

~~SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFI//X4~~

MNF-I DETAINEE STATUS

MISSION VELOCITY

XO - *Reference*

DTG 27 1000L MAY 04

	15 APR	27 MAY
TOTAL POPULATION	11,643	10,982
TOTAL PROTECTIVE PERSONS (MEK)	3,842	3,842
TOTAL SECURITY INTERNEES	7,774	7,117
- HVD	92	92
- MI / CID HOLDS	1,213	676
- REFERRAL TO CCCI	27	141
- MSC DETENTION FACILITIES (1304 new captures since 15 Apr 04)	815	714
- SECURITY INTERNEES AVAILABLE FOR BOARD	5,627	5,494
DETAINEES RELEASED		(+1098#)
PENDING RELEASE/UNIT REVIEWS (412)	637	1,129
INTERNEED	1,414	2,725
REFERRED TO CCCI WITH HEARING/TRIAL DATES	27	76
SECURITY INTERNEES REMAING TO BE BOARDED (ESTIMATED COMPLETION IS 2 WEEKS)	3,549	1,564

•# 629 ADDITIONAL DETAINEES WILL BE RELEASED 28-30 MAY

•Detainees boarded 15 Apr to present, 2745.

As of 27 MAY 2004

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COS/Ops

03 May 04

XO-file
①

DCG MNE-I
DCG MNC-I

Copy to:

GOC MND(SE)

AL AMARA

BACKGROUND

1. Following the arrest of Yacubi and the closure of the Hawaza newspaper in early Apr 04, there have been almost continuous violent clashes with CF in the city of Al Amara in Maysan Province.

2. This violence has been linked to adherents of Muqtadr al Sadr, but this assessment oversimplifies the situation. Whilst OMS has strong representation in Maysan Province, the trouble has wider roots. The majority of people in Maysan are moderate and the majority in Al Amarah want peace. But the villages of Al Majir al Kabir, Al Kahala and Q' al Salih, and the city of Al Amarah itself, have significant numbers of violent criminals with a degree of tribal and family affiliation, who will rally to any 'popular' cause. There is clear evidence that groups from elsewhere in the Province have moved to Al Amarah to take advantage of any opportunity to display lawlessness; inevitably, such lawlessness is extremely violent. They are drawn from the droves of unemployed young men and are armed with small arms, heavy machine guns, RPGs, rockets and explosives. The Province has been unruly for centuries and its people, drawn from the Marsh Arabs, are fiercely independent. Any outsider is considered to be a potential enemy and criminality is rife, not least highway robbery. Even during Saddam's regime there was insurrection, with which he was unable to deal effectively, despite various murderous campaigns. The activities of Muqtadr al Sadr have provided the criminals of Maysan Province with their latest cause and, although Sadr's general influence cannot be ignored, it is not deemed as the true reason for the current trouble. It is considered that a peaceful solution in An Najaf will moderate but not end the violence.

3. The violence in Al Amarah involves 200-300 criminals. They include young men fuelled by disdain for CF and fortified by religious zealotness. They are bold but ill-led. They employ irregular tactics in small groups and are beginning to fix themselves at barricades. Whilst some congregate at the OMS office, the office is not a headquarters and the office is not itself a particular target for CF. Many of those fighting originate from elsewhere and some spend the night at homes in Al Amarah.

4. The seat of local government is the Pink Palace. The CPA representative lives and works at the CIMIC house, which is adjacent 1.4a. These buildings are isolated at the confluence of two rivers and approaches are constrained by three bridges and narrow streets. They are the target of desultory attacks. Recent attacks

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have become more violent. They have polarized local opinion and hitherto recalcitrant moderates have offered CF information to make arrests. Having successfully acted on this information the criminals have intensified their violence. Nonetheless OMS has distanced itself from the violence and declared its opposition to violence and lawlessness.

