNELS. (NOT TO BE BUREAUCRATIC BUT TO CLEARLY DEFINE THE PROBLEM AND PUSH VISIBILITY TO THE LEVEL IT NEEDS TO BE). IF THIS IS A PROBLEM IN SEVERAL STAFF SECTIONS THEN MNC-I NEEDS TO RELOOK THE MANNING REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED TO SHIFT MNB-NW INTO A TWO STAR HQ.
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MNB-NW

CENTRIXS	States CENTRIX will be available to Division level MITTs but did not allocate assets to make that happen. We do not have that capability.	Provide further clarification on the methodology for issuing CENTRIX. SEE BELOW:
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MNC-I OPORD (ANNEX K, APPENDIX 1, PARA 3.C.1.F.) MND/BS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING DIVISION LEVEL MITTS ACCESS TO A SECURE DATA NETWORKS: SIPR AND CENTRIXS. IF MND/BS ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE MSE OR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, COORDINATION CAN BE MADE THROUGH MNC-IC6 FOR SUPPORT AS STATED IN THE COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

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MND-NC

- Intent for force array in Provinces after transition to Iraqi Control.
- C2 relationships of the ASTs

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MND-NC

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION:
Timeline for Transition of provinces must be clarified.	Order appears to conflict between a period to set conditions and the NLT time to have Provinces transitioned.	WILL CLARIFY TIMELINE, CONDITIONS, AND TRIGGERS.
Prioritized Bde list needs to clearly indicate which the MSCs will be prioritized.	List does not clearly reflect how the MND prioritization was developed	Prioritized Bde list should reflect the top six Bdes already conducting operations. WILL CLARIFY BY STATING FIRST SIX UNITS ARE ALREADY OPERATIONAL AND DO NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES.
Intent for force array in Provinces after transition to Iraqi Control.	What is the expected endstate for Coalition Forces after a Province is Transitioned to Iraqi Control? Is the intent to reduce the footprint or eliminate the footprint? MSCs will continue to have responsibilities to the Commo Nodes and MITTs in the battlespace.	Transition and basing plans must allow rational flexibility in the provinces to ensure the MSCs can provide adequate logistics and Force Protection to Coalition and ISF remaining in a province where Iraqi Control exists. UNITS TO BE DIRECTED IN COORDINATING INSTR. TO BACK BRIEF CG, MNC-I ON REQUIRED FORCES TO REMAIN IN PROVINCE BASED ON SUPPORT AND FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS. SOME ENDURING PRESENCE WILL BE MAINTAINED UNTIL PHASE IV AND MITT REQUIREMENT IS COMPLETE.
C2 Chart does not adequately convey relationships of ASTs to the MSCs.	C2 relationships of the ASTs has been an obstacle to efficient operations.	C2 relationships of the ASTs must be clearly stated in the OPORD. Order must include NLT date. ASTs ARE ATTACHED TO MNC-I. C1 HOLDING WORKING GROUP WITH MNSTC-I TO ENSURE ORDERS AND ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS ARE COMPLETED UPON EFFECTIVE DATE.

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MNF-W

- MNF-W must retain a COMREL w/155th upon RIC in Karbala & Najaf
 - Overwatch requirements upon RIC (Bn TF per province for near term)
 - Success in Babil tied to 155th's ability to reposition forces upon RIC in Najaf & Karbala
- Al Anbar is the key to both Sunni Inclusion, and the neutralization of the insurgency
 - More important than geography/population indicate
 - If MNC-I can't protect Sunni "fence sitters" out here, the insurgency will continue to be exported from here
 - So goes Anbar, so goes Iraq
 - Passageway of Salafist-Sunni movement
 - Best way to achieve neutralization of AIF is to go where they live
 - This neutralization does one thing... 'create time.' With this time, we will do two things: Operationalize the ISF, and set conditions for successful elections
 - Resourcing this fight is the best way to achieve neutralization



