MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

OPERATIONS ORDER 05 - 02

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HEADQUARTERS, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS–IRAQ
Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09316
1 Apr 05

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

OPERATIONS ORDER 05-02

PARTNERSHIP: FROM INITIAL TO POST-CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS

(U) References:

a. (U) US Joint Publication 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning
b. (U) Maps and Charts.  US DoD Iraq-Support Study dated Jun 03
c. (S//REL) MNF-I Campaign Plan: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 5 Aug 04
d. (S//REL) MNF-I Campaign Action Plan: 2005 Way Ahead, Draft 28 Jan 05

1. (S//REL) Situation.  This OPORD will serve as the baseline for operations during OIF 04-06 and lay a way ahead for subsequent OIF rotations.  This is an amalgamated OPORD; its flow may differ from that of a traditional document because only the active requirements are included.  The intent of this OPORD is to help lay the foundation for Iraqi Self reliance, with intermediate goals of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and National Iraqi Control (NIC) desired to be complete by year’s end.  The major combat victories against the AIF in 2004 and the January 2005 elections provided significant momentum towards rebuilding a new democratic Iraqi government. The remainder of 2005 should see a significant increase in ISF independent operations as the ISF assumes the lead in COIN operations with a corresponding transfer from direct support to overwatch for Coalition forces.

a. (S//REL) General. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) continues to progress: Al Qaida (AQ) is fractured, yet dangerous, with the leadership taking temporary sanctuary in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban movement is all but extinguished. There is, however, clear evidence of the migration of AQ elements into Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. AQ and allied elements are drawing on their dispersion, OPSEC, environment and popular support to provide resources and freedom of movement to mount operations globally with no regard for the constraints of international laws, norms or borders. Many of those operations are currently being mounted from within Iraq, against Iraqis. In Iraq, the Coalition has seen itself step from liberation into occupation and, as that period has drawn to a close, to partnership in support of Iraq’s movement to a representative and constitutionally-elected government. Within the country there remains a complex mosaic of those who would wish to undermine the legitimate government and to destabilize or disrupt Iraq for their own purposes. This element comprised primarily of Former Regime Extremists, Senior Ba’ath Party Officials under the former regime, and their recruits compose 75 – 85% of Iraq’s current threat. Within those elements are insurgents and terrorists who would seek to undermine the legitimate government and the work of the MNF-I through the use of armed force. Successful MNF-I / ISF operations and targeting has severely hampered their ability to conduct operations, resulting in the attempted formation of alliances between once diametrically opposed elements in order to survive. These insurgents must be the focus of
MNC-I’s security activities. MNF-I will work with a succession of Iraqi Governments (IG), and with the ISF, as the country transitions to a constitutionally-elected representative government in 2006. The UN will have a key role to play in this period of change, both as advisors and as the representatives of international legitimacy. The protection of, and support to, the UN will be essential, especially by helping to expedite free and fair elections.

(1) (S//REL) **Environment of Conflict.** There are three dimensions to the insurgent situation in Iraq. The first dimension is the multi-ethnic Iraqi people. The second dimension is the Coalition Force (CF) in partnership with the legitimate Iraqi government (IG). The third dimension is the multi-faceted Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) perpetuating the insurgency. The fundamental focus of the current insurgency is the competition between the legitimate IG, supported by the CF, and the AIF for the active or passive support of the Iraqi people.

(2) (S//REL) The focus of the Coalition Forces’ counterinsurgency (COIN) effort in this wider campaign for the support of the Iraqi people is a four-fold task. The CF in partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will continue operations to neutralize the AIF. The CF, in partnership with the IG, will work to build Iraqi capacity to defeat the insurgency on its own through improving governance, capable security forces, economic development, and effective communications. The CF, in partnership with the IG, will operate diplomatically and militarily to reduce external support to the AIF and gain control of Iraq’s borders. The CF in partnership with the IG will conduct operations to consolidate gains in areas that have already experienced COIN success and operate to exploit this success by expanding into less stable areas as conditions warrant.

b. (U) **Policy Goals.**

(1) (S//REL) In 2005, MNC-I will work closely with the Iraq Transitional Government (ITG) to diminish the insurgency and prepare ISF and the ITG to begin to accept the counterinsurgency lead. MNC-I will also support the ITG’s efforts to complete the political process laid out in UNSCR 1546, advancing its vision of a “federal, democratic, pluralistic, and unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political and human rights.” We will capitalize on the momentum the January 30th election generated towards realizing these two primary goals by recognizing that they are mutually reinforcing: Suppressing the insurgency through military operations was integral to the January 30th elections and will continue to be integral to future political developments. Conversely, Iraq’s political development is a major component of the counterinsurgency. That said, each goal within this unified political-military strategy is ambitious in its own right. Achieving both simultaneously will require extensive technical, economic, diplomatic and public affairs support, in conjunction with observing and reporting extant Iraqi perspectives. We must always remember that Iraq is a sovereign nation – a government of the people of Iraq. There is a consistent message here: Iraq’s destiny belongs to Iraqis; they want to control it; and the more
they do for themselves the more they will value the results. (Joint Mission Statement, February 7th, 2005)

(2) (U) Legal Considerations.

(a) (U) UN Resolution.

(i) (S//REL) Authority. The MNF-I derives its authority from UN Security Council Resolution 1546 dated 8 June 2004 (in conjunction with the “exchange of letters” between the United States and Iraq). CPA Order 17 provides various protections which would normally be contained in a status of forces agreement until such time as a true bilateral agreement can be negotiated. UNSCR 1546 grants the following authorities:

1) (S//REL) A reaffirmation of the authorization for the MNF under unified command, under UNCSRC 1511.

2) (S//REL) Grants the MNF the authority to take all necessary means to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including preventing and deterring terrorism.

3) (S//REL) The right to detain and imprison Iraqi nationals based upon UNSCR 1546 granting MNF the ability to engage in the following: “... combat operations against members of these groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security.”

c. (U) Area of Concern.

(1) (S//REL) Area of Responsibility. CG MNC-I is responsible for the conduct of operations within the national borders of Iraq (C2PC & MCS Light version available in ANNEX C, Appendix 5). An outline map of the AOR and current force lay down is as follows:
(2) **Area of Interest.** For MNC-I, the Area of Interest is principally Iraq and its neighboring countries. The region contains allies and friends that support the mission (such as Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) as well as present a threat to Coalition operations and the sovereignty and security of Iraq. Cross border activity will remain a problem as seeks to gain and maintain influence over the Shia population, while continues to support former Ba’athists by allowing them sanctuary. Destabilization of the moderate Shia majority would pose a major threat to MNC-I objectives. offers a potentially more disruptive and near-term problem. The sympathy apparent for the Ba’athist cause, and the evident support to the insurgents -- in particular to elements and individuals from the former regime -- coupled with a porous border, present the Force with a challenge that will require early resolution in order to neutralize the Former Regime Extremist element of the insurgency. Additionally, MNC-I’s area of interest includes the Iraqi Government Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.
(3) (S//REL) Key Cities. In an effort to facilitate prioritization, we will focus our efforts on 21 key cities (see ANNEX B, APPENDIX 2, Key Cities and Province Assessment). If controlled, they will give the ITG a marked advantage towards successfully conducting the elections, while simultaneously neutralizing the insurgents. Perceptions of election validity and legitimacy, and the production of a representative government, both for the Iraqi people and in the UN and wider international community, would be strengthened by the control of these cities.
d. (U) **Risk.**

(1) *(S//REL)* ITG formation will be turbulent, and possibly violent. If the transition is paralyzed by infighting, it will jeopardize Sunni Arab (SA) reintegration and significantly affect momentum created during the election, Ashura and most recently, Arba'een.

(2) *(S//REL)* Successful COIN accompanied by parallel success reintegrating Iraqi SAs could trigger migration of insurgent violence to areas where we have accepted greater risk.

(3) *(S//REL)* The process of reintegration may create unrealistic SA expectations. If these expectations go unmet, explosive SA discontent could ensue. Conversely, reintegration efforts could trigger Shi'a blowback, if perceived as unreasonable. All groups during the post-election period will be attempting to secure as much control as possible.

(4) *(S//REL)* Uneven progress between LOOs could become particularly acute. For example, aggressive COIN accompanied by less substantial progress in governance and economic development could undermine SA reintegration by appearing deliberately heavy-handed and one-dimensional.

(5) *(S//REL)* The ISF still requires substantial assistance. However, pressure is mounting for a speedier handover of COIN responsibilities. Premature transfer of responsibilities would create security gaps that insurgents are eager to fill and would threaten the overall efficiencies of the emerging ISF capability.
(6) (S//REL) Uneven progress between the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) could be manifested in the inability to transition responsibility for enforcing the rule of law to the traditional guardian, the IPS. This situation would set the conditions for a potential return another authoritarian military regime, which is an unacceptable circumstance.

e. (U) **Enemy Forces.** See Annex B.

f. (S//REL) **Friendly Forces.** The friendly forces comprise the US-led multinational forces, the ISF, Elements of the United Nations (UN), the Government of Iraq (GOI), and a range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). (Ref Annex A-Task Organization.)

(1) (S//REL) **MNF-I Mission and Intent.**

(a) (S//REL) **Mission.** In partnership with the ITG, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and ISF by developing Iraqi security forces and ITG security ministries while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustenance of political and economic development.

(b) (S//REL) **Commander’s Assessment and Intent.** The campaign has already seen two phases (Liberation and Occupation); this campaign plan will take the MNF-I from occupation to the constitutional elections (Partnership).

(i) (S//REL) The period covered by this plan, from July 2004 to January 2006, will see the transformation of the Iraqi Government from an appointed body to a representative and constitutionally-elected government. This will include two elections (one in January 2005, and one in December 2005). During this period of political change, MNF-I will work in close consultation with Coalition missions and embassies to support the Iraqi Interim and Transitional Governments, in particular, the Ministries of the Interior and Defense, in order to enhance their legitimacy and their capacity to govern effectively.

(ii) (S//REL) The threat to security and stability in Iraq is from a complex mosaic of insurgents and discontents, following a range of agendas from across the ethnic and tribal groups and is variously supported by neighboring countries and international terrorists. The pre-eminent threat is presented by the insurgency comprised of Sunni Arab Rejectionists and Former Regime Extremists, supported by international terrorists centered in the Sunni Triangle, and receiving support from FRE leaders living in [14b] in terms of resources, safe haven and a route of supply across the border.
(iii) (S//REL) MNF-I will pursue a strategy in 2005 that focuses on progressively
transitioning responsibility for the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG
and ISF (Main Effort). MNF-I will work with the US and other coalition
missions to build the institutional capabilities of the government to plan and
direct counterinsurgency operations (including an improved Iraqi Intelligence
capability) and develop ISF capacity to conduct independent
counterinsurgency operations and to maintain domestic order in a
counterinsurgency environment. Coalition forces will maintain pressure on
the insurgents, but at gradually reduced levels, through the transition period.
As conditions, warrant more responsibility and, ultimately, potions of Iraq
will be passed to Iraqi control, thereby reducing coalition presence.

(iv) (S//REL) The MNF-I, in partnership with ISF, will neutralize the insurgency
by driving a wedge between the insurgents and the people of Iraq, separating
them from their supporters and potential supporters. This will be done by
conducting full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. Concurrently, the
campaign will be pursued along the political, economic and strategic
communications lines of operation. Through synchronization of the activities
and resources of the Coalition missions and embassies, the lives and
conditions of the moderate population will be improved to encourage
reconciliation and inclusion of the fringe population and deny assistance to the
insurgents from neighboring countries. These activities will be informed by an
improved and coordinated intelligence effort, working in concert with Iraqi
intelligence resources.

(v) (S//REL) The momentum and tempo of the campaign will be driven forward
by a “drumbeat” of positive activity, underpinned by a Strategic
Communications effort publicizing the positive activities of the IG to enhance
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Government, while highlighting the
negative aspects of the actions and activities of those who seek to undermine
the better interests of the Iraqi people. This message will be reinforced by the
responsible conduct of all members of the force, demonstrating respect for the
people of Iraq and changing the image of the Coalition from occupying force
to supporter and protector, with common interests and shared goals for the
future of Iraq.

(c) (S//REL) MNC-I will develop ISF capacity to conduct independent
counterinsurgency operations in order that the ITG and ISF can assume
responsibility for the counterinsurgency campaign. This effort will rely on a
multi-faceted counterinsurgency campaign to bring together all lines of operation.
This comprehensive approach is reflected in the objectives of the US Ambassador
and Commander, MNF-I that follow.

(i) (S//REL) Complete the UNSCR 1546 political process, with focused effort on
achieving a federal, democratic, pluralistic and unified Iraq.
(ii) (S//REL) In conjunction with the ITG, develop a comprehensive long-term approach to Iraq.

(iii) (S//REL) Defeat the campaign of intimidation, and force the insurgency and foreign terrorists to a level that can be contained by the Iraqis.

(iv) (S//REL) Continue ISF development and transition the counterinsurgency effort to the Iraqis.

(v) (S//REL) Continue economic development and reconstruction efforts by encouraging necessary internal economic reforms and enlisting additional economic support from other countries and international financial institutions.

(vi) (S//REL) Enhance Iraq’s external security through diplomatic efforts focused on deterring interference in Iraqi internal affairs and building “win-win” relationships with its neighbors.

(vii) (S//REL) Enhance the capacity of Iraqi ministries and improve links between the central government and provinces.

(d) (U) In addition, the following objectives require continued focus.

(i) (S//REL) Change the Iraqis’ perceptions of Coalition Forces.

(ii) (S//REL) Guard against strategic surprise.

(iii) (S//REL) Build teamwork between embassies, MNF-I and the IG, and sustain the multi-national Coalition.

(e) (S//REL) End State. Iraq at peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven to terrorists.

(g) (S//REL) Centers of Gravity (COG). Centers of Gravity are a source, or sources, of power. At the operational level, the Center of Gravity is the single thing that allows other entities to act or accomplish tasks. At the tactical level, the COG is someone or something that protects or enables the operational level Center of Gravity.

(1) (S//REL) Operational. Presently, Coalition Forces, the ISF, and Anti-Iraqi Forces are struggling for the support of the Iraqi people. Recognizing this, MNC-I has identified The Sunni People as the Operational Level Center of Gravity. The construct below depicts and defines the COG, its critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. Of the three elements of the Iraqi Population, the sector with primary importance to this insurgency and where MNC-I can have the most impact is by focusing on the Sunni element of the population.
(2) **Operational Summation.** In order to influence the operational Center of Gravity, there are several actions that MNC-I must take. First, MNC-I must build an effective ISF. By targeting the critical vulnerabilities listed above, particularly the security environment, MNC-I will reduce AIF sanctuary and freedom of action while raising the confidence of the Iraqi people in their government. Second, MNC-I must assist with the political development process. By increasing the capabilities of the Iraqi political system, MNC-I will not only build the confidence of the Sunni people in their government, but will also set the conditions for the government to achieve self-reliance. Third, MNC-I must assist with the delivery of basic services to the Iraqi people. By completing the “last mile” with regard to electricity, water, and sanitation, MNC-I will improve the quality of life for the Iraqi people and directly impact the insurgent’s critical requirements. Finally, MNC-I must execute focused Information Operations in order to increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government while simultaneously criminalizing those associated with or part of the insurgency.

(3) **Tactical.** MNC-I has identified the Friendly Center of Gravity as the ISF and the Threat Center of Gravity as the Sunni Arab Fence Sitter. While not direct mirror images, both have the ability to influence the Operational Center of Gravity. MNC-I must directly affect both tactical COGs to ensure success at the Operational Level. In particular, MNC-I must kill/capture/co-opt Former Regime Elements, kill or capture Terrorists, and engage Sunni Arab Rejectionists. With regard to the ISF, MNC-I must initially ensure the success of the Greater Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police.
Service and subsequently fully develop the Facilities Protection Service and Department of Border Enforcement.

