STAFF SUMMARY

TO: CG
FROM: CJTF

DATE: 25-Feb-04
ACT OFF:

SUBJECT: Update of Consolidating the Security Line of Operations
- The Rumsfeld Memo, 20 Feb 2004

ISSUE/PURPOSE: To gain decisions from the CG to begin implementation and issuance of warning orders

BACKGROUND: Rumsfeld memo consolidates security line of operations under CENTCOM. We expect FRAGO from CENTCOM that will delegate that responsibility to CJTF. CJTF must be ready to assume this mission NLT 15 March 2004

COORDINATION: CENTCOM

ISSUE/CONCERNS: New Mission Statement for CJTF. Organizational Changes with OSC; Warning Order to MSCs; Implementation of Police Working Group Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: Approve recommendations on Slide # 16

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: Powerpoint briefing

REMARKS:

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COMMENTS: C = CONCUR; NC = NONCONCUR.
Consolidating the Security Line of Operation

UPDATE

SYRIAN DESERT

KUWAIT

AL HAJARAH

AL KHAJAH

An Nasiriyah

An Najaf

Kadhimiya

Kufa

This briefing is classified
SECRET
REL: MGFI
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: X1

25 Feb 2004

We will not falter – We will not fail
SITUATION UPDATE

- Police Working Group
- CENTCOM Way Ahead
- OSC Structure
- Analysis of Rumsfeld Memo
- Recommendations

We will not falter – We will not fail
POLICE WORKING GROUP

BG Mackay is off to fast start
- Visiting 3 of 6 MSCs by Saturday
- Getting input from MSCs for prioritization
- Conference on Saturday with MSCs, CJTF, PMO, and MoI
- Supported by CJTF and PMO staff to "jump start" processes
- Expected to produce recommendations that will accelerate training and accelerate disbursement of supplemental funding
- Terms of Reference call for decision brief NLT 5 March
CENTCOM WAY AHEAD

CENTCOM is working Rumsfeld 20 Feb Memo in order to issue FRAGO:

- Direct CJTF[1.4a] to adjust mission statement to include developing Iraqi Security Forces
- Delegates authority for manning, training, and equipping ISF to CJTF[1.4a] and MNC-I
  - Assume mission NLT 15 March
  - Leverage CMATT structure to standup CPATT/OSC
- Delegates OPCON OF ICDC and IAF forces to CJTF[1.4a]
- Directs establishment of mechanism to coordinate with police and assume TACON of police only as warranted
- Delegates OPCON of CMATT to CJTF[1.4a]
- Delegates authority to prioritize and resource for all ISF to CJTF-7
- CENTCOM retains final authority for certification of ISF forces, but CJTF-1[4a] will develop the certification process NLT 15 April
SITUATION UPDATE

- OSC Structure
- Analysis of Rumsfeld Memo
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COURSES OF ACTION
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, OSC

COA A - Deputy, OSC

US Emb

MOD

1. Management

DCG

MOI

2. Policy

COA B - Director, Police Cooperation

US Emb

MOD

1. DCG, MOI

2. Policy

3. Management

COA C - Senior Advisor

US Emb

MOD

1. Management

2. Policy

3. Management

Guiding Principles

1. DCG is dual-hatted as CDR, OSC
   - 3-Star Commander to designate importance of task
   - Complimentary to DCG role (Embassy Based)

2. Combines resources, program management, and policy support for OSC under the Commander
   - Allows commander to prioritize resources
   - Economies of scale and effort for back office support

3. COAs vary on Police Coordination Directorate
   - All three COAs have roughly the same JMD

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COURSES OF ACTION
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, OSC

**COA A**
- Senior Advisor to Mol is dual-hatted as Deputy, OSC for Domestic Security
- Police Cooperation Directorate reports directly to Cdr, OSC
- Clean chain of command within OSC – Unity of Effort
- Gives Sr Adv to Mol direct influence within OSC – civilian influence at the top of OSC
- May not be enough direct civilian control for some

Acceptable

**COA B**
- Senior Advisor to Mol is dual-hatted as Director, Police Cooperation
- As Director, Police Cooperation, he reports to Cdr, OSC
- As Sr Adv to Mol reports to CPA
- Direct Civilian Control of Police Cooperation Directorate under the Cdr, OSC
- Police Cooperation Directorate answers to two masters – OSC and CPA

Not Recommended

**COA C**
- Police Cooperation Director is dual-hatted and reports to both Cdr, OSC and Sr Advisor to Mol
- Sr Advisor to Mol has direct link to execution
- Hybrid of COA A & COA B
- Police Coordination Directorate reports to both OSC and CPA
- Allows Sr Adv to Mol to have direct policy input
- May impede unity of effort

Acceptable
COAs FOR PHYSICAL LOCATION FOR OSC

- In the short run, prior to 15 April, everyone stays where they are

- During the MNC-I reorganization, OSC begins relocation:
  - **Camp Victory**: Small Coordination Office within MNC-I
  - **Presidential Palace**: Cdr, OSC; Resource and Program Mnlt
    Office, Policy Support, and small plgitfs from Military and Police
    Coordination Directorates
  - **MoD HQ, Green Zone**: Military Coordination Directorate
  - **MoI HQ, Green Zone**: Police Coordination Directorate
SITUATION UPDATE

- Analysis of Rumsfeld Memo
- Recommendations
The ISF Memo – 20 Feb 2004

Para 1: The Cdr, MNF will give highest priority to standing up capable ISF... This priority will be reflected in MNF guidance and mission statements.