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MNF-W

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
Timing and apportionment of Coalition Forces as they become available • Tied to POE for Coalition Resources • Tied to Transition of Karbala / Najaf to Regional control • Tied MNF-W task to support MNB-NW and MND-B • Tied to securing the strategic victory in Fallujah, and creating the environment for successful elections in Ramadi	At the end of Phase I (JUN 05), MNC-I sees 2 Coalition Bdes available for re-tasking. By the end of Phase II (SEP 05), MNC-I envisions 1 Coalition Bde available for re-tasking. Based on MNC-I's anticipated timeline for achieving Regional Control in Karbala / Najaf, MNF-W assumes that MNC-I sees 155 BCT as a likely target for re-tasking/re-apportionment (reinforce MNB-NW or MND-B) o/a OCT 05. MNF-W does not concur with the re-assignment of the 155 BCT outside MNF-W battlespace, particularly during the most critical phase of the Iraqi political process (OCT – Referendum; DEC – Nat'l Elections). By <i>repositioning</i> 155 BCT within MNF-W battlespace (rather than re-assigning 155 BCT) MNF-W believes it will have the necessary forces to disrupt/neutralize the AIF in the Ramadi-Fallujah-Iskandariah and Hit-Haditha Corridors IOT support MNB-NW and MND-B as directed in OPORD 05-02. Without the 155 BCT, MNF-W cannot effectively support MNB-NW and MND-B or create an environment that facilitates Sunni participation in the Nat'l Elections.	• Upon achievement of RIC in Karbala & Najaf, 155 BCT retains a COMREL with MNF-W. MNF-W establishes Bn TF overwatch positions, and reinforces efforts in North Biloqi (central Babil). PENDING DECISION. ELEVATED TO MNC-I / MNF-I COMMANDER'S COA DEV SESSION

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MNF-W

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
Transition N.Babil to Regional Control by 31 Dec. (Pg 30)	N. Babil is part of Babil Province, with the capital in Hillah. Babil Province is owned by three MSCs. Coordination and C2 relationships between the MSCs must be elaborated on in OPORD 05-02.	Specify projected timeline & desired effect by exact locale in the Babil Province. WILL READDRESS FOR CLARITY USING: N.BABIL(Bag) / CENTRAL BABIL(w) / S. BABIL(cs). EFFECTS ASSESSMENT WILL SUPPPORT WITH THREE SEPARATE ASSESSMENTS. BATTLESPACE REALIGNMENT DECISIONS WILL IMPACT ISSUE. COMBINED PRESENCE IN PJCC WILL FACILITATE BETTER COORD (see MND-CS comment).
Resourcing MSCs for the National Elections in Dec 05 and for accomplishing MNC-I Key Task (d) -- <i>"Neutralize the AIF intimidation campaign in Mosul, Baghdad, and Al Anbar."</i> FACT h(5): Effective local security capacity has collapsed or is ineffective in much of the GST—most acutely in al Anbar.	The National Election in Dec 05 is arguably the most important event likely to occur during Feb 05 to Feb 06. According to MNC-I's plan, four key Sunni Provinces will not reach Regional Control before the Elections. MNC-I could potentially mitigate a repeat of the Jan 05 Elections (Lack of Sunni Participation) by resourcing MNB-NW, MND-B, and MNF-W with the means to reduce AIF influence, elevate ISF capability, and encourage Sunni participation well before the OCT-DEC 05 Elections.	Key task is to neutralize the AIF, not their intimidation campaign. We're neutralizing to 'buy time' to build ISF & conduct elections. Countering the intimidation is just a small piece of that neutralization. In layman's terms, this order tells MNF-W to conduct a holding action. Is this what MNC-I requires of MNF-W? WILL CLARIFY. INTENT IS TO COMMUNICATE "MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND PROGRESS." SHIFTING POE IS NOT TIME DEPENDENT BUT CONDITIONS. TIMES WERE MARKS ON WALL (ESTIMATES) SO UNITS COULD PLAN. POE MAY SHIFT EARLIER / LATER / OR MORE FREQUENTLY THAN EXPECTED.

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ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
Transition Najaf & Karbala to Regional Control by 30 Sept.	Assuming that 155 BCT is re-apportioned following the achievement of Regional Control, the requirement to maintain a Bn-strength unit within Najaf / Karbala remains (IAW the Regional Control concept, Coalition Forces remain in overwatch.). OPOD 05-02 does not elaborate on what unit will cover down on the "overwatch" requirement. MNF-W does not have the force structure to provide an "Overwatch" Bn if 155 BCT is re-apportioned.	Assuming 155 BCT is re-apportioned, MNC-I should: Preferred COA: Re-assign Karbala & Najaf Provinces to another MSC -or- • Least Preferred COA: Provide MNF-W the combat power to execute regional "overwatch" in Najaf & Karbala DECISION PENDING. PREFERENCES TO BE INCLUDED IN DECISION MAKING PROCESS.
Extensive use of facts and assumptions	Statements of Fact and assumptions are used extensively. Assumptions will be taken as fact by MSCs. One example: (U) AIF will attempt to influence the constitutional process. Is this assumption required?	Review draft assumptions. Use only those absolutely necessary. C3 PLANS WILL REVIEW PRIOR TO PUBLICATION.
Tasks	• Are tasks listed by priority? • Tasks in Phases appear redundant.	Prioritize tasks. Do not restate tasks in separate phases if they remain the same. C3 PLANS WILL PRIORITIZE TASKS FOR PUBLICATION.