5. CF maintain an Infantry BG (1 PWRR) in Al Amarah, in Camp Abu Naji just to the South of the city [1.4a] It has one WARRIOR company, 1 SAXON company and one light company. Additionally, 605 Bn ICDC is to the West at Camp Sparrow Hawk [1.4a] and 606 Bn ICDC to the South at Camp Condor [1.4a]

THE LAST 72 HRS

6. The last 72 hours has seen a period of sustained violence and operations by CF against ACF in Al Amara.

7. In the early hours of Saturday 1 May a successful intelligence based lift operation in the city saw 14 people arrested (8 were subsequently released after questioning). These arrests led to an immediate reaction from the ACF in the city. 3 ICDC personnel were taken hostage (subsequently released) and gunmen occupied defensive positions throughout the city, apparently in the belief that the OMS was imminently under attack. The ACF demonstrated their ability to raise significant forces at short notice and their clear intent to kill CF. During the afternoon a CF patrol was attacked by SAF and RPG7, resulting in 7 UK casualties. This was followed by a series of sporadic attacks running through into Sunday morning, with particularly persistent mortar attacks on the CIMIC House and Camp Abu Naji. During this time and unknown to MIND (SE), a US engineer convoy travelling South on MSR TOPEKA drove through the contact area, where it was attacked. 2 US military personnel were killed and 11 wounded.

8. Yesterday there was a tenuous commitment offered by OMS to end the violence and local Imams tentatively agreed to preach for greater calm. However, last night saw a resumption of violence with SAF, RPG and mortar attacks on CF during a successful re-supply operation of the CIMIC House. Local councillors have reported that the crowd is leaderless and fractured and it is not inclined to reason. Further attacks against CF are expected and will continue to be met with appropriate force.

WAY AHEAD

9. CF will continue with attempts at dialogue during lulls in activity in Al Amara. Meanwhile a number of operations are being planned against the ACF, including search operations targeting outlying villages and the fringes of the city. In addition there will be a redoubling of CIMIC and Ops Sp activities throughout the AO and continued work in developing CF relationships with the tribal elders. If necessary and whenever a target presents itself, kinetic operations will be mounted to defeat ACF.

10. CF will continue to sustain and protect both the CIMIC House and the Pink Palace until 30 Jun 04. From 1 Jul 04 CF will sustain the conditions for ISF to protect

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the seat of local government and uphold the rule of law in order to create the conditions for elections in Jan 05. The concept will be to isolate criminal elements from OMS through negotiation, SSR and Ops Sp activity. Joint operations with ISF will be designed to disrupt and defeat armed criminality in Al Amarah, Majir al Kabir, Al Kahala and Q'at al Saith in order to create the conditions for national and provincial elections in Jan 05.

COMDS ASSESSMENT

11. Maysan Province presents an interesting problem. Ostensibly fuelled by the adherence of zealots to the minority Shia grouping rallying to Muqtadr al Sadr, negotiations through intermediaries suggest that the combatants are thugs and criminals. They are behaving as true descendants of their forebears. Saturday's arrest operation was successful but as predicted it provided a rallying call from outlying villages. Given the persistent level of violence the number of attacks makes our casually list seem remarkably light. It will be interesting to gauge whether the intervention of the councillors and religious leaders lessens activity. Kinetic effect in some cases may be the only answer as any perception of weakness on the part of CF will simply encourage further violence towards CF and gross intimidation of the population.

12. This has been an extremely difficult couple of days in Al Amara and the solutions are not straight forward or obvious. The ACF need to be hit hard but they are a cautious and callous foe, too ready to use any cover available, including the use of women and children as human shields, to carry out their attacks. All of our acts against them must be measured alongside our Centre of Gravity: Maintaining the consent of the population in the Province.