The Tactical Center of Gravity Enables or Blocks Access to the Operational Center of Gravity

**TACTICAL THREAT COG**

- Center of Gravity: Sunnis Arab Forces/Sitter
- Critical Capabilities: Manpower, Support, Financial and Sanction, Freedom of Movement
- Critical Requirements: Peace & Reconciliation, Effective local government, Effective leadership, Law of Successful Service, No Hope for the Future
- Critical Vulnerabilities: Secure Environment, Basic Services, Participation and Feasibility of a Better Future

**TACTICAL FRIENDLY COG**

- Center of Gravity: ISF
- Critical Capabilities: ISF
- Critical Requirements: Resource & Sustainment, Effective and Trained Personnel, Effective Leadership, Partnership and Transition Teams
- Critical Vulnerabilities: Secure Environment, Basic Services, Participation and Feasibility of a Better Future

**CRITICAL PATH**

- Equip, Train, Advise, Employ ISF
- Engage Key Sunni Leaders
- Eliminate AIF Sanctuaries
- Complete the “Last Mile” Focused to Effort
- Disrupt AIF Influence (Misinformation)
- Popular Support and Legitimacy of ISF

(4) **S//REL** Tactical Summation. In order to influence the Tactical Center of Gravity, there are several actions that MNC-I must take. First, MNC-I must train, equip, mentor and employ the ISF. The Partnership, Military Transition Team (MiTT), Police Partnership Program (P3), and Border Transition Team (BTT) programs are the primary ways to increase the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces. By developing Iraqi capabilities MNC-I will reduce Coalition requirements and reduce the effectiveness of the Anti-Iraqi Forces. Second, MNC-I must improve Coalition and ISF integration. While the partnership programs will help with integration, joint/independent patrols and Iraqi forces assuming battlespace are the true measures of integration. Successful transition of areas to Iraqi control will not only increase the confidence of the ISF, but will also improve their capability. Third, MNC-I must engage key leaders in the Sunni community. By targeting these individuals, bringing them into the political fold, and providing them a better future, the Coalition is indirectly limiting the capabilities of the AIF. Fourth, by eliminating our own seams and denying AIF sanctuary from Coalition Forces, MNC-I will reduce the insurgents ability to intimidate the Sunni Arab population and assist the GOI with protection of...
their resources. Finally, MNC-I must also execute focused Information Operations at the tactical level. IO will display the capabilities of the ISF, GOI and isolate the insurgents from the rest of the population, particularly with the Sunni Arab population.

h. (U) **Facts.**

(1) Iraqi Sunni Arabs (SAs) are fundamentally nationalistic in their orientation; their political identity is traditionally expressed through participation in/control of state institutions.

(2) Iraqi SAs comprise 12-16% of the population, are predominantly urban, and were disproportionately represented in professional ranks.

(3) Greater than 50% of Iraqis are under 25 years old and vulnerable to radicalization.

(4) SA political organization is weak; de-Ba’athification excluded experienced political actors.

(5) There is entrenched SA skepticism toward Iraq’s new political order—particularly, with regard to a Shi’a dominated government.

(6) Rival Shi’a/Kurdish populations are mistrustful of Iraqi SAs.

(7) CF remains “occupiers” to the vast majority of SAs.

(8) SA disenfranchisement is a key enabler for the insurgency.

(9) There is no common SA or insurgent identity; the insurgency reflects diverse, even divergent, secular/religious political interests—Saddamists, FRE, SAR, Iraqi Salafists, foreign extremists.

(10) We have imposed effective security episodically in specific SA localities, but only by assuming risk and concentrating all available resources.

(11) Security in some SA localities depends on the continued, heavy presence of ISF/CF.

(12) Discretionary funds for 2005 are largely controlled by the ITG.

i. (U) **Assumptions.**

1. **Political**

   (a) (S//REL) The Iraqi constitutional process progresses toward a seated government by 31 Dec 05.

   (b) (S//REL) AIF will attempt to influence the constitutional process.

   (c) (S//REL) Provincial leadership structures will be established in time for transition to provincial control.

   (d) (S//REL) GOI will increasingly exercise sovereignty and impact on Coalition operations.
(e) **(S//REL)** The Government of Iraq will maintain legitimacy with population but have limited initial effectiveness.

(f) **(S//REL)** Sunni Arab (SA) redlines include: mandated adherence to Velayat-e Faqih; regional control of natural resources; alterations to TAL Article 61; ethnic/religious based military formations; integration of militias; and appointments based on confessional identity. Continued SA exclusion, combined with violations of SA redlines would substantially increase the prospect of sectarian conflict and jeopardize effective governance.

(g) **(S//REL)** Formation of the ITG will be contentious, disruptive, and potentially violent; complicating delicate efforts to reintegrate SAs.

(2) **(U)** Social

(a) **(S//REL)** The greatest fear of Iraqi SAs is permanent disenfranchisement; many SAs perceive the election as a missed opportunity.

(b) **(S//REL)** Election results, if combined with perceived SA marginalization, would reinforce disenfranchisement and harden many SA attitudes against reintegration.

(c) **(S//REL)** Only the ITG can reverse entrenched SA disenfranchisement and affect reintegration.

(d) **(S//REL)** Significant political organization according to religion and ethnicity is unavoidable.

(e) **(S//REL)** Many insurgents can be rehabilitated.

(f) **(S//REL)** A reconciliation/rehabilitation process establishing purposeful alternatives to armed resistance would assist in reintegrating SA rejectionists.

(g) **(S//REL)** Absent perceived alternatives, many will continue withholding consent from Iraq’s political transformation.

(h) **(S//REL)** The insurgency will continue at the present level through 2005; some insurgent resistance to the Iraq’s central government will persist indefinitely.

(i) **(S//REL)** ITG will remain committed to MNF-I presence. However, external pressure will grow in favor of speedier CF withdrawal.

(j) **(U)** A majority of SAs would likely commit to Iraq’s new political order if they believed their minimum economic, political, and security aspirations were guaranteed and their redlines inviolable.
(k) (U) Adequate SA representation in state institutions is likely viewed among many as a surer guarantee of security and status than even political representation.

(3) (U) **Security**

(a) (S//REL) By 1 SEPT 05, up to 44 Army Battalions with MiTTs will be capable of tactical COIN Operations.

(b) (S//REL) Properly resourced, trained, and supported ISF will be capable of conducting successful counterinsurgency operations but performance will remain mixed.

(c) (S//REL) The coalition will remain intact and partners will support adjusted concept of operation. 3-6 months of diplomatic negotiations are required to allow adjusted missions.

(d) (S//REL) Emerging capability in Iraqi MOD and MOI will shape operations in the AOR.

(e) (S//REL) The Iraqi National Intelligence Service achieves limited effectiveness in the foreseeable future.

(f) (S//REL) Security situation across country will not be uniform.

(g) (S//REL) ISF Battalions are capable of owning limited battlespace in a Coalition AOR.

(h) (S//REL) Development of ISF forces will continue as planned. However, up to four provinces will likely not achieve provincial control in 2005, al Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, and Baghdad.

(i) (S//REL) There will be no increase in the CF levels and there will likely be decreases.

(j) (S//REL) IPS must develop to a point that allows it to assume the lead in defeating the insurgency and enforcing the rule of law, thus allowing the Army to transition to national security and protection from external threats.

(4) (U) **Economic**

(a) (S//REL) Economic conditions preclude widespread unrest; however, growing economic disparity and economic stagnation threatens to destabilize Iraq’s new democracy.

(b) (S//REL) Basic economic conditions will improve security conditions.
(c) (S//REL) Economic development and assistance will continue but will not meet expectations.

(5) (U) Information

(a) (S//REL) GOI will develop some STRATCOM capability.

(b) (S//REL) AIF information operations targeting Iraqi and regional audiences remain effective.

(c) (S//REL) Select regional and international information operations continue to seek to discredit coalition operations.

(6) (U) Infrastructure

(a) (S//REL) Infrastructure security continues to limit delivery of basic needs and services.

(b) (S//REL) AIF continue to target infrastructure.

(c) (S//REL) Much of the country’s infrastructure requires replacing and extensive repair IOT be effective. Years of neglect have resulted in the system’s current inability to meet growing demands.

j. (U) Iraqi Security Forces.

(1) (S//REL) ISF are progressing at varying rates with most still lacking the capacity to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations. The key elements to be addressed include: leadership; establishing properly manned, equipped, trained and capable headquarters; reversing poor administrative care that results in absenteeism while instilling a warrior ethos committed to service to the nation.

(2) (S//REL) In addition to the MNC-I focus (the Greater Iraqi Army), efforts to develop capable Iraqi national intelligence organizations as a key element in counterinsurgency are at an early stage. The development of police and military intelligence remains a key focus though these will progress at different rates than the Army.
**IRAQI SECURITY FORCE MISSIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police (IPS)</td>
<td>- Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force</td>
<td>- Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commands</td>
<td>- Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Emergency Response Unit (ERU)</td>
<td>- Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>- Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Battalion (POB)</td>
<td>- Provide a national level policing capability in order to counter large scale civil disobedience and insurgency activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Services (FPS)</td>
<td>- An organization of trained, armed, uniformed entities charged with providing static security for ministry and government offices, government infrastructure, and fixed sites under the Director and control of government ministries and government administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement (DBE)</td>
<td>- Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>- Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convey security along major highways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Diplomatic Protection</td>
<td>- Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi diplomatic missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Army (RA)</td>
<td>- Defend Iraq against external threats. - When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Army (IA)</td>
<td>- Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of security objectives, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. - Conduct Constituency visits in support of internal security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Force (IFP)</td>
<td>- Conduct operations to defeat and fight Iraqi, and primary focus on urban areas - Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraq National Guard can maintain law and order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commando Battalion</td>
<td>- Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force - Similar organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terrorist Task Force (SOF)</td>
<td>- Direct action counter terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorism function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>- Provide aerial reconnaissance, and intelligence and fixed wing transport for Iraq Security Forces and authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>- Conduct security operations off the Iraqi coast and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles. - In conjunction with DNC, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling, and other unlawful activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 6 (S/REL) Table**

k. **(S/REL) Adjacent Supporting Commands and Agencies.**

(1) MNSTC-I: Organize, train, equip, mentor Iraqi Security Forces, in order to support Iraqi's ultimate goal of a unified, stable and democratic Iraq, which provides a representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growth market economy; and is able to defend itself and not pose a threat to the region.

(2) GRD

(3) TF 1.4

2. **(S/REL) Mission.** MNC-I develops Iraqi Security Forces to allow the progressive transition of Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations to the Government of Iraq and neutralizes the Anti Iraqi Forces (AIF) to establish a secure environment and set conditions for successful completion of UNSCR 1546.

3. **(U) Execution.**

a. **(U) Commander’s Intent**
(1) **(S//REL) Purpose.** To create a security environment that permits completion of the political process and progressively transitions responsibility for COIN operations to the ISF while enabling the ITG to establish domestic order and transition to Self Reliance.

(2) (U) **Key Tasks.**

(a) **(S//REL)** Develop capable Iraqi Security Forces by establishing Partnerships that capitalize on Iraqi capabilities and prepare the ISF to take the lead in Counterinsurgency Operations.

(b) **(S//REL)** Implement Transition Team Programs throughout the Iraqi Security Forces to increase their capabilities.

(c) **(S//REL)** Maintain momentum against the AIF by continuing shaping operations and conducting COIN to deny the enemy the ability to regroup while transitions teams and partnerships are established.

(d) **(S//REL)** Neutralize the AIF intimidation campaign in Mosul, Baghdad, and Al Anbar.

(e) **(S//REL)** Transition battlespace to Iraqi Control when ready by synchronizing CF and ISF capabilities to facilitate security operations.

(f) **(S//REL)** Execute IO that exploits opportunities in a timely manner IOT change the public image of the AIF, in order to separate the people from the AIF, and deny the AIF’s ability to influence the people of Iraq while promoting the legitimacy of the GOI. Initially priority will focus on the predominantly Sunni Areas of Al Anbar, Baghdad, and Nineveh.

(g) **(S//REL)** Assist the ITG and Provincial governments in developing and securing infrastructure at the local level to ensure delivery of basic needs and essential services.

(h) **(S//REL)** Continue the support and maintenance of JCCs and PJCCs.

(i) **(S//REL)** Coordinate with border security forces and develop their capability.

(j) **(S//REL)** Support the Iraqi Transitional Government in safeguarding the political process and the due process of law.

(k) **(S//REL)** Respect the people of Iraq and their culture.

(3) **(S//REL) Endstate.** ISF assumes responsibility for leading the Counter Insurgency Campaign and is capable of defeating the insurgency. AIF are unable to influence the democratic process and lack credibility with the majority of the population. AIF denied sanctuary. Key infrastructure protected. Territorial integrity of Iraq protected by the ISF. Coalition Forces postured for a conditions-based withdrawal of designated forces. The GOI establishes the rule of law and is recognized as legitimate by the people of Iraq.
Operational Objectives. (4) In support of the MNF-I Campaign plan, the OPORD takes MNC-I, in partnership with the Government of Iraq (GOI), from Local Control to the constitutional elections in December 2005, and sets conditions for a long-term relationship with respect to the MNF-I desired endstate. Operations will center on four Lines of Operation (LOO): Security; Governance; Economic Development; and Communicating. These lines of operation are described by their associated objectives. The security line of operation is the critical path to successful MNC-I operations. The other LOOs are supporting efforts to enable the security LOO. The security objectives are:

(a) OBJECTIVE: A CAPABLE ISF. Defined as a force that is properly organized, trained, equipped, employed, and respected by the Iraqi people.

(b) OBJECTIVE: AIF NEUTRALIZED. Defined as a force that can no longer destroy infrastructure, deny essential services, intimidate the Iraqi people or conduct effective ongoing operations against the interests of Iraq or the Iraqi people. Effect is achieved through intelligence led operations, deterred through Information Operations, dislocated by isolating from popular support, and ultimately defeated through direct action by the ISF.

Developing capable ISF will be the cornerstone of the security LOO. MNC-I support efforts to enhance the governance and judicial system of the Iraq
government will be a key component in the Iraqi government gaining legitimacy. The governance objective is:

(c) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: LEGITIMATE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. Defined as an establishment of a legitimate representative government which enforces rule of law and is capable of providing basic services.

(S//REL) It is also important that MNC-I support the development of the fundamental aspects of the nation’s viability that will lead to improving the prospects and standards of living of the population through economic reconstruction.

(d) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: IRAQI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPING. Defined as development of Iraqi structures and institutions needed to support economic growth.

(S//REL) These second and third LOO will have direct stabilizing effects on the security LOO and will help to isolate the insurgents from the support of the Iraqi people. The fourth line underpins the first three. The need to communicate the successes of the ISF and the IG will generate an irreversible momentum to operations, and will overwhelm the disruptive and negative aspects of our adversaries’ actions. This fourth line of operation, communicating, will strengthen the commitment of the operational COG, while undermining that of the insurgency.

(e) (S//REL) OBJECTIVE: IRAQIS SUPPORT THEIR GOVERNMENT. Defined as greater than 50% of each major ethnic group believe that their culture / ethnic / religious / personal interests are satisfactorily represented by the government

(5) (S//REL) The Effects Based Process.

(a) Effects based operations is a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations to attain the effects required to achieve desired objectives. This is an effects based OPORD and is designed to be supported by accurate and flexible targeting along all four lines of operation. The ability to assess the physical, behavioral, intended, and unintended effects described in this document is critical to the effects based process.

(b) The objectives described in the OPORD identify the Commander's priorities and are designed to provide guidance so supporting units can coordinate available assets in order to positively influence the situation; as assessments are completed it is incumbent upon planners to develop contingency plans to reinforce success or address less than satisfactory progress.

(c) The Corps Targeting Process will be driven by the planning process and will ensure limited assets are identified, prioritized and placed against particular target sets in order to achieve the desired effects.
(d) Finally, the Assessment Process will serve two purposes: 1) it will evaluate the current plan with regard to its effectiveness in achieving the identified objectives and desired effects, and 2) it will provide the data necessary for the planners to develop contingency plans.