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MNF-W

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
POE for the Counterinsurgency Operations with Coalition Forces and Effects (p 29)	MNC-I introduces a new term in Phase II CONOPs that leads to confusion: POE for COIN Ops. Is POE for COIN Ops synonymous with POE for Coalition Resources? If so, there appears to be an oversight. POE for Coalition Resources. should read: MNB-NW, MND-B, and MNF-W. MNF-W was not mentioned as a POE for COIN Ops, but it is for Coalition Resources.	On Page 28-29, include MNF-W with MNB-NW and MND-B as a POE for COIN Ops. WILL INCLUDE FOR PUBLICATION.
Priority of Effort (POE) for Intel Support (p 31)	The Concept for Intel Support states that assets will be allocated based on the MNC-I Cdr's priorities, which in the Concept for Intel paragraph are listed as: HVI/HVT, COIN Support, Force Protection, and finally ISF. These asset allocation priorities do not match other themes articulated in the order (i.e., ISF is the ME, etc.).	Based on themes articulated in the order, recommend that intel assets be prioritized in the following order: • Force Protection • ISF Development • HVI/HPT • COIN NEW PRIORITIZED LIST: (I) SUPPORT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS (COIN). (II) SUPPORT HVT/HVI TRACKING AND ASSESSMENT. (III) TRAIN, COACH, AND MENTOR IRAQI SECURITY FORCES THROUGH PARTNERSHIP AND MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS. (IV) SUPPORT FORCE PROTECTION (FP).

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MNF-W

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POE for ISF Resources	MNC-I intends to turn Karbala/Najaf to Regional Control by 1 Oct (Endstate for Phase II). MNF-W owns Karbala/Najaf. Yet MNF-W is not listed as a POE for ISF Resources.	Because MNF-W owns Karbala/Najaf, MNF-W should be a higher priority for ISF Resources. POE MATRIX WILL CLARIFY INTENT TO PRIORITIZE ISF DIVISION HQ IN MND-CS AO BUT MNF-W WILL BE RECIPIENT AND EXECUTOR OF RESOURCES.
Task Organization (Annex A)	Cannot access Annex A, but the Task Organization Diagram posted for review at the 24 Mar C3 Conference is inaccurate for MNF-W.	MNF-W owes MNC-I an updated T/O Slide. Do not publish Annex A until MNF-W provides MNC-I an accurate task organization. GUIDANCE PASSED TO FUOPS
Units Naming Convention (Admin Comment)	OPORD 05-02 refers to II MEF (FWD) as MND-W and MNF-W throughout the OPORD. OPORD 05-02 also refers to MNB-NW as MND-NW in different areas of the OPORD 05-02.	• Refer to II MEF (FWD) as MNF-W • Is MNB-NW a Division or Brigade? Keep consistent throughout OPORD. C3 PLANS WILL CLARIFY PRIOR TO PUBLICATION. MNB-NW WILL REMAIN REFERED TO AS MNB-NW UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

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MNF-W

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MoD IAF Units listed on Table X on page 27	1st DOB Bde replaced 60 th ING Bde. An unnamed Bde (XX Bde) that would absorb 405 th , 406 th , and 507 th ING Bns is not listed.	- Remove the 60th ING Bde from Table. - Add XX Bde to Table. C3 ISF WILL CLARIFY. C3 ISF ICW MOD INTENT IS TO RECONSTITUTE THESE UNITS WITH NAMES TBD.
Key Cities	MNC-I identified Al Qaim, Haditha, Ramadi, Fallujah, Karbala, and Najaf as key cities within the MNF-W AO. MNC-I also listed N. Babil as a key city. There is no city called N. Babil. Furthermore, MNC-I directed MNF-W to accept risk in the west. Based on that guidance to accept risk in the west (and MNF-W inability to maintain constant pressure on the border region), MNF-W does not see Al Qaim as a key city. WRT N. Babil ("Throat of Baghdad"), MNF-W identified Iskandariah as a key city.	MNC-I adopts MNF-W's key cities (Drop Al Qaim; Add Iskandariah). MNF-W Key Cities: Najaf, Karbala, Iskandariah, Fallujah, Ramadi, and Haditha. CITIES ARE NESTED WITH FORCE....HAVE ADDED HADITHAH BECAUSE IT IS A KEY CITY THAT HAS BEEN OVERLOOKED....NORTH BABIL COMBINES MANY OF THE SMALLER AREAS WHICH MAKE UP THE "THROAT OF BAGHDAD" AND IS MORE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CORPS CONCERN THAN ONE PARTICULAR CITY