Original Signed

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Chief of Staff
HQ MND(SE)

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Pages 5 through 6 redacted for the following reasons:

Joint Staff

Approved for Release

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~~medications, to use, and all other information to use, such as, care~~

• **The Pursuit of Conflict-Resolution through extra-governmental violence:**




- What is the same.**

- **What is different.**

- 2

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Baghdad: Indicators Last Two Weeks

Activity	Trend	Recent Reporting
Atmospherics		- Sunni citizens continue to fear MOI, JAM and Badr death squads, and 1 Ab, 1 Ad + Tawafog Coalition returned to Council of Representatives, but Sadrist and Fadilla pull out - Iraq's media emphasizing signs of stress from sectarian killings. - Residents concerned with the lack of electricity second to security
Intimidation		- High profile incidents continue - JAM continues assassinations + Mixed information as to the status of Dr. Maashadani - Continued reprisal against political figures
Permissive Environment		- Adhamiyyah, Dora, Mansour still key areas of violence - Shi'a / Sunni groups using ethnic neighborhoods to launch attacks + JAM EJK groups being actively targeted

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Battle of Perception Incidents, Hearts & Minds



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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS UPDATE

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Amalya Ma'an Ila Al-Amam - Pan-Arab Media Assessment

03 Jul 2006 - 16 Jul 2006


Headlines	Trend	Media Coverage
Sectarian Violence	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Increase in Violence Sparked by al-Jihad Incident- Mol Receiving Brunt of Blame for Death Squad Problems- Man-on-Street: "Baghdad Security Plan is Failing and Not Protecting"- Gol: Security Plans Has Problems, Needs to Be Revised- Al-Sadr and Hakim Emphasize "We All Need to Work Together"
Death Squads	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Gol Admits Definite Death Squad Infiltration in Security Forces- Media: Illegally Armed Gangs Bigger Threat to Iraq Than T&FF- Al-Sadr: ISF Incapable of Protecting, Mahdi Army Must Protect
National Reconciliation	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- "Civil War" Replaces "Reconciliation" in Most Reporting- PM in Kurdistan: "We are Not on Brink of Civil War"- Armed Group Ready to Talk to Prime Minister
Capable ISF	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Muthana PIC - Widespread Coverage, "History Was Made This Day"- IA Takes Control During Sadr City Clashes - No Help From Mol
Basic Services	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- MoC Proclaims Fuel Crisis Near End - No More Long Lines- Sadr City Undergoing Major Basic Services Projects

Assessment: Reports of increased sectarian violence in Baghdad have garnered intense media coverage - Al-Jihad incident labeled by some commentators as "the worst example of sectarian violence since the U.S. invasion." Media reporting has underscored the inability of Amalya Ma'an Ila Al-Amam to restore Baghdad's security, while Gol officials are increasingly critical of the security plan and highlighted death squads as the single biggest threat to Iraq. Future media coverage is likely to continue scrutinizing violence in Baghdad, and increasing sectarian attacks will be linked to governmental failure to provide promised stability.


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Amaliya Ma'an ila Al-Amam


Can GOI guarantee security?



Perception of ISF



Who should provide security?



How to stop sectarian violence



Baghdad residents' perception of GOI's handling of security and ISF effectiveness both received a significant boost from the BSP. More than % of residents believe the IP and/or IA should provide local security. From May to June, there was a major shift in how residents believe sectarian violence can be stopped; more than a third now say 'cleanse the militias'.

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Baghdad VTC

MOI/MNSTC-I Support to Man, Train, Equip and Base Baghdad IPS


- **Man/Train:**
 - Auth 25,000; 24,685 Assigned; 19,010 Trained; 5,675 Untrained; 532 in Training.
 - Remaining Baghdad recruits will graduate as follows:
 - JPTC 30: 15 Aug - 113
 - BPC 30: 10 Aug - 328
 - TIPS: 3 Aug - 90
- **Equip:** All key equipment will be 100% OH by Aug 06.
- **Base:** 7 projects completed, 13 in progress, 17 more planned/funded. Due to 2006 Supplemental Decrement 3 planned/unfunded.
- **Sustain:**
 - **Maint:** A steady improvement in the development of a National maintenance plan will yield results later this year.
 - In the short term, MOI's logistic and maintenance capability will be heavily reliant on CF support. A 6 month CF funded vehicle maintenance contract for NP and Baghdad IPS is in place. The intent is for the MOI to continue with this contract.
 - \$950 K vehicle spare parts contract for all MOI forces, both National and Provincial is providing parts now through AGW.
 - \$350 K vehicle spare parts contract for Baghdad will be let in addition to the above contract.
 - **Fuel:**
 - MOI is still providing insufficient fuel.