(e) The way ahead after publication includes comprehensive assessments ICW MNF-I, MSCs, and Interagency Representatives in the June and September timeframe. Another comprehensive assessment will be required in the January – March 2006 timeframe to determine if this order has run its course requiring publication of another capstone order. This order deliberately focuses on the development of the Greater Iraqi Army as the primary means to achieve the essential security environment. Subsequent orders will require focus on the role of the IFS in establishing the rule of law and the final transition of Coalition presence in Iraq.
security environment that allows the democratic process to continue. The ISF’s ability to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations within their own battlespace secures the Sunni Arab Population (Center of Gravity) and allows a level of engagement and reintegration in support of the Iraqi Government. Security is the decisive Line of Operation (LOO) for MNC-I. This LOO focuses on two critical objectives: The first objective is the continued development of capable ISF IOT allow transition of COIN operations to the ISF. Coalition support will correspondingly decrease during this time but ensure no failure of ISF units at battalion level or above. The second objective is neutralizing the AIF. This will be accomplished by ending the AIF intimidation campaign, protecting critical infrastructure, eliminating sanctuaries and extremists attempts to influence the will of the people, and thereby preventing them from actively supporting the government of Iraq.

(b) (S//REL) MNC-I Decisive Operations. The development of the ISF capability is the Corps’ Main Effort. Initially, the key task for MSCs is to establish Partnerships and to embed Transition Teams with BN, BDE, and Division ISF formations. Through Partnership and Transition Teams, Coalition Forces will dedicate maximum effort to develop capable Iraqi Security Forces. MND-NC is the initial Priority of Effort (POE) for ISF resources. This allows MND-NC to develop ISF capabilities the fastest IOT allow these forces to assume control of designated battlespace, subsequently freeing Coalition Forces for flexible employment. On order, the priority for ISF resources shifts to MND-CS and then MNB-NW. MNB-NW is the initial Corps POE for available Coalition Forces and effects. MNB-NW neutralizes the AIF IOT establish a security environment until the ISF are capable of assuming the COIN lead. Once the security environment has been established in MNB-NW that allows transition of control to the ISF the POE for Coalition Forces and effects shifts to MND-Baghdad. Initially, MND-B is second in Priority for Coalition effects due to Baghdad’s relevance as the seat of Iraqi power, the large population center, and because it is the focus of the continuing democratic process. MND-B secures greater Baghdad and neutralizes the AIF intimidation campaign IOT allow the completion of the political process. MNF-W initially disrupts AIF operations that influence the Baghdad and Mosul areas in support of MND-B and MNB-NW. Once irreversible momentum is achieved the POE for Coalition forces and effects shifts to MNF-W. MNF-W subsequently neutralizes AIF influence in Al Anbar IOT create a security environment that allows the ISF to assume control and allows the Sunni population to be further engaged in the political process. Concurrent with MOD and GIA development, the Ministry of the Interior will be developed through the Police Partnership Program (P3). P3 will focus on three areas: Reconstruction of failed police organizations, developing law enforcement administrative systems and infrastructure and establishing Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs) and Provincial JCCs to facilitate MOI and MOD coordination as well as provide access to Coalition Forces. Momentum gained by MOD forces during phase I and II will be advanced as the MOI matures its capability during Phase III and IV, eventually taking the lead for COIN operations.
(S/REL) Significant to the operation is the Corps’ ability to maintain popular momentum created by the successful employment of ISF during the national elections, Ashura, Arba’een and by successful operations against the AIF. This will be accomplished by transitioning provincial and national security responsibilities to independent Iraqi control as soon as possible, thus highlighting the Coalition’s intent to return Iraq to self reliance with the international community providing strategic overwatch. The order of transition for provinces will be determined by multiple factors and refined during the Corps Effects Assessment process. This process is described in Figure 9 and further refined in the Decision Guide (Annex U). Additional assessments will be conducted concerning the development of Iraqi Army Brigade capability to conduct autonomous tactical operations. MSCs will reassess these issues every 30 days and MNC-I will adjust priorities as necessary based on the effects assessment process. The intent is to send resources to those units postured to assume battlespace the quickest. The initial Provincial assessment and the Brigade assessment that are guidelines to be used as a starting point. Fidelity will be achieved following the second and third round of reporting with the Provincial Assessment and Army Validation Model. Development of ISF and the transition of battlespace as depicted in Table 10 are conditions based decisions, not time driven. The designated times are objectives ISO the MNF-I Campaign Plan. The ability to achieve these objectives will be assessed through the recurring Corps assessment process and the MNF-I Campaign Assessments scheduled for June and September 2005.
PROVINCIAL CONTROL
TRANSITION METHODOLOGY

Fig. 9 (S//REL) Diagram
(d) (S//REL) MNC-I coordinates and integrates ongoing Shaping Operations to set the conditions for the two key objectives. MNF-I sets conditions for Provincial Iraqi Control, National Iraqi Control, and Iraqi Self Reliance phases by coordinating operations with the United States Embassy, the Government of Iraq, and the JHQ / MOD / MOT to build Iraqi institutional capability and allow MNC-I freedom of action. MNF-I also coordinates with the US Embassy to set conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance through diplomatic efforts with neighboring countries. Diplomatic efforts will be focused on reducing support to AIF and on synchronizing the reconstruction priorities through USAID and GRD/PCO. The Intelligence Community supports operations by collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence against HVTs. In coordination with MNC-I, MNSTC-I sets conditions by the continued prioritized resourcing (man, train, and equip) of the Greater Iraqi Army and development of the Regular Army and Iraqi Police Forces ISO the Iraq Transitional Government. CFACC sets conditions by continued support of ground operations, including ISF operations, and by disrupting AIF operations illegally crossing Iraqi borders. CJSOTF-AP sets conditions by conducting Foreign Internal Defense in a mutually supporting relationship to MNC-I and its MSCs. CJSOTF-AP will assist Coalition Force Commander in the development of ISF. ODA's are in mutual support relationship with the CF in sector. [Joint definition: the action that units render each other against an adversary because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the adversary, and their inherent capabilities (Joint Pub 3-0, II-9)]. ODA's work in concert with CF & MiTTs against threats to Iraq, operate in the same battle space, and are chartered to train the ISF in tactical level targeting.
capability. ODAs will train the indigenous collection capability to feed the targeting process within the ISF assigned battle space. ODAs will assist the other elements in training (as coordinated with the battle space owner), but this is not the primary focus for the ODA. The ODAs primary function is to train scout/recce platoons to conduct tactical level intelligence operations IOT create organic targeting capability at the battalion level. MNC-I Information Operations (IO) will execute IO to support COIN operations in Iraq, legitimize the GOI, and change the public image of the AIF, thus denying their ability to influence the people of Iraq. This will be accomplished by building an ISF public information capacity which will publicize the successes of the ISF and the atrocities of the AIF. We will also demonstrate the competence and commitment of the GOI by publicizing the improvements in public safety, health, basic services, economic opportunities and infrastructure. IO efforts will be focused on preplanned, targeted events as much as possible IOT disseminate products concurrently with the actual event. We will keep in mind that the most effective products are those that are disseminated by, or through, the GOI. We will protect coalition forces through an aggressive OPSEC program and effective employment of Electronic Warfare assets with timely release of device programming updates. Inherent to the process is the continuous assessment of effectiveness and the modification of IO efforts IOT address the evolving perceptions of the Iraqi people. MNC-I conducts sustaining operations by the reducing threat on LOCs and shapes the environment of the MSCs by disrupting smuggling across the borders, supporting reconstruction and engagement operations, and providing Corps enablers to support MSC operations as required.

(e) The “ways” MNC-I will influence the critical objectives (“ends”) is through the allocation of resources that it controls. This ultimately provides the major subordinate commands (MSCs) the “means” to accomplish the objectives. To this end MNC-I will separate the categories of resources it controls and prioritize these based on the two primary objectives (develop a capable ISF and neutralize the AIF). (see Figure 14) Through the affects assessment process the method of prioritization will remain flexible to meet unanticipated opportunity or mitigate risks. MSCs will identify minimum essential requirements or potential risks throughout this process to ensure they are capable of meeting task requirements. The method of prioritization is intended to add structure and clarity to the weighting of efforts in support of the two objectives.

(f) (S//REL) This operation will be conducted in four phases:
### PHASING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
<th>PHASE III</th>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implement Transition Team Concept</td>
<td>Provincial Iraqi Control</td>
<td>National Iraqi Control (Division Control)</td>
<td>Iraqi Self Reliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### APR 05 - JUN 05
- Begins: RIP TOA
  - Complete. Begin shaping operations to allow move of additional Coalition Forces to MNB-NW.
  - Coalition Forces, ISF Partnerships established, and Transition Teams in place.

#### JUL 05 - SEP 05
- Begins: Turn over battlespace in Category A provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). MNB-NW reinforced with additional Coalition Forces (CFs).
- Postured to support ISF as required in CAT A provinces. Priority of Effort shifts to CAT B provinces to develop ISF Bde's and transition areas of operation.

#### OCT 05 - JAN 06
- Begins: All key provinces (Category A & 6 CAT B) at Provincial Control. Priority of Effort to remaining CAT B provinces for transition of PIC. ISF establishing sustainment and infrastructure capability.

#### FEB 06 - JUN 06
- Begins: ISF in control of 9 Division AORs. Priority of Effort to CAT C provinces for transition of PIC Sets conditions for additional coalition footprint adjustments. ISF building capability to assume the lead for enforcing the rule of law.

#### JUL 06 - As Required
- Begins: All provinces at National Control with the National government independently functioning with respect to constitutional requirements and public needs. Limited requirement for Coalition forces. Coalition presence reduced in all areas.

**Ends:** Coalition forces transitioning to Contingency Operating basins and in strategic overwatch from the horizon bases. Transition teams remain and work with security forces and government to support the GWOT.

---

**Fig. 11 (S//REL) Table**

(i) **(S//REL) Phase I (Implement Transition Teams and Transition of Category A Provinces - Shaping Operations)** begins with the establishment of Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) in existing Iraqi units by 1 April 2005. Coalition Forces establish Partnerships with designated units in their battlespace IOT ensure development of ISF capability. The phase ends with approximately 44 Iraqi Army battalions in control of battlespace, the transfer of seven Category A (CAT A) provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control (NLT 30 June 2005), all MiTTs established, all Partnerships formed, and all 21 key cities maintain domestic order by 30 June 2005. Stage A of this phase focuses on setting the conditions for transition of Category A provinces and setting the conditions to allow MNB-NW to be reinforced with additional Coalition Forces, up to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The decision to transition provinces is triggered after adequate ISF are available to maintain domestic order and the acceptance of control by the Iraqi Provincial governments.

**Priority of Effort** for development of ISF is to MND-NC, MND-CS then to MNB-NW, and MND-B (see Figure 14). Development of ISF and the transition of battlespace to ISF in the 10th Division AOR of Basrah, Missan, Thi-Qar, and Muthanna; and in Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulaymaniyyah is not dependent on additional resources as these provinces are already developing.
adequate security environments. The transition of these provinces to Iraqi Provincial Control is intended to gain significant popular support by demonstrating the Coalition's desire to reduce Coalition Forces and allow Iraqi Self Reliance. Priority of Effort for Coalition Forces and Effects is MNB-NW, B, W, and NC to ensure an adequate security environment exists to allow the repositioning of up to a BCT in support of MNB-NW in phase II. The order of transition for Brigade battlespace will be determined by multiple factors and continually refined during the Corps Effects Assessment process. The initial “GIA Brigade Development Priority List” list below indicates the status of these Brigades as of 1 April 2005.
(ii) MNC-I ensures conditions for transition of provinces and Iraqi Army Brigades are met during this phase by focusing operations and resources on mission requirements and continue to maintain domestic order across Iraq. Stage B commences when Category A provinces are turned over to Iraqi control. Once transitioned, MND-SE will realign its disposition within its battlespace and be prepared to:
1) Assist in training ISF and as well as other ISF development requirements (e.g. Future Regional / National Training Center, Government Transition Teams);

2) Prepare for subsequent operations within AOR (planning priorities include LOC security, convoy security, and fixed site security);

3) Pending National Authority approval, be prepared to conduct subsequent operations in MNC-I AOR. Planning priorities include operations in MND-CS AO, Dahuk, As Sulaymaniyah, An Najaf, or Karbala; or

4) Prepare to redeploy to home locations. These four employment options will remain constant thru Phase IV for all forces as they become available. At the conclusion of Phase I up to two Coalition brigades will potentially be available for these options depending on national caveats.

WEIGHTING THE PRIORITY OF EFFORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>PHASE I: IMPLEMENT TRANSITION TEAMS</th>
<th>PHASE II: PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL (DECISIVE OPERATIONS)</th>
<th>PHASE III: NATIONAL IRAQI RELIANCE</th>
<th>PHASE IV: IRAQI SELF RELIANCE</th>
<th>TRANSITION THE FORCE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSETS AVAILABLE</td>
<td>NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, W, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>W, B, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, NW, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
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<td>COALITION FORCES AND EFFECTS</td>
<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
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<td>NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>W, B, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
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<td>ISF RESOURCES* (List will follow 1-37 with other considerations)</td>
<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
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<td>INFORMATION OPERATIONS</td>
<td>SE, NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE</td>
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<td>NW, B, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
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<td>NC, CS, NW, B, W, SE, NE</td>
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<td>W, B, NW, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
<td>B, NW, W, NC, CS, SE, NE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 14 (S//REL) Table
(*Link to Exception for Prioritization of DBE)

(iii)(S//REL) Phase II (Transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) – Decisive Operations) is conducted in two stages. Stage A begins with the focus of security operations designed to ensure the development of ISF units in up to six provinces (Diyala, Qadissiya, Wassit, Karbala, An Najaf, and southern Babil) (IAW the above table) and parts of Baghdad. Prioritization of units is
based on the ISF Transitional Readiness Assessment process. Developing their capability will enable the transition of these provinces to PIC NLT 30 September 2005. During this stage, the transition to PIC of these six provinces will allow the reassignment of Coalition forces as in paragraph 3.b.(f) to d). Stage B begins when six Category B provinces complete their transition to PIC and Coalition Forces re-organize to reset their disposition for operations in Phase III. (link) Priority of Effort for ISF development during this phase is to MND-NC, MND-CS then MNB-NW IOT ensure transition of Diyala, Karbala, and An Najaf to PIC (Karbala and Najaf Army units are commanded by the 8th Division HQ located in MND-CS AOR though their direct responsibility falls under MNF-W.) Transition of these provinces will further allow the repositioning of up to one BCT to MNB-NW IOT assist in establishing a more permissive security environment. Coordinating instructions provide guidance concerning minimum requirements for forces remaining in transitioned provinces; (link) POE for Coalition Forces and Effects is MNB-NW, MND-B, and MNF-W. MNB-NW, MND-B neutralizes the AIF in these key areas IOT establish a security environment until the ISF are capable of assuming the COIN lead. Supporting security operations, governance development and economic reconstructions enable the desired security effects by increasing employment, the delivery of basic needs by the government, and ensuring the participation of the majority of Iraqis in the constitutional referendum. Provincial Iraqi Control is achieved when 12 of 18 Provinces have met the required conditions for PIC, Iraqi Security Forces are adequate to maintain domestic order, and none of the 6 remaining provinces failing to make progress toward Provincial Iraqi Control.

PROVINCIAL TRANSITIONS (PH II)

Fig. 15 (S//REL) Diagram

(ii) (S//REL) Phase III (Transition to National Iraqi Control – Sustaining Operations) is conducted in two stages. During Stage A the priority of effort for ISF is MNB-NW, MND-B, and MNF-W to allow the continued development of capable ISF in Ninewa, Baghdad, Al Anbar, Salah ad Din,
and Tameen provinces IOT allow respective ISF units to assume battlespace from Coalition Forces. This sets the conditions for the transition of two Provinces (Diyala and Tameen) to PIC NLT November 2005. During Stage B the priority of effort for Coalition Forces and effects is to MND-B, MNF-W, and MNB-NW. MND-B ensures adequate security conditions are established in Greater Baghdad to ensure N. Babil is prepared for transitioned to PIC NLT 31 December 2005. Babil Province will be transitioned to PIC when all three regions (S. Babil (MND-CS), Central Babil (MNF-W), and N. Babil (MND-B)) assess the regions have the conditions set for transition to PIC. Close coordination between all three MSCs is required to ensure progress. Cross MSC coordination will be facilitated through participation in the Babil PJCC. MND-B and MNF-W neutralize the AIF in key areas IOT establish a security environment until the ISF are capable of assuming the COIN lead. This phase ends when 14 of 18 provinces are transitioned to PIC and 9 of 10 Iraqi Army Divisions are capable of Division level operations. During this phase ISF development also focuses on establishing sustainment and infrastructure development capabilities supported by COSCOM and the Corps Engineer BDE. Supporting security operations, governance development and economic reconstruction support the desired security effects by increasing the rule of law and establishing a local and regional detention system. The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) takes the lead and coordinates reconstruction and development efforts through a national chain of administration from national ministries to local bureaucracies. During this phase conditions are set to allow participation in the general election on or about 15 December 2005.