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Engineer/Reconstruction Concept (p 32)	ME is to develop the ISF, yet engineer effort is going to supporting Coalition Forces (mobility), constructing Coalition Bases, and then constructing temporary MoD/MoI bases.	Maintaining the theme of developing the ISF, list the construction of ISF Bases as priority number one vice priority number three. MNC-I NEEDS TO MAINTAIN ASSURED MOBILITY ACROSS THE BATTLEFIELD IN ORDER TO STAND UP THE ISF. IN A SIMILAR MANNER, THE EXPANSION AND CLOSURE OF COALITION BASES IS A PRECURSOR TO BASING OF THE ISF.
Line of Effort vs Line of Operation (Administrative Comment) (p. 32)	Paragraph 2, under Engineer Concept of Support, discusses Security and Economic Lines of Effort. Line of Effort is not consistent with Lines of Operation used elsewhere in OPORD 05-02.	Maintain consistency C7 PLANS ACTION. TO BE CORRECTED TO LOO.
MP Concept for Support (p 33-35)	On page 34, Priorities for MP Support include MNF-W. On page 35, tasks to 18 MP Bde and 42 MP Bde missions that apply to the MNF-W AO. Bottom-line: MP priorities do not match MP tasks.	If the MP units are not tasked to conduct missions that affect the MNF-W AO (p 35), then delete the MP priorities on page 34 that list MNF-W as a number 2 or 3 priority. MNF-W PRIORITY OF SUPPORT FOR MPs WILL SHIFT TO THE RIGHT BASED ON CURRENT SUPPORT LEVELS. WILL REMAIN SAME FOR PH III & IV BASED ON POTENTIAL FOR REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

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MND-B

- IA logistics and communications not adequately addressed
 - C4 Comments: MND-B stated that they did not see Log development at the Top – National Logistics Command. The plan to develop a national level log command exists, however, it will not be put into development this year. Resources and money are limited. Priorities had to be selected and the Support Command will not be formed this FY. The Log Community at Force, Corps and MNSTC-I have prioritized 1st Line (Organizational) as the first Priority and BSUs (3rd/4th Line) as second priority. Once established, BSUs and 1st Line combined will allow a unit to sustain itself. Right now training is focused at the junior leader level – The reason for a centralized school is so that junior leaders are educated in the same doctrine and procedures, not a different set by each MSC. ASTs embedded in the JHQ from MNSTC-I are partnering/training at the Snr Command level.
- Inadequate ISF facilities
- Current priorities place emphasis for MND-B to train a large # of non-6th IA division units. These units will not hold terrain or conduct COIN in Baghdad. This will delay the ISF from reaching local or regional control until 2006 at the earliest. It will also have a negative IO effect and degrade the Iraqi political process due to the overt US military presence in Baghdad during the referendum period.

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MND-B

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Priorities of MND-B IA forces	Current priorities place emphasis for MND-B to train a large # of non-6 th IA division units. These units will not hold terrain or conduct COIN in Baghdad. This will delay the ISF from reaching local or regional control until 2006 at the earliest. It will also have a negative IO effect and degrade the Iraqi political process due to the overt US military presence in Baghdad during the referendum period.	1) Move 5 th IA BDE/6 th IA DIV (2DoB), and 3 rd IA BDE/6 th IA DIV (Muth.) higher in the priority list. NON-CONCUR: DOES NOT SUPPORT INTENT FOR ISF DEVELOPMENT. POTENTIAL BRANCH: GIVEN CURRENT ASSESSMENTS, CIRCUMSTANCES IN MNB-NW AND ELECTION REQUIREMENTS.
ISF facilities	MND-B will not have adequate facilities in place for IA units in Phase 3 if we do not receive priority of effort during Phase 2.	Give MND-B priority of effort for IA facility development in Phase 2. NON-CONCUR: DOES NOT SUPPORT INTENT FOR ISF BASING AND INFR. DEV. ENGINEER AND CONTRACTING SOLUTIONS WILL BE INTEGRATED TO MITIGATE RISKS
OPORD does not adequately address development of IA logistics and communications	Lack of operational level ISF sustainment and communication structure will adversely impact ability to establish units at tactical level.	MNC-I focus more effort in developing national logistics and communications structure SEE COMMENT ON COVER SLIDE.
MND-B directed to provide MITTs and partner with 1 st Mech Division in Phase 3.	MND-B cannot afford to expend energy on developing capability of the additional BDEs of the 1 st Mech Division in Phase 3 given the events going on in the city at that time and the fact that the units will not assume terrain. The 1 st Mech BDE will be used in a reserve capacity. The remainder of the BDEs will not be ready until well into Phase 4. This doesn't support transition to local or regional security.	1) Postpone organizing and training the remainder of the 1 st Mech Division until Phase 4. ASTs ALREADY ASSIGNED TO MECH DIVISION UNITS. NO MITT REQUIREMENTS ONLY PARTNERSHIP.