Recommendation: That the revised CJTF mission statement be issued

PROPOSED REVISED MISSION FOR CJTF

Conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining non-compliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in the AO in order to create a secure environment in direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Develop credible and capable Iraqi Security Forces in order to accelerate the transition of security from Coalition Forces to Iraqi Forces. Concurrently conduct stability operations to support the establishment of government, the restoration of essential services, and economic development in order to set the conditions for transfer of sovereignty and operations to designated follow on military or civilian authorities.

Changing the mission statement signals a strategic shift
Para 2: USCENTCOM, in coordination with CPA, is responsible for organizing, equipping, and training ISF (IAF, ICDC, IPS, FPS, DBE)

- CJTF[4] Expect CENTCOM to delegate this authority to CJTF[4] BG Mackay continues to lead the working group.
- Recommendation:
  - Form a provisional OSC to assume this mission NLT 15 March.
  - CENTCOM make CMATT OPCON to CJTF[4] immediately, so we can leverage its capabilities

Provisional OSC

- SecDef letter states "promptly" – CENTCOM interprets that as 15 March
- Belief that waiting until 15 April may lose momentum
- CMATT would split into Provisional OSC and a Military Training Team
- Can leverage MoI, CMATT, and CENTCOM assets to stand up team immediately
- Will allow the successful implementation of the Police Working Group
- Provisional OSC Cdr: DCG, CJTF[4] (CPA) MG Figgures
The ISF Memo – 20 Feb 2004

Para 3: CDR, CENTCOM is assigned OPCON over employment of ICDC and IAF.

- CJTF-144 We expect CENTCOM to officially make these forces OPCON to CJTF-144
- Recommendation: Formally pass OPCON of these forces to MSCs

Para 4: IPS will report to Mol. CDR, MNF will establish a mechanism for close coordination.

- CJTF-144 Immediate solution are JCCs. Longer term, we must prioritize the development of the Mol operation centers so that Mol can exercise control from the national and provincial level.
- Recommendation: That CJTF-144, upon formally assuming responsibility, prioritize the development of these permanent operation centers
**The ISF Memo – 20 Feb 2004**

- **Para 5:** The IAF is organized to defend Iraq's territory and sovereignty. The IAF should also be available to assist ICDC, FPS, and IPS
  - CJTF\textsuperscript{44} No Change
  - Recommendation: No Change

- **Para 6:** ICDC will be a separate service to support the police and defend against internal threats. Permanent decisions pertaining to IAF reserve are deferred.
  - CJTF\textsuperscript{44}: Alters the current plan that called them IAF Reserves, but in practicality has no impact in our employment or development
  - Recommendation: No change

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The ISF Memo – 20 Feb 2004

■ Para 7: Resources are aligned with responsibility. Determination and prioritization of all funding and resources for all ISF will be transferred from CPA to CENTCOM promptly. Operational Control of CMATT will transfer to CENTCOM. IPS and ICDC should receive resourcing priority
  ■ CJTF\[1,4\]: Expect CENTCOM to delegate this authority to CJTF\[4,4\]. Will allow us to move resources to where they are operationally needed; may be funding or may just be delivery of equipment.
  ■ Recommendation: Task Police working group to examine options for leveraging all security line of operation assets

■ Para 8: CENTCOM will certify readiness of ISF upon completion of training. This certification will be a factor in determining Post-OIF II structure
  ■ CJTF\[4,4\]: CENTCOM will task CJTF\[4,4\] to develop a certification program, however, CENTCOM may retain final certification authority
  ■ Recommendation: Part of OSC mission will be to develop certification program

■ Para 9: No impact – statement of DoD and DoS arrangement
WHAT HAS CHANGED

Revised CG Guidance for Security Transition

I am willing to accept increased risk in order to accelerate the Security Transition Plan, with a priority on obtaining Local Control Conditions as soon as possible.

Shift in Responsibility

CJTF-14a is responsible for the development of credible and capable Iraqi Security Forces, in coordination with CPA.

Shift in Resource Prioritization

CJTF-14a is able to prioritize and control the resources required to develop Iraqi Security Forces.

Accelerate the development of credible and capable internal security forces in order to support the Security Transition program.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Police Working Group:**
  - If time permits, CG make remarks at Police Working Group Conference on Saturday (Adnon Palace)
  - Await results of Police Working Group on 5 March before making prioritization and resource changes

- **OSC Organization:**
  - DCG (Embassy Support) dual-hatted as OSC Commander
  - Approval to begin JMD development using COA A (Sr Advisor as Deputy OSC for Domestic Security) as the baseline – can adjust later if COA C is chosen

- **Warning Order:**
  - Approve the release of a Warning Order with a new draft Mission Statement, expectation of forming a provisional OSC, and possible prioritization changes (IPS, ICDC, etc)
  - Approve provisional OSC construct with DCG (CPA Support) MG Figgers as commander

- **Formal FRAGO:** Wait until decision brief from Police Working Group (5 March) to issue formal FRAGO. FRAGO will officially change the mission, implement police working group decisions, change task organization for OSC, and make other changes as appropriate
COA A – Deputy OSC

MOD

Sr. Adv.

US Emb

DCCG, MNC-I
Cdr, OSC

Dual Hatted

MOI

Sr. Adv. Mol

Dep. OSC, MNC-I

Dual Hatted

Military

Policy

Management

Police

Police

Sr. Adv, CPA

Dual Hatted

Security Way Ahead v7b – 25 Feb 2004

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
COA C – Senior Advisor

US Emb

MOD

Sr Adv

MNC I

DCG

MOI

Military

Policy

Management

Police

Dual Hatted
DCG, MNC-I
Cdr, OSC

Dual Hatted
Police Cooperation
Mol & OSC