PROVINCIAL TRANSITIONS (PH III)

Fig. 16 (S//REL) Diagram

(v) (S//REL) Phase IV (Iraqi Self Reliance – Sustaining Operations). Stage A begins with ISF in control of 9 Division AORs. Coalition forces will reduce their presence in major population centers and begin to set conditions for the establishment of four Contingency Operating Bases (COBs). Transition to the COBs will be progressive. MSCs will always maintain and position adequate
Force Protection for MiTTs, BTTs, and other remote forces. POE for Coalition Forces and ISF during this phase IV is to MNF-W to allow the transition of those areas to PIC and set the conditions for Coalition footprint adjustments. At the conclusion of Part A, Phase IV the Iraqi Army Divisions are capable of independent national security operations and in control of all 9 Iraqi divisional areas with one Division as the Iraqi Operational Reserve. This sets the conditions for the transition of Ninewa Province to PIC NLT April 2006. All 18 provinces are at PIC, CAT A provinces achieve Self Reliance, and B provinces are in National Control. During this phase Coalition forces will maintain a presence in Iraq to assist only as required and will conduct Partnership responsibilities to assist the continued development of the ISF. (See Province Transition Timeline) AIF are neutralized and the Iraqi Police Services begin to take the lead in the enforcement of the rule of law. On Order, Coalition Forces transition to Phase IV, Part B (Transition the Force). This phase begins with the Coalition progressively transitioning to four COBs. Assistance teams continue to train and advise ISF in order to facilitate the transition from control by the MOD to MOI leading the counterinsurgency campaign and ensuring the rule of law. This Phase ends with the Coalition assuming strategic overwatch. Cooperative arrangements are established with the ISF and the Iraqi Government.

PROVINCIAL TRANSITIONS (PH IV)

Fig. 17 (S//REL) Diagram

(g) (S//REL) Concepts of Support:

(i) (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI) **Coalition Effects** Concept of Joint Fires and Effects. MNC-I conducts effects based operations in order to achieve campaign objectives. MNC-I uses lethal and non-lethal means to conduct shaping operations in order to set the conditions for Provincial Iraqi Control, Iraqi National Control, and Iraqi Self Reliance. Appendix 3 to ANNEX C also portrays the desired effects for the campaign and the linkage between operational phase objectives and component tasks. Coalition Forces focus...
lethal and non-lethal fires in support of Coalition Forces and Iraqi security forces to disrupt insurgent operations and expand our control. MNC-I develops and refines targets for kinetic operations, interdicts main AIF/FRE LOCs IOT disrupt their movement and prevent their ability to reestablish safe havens, building pressure by prosecuting key targets IOT focus AIF/FRE inward, and by disrupting AIF/FRE ability to coordinate operations throughout the Corps AO. Air power provides presence missions in support MNC-I priorities while providing TIC response for operations. Counter-Fire sensors provide radar coverage for coalition FOBs and base camps, while units aggressively conduct proactive counter-fire procedures. Information Operations will support COIN operations in Iraq, legitimize the GOI, and change the public image of the AIF, thus denying their ability to influence the people of Iraq. This will be accomplished by building an ISF public information capacity which will publicize the successes of the ISF and the atrocities of the AIF. We will also demonstrate the competence and commitment of the GOI by publicizing the improvements in public safety, health, basic services, economic opportunities and infrastructure. IO efforts will be focused on preplanned, targeted events as much as possible IOT disseminate products concurrently with the actual event. We will keep in mind that the most effective products are those that are disseminated by, or through, the GOI. We will protect coalition forces through an aggressive OPSEC program and effective employment of Electronic Warfare assets with timely release of device programming updates. Inherent to the process is the continuous assessment of effectiveness and the modifications of IO efforts IOT address the evolving perceptions of the Iraqi people. Desired End State is an enhanced Iraqi confidence of a capable ISF while contributing to the denial of safe havens for AIF and FRE.

(ii) (U) Concept of Intelligence Support

1) (S//REL) MNC-I C2 will direct and synchronize intelligence operations of the staff, subordinate intelligence units, and national agency activities in support of the MNC-I Commander’s intelligence requirements. MNC-I C2 will employ assets as resourced by US and Coalition Partners and will coordinate National, Theater, and multi-national collection coverage in order to collect, report, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence products. Recognizing that assets are limited, they will be allocated on a mission basis, and be weighted to support the MNC-I Commander’s priorities. To further support operations, every effort will be made to synchronize multi-disciplined collection.

a) Priority of Effort: (All Phases)
   i) Support counterinsurgency operations (COIN).
   ii) Support HVT/HVI tracking and assessment.
   iii) Train, coach, and mentor Iraqi security forces through partnership and military transition teams.
iv) Support Force Protection (FP).

b) Priority of support:
   i) Phase I and II
   ii) Tigris River Valley
   iii) Greater Baghdad
   iv) Euphrates River Valley

c) Phase III and IV
   i) Greater Baghdad
   ii) Euphrates River Valley
   iii) Tigris River Valley

d) Assets Available
   i)
   ii)
   iii) 1.4c

(iii) (S//REL) Engineers / Reconstruction Concept of Support

1) (S//REL) Engineer operations will focus on support to establishing the ISF. Operations will be conducted to support Coalition COIN operations while aggressively supporting the development of MOD and MOI capability. The concept of engineer operations incorporates efficiency, flexibility, and the mitigation of risk in order to weight the main effort in each phase of the operation. MSCs will be task organized with sufficient combat, topographic and construction engineer forces IOT execute COIN and partnering operations within their AOR. MNC-I level engineers will be task organized to execute assured mobility missions along Corps MSR’s, construct and/or close Coalition bases, construct temporary MOD and MOI bases, and provide reinforcing prime power, topographic, design and reconstruction support. Flexibility will be achieved by weighting the main effort with GS engineer support, while simultaneously reinforcing supporting efforts across the AOR. Risk will be mitigated by using Coalition engineer construction forces to construct bases in less permissive areas and maximizing the use of contracted construction effort inside bases in permissive areas.

2) (S//REL) Priority of Engineer Effort. During all phases, the priority of engineer effort along the Security Line of Operation is survivability/force protection of Coalition forces, assured mobility, Coalition base construction and closure, MOD base construction, then MOI base construction. During all phases the priority of effort along the Economic Line Effort is essential services: the restoration of electrical power and
water and sewer systems, then the production of oil and oil based products.

(iv)(U) Civil Military Operations (CMO) Concept of Support

1) (S//REL) The purpose of CMO is to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between coalition military forces and Iraqi Government organizations, civil organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the civil populous in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve Coalition objectives. Civil Affairs (CA) forces support commanders at all levels in the targeting and execution of CMO tasks in support of ISF development and COIN operations. Key tasks conducted by CA forces include:

a) (S//REL) Support Development of ISF
   i) (S//REL) Support MSC commanders in targeting, execution, and assessment of CMO IOT set conditions prior to, and during transition of battlespace to the ISF.
   ii) (S//REL) Support MSC Commanders in training and coordination requirements inherent with partnering responsibilities.
   iii) (S//REL) Assist commanders in exploitation of positive effects and mitigation of negative effects consequent to the ISF buildup and CF drawdown.

b) (S//REL) Neutralize AIF influence and support
   i) (S//REL) Support engagement of Sunni Arab leaders and population groups to promote engagement in the political process.
   ii) (S//REL) Assist local and provincial Government of Iraq (GOI) entities in building legitimacy and capability (to include delivery of basic services).
   iii) (S//REL) Assist in the recovery and development of local and provincial economies.
   iv) (S//REL) Target CMO operations in support of MSC COIN operations in order to reduce AIF influence.
   v) (S//REL) Support the development, maintenance, and exploitation of positive relations between the military and the civil community in order to reduce AIF influence.

c) (S//REL) The priority of effort for CMO during all phases is support to ISF development, then AIF neutralization. CA forces in the MNCI AOR consist of one CA BDE (-) (MNCI), one CA Group (2 MEF), three CA BN Headquarters (1 ea. to MNB-NW, MND-NC, and MND-B), one Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Group (POL) (MND-CS), and 15 CA Companies (2 to MNB-NW, 5 to MND-NC, 6 to MND-B, and 2 to MNF-W).
2) (S//REL) Military Police Concept of Operations

a) (S//REL) Purpose. To provide Military Police support, including Internment and Resettlement (Detention), Area Security, Maneuver and Mobility Support (MMSO), and Law and Order, to MNC-I in the Iraqi theater of operations (ITO).

b) (S//REL) Priorities.


ii) (S//REL) Priority of Support.

iii) (S//REL) Phase I (Implement Transition Teams): MNB-NW, MND-B, MND-NC, MND-CS, MND-SE, MND-NE, MNF-W.

iv) (S//REL) Phase II (Provincial Iraqi Control): MNB-NW, MND-B, MND-NC, MND-CS, MND-SE, MND-NE, MNF-W.


c) (S//REL) Allocation. 18 MP BDE TACON to TF 14A for detention operations at Camp Bucca, BCCF (Abu Ghraib), Camp Ashraf, and Camp Cropper. 42 MP BDE GS to MNC-I for MP support and TACON to 3ID for Policing Operations.

d) (S//REL) Resources.

i) (S//REL) MNC-I Provost Marshal. Coordinate and supervise all Military Police assets in ITO IOT support MNC-I priorities and ensure mission success.

ii) (S//REL) Determine best utilization of MP assets in ITO. Provide recommendations to MNC-I Commander on MP missions and utilization.
iii) (S//REL) Monitor detention facility operations, law and order operations, policing operations, and MWD operations.

iv) (S//REL) Provide mission guidance and priorities to 18 MP BDE and 42 MP BDE.

v) (S//REL) Make liaison between 18 MP BDE, 42 MP BDE, MNC-I, and other MSCs as required. Coordinate resources for 18 MP BDE and 42 MP BDE as required.

e) (S//REL) 18 MP Brigade. Conduct detention operations in ITO IOT facilitate creation of a safe and secure environment.

i) (S//REL) Conduct detention operations at Camp Bucca.

ii) (S//REL) Conduct detention operations at BCCF (Abu Ghraib).

iii) (S//REL) Conduct detention operations at Camp Cropper.

iv) (S//REL) Conduct detention operations at Camp Ashraf.

v) (S//REL) Secure Camp Ashraf.

f) (S//REL) 42 MP Brigade. Conduct GS Military Police Support, including Area Security, MMSO, and Law and Order Operations, in MND-B, MNB-NW, MND-NC, and MND-CS IOT facilitate neutralization of AIF and development of capable ISF.

i) (S//REL) Provide GS MP support to MNB-B, MNB-NW, MND-NC, and MND-CS.

ii) (S//REL) Conduct personal security (PSD) for MNC-I and MNF-I Commanders.

iii) (S//REL) Conduct policing operations (to include support to Police Partnership Program (P3) (see Tab C to Appendix 1 from ANNEX C, Operations)) support with the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) and Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP).

iv) (S//REL) Secure sustainment convoys for the Baghdad Police Academy.

v) (S//REL) Conduct training at the Baghdad Police Academy.

vi) (S//REL) Conduct Law and Order Operations ISO MNC-I and MNF-I.
3) **(S//REL) Operational Requirements and Initiatives.** In order to achieve the operational objectives MNC-I will initiate operations to deal with areas of particular interest to the MNC-I commander. These include: Engagement, Borders Initiatives, Election Support, Mosul

a) **(S//REL) Engagement:** To successfully control the insurgency, MNF have thus far focused the majority of their efforts on the conduct of kinetic operations. With the conduct of successful Iraqi and MNF security operations during the elections, Ashura and Arba’een, insurgents no longer enjoy the same freedom of movement and popular support and thus are fighting to retain legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

i) **(S//REL)** As a result of these successes, and to drive a wedge further between the insurgents and populace, an opportunity exists to engage elements of the community in other than kinetic activities. To this end, MNC-I will consider the implementation of several non-kinetic actions targeting the Center of Gravity of those groups supporting the insurgents passively or otherwise, in an attempt to interdict the insurgent’s freedom of movement, disrupt traditional support bases and increase popular support for the ITG and MNF.

ii) **(S//REL)** In particular, along Iraq’s borders, MNC-I will focus information operations on disrupting arms and funds smuggling networks and those supporting the insurgency. Through non-lethal targeting and IO, the Corps will sponsor a communications effort across all mediums directed at those supporting the insurgency and highlighting how they can benefit financially or otherwise, from the insurgency without disrupting traditional trade activities through PSYOP and face to face engagements. Furthermore, in these regions, the motivations of key tribal figures will also, through community engagement and the identification and provision of basic community-beneficial provisions, be affected. For specific effects themes and messages refer to Enclosure 1, Tab D, Appendix 3, to ANNEX C.

iii) **(S//REL)** Attempts will also be made by the Corps to determine the best means of supporting communities, especially those situated along current insurgent movement corridors in Ninewa and Al Anbar, to ensure insurgents are unable to provide a viable alternative to the ITG and MNF. These initiatives will be rewards based but will require those engaged to take a position – either for or against the insurgency. Compliance and assistance will be rewarded while ongoing support of the insurgency will lead to
isolation, neutralization and, if required, the conduct of kinetic operations.

iv) (S//REL) MNC-I will implement community initiatives designed to transfer the responsibility and security of some of Iraq’s roads (Adopt-a-highway) to the local community. Again, by rewards tied to local participation and performance, key members of the community will become responsible for ensuring IEDs and other attacks do not occur with compliance and cooperation rewarded both financially and through the provision of services designed to benefit the community.

v) (S//REL) Without successfully engaging local community leaders and attempting to understand their tribal system, beliefs and motivations, it is highly unlikely that the insurgency will be defeated. The focus for the Corps must continue to be development of engagement programs, new initiatives and local relationships to ensure that momentum created through successful operations thus far, is continued. As Iraq continues to recover from decades of neglect and mismanagement, the role of the MNF will change. The next year will provide many opportunities to influence the direction of the nation’s development but will require thinking outside of the norm. Kinetic operations will continue to prove useful in certain environments, however, the growing importance of non-kinetic operations cannot be ignored.
(2) (S//REL) Scheme of Operations.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN

PHASE I (Feb-Jun 05) PHASE II (Jul 05-Sep 05) PHASE III (Oct 05-Jan 06) PHASE IV (Feb 06-Jun 06) (Jul 06-As Required)

Objective
- Provincial Iraq Control
- National Iraq Control
- Iraqi Self Reliance
- Transition

DP 1
- Transition
- Draft Constitution
- Elections Completed
- Constitution Referendum
- Elected Govt

DP 2
- Interim Government
- Formation
- Elections
- Convene Governing Council

DP 3
- Interim Governing Council
- Assumptions
- Establish Security
-sound

DP 4
- Key Effect

Fig. 18 (S//REL) Diagram

(a) (S//REL) Phase I

(i) (S//REL) Transition Objectives. Implement Transition Teams. MNC-I's Main Effort shifts from offensive operations to partnering with Iraqi security forces, bridges the gap from the current force structure, and mission sets to the objective Military Transition Team (MiTT) structure and mission set in order to accelerate the process of training and coaching the ISF and enable the ISF to execute their internal defense missions independently. During this phase MSCs ensure local control maintained in majority of MNC-I AO. Local Control is judged on a province by province basis, and is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security organizations maintain internal security with Coalition support, and can plan, direct and conduct security operations at the platoon / station level. Local Coalition reaction forces are established to assist ISF in contingency situations. Iraq provincial governments establish Provincial Control by June 2005 in the Category A provinces controlled by MND-SE (Basrah, Muthanna, Thi Qar, Missan), MNB-NW (Irbil and Dahuk), and one Category A province controlled by MND-NC (As Sulaymaniyyah)
IOT continue to provide substantive evidence that the Coalition supports Iraq sovereignty. Other lines of operations will continue to shape in areas of opportunity: MND-SE, the Kurdish region, and other population centers with an adequate security environment.