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MND-B

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
Too many special purpose/strike police units while IP stations are minimally manned. Lack of integration of Iraqi police units in establishing regional control in Baghdad.	Several special MOI units, such as Commando BNs, Public Order BNs, etc. are working in Baghdad. These units are capable organizations and could quickly accelerate the process of handing over many units in Baghdad to Iraqi Control. However, there is currently no effective means to integrate their efforts into our plans and this order does not address that shortcoming. This could lead to escalating confrontation between large MOI and MOD units inside the Iraqi capital leading to increased political turmoil and disrupting the constitutional referendum process.	Engage MOI to convert enough special purpose police units to standard police to allow 100% fill of IP stations. The remaining police units should be better dispersed in Baghdad to provide reinforcement to standard police forces. ACKNOWLEDGED: INITIATIVES - MOI / MOD WORKING GROUP PROPOSED AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH MNF-I FOR ASSISTANCE.

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MND-B

C2/commo plan is still very inadequate- in fact, it doesn't look like we have a plan at all beyond hand-help radios and internet in a box.

There is no way they will be able to manage an Army and control large organizations without a secure data and voice network and it doesn't look like anyone is even working on that. We will build all these large organizations and they won't have any way to control or manage them.

They need a CENTRIX-type network for data and voice and that should be an integral part of the national/operational ISF plan. We should be looking at some type of TACWEB system for SIGACT tracking and orders distribution. They need secure email and voice. Instead of focusing on building Fusion-net for ourselves, we should focus that effort on building them a simple, effective, battle command system. Really think this should be a major focus area for MNCI and MNFI.

MNSTC-I AND THE MNC-I C6 PLANS, HAVE DEVELOPED A STRUCTURE FOR THE IRAQI SIGNAL BATTALION. THE SIGNAL BATTALION WILL CONSIST OF 4-6 COMPANIES, WITH EACH COMPANY HAVING A RADIO, WIRE AND DATA PLATOON. A COMPANY WILL BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SINGLE CHANNEL AND LIMITED DATA CAPABILITIES TO AN IRAQI DIVISION. THE PLATOONS CAN BE TASKED ORGANIZED TO PROVIDE HQ C2 AT THE DIV, BDE OR BN LEVEL. THE COMPANIES WILL BE IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE IRAQI ARMY UNTIL ENOUGH COMPANIES CAN BE GENERATED TO PLACE THEM AT EACH DIVISION. THE IRAQI SIGNAL SCHOOL IS PROVIDING SINGLE RADIO (MOTOROLA/HF) CLASSES TO RTOS THAT ARE ASSIGNED TO THE IRAQI UNITS. THESE RTOS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR THEIR CO/BN/BDE INTERNAL NEEDS WHILE THE SIGNAL COMPANIES PROVIDE THE CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN HQ'S. DATA NETWORKS, THE IRAQI NETWORK AND IRAQI SECURE NETWORK WILL BE EXTENDED TO DIVISION AND BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS THROUGH THE MCI MICROWAVE BACKBONE. INSTALLATION OF DATA SERVICES IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN JUNE 05.