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MNC-I Operations Update

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10 Support To Baghdad Security

EXPAND THE MERGE

Effect: Iraqis reject terrorist ideology

Theme: AQI are thieves, murdering criminals

Messages:

- AQI has no plan for the future of Iraq

- Reject ideology of terrorist

- Assassinate: Use a hope to death is danger

Products:

- When 3: Expanding the Merger TVC: 29 June - 13 July 06

- When 4: Expanding the Merger TVC: 19 July - 8 Aug 06

- Voice of the People DOCS: (Iraqi city July) to July - TBD

- Point of View DOCS: (Iraqi city July) to July - TBD

- On the Street DOCS: pulling of Mowadakatani 19 July - TBD

- TV, Radio, Newspapers, Op-ed/Ad/Interviews

AQI FAILURE

Effect: AQI's ability to recruit is disrupted

Theme: AQI's failure is AQI success

Messages:

- AQI is losing

- Leadership Domino Theory

- Those who join will suffer the same fate


- AQI is losing

- Focus is to join the political process

Products:

- Anticipation/Adm: AQI: Anticipation: likely release

- Newspaper Op-Eds



~~DELINE IN RED COPY AND CHIT AND DONT //~~

MILITIAS

- to these "all attack the innocent"

ISF IN THE LEAD

- we will find you

BAGHDAD FOCUS GROUPS

GROUPS:

- SUMMARY OF RESPONSES:

- 16

MND-B

BAGHDAD SECURITY

BRIEF

MNF-I VTC
19 JUL Y 06

17

Attacks in MND-B

0001 10 to 2400 16 July

- Attack Average: 65 / day
June Attack Average: 51 / day
Baghdad Attack Average: 32 / day
Baghdad June Attack Avg: 23 / day
• IED and Small Arms Fire: 56 % of total attacks
• Attack surge on 13 July: 81 attacks


Assessment:

- Expect attack levels to remain near 65 per day for the next 48 hours consisting of small arms fire, murders and IEDs.
- Murder incidents will remain above average levels with the highest rates remaining in Doura
- Expect VBIED attacks to remain at the 1-3 per day average targeting local national gathering areas and ISF check points

Enemy Vulnerabilities:

- ALF are dependent on support zones to conduct operations
- Negative IO for large number of Iraqi civilian casualties in VBIED attacks


17 JUL 2006 FOR DISSEM ONLY TO HQ



◆ IED ● VBIED ② MURDERS ● EFP ④ SVIED

18

Total Attacks in Baghdad Beladiyehs



- Total attacks still above Pre-Samarra averages. Significant increase in SAF and Rocket attacks.
- IED attacks have increased. AIF and Militias continue to adjust TTPs to counter the security measures of OIF effects

MA'AN ILA AL-AMAM Weekly Assessment

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OVERVIEW AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS - FOCUS AREAS (FA ZONES)

- THERE WERE 3 ATTACKS IN AL-SAMARRA: - 3 IEDs (2 x detonated, 1 x found)
- 1 IED
- 1 VBIED
- THERE WERE 27 ATTACKS IN DOUBAI FA: - 10 IEDs (7 x detonated, 3 x found)
- 10 x Murders of Iraqi Nationals
- 14 x SAF attack
- THERE WERE 10 ATTACKS IN MANSOOR FA: - 3 IEDs (2 x detonated, 1 x found)
- 3 IEDs (2 x detonated, 1 x found)
- 3 IEDs (2 x detonated, 1 x found)
- 1 IED
- 1 IED
- THERE WERE 3 ATTACKS IN DUBAI FA: - 1 IED (detonated)
- 1 IED
- 1 IED
- 1 IED
- THERE WERE 9 ATTACKS IN SAOOR CITY FA: - 1 IED (detonated)
- 1 IED
- 1 IED
- 1 IED
- 1 IED

Focus Areas	14-20 MAR	3-9 JUL	10-16 JUL
Baghdad	10	15	25
Doors	5	10	20
Manusoor	5	10	20
Saoor City	5	10	20