(ii) (S//REL) Key effects for this phase.

1) (S//REL) EFFECT 1A1 - ISF CAPABLE OF BN LEVEL OPERATIONS. Defined as Iraqi Security Forces capable of operations at the Battalion level with limited Coalition support. Operations begin to establish a safe environment within designated area of operation. ISF Conduct Framework Operations.

PHASE I: IMPLEMENT TRANSITION TEAMS

Fig. 19 (S//REL) Diagram

(iii) (S//REL) Task to subordinate units.

1) (S//REL) MNB-NW (MNC-I POE for Coalition Forces and Effects)
   a) Develop capable ISF (to include 6 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDEs), and 30 September 2005 (4x
BDE) IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

b) Receive Battalion Augmentation Teams IOT develop second and third division capability at battalion level and below.

c) Neutralize AIF influence in Mosul IOT create a stability in the AOR until the ISF is capable of assuming control.

d) Disrupt AIF freedom of movement across borders IOT limit the resources and leadership necessary to the insurgency from reaching Mosul and deny insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, Mosul and Tal Afar.

e) Rebuild ISF capacity to control Mosul’s contested urban areas. Focus on reliable IPS.

f) Establish a secure environment within Mosul; assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.

g) Exploit wedges between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.

h) Create supportive, neighborhood-based ‘civil defense’ and policing mechanisms.

i) Focus rewards program against Salafists and Foreign Fighters.

j) Lower Coalition profile in COIN as soon as practical.

k) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish PIC by June 2005 in Category A provinces (Dahuk, Irbil).

l) BPT receive additional Coalition Forces for reinforcement of COIN operations in the MNB-NW AO.

2) (S//REL) MND-NC: (MNC-I POE for ISF resources)

a) Develop capable ISF (to include 4 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (1x BDE) and 30 September 2005 (3x BDE) IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

b) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, the Zaab region and Mosul IOT allow MNB-NW to establish domestic order in Mosul and ensure stability in AOR.

c) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, Baqubah, Balad, and Baghdad IOT allow MND-B to establish domestic order in Baghdad and ensure stability in AOR.

d) Assist ISF in securing key infrastructure and LOCs IOT prevent disruption of essential services in Baghdad and Mosul.

e) Isolate AIF from sanctuaries and the local population IOT prevent disruption of operations ISO MNC-I ME and set conditions in its Category B Provinces during Phase II.

f) Contain AIF in key areas IOT prevent unrest that will divert resources away from MNB-NW or MND-B.
g) Support Iraqi provincial government and ISF IOT establish PIC by June 2005 in Category A province (As Sulaymaniyah).

h) (S//REL) On order, establish partnership with BSU at Kirkuk and KMTB.

i) BPT reinforce MNB-NW with up to a BCT.

3) (S//REL) MND-SE: (POE for Information Operations)
   a) POE for information operations and governance support in Phase I is to MND-SE to ensure conditions set for transition of four provinces to PIC and exploit Informational opportunity by 30 June 2005 IOT facilitate continued momentum with the Iraqi people.
   b) Develop capable ISF (to include 4 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), and 30 September 2005 (2x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   c) MND-SE supports Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish PIC by June 2005 in Category A provinces (Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Missan, and Basrah).
   d) Upon completion of transitions, MND-SE potentially re-tasks Coalition Forces to conduct operations ISO MNC-I future operations in accordance with (IAW) employment option planning priorities. (see planning priorities)

4) (S//REL) MNF-W:
   a) Develop and maintain capable ISF (to include 2-3 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), and 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   b) Neutralize AIF influence in MNF-W IOT create stability in the AOR and allow potential engagement of the Sunni Arab population.
   c) Set conditions in Category B Provinces (An Najaf, Karbala) for transition to PIC during Phase II by developing capable ISF through partnership IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and set conditions for ISFs in An Najaf and Karbala to assume control of the AOR.
   d) Isolate AIF from sanctuaries, population centers, and sources of support IOT sustain local control and conditions achieved as a result of OPERATION AL FAJR.
   e) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between Ramadi / Fallujah and Baghdad IOT reduce AIF support in Baghdad.
   f) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between Hadithah and Bayji IOT reduce AIF support in Mosul.
g) Establish a secure environment within Ramadi; assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.

h) Contain AIF influence in Central Babil IOT prevent disruption in MND-B AOR and set conditions in Babil for transition to PIC during Phase II.

i) Exploit fissures between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.

j) As required, risk along border areas is acceptable IOT focus capability toward areas of greater AIF activity.

k) Provide representative to Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

l) (S//REL) On order establish partnership with BSU at Habbaniyah.

m) BPT reinforce MNB-NW with up to a BCT.

5) (S//REL) MND-B:

a) Develop capable ISF (to include 3 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE) and 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and set conditions for ISFs within Baghdad to assume control of the AOR as soon as possible setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

b) Secure Baghdad IOT sustain local control conditions, allow force generation for decisive operations, set conditions to establish PIC in Baghdad AOR in Phase III and allow the political process to be completed IAW UNSCR 1546.

c) On Order, in conjunction with the ISF, secure the International zone and neutralize the AIF IOT ensure conditions set to allow the meeting if the Iraqi Transitional Government and completion of the political process.

d) Assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.

e) Provide representative to Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

f) (S//REL) On order establish partnership with BSU at Ar Rustamiyah.

6) (S//REL) MND-CS:

a) Develop capable ISF (to include 3 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 September 2005 (2x BDE) IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and set conditions for ISFs in Wasit and Qaddissiya provinces to assume control of the AOR.

b) Support ISF IOT ensure stability until ISF capable of assuming control.
c) Contain AIF influence in S. Babil IOT prevent disruption in MND-B AOR and set conditions in Category B Provinces for transition to PIC during Phase II.

d) Coordinate Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

e) (S//REL) On order establish partnership with BSU at An Numaniyah.

7) (S//REL) MND-NE:

a) Support reconstruction in the AOR IOT ensure economic and political conditions support transition of AOR to PIC during phase I.

b) Develop capable ISF (to include 1 Army Brigade) through partnership 30 September 2005 (1x BDE (-)) IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish PIC by June 2005 in Category A provinces (Dahuk, Irbil).

8) (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP:

a) (S//REL) CJSOTF units remain TACON to MNC-I and provide mutual support to MSCs.

b) Assist Coalition Force Commanders with the development of ISF. Specifically, CJSOTF provides recommendations for “best practices” to assist with Coalition Force and MiTT training for use with ISF.

c) (S//REL) Establish and maintain PSDs on the ITG (+) until relieved (NLT 15 AUG 05) IOT prevent disruption of the political process.

d) (S//REL) Priority of training during all phases of this operation: ISOF, ISF in critical locations (21 cities), and coalition MiTT cultural training.

e) (S//REL) BPT support Taji training academy ISO CF Transition Teams.

f) (S//REL) Establish mutual support with MSCs in assigned AOR in order to facilitate MNC-I MiTTS Implementation Strategy.

g) (S//REL) Continue to conduct targeting operations ICW MSCs.

h) (S//REL) Build tactical ISF targeting capability and Scout Platoons IOT allow the ISF to use their cultural and social capability to the maximum extent.
i) (S//REL) Support Combined / Joint Operations as required.

j) (S//REL) BPT provide sniper support to MSCs ISO ongoing operations.

(iv)(U) Tasks ISO key effects.

1) (U) MSCs:

a) (S//REL) Develop ISF capability:
   i) T1: Establish Partnerships designated with ISF
   ii) T2: Embed Transition Teams
   iii) T3: Establish JCCs and PJCCs.
   iv) T4: Coordinate / Integrate / Synchronize operations with ISF
   v) T4: Provide ISF necessary CS / CSS
   vi) T5: Support ISF in task to collect, analyze, and disseminate actionable intelligence
   vii) P: IOT enable ISF to conduct tactical BN Level Operations and Set conditions to transition COIN lead to the ISF

b) (S//REL) Conduct COIN:
   i) T1: Ensure Force Protection and limit influence by AIF
   ii) T2: Clear AIF sanctuaries
   iii) T3: Secure 20 key cities
   iv) T4: BPT transition CAT A provinces
   v) T5: Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate Actionable Intelligence
   vi) T6: Coordinate operations with ISF
   vii) T7: Disrupt AIF support networks
   viii) P: IOT prevent AIF freedom of action

(v) (S//REL) Iraqi Security Forces.

1) (S//REL) GIA Development (Main Effort):
   a) T1: Support CFs disrupting AIF
   b) T2: Receive embedded MiTT
   c) T3: Coordinate / Integrate / Synchronize operations with other ISF and Coalition elements through JCCs and PJCCs
   d) T4: Support IPS, DBE, and FPS as needed based on threat
   e) T5: Conduct BN level C2
   f) P: IOT conduct tactical BN Level Operations and Set conditions to conduct BDE level Operations.
PHASE II: PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL

CONCEPT STATEMENT:
- SECURE ENSN KEY CITIES
- ESTABLISH LEVEL 1 SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
- ESTABLISH LEVEL 1 AND 2 SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
- CONDUCT TACTICAL, LOGISTIC, OPERATIONS AND SET CONDITIONS TO CONDUCT LEVEL 1 OPERATIONS
- SECURITY OPERATIONS, GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
- ENHANCED SECURITY EFFECTS BY INCREASING EMPLOYMENT, DELIVERY OF BASIC NEEDS BY THE GOVERNMENT.
- PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL IS ACHIEVED WHEN 12 OF 18 PROVINCES HAVE MET THE REQUIRED CONDITIONS FOR PIC.
- PROVINCES ARE ADAPTED TO MAINTAIN DOMESTIC ORDER, AND NONE OF THE 8 REMAINING PROVINCES FAIL TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL.

Fig. 20 - [S/REL] Diagram

(b) (S/REL) Phase II

(i) (S/REL) Transitions Objectives. Provincial Iraqi Control

Provincial Iraqi Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby local and provincial Iraqi security forces are sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain security operations at the brigade/provincial level or as needed to maintain domestic order within a unit’s AOR. Command and control structures are functioning, and Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions at the local/provincial level. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF are increased to a level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of anti-Iraqi forces.

Under Provincial Iraqi Control, ISF can maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment, assert territorial control through framework operations, and conduct counterinsurgency operations enabled by Coalition support. CF reduce unilateral operations, increase joint operations, are postured to deliver regional supporting effects to Iraqi security organizations, and are prepared to defeat external threats and preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iraqi provincial governments establish PIC in Category B provinces.
by 1 October 2005. Order of transition remains flexible and continually assessed during the CASB process IOT ensure MSC’s operations remain mutually supporting.

(ii) (S//REL) Conditions: The following conditions are required to achieve the transition objective. As described the effects assessment process will integrate MSC feedback and assist the Commander’s decision making process.

1) (S//REL) ISF is capable of sustaining tactical operations at BCT level.
   a) Logistics and sustainment capable of supporting BCT operations at direct and organizational levels.

2) (S//REL) Basing established for all units at BDE level.

3) (S//REL) Staff functioning at BCT level.
   a) S1 through S6 Staffs established.

4) (S//REL) ISF leads COIN operations.
   a) Sanctuaries for AIF reduced.

5) (S//REL) GIA provides constabulary role ISO Police to ensure regional domestic order is maintained.
   a) Intimidation campaign marginalized.
   b) FPS/Oil protection services capable of providing basic essential effects, ensuring basic needs of the people (electricity and fuel).

6) (S//REL) Initial capability to conduct regional Intel operations.

7) (S//REL) UNSCR 1546 process is on track.
   a) ISF capable of safeguarding election process.
   b) Iraqi participation is maintained.

8) (S//REL) Functioning local and regional detention and release system ensures domestic order is maintained.

9) (S//REL) Local and regional governments assuming responsibilities.

10) (S//REL) Local and regional government administration able to survive party/leadership transitions.
11) (S//REL) CF assessment that local/regional governments are capable of providing basic services.

12) (S//REL) Opportunities exist for economic development.
   a) (S//REL) Essential services continue to expand.
   b) (S//REL) Domestic order maintained.
   c) (S//REL) Economic conditions sufficient to preclude widespread unrest.

13) (S//REL) CF assessment that economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services.

14) (S//REL) Iraqi people perceive ISF are providing regional security.

15) (S//REL) Increased confidence and trust in ISF.

16) (S//REL) Iraqi people acknowledge that local and regional governments exist.

17) (S//REL) Government of Iraq is perceived as present and functioning although it may not yet be completely effective.

18) (S//REL) Iraqi people perceive progress in basic services and needs being met by local and provincial government.

19) (S//REL) CF understands Iraqi needs and perceptions and assesses if they are being met.

(iii) (S//REL) Key effects for this phase.

1) (S//REL) Effect 1A2 – ISF capable of BDE level operations. Defined as ISF capable of operations at the Brigade level with limited Coalition support. Operations establish a safe environment within designated area of operation. ISF Conduct Framework Operations.

2) (S//REL) Effect 1B1 – AIF freedom of action disrupted. Defined as gaining control of the 21 key cities, with or without force, and mitigating the influence of the AIF on their populations, key facilities, and essential services.

3) (S//REL) Effect 1C1 – Iraqi officials increasingly free to operate without intimidation. Defined as Iraqi officials are willing and able to carry out their jobs.
4) **(S//REL)** Effect 2A1 – Iraqis acknowledge and participate in the political, election, and constitutional processes.
   Defined as Iraqis are aware of, and are free to participate in, the political, election, and constitutional processes at the local, provincial and national levels.

5) **(S//REL)** Effect 2A2 – GOI assumes responsibility for the delivery of basic services. Defined as GOI delivers basic services.


7) **(S//REL)** Effect 4A1 – Iraqis participate in the Constitutional process.
   Defined as sufficient Iraqis of the three major ethnic/religious groups participate in the constitutional process so as to have an inclusive and legitimate process.

(iv) **(S//REL)** Task’s to subordinate units.

1) **(S//REL)** MNB-NW (POE for Coalition Forces and Effects)
   a) Develop capable ISF (includes 6 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE) and 30 September 2005 (4x BDE) IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   b) Neutralize AIF influence in Mosul IOT create stability in the AOR until the ISF is capable of assuming control.
   c) Disrupt AIF freedom of movement across borders IOT limit the resources and leadership necessary to the insurgency from reaching Mosul and deny insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, Mosul and Tal Afar.
   d) Rebuild ISF capacity to control Mosul’s contested urban areas. Focus on reliable IPS.
   e) Establish a secure environment within Mosul; assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.
   f) Exploit wedges between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.
   g) Create supportive, neighborhood-based ‘civil defense’ and policing mechanisms.
   h) Focus rewards program against incorrigible Salafists and Foreign Fighters.
   i) Lower Coalition profile in COIN specifically in urban areas as soon as practical.
j) On Order, receive additional Coalition Forces for reinforcement of COIN operations in the MNB-NW AO.

2) (S//REL) MND-NC (POE for ISF Resources)
   a) Complete development of capable ISF (includes 5 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (1x BDE), 30 September 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   b) Neutralize AIF IOT prevent disruption of operations ISO MNC-I ME and set conditions in Category B Provinces for transition to PIC during Phase II*.
   c) Support Iraqi provincial government and ISF IOT establish PIC by November 2005 in Category B provinces (Diyala and Kirkuk).
   d) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in and between, the Zaab region and Mosul IOT allow MNB-NW and MND-B to establish domestic order in Mosul and ensure stability in AOR.
   e) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in and between, Baqubah, Balad and Baghdad IOT support establishment of domestic order in Baghdad and ensure stability in AOR.
   f) Assist ISF in securing key infrastructure and LOCs IOT prevent disruption of essential services in Baghdad and Mosul.
   g) Contain AIF in key areas IOT prevent unrest that will divert resources away from MNB-NW.
* Based on current timeline MNF-I Phase III is expected to begin on or about 1 October 2005. Diyala and Kirkuk Province are not anticipated to transition until November 2005. This does not create a discrepancy given on satisfactory progress toward PIC. Transitions remain conditions based not time.