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MND-CS

- Due to restraints in MND-CS MOU, MND CS will not be able to:
 - Train Law Enforcement Agencies,
 - Conduct COIN OPS
 - MNC-I in cooperation with MND CS to appoint units to fulfill this task in due time.
- PJCC CF representatives should be nominated by all MSCs operating in the province (e.g. Babil province is divided into two MSCs). Both should nominate reps to PJCC).
- No need and condition to put a force into Soaira



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MND-CS

G 7 Establishing the rule of law.	MND CS has no means to do this.	MNC-I in cooperation with MND CS to appoint units to fulfill this task in due time. PENDING DECISION.
G 7 conduct tactical BN Level OPS... conduct tactical BDE Level Operations..	MND CS will not be able to: -- Conduct COIN OPS in the nature of offensive OPD due to restrains in MND CS MOU.	MNC-I in cooperation with MND CS to appoint units to fulfill these tasks in due time. PENDING DECISION.
OPLAN tasks: <i>two Civil Military Information Centers (1 ea. to MND-CS and MND-SE) "</i>	MND CS does not posses Civil Military Information Centre. MND CS Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) structure in shown in the attached slide	Introduce CIMIC GROUP (POL) OPORD CORRECTED
G9- CA or CMO capable units in the AO <i>"2x Civil Military Information Centers"</i>	MND CS does not posses Civil Military Information Centre. MND CS Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) structure in shown in the attached slide	Introduce CIMIC GROUP (POL) /at the CA company level/ ANNEX G (CMO) CORRECTED
G3- Support ISF IOT ensure stability until ISF capable of assuming control;	AIF activities are different in both provinces. Qadisiyah Province situation is relatively stable. In Babil Province the AIF activity remains still high and threaten to CF	Set condition to establish well functioning PJCC able to monitor the whole situation and coordinate all activities. PJCC CF representatives should be nominated by all MSCs operating in the province (for example Babil province is divided into two MSUs and both should nominate reps to PJCC). C3 PLANS ACTION: ALL MSCs WILL BE TASKED TO PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVE IN PJCC.

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MND-CS

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
G-7- According to the OPLAN draft are mentioned 7 x IA Bn in <u>Soaira</u> (3 x IA Bn from 27 (3) IA BDE and 4 x IA Bn 28 (4) IA BDE and 4 IA BDE HQ.	According to our assessment of that situation there is no need and condition to put such a force into Soaira. But over all we hope that was rather simple mistake than deliberated action with locating that BDE in Soaira.	We advice to form that 4th BDE according to our and 8th IA DIV CON plan, and put in Karbala. We are attaching our (and 8th DIV COM) suggestion of further 8th DIV development plan. ENGINEER ANNEX IS TRACKING THE 4TH BDE IN LOCATIONS NEAR KARBALA.
G 7 MND CS will not be able to: -Train Law Enforcement Agencies, - Conduct COIN OPS in the nature of offensive OPD due to restrains in MND CS MOU.	MNC-I must be aware of this shortfalls and make sure that other units will train IA in Law enforcement Agencies and especially in offensive OPS.	MNC-I in cooperation with MND CS to appoint units to fulfill these tasks in due time. C3 RESTRICTIVE ROE AND NATIONAL CAVEATS NOTED. C3 PLANS WILL ENSURE TASKS AND OBJECTIVES FOR MND-CS DO NOT VIOLATE THIS DIRECTION.

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


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Annex C – Appendix – Tab A –
Encl 3 – Iraqi Hierarchy

C-1-A-3-9

8th Division




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PROPOSAL


8 DIV IA future structure in MND CS AOR



G9 suggestion



CIMIC TASK ORGANIZATION





MND-SE

- There appears to be no direct linkage made between the failure of critical infrastructure, economic stagnation and any change to the security situation.
- OPLAN Phasing: The timelines for these Phases are very ambitious and possibly over optimistic.
- The 'be prepared to' employment options for MND(SE) post transition to Iraqi control – less possibly for ISF training and development – are inappropriate.
- The MNC-I Endstate itself is both ambiguous (is it CF or ISF maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq?), and over-ambitious for the tactical level of command (is MNC-I able to ensure that the GOI establishes the rule of law and is recognized as legitimate in the time it has available?)