ATTACK METRICS - BELADIYAS

Attack Type	10-16 JUL
SAF UP	44
IED (Found)	20
IED (Det)	46
KIDNAPPING	10
MONTAR	33
MURDER	51
ROCKET	4
VBIED	1
Total	219


Attack Type	14-20 MAR	3-9 JUL	10-16 JUL
SAF UP	10	15	25
IED (Found)	20	20	20
IED (Det)	46	46	46
KIDNAPPING	10	10	10
MONTAR	33	33	33
MURDER	51	51	51
ROCKET	4	4	4
VBIED	1	1	1
Total	219	219	219



Assessment:

- Total number of attacks increased in comparison to Sadr's of justice daily averages. IEDs (Admariyah and Douair) most significant increase.
- Daily attack averages in the Mansoor and Sadr City focus areas decreased, but increased in the Douair and Rusafa.
- Murders within the focus areas of Douair and Rusafa increased from the previous week, as Sunni AIF and Shia militants continue sectarian attacks.
- Overall attacks will remain elevated, mostly consisting of IEDs, SAF against IIP and Iraqi Police CPs, and murders against civilians.

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MND-B Operations
(03 July – 16 July)

MND-B Operations (03 July - 16 July)	
Operational Summary	
Patrols	12,123
Cordons and Searches	253
Raid	12
TCPs	17,681
Caches Found	27
AIF KIA	36
AIF WIA	4
AIF Detained	133

140 CPs run/day (all 15E)
+ 20 emergency CPs on outskirts.
patients inside Bagbyday 150/day, not
including 10's

Targeting Successes Against Murderers

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(b)(6)

over CRS of unit
S-15 focused Auth
Sgt ops.
CRS of training
additional 446/night

IP Manning Levels for Baghdad Province

POLICE DISTRICT/ BELADIAH	AUTH BY POLICE STATION	1 JULY PSNR + ASSIGNMENTS	DIFFERENCE
Al Mansour	3,428	3,316	-112
Al Bayza/Al Douja	2,206	2,037	-169
Al Adhamiya	1,570	1,561	11
Al Kadhimiya	2,034	2,125	91
Thawra	1,945	2,087	142
New Baghdad	2,806	2,616	-190
Al Karrada	2,283	2,328	33
Mahmudiya	1,328	364	-964
Tarmiya	508	261	-247
Abu Ghareb	261	158	-103
Mada'in	648	653	285
Rusafa	2,528	2,813	285
Kutiba	1,889	2,458	569
Al Zuhour	1,254	1,221	-33
TOTAL	25,084	24,016	-1,068

OP
Together Fwd
Short 270

Short 1,068
4.3% of
Auth

Untrained IPs: 3,282

NOTE: These numbers include all provincial IPS forces: Police, Traffic, Patrol
and their supporting headquarters

PRIORITY OF FILL

As of 1 July 08

CG's Comments

25

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Murder & Execution Change Detection

Victim Locations May through June 08

Kadhamiyah/Adhamiyah
SW2


Nur
(Kadhamiyah)
SW2

Ur and Sadr City
SW2


Masafee (Al Daura)
fell 34% (148 down to 98 killings)
SW2

Density
Attacks per Sq Km
Decreasing
Increasing

Assessment: JAM is likely responsible for majority of ongoing sectarian killings in Baghdad. JAM killings in Sadr City include Shi'a victims of punishment committees and Shari'a courts. High concentration of bodies in Kadhamiyah/Adhamiyah found lodged in river bend - likely dumped up river.



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~~FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO IRQ~~



MAJOR ENEMY ACTIONS - MAHMUDIYAH (MND-B)


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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AIF TARGETS (ALL ACTIONS) – MAHMUDIYAH (MND-B)

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
Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
 USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
 Declassified on: 201506



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CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY ACTION- MAHMUDIYAH (MND-B)



- Sum of CFWIA
- Sum of CFKIA
- Sum of ISFWIA
- Sum of ISFKIA
- Sum of CIVWIA
- Sum of CIVKIA

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