3) (S//REL) MND-B
   a) Develop capable ISF (to include up to 9 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (6x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order and set conditions for ISFs within Baghdad to assume control of the AOR which sets the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   b) Neutralize AIF IOT set conditions for PIC in N. Babil in Phase III.
   c) Secure Baghdad IOT sustain local control conditions, allow force generation for decisive operations, set conditions to establish PIC in Baghdad AOR in Phase III and allow the political process to be completed IAW UNSCR 1546.
   d) On Order, in conjunction with the ISF, secure the International zone and neutralize the AIF IOT ensure conditions set to allow the meeting
if the Iraqi Transitional Government and completion of the political process.

e) Assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.

f) Provide representative to Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

g) BPT receive additional combat power during this phase IOT set conditions for Provincial Iraqi Control and the transition of battlespace during Phase III.

4) (S//REL) MNF-W

a) Develop capable ISF (includes 3-4 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), and potentially one additional BDE by 31 December 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

b) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT ensure conditions set for transition of category B provinces (An Najaf and Karbala) to PIC by 1 September 2005 and to generate combat power ISO subsequent operations.

c) Neutralize AIF IOT prevent disruption of operations in Baghdad, create stability in the AOR, and allow potential engagement of the Sunni Arab population.

d) Isolates AIF from sanctuaries, population centers, and sources of support IOT sustain local control and conditions achieved as a result of OPERATION AL FAJR.

e) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between Ramadi / Fallujah and Baghdad IOT reduce AIF support in Baghdad.

f) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between Hadithah and Bayji IOT reduce AIF support in Mosul.

g) Establish a secure environment within Ramadi; assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.

h) Contain AIF influence in Central Babil IOT prevent disruption in MND-B AOR and set conditions in Babil for transition to PIC during Phase II.

i) Exploit wedge between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.

j) As required, risk along border areas is acceptable IOT focus capability toward areas of greater AIF activity.

k) Provide representative to Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

l) BPT receive additional combat power (Coalition or ISF) during this phase IOT set conditions for transition to PIC of Al Anbar in Phase IV.
5) (S//REL) MND-CS
   a) Develop capable ISF (includes 4 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 September 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   b) Ensure conditions set for transition of category B provinces (Wassit, Qaddissiya, and S. Babil) to PIC IOT generate combat power ISO subsequent Phase II and Phase III operations.
   c) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish PIC in Wassit, Qaddissiya, and S. Babil by 1 September 2005.
   d) Support ISF IOT ensure stability until ISF capable of assuming control.
   e) Continue to develop capable ISF through partnership IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and set conditions for ISFs in Wassit and Qaddissiya provinces to assume control of the AOR.
   f) Contain AIF influence from S. Babil IOT prevent disruption in MND-B AOR and set conditions in S. Babil for transition to PIC during Phase II or as soon as conditions set in N. Babil.
   g) Coordinate Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

6) (S//REL) MND-NE:
   a) Support reconstruction in AOR IOT ensure economic and political conditions support transition of its AOR to NIC in Phase II and support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT maintain PIC Category A provinces (Dahuk, Irbil).
   b) Maintain capable ISF (includes 1 Army Brigade) through partnership NLT 31 September 2005 (1x BDE) IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

7) (S//REL) MND-SE:
   a) Develop capable ISF (includes 4 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), and 30 September 2005 (2x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing domestic order, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   b) Continue to develop capable ISF through partnership IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, maintain the rule of law, and facilitate transition to Iraqi Self Reliance.
   c) MND-SE supports Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish National Iraqi Control (NIC) by October 2005, in Category A provinces (Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Missan, and Basrah).
d) Upon completion, MND-SE potentially re-tasks two brigades to conduct operations ISO MNC-I operations.

8) (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP:

a) (S//REL) CJSOTF units remain TACON to MNC-I and provide mutual support to MSCs.

b) Assist Coalition Force Commanders with the development of ISF. Specifically, CJSOTF provides recommendations for “best practices” to assist with Coalition Force and MiTT training for use with ISF.

c) (S//REL) Establish and maintain PSDs on the ITG (+) until relieved (NLT 15 AUG 05) IOT prevent disruption of the political process.

d) (S//REL) Priority of training during all phases of this operation: ISOF, ISF in critical locations (21 cities), and coalition MiTT cultural training.

e) (S//REL) BPT support Taji training academy ISO CF Transition Teams.

f) (S//REL) Establish mutual support with MSCs in assigned AOR in order to facilitate MNC-I MiTTS Implementation Strategy.

g) (S//REL) Continue to conduct targeting operations ICW MSCs.

h) (S//REL) Build tactical ISF targeting capability and Scout Platoons IOT allow the ISF to use their cultural and social capability to the maximum extent.

i) (S//REL) Support Combined / Joint Operations as required.

j) (S//REL) BPT provide sniper support to MSCs ISO ongoing operations.

(v) (S//REL) Tasks ISO key effects.

1) (S//REL) MSCs:

a) (S//REL) Develop ISF capability:
   i) T1: Maintain Partnerships designated with ISF
   ii) T2: Maintain Transition Teams
   iii) T3: Coordinate / Integrate / Synchronize operations with ISF
   iv) T4: Provide ISF necessary CS / CSS
v) T5: Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate Actionable Intelligence
vi) P: IOT enable ISF to conduct tactical BDE Level Operations and
    Set conditions to transition COIN to ISF

(b) (S//REL) Conduct COIN:
i) T1: Ensure Force Protection and limit influence by AIF
ii) T2: Clear AIF sanctuaries
iii) T3: Secure 21 key cities
iv) T4: On Order transition CAT B provinces to ISF control
v) T5: Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate Actionable Intelligence
vi) T6: Coordinate operations with ISF
vii) T7: Disrupt AIF support networks
viii) P: IOT prevent AIF freedom of action

c) (S//REL) Identify key officials and assess level of intimidation IOT
   focus and prioritize supporting efforts.

d) (S//REL) BPT to provide training and advisory assistance to Iraqi
   institutions IOT assist ISF in protecting key officials.

(vi)(S//REL) Iraqi Security Forces.

1) The GIA will also support IPS, DBE, and FPS as needed based on threat
   and partnering requirements.

   GIA: IAF brigades augment MSCs as
   needed to set conditions for transfer, ensure sustained security after
   transfer to PIC, and allow Coalition forces to reorganize for follow on
   operations. The GIA disrupts AIF freedom of action, maintains embedded
   MiTT, and maintains JCCs and PJCCs IOT set conditions to control
   territory. Coordinate / Integrate / Synchronize operations with other ISF
   and Coalition elements through JCCs and PJCCs.

   a) (S//REL) Conduct Framework Operations (Main Effort):
a) T1: Follow and assume Coalition Forces
b) T2: Ensure Force Protection and limit influence by AIF
c) T3: Clear AIF sanctuaries
d) T4: Secure 20 key cities
e) T5: Disrupt AIF support networks
f) P: IOT prevent AIF freedom of action

b) (S//REL) GIA Development:
a) T1: Disrupt AIF freedom of action
b) T2: Maintain embedded MiTT
c) T3: Coordinate / Integrate / Synchronize operations with other ISF
   and Coalition elements through JCCs and PJCCs
d) T4: Maintain JCCs and PJCCs
e) T5: Support IPS, DBE, and FPS as needed based on threat.
(c) (S//REL) Phase III

(i) (S//REL) Transition Objective. National Iraqi Control is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security forces are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations. Iraq’s national, provincial, and local government organizations are effectively linked, with ministries that can deploy and support integrated and complementary security operations throughout the country. A combined Coalition-Iraqi command and control structure is in place to plan and execute national level counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF have increased to a level where the Coalition supports only as needed. Under National Iraqi Control, ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent framework and counterinsurgency operations, preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity, and deter threats to the national security of Iraq with Coalition support in extremis. Coalition forces assist Iraqi
operations as needed, remain postured to deliver supporting effects to the ISF when requested, and progressively transition national security responsibilities to the Iraqis.

(ii) (S//REL) Conditions: The following conditions are required to achieve the transition objective. As described in Annex U, Appendix 2, the effects assessment process will integrate MSC feedback and assist the Commander’s decision making process.

1) (S//REL) Area BSU(s) and Regional BSU(s) developed sufficiently to support tactical Division Operations.

2) (S//REL) MOD/MOI assumes responsibility for ISF sustainment, C2, and Administrative and Logistics support to Joint Forces.

3) (S//REL) ISF conducts COIN operations and national defense:
   a) Sanctuaries for AIF eliminated.
   b) CF supplies minimal fires and effects (only as required).

4) (S//REL) ISF capability exceeds AIF with ITG freedom of action increased without reliance upon CF for direct support.

5) (S//REL) Local Rule of Law established with MOI/MOJ/COJ in lead (assumes lead from MOD).

6) (S//REL) ISF provides constabulary role ISO IPS to ensure National domestic order.

7) (S//REL) INIS able to conduct Intel operations ISO Division Regional Operations.

8) (S//REL) Essential bureaucratic structure and procedures capable of handling national down to local administration in place.
   a) Functioning relationship between local through national agencies.

9) (S//REL) Ministries manage and coordinate essential services and basic needs.

10) (S//REL) CF assess that national government is capable of achieving desired effect.

11) (S//REL) ITG linkage to local/regional infrastructure development.

12) (S//REL) Begin establishment of national financial system.

13) (S//REL) Progression continues for economic development.
a) Essential services continue to expand.
b) Domestic order maintained.
c) Economic benefits of production/distribution are realized.

14) (S//REL) Alternatives are sought out to resolve problem areas.

15) (S//REL) CF assessment that economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services.

16) (S//REL) Iraqi people perceive ISF as providing national security and independently conducting COIN operations
   a) Increased confidence and trust in ISF.

17) (S//REL) Iraqi people acknowledge local, regional, and national governments exist and effectively linked.

18) (S//REL) Government of Iraq is perceived as present and functioning and its effectiveness is improving.

19) (S//REL) Iraqi people perceive basic services and needs are being met by local, provincial, and/or national government.

20) (S//REL) National government is perceived as responsive to local emergencies.

21) (S//REL) CF understand Iraqi needs and perceptions and assess they are being met.

(iii) (S//REL) Key effects for this phase.

1) (S//REL) **Effect 1A2 – ISF controls territory across region.** Defined as ISF established in operating bases and able to self deploy up to a BDE out to 65km for continuous operations up to 20 days. Able to maintain domestic order. Cooperate with local governments and can coordinate operations outside of designated AOs.

2) (S//REL) **Effect 1A3 – ISF capable of Division operations.** Defined as Iraqi Security Forces organized, trained and equipped to plan, direct, conduct and sustain division level security operations. A Combined C2 structure is in place to execute national level COIN. ISF not dependent on CF to deal with insurgency.

3) (S//REL) **Effect 1B2 – AIF denied freedom of action.** Defined as Iraqis not influenced by lethal or non-lethal AIF activity. ISF progressively gain control of the 18 Provinces with or without force and mitigate the
influence of the AIF on the population, key facilities, and essential services.

4) (S//REL) Effect 1C2 – GOI local and regional detention system established. Defined as GOI has the ability to process and detain suspected AIF and criminals.

5) (S//REL) Effect 2A3 – Increased primacy of rule of law. Defined as Iraqi institutions develop and maintain effective and accountable judicial processes.

6) (S//REL) Effect 2A4 – GOI leads and coordinates reconstruction and development efforts. Defined as Iraqi GOI leads and coordinates internal and external reconstruction and development efforts.

7) (S//REL) Effect 2A5 – Ministries administer government functions through a national chain of command. Defined as Provincial ministry offices linked to respective national government offices and are providing national services in accordance with national priorities.


9) (S//REL) Effect 4A2 – Iraqis participate in the referendum / election process. Defined as sufficient Iraqis of the three major ethnic/religious groups participate in the referendum/election process so as to have an inclusive and legitimate process.

(iv)(S//REL) Tasks to subordinate units.

1) (S//REL) MND-B (POE for Coalition Forces and Effects)
   a) Continue development of capable ISF (includes up to 9 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (6x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the domestic order, and set conditions for ISFs within Baghdad to assume control of the AOR which sets the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.
   b) Neutralize AIF IOT set conditions for PIC in Baghdad in Phase IV.
   c) Secure Baghdad IOT sustain local control, allow force generation for decisive operations, and set conditions to establish PIC in Baghdad AOR in Phase IV, and ISO the political process.
   d) Assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.
e) BPT receive additional combat power during this phase IOT set conditions for Provincial Iraqi Control and the transition of battlespace.


g) Provide representative to Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

2) (S//REL) MNF-W

a) Develop capable ISF (includes 6 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (3x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order, and allow ISF in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

b) BPT receive additional combat power (Coalition or ISF) during this phase IOT set conditions for transition to PIC of Al Anbar in Phase IV.

c) Neutralize AIF IOT prevent disruption of operations in Baghdad, create stability in the AOR, and allow potential engagement of the Sunni Arab population.

d) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad IOT reduce AIF support in Baghdad.

e) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, Hadithah and Bayji IOT reduce AIF support in Mosul.

f) Establish a secure environment within Ramadi; assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.

g) Exploit wedge between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.

h) As required, risk along border areas is acceptable IOT focus capability toward areas of greater AIF activity.


j) Provide representative to Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

3) (S//REL) MND-NC

a) Complete development of capable ISF (includes 5 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (1x BDE), 30 September 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

b) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, the Zaab region and Mosul IOT allow MNB-NW and MND-B to establish domestic order in Mosul and ensure stability in AOR.
c) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between the Baqubah / Balad and Baghdad IOT support establishment of domestic order in Baghdad and ensure stability in AOR.

d) Assist ISF in securing key infrastructure and LOCs IOT prevent disruption of essential services in Baghdad and Mosul.

e) Contain AIF in key areas IOT prevent unrest that will divert resources away from MNB-B.

f) Support Iraqi provincial government and ISF IOT establish PIC by November 2005 in Category B provinces (Diyala and Tameen).

g) Ensure conditions set in Category C province (Salah Ad Din) for transition to PIC and transition of MNC-I to strategic overwatch.

4) (S//REL) MNB-NW (POE for ISF Resources)

a) Neutralize AIF IOT prevent disruption of operations in Baghdad and Mosul.

b) Develop capable ISF (includes 6 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), and 30 September 2005 (4x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

c) Neutralize AIF influence in Mosul IOT create a stability in the AOR until the ISF is capable of assuming control and set conditions for transition of Ninewa province to PIC in Phase IV.

d) Deny insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, Mosul and Tal Afar.

e) Disrupt AIF freedom of movement across borders IOT limit the resources and leadership necessary to the insurgency from reaching Mosul.

f) Establish a secure environment within Mosul by assisting the extension of local authority and increasing public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.

g) Exploit wedges between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.

h) Rebuild ISF capacity to control Mosul’s contested urban areas. Focus on reliable IPS.

i) Create supportive, neighborhood-based ‘civil defense’ and policing mechanisms.

j) Focus rewards program against incorrigible Salafists and Foreign Fighters.

k) Lower Coalition profile in COIN, specifically in urban areas, as soon as practical.

5) (S//REL) MND-CS
a) Continue to develop capable ISF through partnership NLT 30 September 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order.

b) Coordinate Babil PJCC Working Group IOT facilitate cross MSC coordination in the transition of Babil Province.

c) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish NIC in An Wassit, Qaddissiya, and S. Babil by 1 January 2006.

6) (S//REL) MND-SE

a) Continue to develop capable ISF (to include 4 BDEs) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), 30 September 2005 (2x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, maintain the rule of law, and facilitate transition to Iraqi Self Reliance.

b) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish Iraqi Self Reliance in Basrah, Muthanna, Thi-Qar, and Missan provinces by 1 January 2006.