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MND-SE

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
The term Regional Control is simply not applicable to the situation in Iraq.	There is no regional mechanism of governance or command in Iraq. The province is the next layer of control after Baghdad. If regional mechanisms are developed they will be in addition to, rather than instead of, the existing provincial structures.	'Regional Iraqi Control' is a misleading term and should be replaced by 'Provincial Iraqi Control'. MNC-I WILL CONTINUE TO USE REGIONAL CONTROL IAW MNF-I CAMPAIGN PLAN AND ALLOW MSCs TO JUDGE ON PROVINCE BY PROVINCE BASIS AS REQUIRED.
Applicability of many of the tasks and coordinating instructions to MND(SE).	It is a diverse multinational organization, with significant national caveats and constraints; not to mention widely differing doctrines, operating procedures, capabilities and structures. Complex or overly generic plans will not survive contact with this organization. Similarly some tactical decisions – such as base transfer and closure, or unit tasking - will need to be made in close consultation with TCN's national authorities and embassies when applied to MND(SE).	ASSIGNED TASKS TO BE REVIEWED BY COALITION PLANNER AND SJA PRIOR TO PUBLICATION
There appears to be no direct linkage made between the failure of critical infrastructure, economic stagnation and any change to the security situation.	This is an important factor when considering the expected pace of transition. It highlights the fact that achieving Iraqi self-reliance is more than simply handing over the battlespace to ISF.	IAW MNF-I CDR GUIDANCE - OTHER LOOs WILL NOT HOLD MNF-I HOSTAGE CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN BEYOND MINIMUM MNF-I REQUIREMENTS WITH ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION TO NEXT PHASE. THESE ARE LISTED IN THE SCHEME OF OPERATIONS BY PHASE.
<u>ISF Missions.</u> (Table, Pg.17).	This table could be laid out more logically and seems extraneous. If it is to be included and be useful then it needs to show the relationship of the various ISF to their parent ministries. It should also relate directly to a part of the main body text.	MATURITY OF OVERALL MOD & MOI COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DOES NOT EXIST. INTENT IS TO COMMUNICATE ADJACENT UNIT MISSIONS. WILL CLARIFY.

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MNB-SE

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
<u>Lines of Operation.</u> (Table, Pg.19).	The appearance of the MCF-I and the MCF-I Endstates in such close proximity, without being clearly labelled as such, is confusing. This is because the table showing the Lines of Operation is probably an unnecessary addition.	C3 PLANS ACTION: WILL CLARIFY ON SLIDE.
<u>Endstate.</u> (Pg.19)	The MNC-I Endstate itself is both ambiguous (is it CF or ISF maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq?), and over-ambitious for the tactical level of command (is MNC-I able to ensure that the GOI establishes the rule of law and is recognized as legitimate in the time it has available?).	FOR REVIEW BY COMMANDER, MNC-I
<u>Key Tasks.</u>	There appears to be no discernable difference between the 'Key Tasks' (Pg.18) and the 'Operational Objectives' (Pg.19).	INTENT ACHIEVED. NO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REQUIRED.
<u>OPLAN Phasing.</u> (Table, Pg.26).	The timelines for these Phases are very ambitious and possibly over optimistic. 'Regional Iraqi Control' will not be achieved in the MND(SE) provinces by Sep 05. CG MND(SE)'s best estimate for Al Muthanna and Maysan provinces – the 2 closest to the Regional Control model – is 31 Oct 05. He does not envisage full transition to Iraqi control in Basra and Dhi Qar provinces before 31 Mar 06.	TRANSITIONS BY PHASE ARE CONDITIONS BASED, NOT TIME. TIMES ARE DRECTED BY MNF-I AS A GOAL. EFFECT ASSESSMENT PROCESS IS MECHANISM TO ASSIST COMMANDERS DECISION MAKING (AS PER ORDER)

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MNB-SE

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
<u>Employment Options.</u> (Pg.29).	The 'be prepared to' employment options for MND(SE) post transition to Iraqi control – less possibly for ISF training and development – are inappropriate, and reflect the general comments made above about misunderstanding the nature of MND(SE).	ACKNOWLEDGED. NO ACTIONS EXPECTED FROM MND-SE WITHOUT PROPER NATIONAL AUTHORITY PERMISSIONS.
<u>Scheme of Operations.</u>	What is the fundamental difference between the description of the Phases in the Concept of Operations (Pgs.26-32) and the description of Phases in the Scheme of Operations (Pgs.39-68)? This looks like process taking precedence over clarity.	-TRANSITION OBJECTIVES DEFINE PHASES. -CONDITIONS ASSIST EBO DECISION MAKING. -KEY EFFECTS ASSIST PURPOSE DRIVEN OPERATIONS -TASKS DEFINE REQUIREMENTS. C3 PLANS WILL COMMUNICATE WITH MND-SE FOR DESIRED MODIFICATIONS.
<u>Tasks to Subordinate Units.</u>	Unlikely timelines and unrealistic tasks. Example: Pg.42, Para. 3. Sub-para. d. 'Upon completion, MND(SE) potentially retasks two brigades to conduct operations ISO MNC-I operations.' Whose brigades? Iraqi or MNF? Where? In later Phases the Tasks do not fit the Phase Concept.	-TRANSITIONS BY PHASE ARE CONDITIONS BASED, NOT TIME. TIMES ARE DIRECTED BY MNF-I AS A GOAL. EFFECT ASSESSMENT PROCESS IS MECHANISM TO ASSIST COMMANDERS DECISION MAKING (AS PER ORDER) -EMPLOYMENT OPTION PLANNING PRIORITIES WILL BE CLARIFIED PRIOR TO PUBLICATION

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CJSOTF-AP

- CJSOTF-AP not listed as an MSC in Tasks to Subordinate Units.