7) (S//REL) MND-NE

a) Support reconstruction in the AOR IOT ensure economic and political conditions support transition of its AOR to PIC.

b) Maintain capable ISF (to include 1 Army Brigade) through partnership NLT 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

c) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish NIC by 1 January 2006, in Irbil.

8) (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP:

a) (S//REL) CJSOTF units remain TACON to MNC-I and provide mutual support to MSCs.

b) Assist Coalition Force Commanders with the development of ISF. Specifically, CJSOTF provides recommendations for “best practices” to assist with Coalition Force and MiTT training for use with ISF.

c) (S//REL) Priority of training during all phases of this operation: ISOF, ISF in critical locations (21 cities), and coalition MiTT cultural training.

d) (S//REL) BPT support Taji training academy ISO CF Transition Teams.
e) (S//REL) Establish mutual support with MSCs in assigned AOR in order to facilitate MNC-I MiTTS Implementation Strategy.

f) (S//REL) Continue to conduct targeting operations ICW MSCs.

g) (S//REL) Build tactical ISF targeting capability and Scout Platoons IOT allow the ISF to use their cultural and social capability to the maximum extent.

h) (S//REL) Support Combined / Joint Operations as required.

i) (S//REL) BPT provide sniper support to MSCs ISO ongoing operations.

j) (S//REL) BPT provide sniper support to MSCs ISO ongoing operations.

(v) (S//REL) Tasks ISO key effects.

1) (S//REL) MSCs:
   a) (S//REL) Develop ISF capability:
      i) T1: Support ISF with QRF and combined effects only as required
      ii) T2: Facilitate transition of AOs to National Iraqi control
      iii) T3: Transfer bases to Iraqi control
      iv) P: IOT enable ISF to conduct Framework operations and maintain domestic order across the region
      v) T1: Progressively transition bases of operation to Contingency Operating Bases
      vi) T2: Provide supporting effects as necessary
      vii) P: IOT preserve Iraq’s national security from external threats

   b) (S//REL) Conduct COIN:
      i) T1: Deny influence by AIF
      ii) T2: Clear AIF sanctuaries
      iii) T3: Progressively secure 18 Provinces
      iv) T4: Coordinate operations with ISF
      v) T5: Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate Actionable Intelligence
      vi) T4: BPT transition CAT B provinces
      vii) T6: Deny AIF support networks
     viii) T7: Support ISF as Required
      ix) P: IOT prevent AIF freedom of action

(vi)(U) Iraqi Security Forces.

1) (S//REL) Combined, their efforts are the Main Effort in local and provincial security. GIA:
a) (S//REL) Conduct Framework Operations / Transition to COIN (Main Effort):
   i) T1: Ensure Force Protection and limit influence by AIF
   ii) T2: Deny influence and freedom of action by AIF
   iii) T3: Clear AIF sanctuaries
   iv) T4: Progressively secure 18 Provinces
   v) T5: Deny AIF support networks
   vi) P: IOT prevent AIF freedom of action

b) (S//REL) GIA Development:
   i) T1: Receive control of battlespace
   ii) T2: Maintain partnership with Coalition units
   iii) T3: Coordinate / Integrate / Synchronize operations with other ISF and Coalition elements through JCCs and PJCCs
   iv) T4: Support IPS, DBE, and FPS as needed based on threat.
   v) T5: Command and Control operations within the battlespace
   vi) P: IOT maintain control of territories and Set conditions to establish National Iraqi Control
   vii) T1: Maintain embedded MiTT
   viii) T2: Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate Actionable Intelligence
   ix) T3: Establish level 3 and 4 support functions (BSU / RSU)
   x) T4: Maintain JCCs and PJCCs
   xi) T4: Conduct Division level C2
   l) P: IOT conduct Division Level Operations and Set conditions to conduct Independent COIN.
(d) (U) **Phase IV**

(i) (S//REL) **Transition Objectives. Iraqi Self Reliance.** Iraqi Self Reliance is defined as the conditions whereby the UNSCR 1546 political process is complete and Iraqi security forces and institutions are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain independent national security operations. ISF function under a national command and control structure that integrates cross-ministry counterinsurgency and national defense activities. Iraq’s national, provincial, and local government organizations function effectively, and are perceived as legitimate and representative of all Iraqis. Iraq’s government ministries also effectively manage reconstruction and economic development activities to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people. Additionally, ISF and Iraqi ministerial capabilities have increased to a level where insurgents and terrorists are denied safe-haven in Iraq. Under Iraqi Self reliance, ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent, full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations, and preserve the national security of Iraq without direct assistance from CF. CF handover national security responsibilities to the Iraqis, largely disengage from Iraq, and
assume a strategic overwatch posture. Remaining CF continue to work with Iraq’s government and security forces to establish cooperative security arrangements and support the GWOT.

(ii) (S//REL) Conditions: The following conditions are required to achieve the transition objective. As described the effects assessment process will integrate MSC feedback and assist the Commander’s decision making process.

1) (S//REL) ISF able to conduct and sustain independent COIN and national security operations without support from the Coalition and AIF Neutralized.

2) (S//REL) Rule of Law enforced with MOI/MOJ/COJ in the lead.

3) (S//REL) IPS ensures National Rule of Law maintained.

4) (S//REL) ISF ensures integrity of border maintained, internal as well as external threats mitigated.

5) (S//REL) Coalition forces in strategic overwatch by establishing over the horizon capability and COBs to facilitate continued cooperative security arrangements.

6) (S//REL) Bureaucratic structures and procedures capable of handling national to local administration and a functioning relationship between local through national agencies.

7) (S//REL) Ministries manage and ensure all basic services and needs are met.

8) (S//REL) Cross-ministerial functions operating effectively.

9) (S//REL) Iraqi Government linkage to local/regional infrastructure developed.

10) (S//REL) Continued creation of national financial system.

11) (S//REL) Progression continues for economic development.
    a) Essential services continue to expand.
    b) Economic benefits of production/distribution are realized.
    c) Alternatives are sought out to resolve problem areas.

12) (S//REL) Iraqi people perceive ISF providing national security and independently conducting COIN operations without CF assistance.
13) (S//REL) Iraqi people acknowledge local, regional, and national governments exist and are effectively linked.

14) (S//REL) Government of Iraq is perceived as present and functioning and its effectiveness is improving.

15) (S//REL) A majority of the Iraqi people perceive basic services and needs being met by local, provincial, and/or national government.

16) (S//REL) National government is perceived as responsive to local emergencies.

(iii)(U) Key effects for this phase

1) (S//REL) Effect 1A4 – ISF capable of independent COIN. Defined as Iraqi Security Forces organized, trained and equipped to plan, direct, conduct and sustain security operations. A Combined C2 structure is in place to execute national level COIN. ISF not dependent on CF to deal with insurgency.

2) (S//REL) Effect 1A5 – Iraqi Security Forces self-reliant. Defined as guaranteeing sovereignty of Iraq, increasing regional stability and denying sanctuary to terrorists. ISF capable of maintaining rule of law, denying sanctuary for terrorists, and defending against external threats.

3) (S//REL) Effect 1B4 – AIF marginalized. Defined as AIF irrelevant in the daily life of Iraqis, lacking credibility with the majority of the Iraqi population, unable to garner active or passive support from the population, and unable to disrupt essential services and the continued progress of the GOI.

4) (S//REL) Effect 1B5 – AIF neutralized. Defined as AIF operations ineffective and failing to influence population or progress of the UNSCR 1546 process. Ability to reconstitute limited and any threat to the GOI can be contained by the MOI.

5) (S//REL) Effect 2A6 – Iraqi institutions are responsive to public needs. Defined as national government is aware of, and responds to, public needs at a national level.

6) (S//REL) Effect 3B3 – Increased private and foreign investment. Defined as increased private and foreign investment in the Iraqi government and economy.

7) (S//REL) Effect 4A4 – Iraqi populace supports the GOI. Defined as greater than 50% of each major ethnic/religious groups believe that their
local, provincial and national governments are capable of making progress toward providing basic needs and essential services.

(iv)(S//REL) Tasks to subordinate units.

1) (S//REL) MNF-W (POE for Coalition Forces and Effects and ISF Resources)

   a) Develop and maintain capable ISF (includes 6 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (3x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

   b) BPT receive additional combat power (Coalition or ISF) during this phase IOT set conditions for transition to PIC of Al Anbar in Phase IV.

   c) Transition Al Anbar province to NIC.

   d) Exploit wedge between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.

   e) As required, risk along border areas is acceptable IOT focus capability toward areas of greater AIF activity.

   f) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish PIC in Al Anbar by 1 April 2006 and NIC in An Najaf and Karbala provinces by 1 January 2006.

   g) Support Iraqi provincial government and ISF IOT establish PIC in Al Anbar by January 2005 and NIC by 1 June 2006.

2) (S//REL) MND-B

   a) Continue development of capable ISFs (includes up to 9 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (6x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the domestic order, and set conditions for ISFs within Baghdad to assume control of the AOR which sets the conditions for Iraqi Self reliance and the Transition of the Force.

   b) Transition Baghdad to NIC in Phase IV.

   c) Assist as needed in secure Baghdad IOT sustain NIC.

   d) Establish a secure environment within Baghdad; assist the extension of local authority; increase public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.


3) (S//REL) MND-NC

a) Complete development of capable ISF (includes 5 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (1x BDE), 30 September 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establish domestic order, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

b) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, the Zaab region and Mosul IOT allow MNB-NW and MND-B to establish domestic order in Mosul and ensure stability in AOR.

c) Disrupt insurgent freedom of movement in, and between, Baqubah, Balad and Baghdad IOT support establishment of domestic order in Baghdad and ensure stability in AOR.

d) Assist ISF in securing key infrastructure and LOCs IOT prevent disruption of essential services in Baghdad and Mosul.

e) Contain AIF in key areas IOT prevent unrest that will divert resources away from MNB-B.


4) (S//REL) MNB-NW

a) Neutralizes AIF IOT prevent disruption of operations in Baghdad and Mosul.

b) Develop capable ISF (includes 6 Army Brigades) through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), and 30 September 2005 (4x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self Reliance and the Transition of the Force.

c) Neutralize AIF influence in Mosul IOT create a stability in the AOR until the ISF is capable of assuming control and set conditions for transition of Ninewa province to PIC in Phase IV.

d) Deny insurgent freedom of movement in, and between Mosul and Tal Afar.

e) Disrupt AIF freedom of movement across borders IOT limit the resources and leadership necessary to the insurgency from reaching Mosul.

f) Establish a secure environment within Mosul by assisting the extension of local authority and increasing public confidence in the durability of Iraq’s political transformation.
g) Exploit wedges between disparate insurgent groups and their supporters, employing positive and negative incentives.
h) Rebuild ISF capacity to control Mosul’s contested urban areas. Focus on reliable IPS.
i) Create supportive, neighborhood-based ‘civil defense’ and policing mechanisms.
j) Focus rewards program against incorrigible Salafists and Foreign Fighters.
k) Lower Coalition profile in COIN, specifically in urban areas, as soon as practical.

5) (S//REL) MND-CS

a) Continue to develop capable ISF through partnership NLT 30 September 2005 (3x BDE), and 31 December 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN and establish domestic order.
b) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish NIC in An Wassit, Qaddissiya, and S. Babil by 1 January 2006.

6) (S//REL) MND-SE

a) Continue to develop capable ISF through partnership NLT 30 June 2005 (2x BDE), and 30 September 2005 (2x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, maintain the rule of law, and facilitate transition to Iraqi Self Reliance.
b) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish NIC in Basrah, Muthanna, Thi-Qar, and Missan provinces by 1 January 2005.

7) (S//REL) MND-NE

a) Support reconstruction in the AOR IOT ensure economic and political conditions support transition of its AOR to PIC.
b) Maintain capable ISF (to include 1 Army Brigade) through partnership NLT 30 September 2005 (1x BDE), IOT allow ISF to assume the lead in COIN, establishing the rule of law, and allow ISFs in AOR to assume battlespace while setting the conditions for Iraqi Self reliance and the Transition of the Force.
c) Support Iraqi provincial governments and ISF IOT establish NIC in Irbil by 1 January 2006.

8) (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP:

a) (S//REL) CJSOTF units remain TACON to MNC-I and provide mutual support to MSCs.

b) Assist Coalition Force Commanders with the development of ISF. Specifically, CJSOTF provides recommendations for “best practices” to assist with Coalition Force and MiTT training for use with ISF.

c) (S//REL) Establish and maintain PSDs on the ITG (+) until relieved (NLT 15 AUG 05) IOT prevent disruption of the political process.

d) (S//REL) Priority of training during all phases of this operation: ISOF, ISF in critical locations (21 cities), and coalition MiTT cultural training.

e) (S//REL) BPT support Taji training academy ISO CF Transition Teams.

f) (S//REL) Establish mutual support with MSCs in assigned AOR in order to facilitate MNC-I MiTTS Implementation Strategy.

g) (S//REL) Continue to conduct targeting operations ICW MSCs.

h) (S//REL) Build tactical ISF targeting capability and Scout Platoons IOT allow the ISF to use their cultural and social capability to the maximum extent.

i) (S//REL) Support Combined / Joint Operations as required.

j) (S//REL) BPT provide sniper support to MSCs ISO ongoing operations.

(v) (U) Tasks ISO key effects.

1) (U) MSCs: Supporting Effort

a) (S//REL) Develop ISF capability:
   i) T1: Transition forces to and operate from Contingency Operating Bases.
   ii) T2: Provide supporting effects as necessary
   iii) T3: BPT transition the force to over the horizon support
   iv) P: IOT preserve Iraq’s national security from external threats
v) T1: BPT reinforce IG
vi) P: IOT preserve Iraq’s national security

b) (S//REL) Conduct Stability and Support Operations
   i) T1: Support ISF as Required from Contingency Operating Bases
   ii) T2: Coordinate operations with ISF as required
   iii) P: IOT prevent AIF freedom of action

viii. (U) Iraqi Security Forces.

2) (U) GIA:

a) (S//REL) Leads COIN Operations –Conduct Framework Operations (Main Effort):
   i) T1: Ensure Force Protection and limit influence by AIF
   ii) T2: Neutralize influence by AIF and support networks
   iii) T3: Isolate Insurgents from populace
   iv) T4: Transition control of 18 Provinces to MOI
   v) T6: Coordinate operations with MOD, MOI, and IAG
   vi) T7: Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate Actionable Intelligence
   vii) T8: Sustain ISF Forces
   viii) P: IOT prevent AIF passive and active support from the population

b) (S//REL) GIA Development:
   i) T1: Maintain embedded MiTT
   ii) T2: Coordinate / Integrate / Synchronize operations with other ISF and Coalition elements through JCCs and PJCCs
   iii) T3: Maintain level 3 and 4 support functions (BSU / RSU)
   iv) T4: Maintain JCCs and PJCCs
   v) T5: Support IPS, DBE, and FPS as needed based on threat.
   vi) T6: Exercise National level military C2 against the insurgency
   vii) P: IOT conduct Division Level Operations and Set conditions to assume self reliance.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) This OPORD is effective for execution on issue.

(2) (S//REL) CCIR.

   (a) (S//REL) PIR#1 - Who is coordinating, directing, and facilitating attacks against MNC-I, the Iraqi Government, critical infrastructure, and the Iraqi people? Where are they located?
   (b) (S//REL) PIR#2 - Where and when will the insurgents direct and facilitate attacks against MNC-I, the Iraqi Government, critical infrastructure, and the Iraqi people?
(c) (S//REL) PIR#3 - How will the insurgents maintain freedom of action IOT conduct and facilitate operations?
(d) (S//REL) PIR#4 - How will the insurgents use the informational environment to influence the Iraqi Government, Coalition Forces, and the Iraqi population?
(e) (S//REL) PIR#5 - Where, when, and by what method will the insurgents attempt to disrupt the Iraqi Constitutional Development Process?
(f) (S//REL) PIR#6 - In which key cities/provinces do the insurgents pose a significant threat to the transition of authority to Iraqi Provincial control?
(g) (S//REL) PIR#7 - Who and where are the key technicians and facilitators that are building and resourcing IEDs and VBIEDs?
(h) (S//REL) FFIR#1 – Will there be any delay in Fielding MiTTs?
(i) (S//REL) FFIR#2 – Where are delays in fielding MiTTs?
(j) (S//REL) FFIR#3 – Will there be any delays in Partnerships?
(k) (S//REL) FFIR#4 – Where are delays in Coalition Basing Plan?
(l) (S//REL) FFIR#5 – Where are delays in ISF Basing Plan?
(m) (S//REL) EEFI#1 – Where will lack of Coalition presence create a security risk?
(n) (S//REL) EEFI#2 – Are there critical shortages in Manning, equipping, training, or leadership within an ISF unit?