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CJSOTF-AP

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
CJSOTF-AP not listed as an MSC	CJSOTF-AP is TACON to MNC-I therefore should be addressed as an MSC.	Include CJSOTF-AP in tasks to MSCs. Recommend MNC-I include tasks by Phase. CJSOTF-AP will edit tasks. For example, PSD is CJSOTF-AP's priority task but it is listed nowhere in the OPLAN. JOINT PLANNING EFFORT HAS DEVELOPED ACCEPTABLE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING TASK LIST TO BE PUBLISHED.
Annex C Operations, Appendix 1, Tab B Transition Team 8.a. (15+5) cities	In the OPLAN, 21 cities are mentioned. Tall Afar added. Additionally, the line is an incomplete thought "ISO, ISF in critical locations (15 +5) coalition MITT."	Update line to reflect update on city list. Clarify what task is. CORRECTED.
Annex C Operations, Appendix 1, Tab B Transition Team 8.f. Line improperly worded.	CJSOTF-AP is TACON to MNC-I.	Reword line to read "CJSOTF-AP remains TACON to MNC-I and provides mutual support to MSCs." COMPLETE.
Same document 8.g. Typo	IOT used instead of ISO	Reword line to read "BPT support Taji training academy ISO CF Transition Teams." COMPLETE.
Same document 8.d.	"Build tactical ISF intelligence capability." SOF does this at BN level.	Rewrite to "Build battalion-level tactical ISF intelligence capability" COMPLETE.

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1st COSCOM

- Partnering & training of the regional BSUs has to begin now IOT set the CSS conditions to transition to national Iraqi control in Phase III.
- Basing plan does not address procedures for achieving the end state of Coalition Forces collapsing onto the contingency operating bases (COBs)

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1st COSCOM

ISSUE	DISCUSSION	RECOMMENDATION
REGIONAL BSU	PARTNERING & TRAINING OF THE REGIONAL BSUs HAS TO BEGIN NOW IOT SET THE CSS CONDITIONS TO TRANSITION TO NATIONAL IRAQI CONTROL IN PHASE III.	IDENTIFY A POC SO THAT COSCOM CAN BEGIN THE PARTNERING & TRAINING OF REGIONAL BSUs NOW. C4 COMMENT: NOTED, BUT CURRENTLY REGIONAL BSUS ARE MANNED AND COMMANDED BY MNSTC-I. MNC-I C4 WILL COORDINATED FOR 1 ST COSCOM TO PARTNER/ASSIST WITH CURRENT MNSTC-I OPERATED AND COMMANDED BSUs.
BASING	BASING PLAN DOES NOT ADDRESS PROCEDURES FOR ACHIEVING THE END STATE OF CF FORCES COLLAPSING ONTO THE CONTINGENCY OPERATING BASES	NEED TO ADDRESS BY LOCATION & POPULATION OF EACH BASE. RISK IS UNKNOWN ENGINEER EFFORT, KBR CONTRACT & CSS FORCE STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. CURRENT BASING PLAN IS GAINING THE FIDELITY FOR COLLAPSING PHASE I AND II. THERE ARE TOO MANY VARIABLES AT THIS POINT TO GAIN THE REQUIRED FIDELITY ON PHASE III AND IV. ONCE THE REQUISITE FIDELITY IS GAINED ON PHASE I AND II EFFORTS WILL TURN TOWARDS GAINING VISIBILITY ON THE LAST TWO PHASES.
STRATEGIC BALLOT MATERIAL	THE ORDER DOES NOT STATE WHICH STRATEGIC BALLOT SITE SUPPORTS AL KUT AND HILLAH. IN THE FIRST ELECTION TALLIL SUPPORT BOTH LOCATIONS.	NEED TO CLARIFY STRATEGIC LOCATION AND BASED ON LOCATION TASKED PROPER MSC. TO ELECTIONS AO FOR REVIEW

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