(3) (S//REL) OPRES planning priorities are to the following areas of operation:
   (a) Mosul
   (b) Salman Pak
   (c) Zaaab Triangle
   (d) Baqubah
   (e) Northwest Wassit Province
   (f) Ramadi

(4) (S//REL) Provincial transition Stay Behind Force requirements: Upon transition of battlespace to the ISF, Commanders will BPT reduce their force presence in these areas. Until the requirement for MiTTs end and ISF units are capable of independent operations there will continue to be Force Protection and Sustainment requirements on Coalition Forces. Based on the threat environment, expanded areas of operation, and resource requirements, MNDs will recommend the minimum size, type and capabilities required to meet these functional requirements. Commander MNC-I approves recommendations ISO these requirements.

(5) (S//REL) MSCs will set conditions to allow reintroduction of NGOs/PVOs IOT allow the continued development of Iraqi infrastructure and provision of essential services.

(6) (S//REL) In key areas with Majority Sunni populations, Commanders will facilitate dialogue on: federalism, provincial governance, distributing common economic goods, political consensus building, religious tolerance, constitutional protections, and the role of the Shari’a in law and government among different groups. Simple town hall type meetings can facilitate these kinds of actions.
(7) As P3 develops BPT partner with the police at the operational level (Provincial HQs - P3) and specifically at the tactical level by reconstituting the failed city Police forces of Fallujah, Samarra, Mosul and areas of Baghdad, and other designated cities and provinces. This partnership will also build capability across the staffing functions 1-9, to facilitate communication and to provide counterinsurgency training and access to coalition Quick Reaction Forces (QRF). The P3 (P) Teams will, in addition, coordinate and direct MSC/IPLO support at the District and Station level and oversee the development of the Provincial Joint Control Centers (PJCC). See ANNEX C, Appendix 1, Tab C for initial concepts under development.

(8) Priority of effort for Department of Border Enforcement units and support provided to these units is to MNB-NW, MNF-W, followed by MND-NC, CS, and SE. DBE POE does not follow the POE for ISF Resources.

(9) (S//REL) Establish a framework/ground rules for recognition of SA-affiliated militias likely to develop as insurgents are driven above ground.

(10) (S//REL) Embed credible SA media in the reenergized reconstruction / rehabilitation efforts in targeted SA urban areas.

(11) (S//REL) Submit reports as directed in the Command Policy and Procedures and Annex R (Reports) to this OPORD.

(12) (S//REL) Ensure mechanisms in place to share actionable target data with SOF and adjacent MSCs to facilitate intelligence driven operations.

(13) (S//REL) Upon receipt of the MNC-I FRAGO directing implementation of the P3 concept, each Major Subordinate Command is to form a P3 Province (P3-P) assistance team for each Province within their AOR. Depending upon the MSC assessment; some Provinces may require more than one P3 Team.

(14) (S//REL) MSCs will coordinate with this HQ to schedule MSC Backbriefs with the Commander, MNC-I. Backbriefs should be completed by 28 April.

4. (U) **Administration and Logistics.**

   a. (U) Concept of Support.

   (1) (S//REL) MNC-I provides logistics support and services to sustain joint and coalition forces in building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capability and transitioning COIN to ISF. US Forces and other Coalition Forces (CF) are supported by their respective nations’ resources and mutual support agreements along with Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) which mitigate logistical shortfalls within the theater of operations. MNC-I leverages coalition logistics and integrates national logistics providers. Coalition Forces’ logistics systems will provide “coaching, teaching and mentorship” to the ISF in order to transition them to the provision of their own support vice a dependency upon Coalition Support. MNC-I establishes essential
services and assists in the development of ISF sustainment capability in order to transition to national Iraqi control and strategic overwatch. MNC-I’s intent is to increase contractor support in permissive/protected sites in order to reduce the logistic footprint. MNC-I will continue to provide support to Coalition Forces from Contingency Operating Bases (COBs), otherwise known as the GS Hubs. CF logistics systems will encounter large requirements as we provide limited backstop for Iraqi Forces as their logistics structure is designed and trained.

(2) (S//REL) In order to achieve CG MNC-I’s aim, rapid development of ISF Logistics capability is required. To this end, MNC-I will strive to institute a “Self-Sustainment Model” (Tab 1 to Appendix 1 of Annex D). To do this MNC-I will undertake a “Seed Program” whereby units considered to be the main effort will be prioritized for resources, thus providing them with the capability to perform limited self-sustainment. Essentially, units will be resourced with transport type vehicles to start to build an “ad-hoc” 1st Line system within their Partner ISF Units, thus allowing the ISF the ability to undertake limited self-sustainment. Concurrently with the “Seed Program”, MNC-I will work with MNF-I and MNSTC-I in the institutional development of the ISF. This will be done through a combination of ISF Units attending the CSS School, MSC Partnership with ISF Logistics Units and Base Support Units, and the prioritized standup of BSUs in the easiest to hardest regions to transition. ISF Logistics units will be stood up in areas with the lowest threat in order to establish the logistics foundation in the country.

b. (U) Logistics.

(1) (S//REL) Coalition Logistics support will be provided through a combination of tactical logistics and contracted service support throughout the theater of operations ISO partnership and COIN operations. Priority of support will initially be to CF involved in COIN operations and ISF prioritized Brigades 1 through 27.

(2) (S//REL) ISF Logistics support will be a combination of contractors and ISF, with CF “coaching, teaching, and mentoring” through the partnership program. ISF logistics is in its infancy. ISF Logistics is discussed in more detail in Annex D, but in general, the ISF Logistics system will be based on four lines of support, agreed to by the Ministry of Defense (MOD), as its doctrinal foundation:

(a) (U) 1st Line: Organic to unit (e.g.: Inf BN HQ and Services Company (HQ&S Company).
(b) (U) 2nd Line: Organic to, or in direct support of, a unit (BDE Logistics Companies)
(c) (U) 3rd Line: General Support (provided by Base Support Units and Regional Base Support Units - - BSUs).
(d) (U) Provision for a military 3rd Line Logistics capability for specialist CSS.
(e) (U) 4th Line: Depot Support (Tadji as the national depot for maintenance and stockholding).
(3) (S//REL) Phase I. Implement Transition Team Concept. Logistics focus will be on equipping transition teams and posturing of logistics assets to facilitate support to transition teams and partnered coalition forces. In conjunction with the MoD, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I assist in initiating build-up of ISF sustainment capability at the 1st and 3rd/4th Line support levels commencing with ISF AORs that are considered to be the easiest to hardest, in that order, to transition to full ISF control. Concurrent to this effort, ISF units in the MNB-NW, MND-B, and MNF-W will have unit 1st Line capability enhanced with the addition of cargo vehicles to be used in a unit replenishment role..

(4) (S//REL) Phase II. Provincial Iraqi Control. Priority of support remains MNB-NW, MND-B, and MNF-W. ISF Units continue the build up of sustainment capability at the 1st and 3rd/4th line. Shift CF CSS assets as required IOT support maneuver forces as they are reorganized/re-missioned and COIN operations are transitioned to ISF in areas where provincial control is achieved.

(5) (S//REL) Phase III. National Iraqi Control (Division Control). Priority of support remains with MNB-NW, MND-B, and MNF-W ISF Units continue to the build-up of sustainment capability at all levels (1st through 4th line) IOT support the ME. MNC-I will support the redeployment of outbound coalition forces and RSO of inbound coalition forces. MNC-I will sustain coalition forces based at Contingency Operating Bases (COB(s)) located in Endurance (Q-West) or Irbil, Balad, Al Asad, and Tallil.

(6) (S//REL) Phase IV. Iraqi Self-reliance. A reduced CSS force structure will sustain remaining elements of coalition forces operating out of enduring COB(s) while transitioning to strategic overwatch. Transition teams will be sustained by a combination of a reduced/tailored CSS force along with contracting support. ISF will be capable of sustaining themselves from the national/international base through to consuming units and soldiers. 1st through 4th line support will be developed sufficiently to sustain independent brigade and division level operations within Iraq.

c. (S//REL) Personnel. MNC-I PSS units establish essential services and assists in the development of ISF sustainment capability in order to transition to national Iraqi control and strategic overwatch. Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate tasking. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements).

5. (U) **Command and Control.**

a. (S//REL) Command. The Commanding General of MNC-I is the commander of all ground component Coalition Forces in Iraq. MNC-I reports to MNF-I. ROE will
remain a matter for individual nations within the Coalition. MNC-I will be commanded by the CG based at Camp Victory.

b. (S/REL) MNC-I Task Organization. Coalition Ground Component Forces in Iraq are OPCON or TACON for operations to MNC-I.

![MNC-I Task Organization Diagram]

Fig 22. (S/REL) MNC-I Task Organization

c. (S/REL) The MNC-I - ISF Command Relationships. MNC-I will establish at Corps, Division, Brigade, and Battalion levels an advise and support (partnering) relationship with aligned Iraqi Army units. Iraqi Army units will maintain an ADCON relationship through the Iraqi Army chain of command while establishing an OPCON or later on, a TACON relationship with their respective partnered coalition unit (per MOU between MNC-I and Iraqi MOD/DOI). MNC-I will coordinate with MNSTC-I for the organization, training, equipping, basing and other issues concerning the Transition Teams. The IAG(P) will be established, initially under MNC-I, to coordinate RSOC of Transition Teams between MNC-I and MNSTC-I. The IAG(P) will provide administrative support and coordinate sourcing, equipping, training and policy development for Transition Teams. MiTTS and BTTs will be attached to a coalition partner at the Division, Brigade or Battalion level. They will provide partnered Iraqi Army and Border units training, coaching, mentoring and access to coalition effects. Special Police Transition Teams (SPTT) are OPCON to MNSTC-I (CPATT) but will be TACON to MNC-I during operations. These teams will provide training, coaching, mentoring and access to coalition effects to their respective Special Police units.
d. The attached diagram illustrates the MNC-I – ISF command relationships:

![MNC-I – ISF Command Relationships Diagram](image)

**Fig 22. (S//REL) MNC-I - ISF Command Relationships**

e. (S//REL) Succession. CG, DCG (UK), DCG (IT), DCG (US)

f. (S//REL) Control. MNC-I will conduct coalition coordination and command through CENTRIXS. Presently, CENTRIXS only exists at the MND/B level and has not been extended to the brigades. Signal teams are being dispatched to install CENTRIXS at the brigade level, and all brigades will have CENTRIXS access by the end of OIF 04-06. The Iraqi Assistance Group (Provisional) will conduct administration and coordination of the Transition Teams over CENTRIXS and NIPR data networks. Communications with Division level Transition Teams will be over single channel secure radio and CENTRIXS/SG01 data networks. Communications from the Division level teams and below will be single channel secure communications. The Iraqi Army Headquarters will conduct administration and coordination via Iraqi Government and Coalition NIPR networks.
Acknowledge:

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
C3, Multi-National Corps – Iraq

Approved for Release
KEY DEFINITIONS:

**Partnership** is a personal one on one relationship between Coalition Force Divisions, Brigades and Battalion Commanders with one or more Iraqi formations of a similar echelon. Partnership is similar to a Command/Support relationship.

**Local Iraqi Control:** Local control is judged on a province by province basis, and is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security organizations maintain internal security with coalition support, and can plan, direct and conduct security operations at the platoon/station level. Local coalition reaction forces are established to assist ISF in contingency situations.

**Provincial Iraqi Control:** Provincial Iraqi Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby local and provincial Iraqi security forces are sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain security operations at the brigade/provincial level. Command and control structures are functioning, and Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions at the local/provincial level. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF are increased to a level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of anti-Iraqi forces. Under Provincial Iraqi Control, ISF can maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment, assert territorial control through framework operations, and conduct independent counterinsurgency operations enabled by coalition support. Coalition forces reduce unilateral operations, increase joint operations, are postured to deliver regional supporting effects to Iraqi security organizations, and are prepared to defeat external threats and preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity.

**National Iraqi Control:** National Iraqi Control is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security forces are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations. Iraq’s national, provincial, and local government organizations are effectively linked, with ministries that can deploy and support integrated and complementary security operations throughout the country. A combined Coalition-Iraqi command and control structure is in place to plan and execute national level counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF have increased to a level where the Coalition supports only as needed. Under National Iraqi Control, ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent framework and counterinsurgency operations, preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity, and deter threats to the national security of Iraq with Coalition support in extremis. Coalition forces assist Iraqi operations as needed, remain postured to deliver supporting effects to the ISF when requested, and progressively transition national security responsibilities to the Iraqis.

**Iraqi Self-Reliance:** Iraqi Self-Reliance is defined as the conditions whereby the UNSCR 1546 political process is complete and Iraqi security forces and institutions are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain independent national security operations. ISF function under a national command and control structure that integrates cross-ministry counterinsurgency and national defense activities. Iraq’s national, provincial, and local government organizations function effectively, and are perceived as legitimate and representative of all Iraqis. Iraq’s government ministries also effectively manage reconstruction and economic development activities to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people. Additionally, ISF and Iraqi ministerial capabilities have increased to a level where insurgents and terrorists are denied safe-
haven in Iraq. Under Iraqi Self-Reliance, ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent, full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations, and preserve the national security of Iraq without direct assistance from Coalition forces. Coalition forces handover national security responsibilities to the Iraqis, largely disengage from Iraq, and assume a strategic overwatch posture. Remaining Coalition forces continue to work with Iraq’s government and security forces to establish cooperative security arrangements and support the GWOT.

**ISF Capable of Independent COIN:** Defined as Iraqi Security Forces organized, trained and equipped to plan, direct, conduct and sustain security operations. A Combined C2 structure is in place to execute national level COIN ISF not dependent on CF to deal with the insurgency.

**Domestic Order:** Make and enforce all reasonable laws and regulations necessary to the maintenance, upbuilding and advancement of public welfare and protection of public interests. It restrains individuals from transgressing the rights of others, and restrains them in their conduct so far as is necessary to protect the rights of all. Individuals are bound to conform their behavior to the rules of decency, respectability and inoffensive in their daily lives.

**Rule of Law:** “Principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State of Iraq itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated.”

**Secure:** To gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.

**Neutralize:** To render ineffective or unusable. To render the enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operations.

**Contain:** To stop, hold, or surround the forces of the enemy or to cause the enemy to center activity on a given front and to prevent the withdrawal of any part of the enemy’s forces elsewhere.

**Disrupt:** A tactical effect that integrates effects planning to break apart an enemy’s tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable or cause premature commitment of enemy forces, or the piecemealing of his attack.

**KEY ACRONYMS:**

- **AIF:** Anti-Iraqi Forces
- **SAR:** Sunni Arab Rejectionists
- **FRE:** Former Regime Elements
- **AMZ:** Abu Musab Al- Zarqawi
ISF: Iraqi Security Force

GIA: Greater Iraqi Army (includes RA, IIF, and IA formerly ING: Iraqi National Guard)

IPS: Iraqi Police Service

DBE: Department of Border Enforcement

FPS: Facilities Protection Services

IOC (MiTT): Initial Operational Capability (Military Transition Team) 1 April 05

FOC (MiTT): Fully Operational Capability (Military Transition Team) 1 July 05

IOC (MNSTC-I): Initial Operational Capability

FOC (MNSTC-I): Fully Operational Capability

CAT (A-C): Provincial Categories A through C:

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